Pub Date : 2022-02-17DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2033818
Nicole Rathgeb
ABSTRACT In the last decade, various analyses of beliefs in terms of dispositions have been advanced. One principled objection against dispositional accounts of belief is that they cannot accommodate first-person authority. While people can infallibly state their beliefs without the need for any kind of evidence, their assertions about their dispositions are fallible and in need of evidential support. Hence, the argument goes, beliefs are not the same thing as dispositions. In this paper, I defend a linguistic version of dispositionalism against this objection, namely the thesis that the belief that p is the disposition to answer the question whether p in the affirmative. I offer a detailed account of first-person authority with regard to belief, and argue that linguistic dispositionalism can account for first-person authority. Further, I discuss the appeal of dispositionalism, argue that it is a mistake to understand first-person authority primarily as a matter of privileged (epistemic) access, and explain the importance of the distinction between self-ascriptions and manifestations of beliefs and dispositions.
{"title":"How would you answer this question? Can dispositional analyses of belief account for first-person authority?","authors":"Nicole Rathgeb","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2033818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2033818","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the last decade, various analyses of beliefs in terms of dispositions have been advanced. One principled objection against dispositional accounts of belief is that they cannot accommodate first-person authority. While people can infallibly state their beliefs without the need for any kind of evidence, their assertions about their dispositions are fallible and in need of evidential support. Hence, the argument goes, beliefs are not the same thing as dispositions. In this paper, I defend a linguistic version of dispositionalism against this objection, namely the thesis that the belief that p is the disposition to answer the question whether p in the affirmative. I offer a detailed account of first-person authority with regard to belief, and argue that linguistic dispositionalism can account for first-person authority. Further, I discuss the appeal of dispositionalism, argue that it is a mistake to understand first-person authority primarily as a matter of privileged (epistemic) access, and explain the importance of the distinction between self-ascriptions and manifestations of beliefs and dispositions.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45722926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-10DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2022.2033819
E. Coffman
ABSTRACT Say that a ‘practical decision’ is a momentary intentional mental action of intention formation. According to what I’ll call the ‘Decisional Prior Intention Thesis’ (‘DPIT’), each practical decision is intentional at least partly in virtue of the representational content of some previously acquired intention. DPIT is entailed by the following widely endorsed thesis that I’ll call the ‘General Prior Intention Thesis’ (‘GPIT’): each intentional action is intentional at least partly in virtue of the representational content of some previously acquired intention. Alfred Mele argues that a certain kind of case impugns DPIT. I defend DPIT from Mele’s argument by showing that his focal case is impossible. I then develop a new argument for an important portion of DPIT – viz., the thesis that, necessarily, if at t you decide to A, then just before t you have an intention whose representational content enables it to play an intentionality-grounding role relative to an act of deciding to A. The defense of DPIT and argument for the indicated portion of it jointly foreground and shed new light on the phenomenon of practical unsettledness – i.e. the felt unsettledness about what to do that precedes a practical decision.
{"title":"Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions","authors":"E. Coffman","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2022.2033819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2033819","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Say that a ‘practical decision’ is a momentary intentional mental action of intention formation. According to what I’ll call the ‘Decisional Prior Intention Thesis’ (‘DPIT’), each practical decision is intentional at least partly in virtue of the representational content of some previously acquired intention. DPIT is entailed by the following widely endorsed thesis that I’ll call the ‘General Prior Intention Thesis’ (‘GPIT’): each intentional action is intentional at least partly in virtue of the representational content of some previously acquired intention. Alfred Mele argues that a certain kind of case impugns DPIT. I defend DPIT from Mele’s argument by showing that his focal case is impossible. I then develop a new argument for an important portion of DPIT – viz., the thesis that, necessarily, if at t you decide to A, then just before t you have an intention whose representational content enables it to play an intentionality-grounding role relative to an act of deciding to A. The defense of DPIT and argument for the indicated portion of it jointly foreground and shed new light on the phenomenon of practical unsettledness – i.e. the felt unsettledness about what to do that precedes a practical decision.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43975719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-07DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.2021275
Hagit Benbaji
ABSTRACT Are kind properties (e.g. being a eucalyptus tree) presented to us in visual experience? I propose an account of kind recognition that incorporates two conflicting intuitions: (1) Kind properties are not presented in the content of visual experience, (2) the application of kind concepts affects the phenomenology of experience. The conjunction of these claims seems puzzling only given the uniformity assumption that dominates theories of experience, according to which experience presents all properties in the same way: either by representing them (‘the content view’) or through acquaintance with the object that instantiates them (‘the object view’). I have developed a hybrid account, according to which experience has sensory content (i.e. of colors and shapes), but is also an acquaintance with objects that are recognized as instantiating kind properties. The motivation for the hybrid account is that it can preserve the conflicting intuitions in a way that shows them to be essential to a proper account of perceptual reason and perceptual knowledge.
{"title":"Why (getting) the phenomenology of recognition (right) matters for epistemology","authors":"Hagit Benbaji","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.2021275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.2021275","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Are kind properties (e.g. being a eucalyptus tree) presented to us in visual experience? I propose an account of kind recognition that incorporates two conflicting intuitions: (1) Kind properties are not presented in the content of visual experience, (2) the application of kind concepts affects the phenomenology of experience. The conjunction of these claims seems puzzling only given the uniformity assumption that dominates theories of experience, according to which experience presents all properties in the same way: either by representing them (‘the content view’) or through acquaintance with the object that instantiates them (‘the object view’). I have developed a hybrid account, according to which experience has sensory content (i.e. of colors and shapes), but is also an acquaintance with objects that are recognized as instantiating kind properties. The motivation for the hybrid account is that it can preserve the conflicting intuitions in a way that shows them to be essential to a proper account of perceptual reason and perceptual knowledge.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49570302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-17DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.2009547
R. Keller
ABSTRACT According to a leading view, emotions such as admiration, contempt, pride, and shame are important vehicles of agential development. Through admiration and contempt, we establish models and countermodels against which to shape our character; through pride and shame, we get a sense of how we measure up to them. Critics of this view object that these emotions always deliver uncompromising evaluations: admiration casts people in a completely positive light, while contempt casts aspersion on them. Therefore, insofar as they lack the capacity for nuance, these emotions are systematically unfitting and misleading. This paper discusses this objection as originally formulated by John Doris as well as Macalester Bell’s response. Drawing from research on emotional intentionality, it will be argued that Doris’ and Bell’s accounts are respectively misguided criticisms and inadequate defences of these emotions. Their mistake lies in an invalid transition from the claim that these emotions are intentionally directed towards persons to the claim that they deliver global evaluations of those towards whom they are directed. By rejecting this inference, it will be shown that these emotions can deliver nuanced and fitting evaluations in a way Doris’ objection overlooks and Bell’s response precludes us from articulating.
{"title":"On the fittingness of agential evaluations","authors":"R. Keller","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.2009547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.2009547","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT According to a leading view, emotions such as admiration, contempt, pride, and shame are important vehicles of agential development. Through admiration and contempt, we establish models and countermodels against which to shape our character; through pride and shame, we get a sense of how we measure up to them. Critics of this view object that these emotions always deliver uncompromising evaluations: admiration casts people in a completely positive light, while contempt casts aspersion on them. Therefore, insofar as they lack the capacity for nuance, these emotions are systematically unfitting and misleading. This paper discusses this objection as originally formulated by John Doris as well as Macalester Bell’s response. Drawing from research on emotional intentionality, it will be argued that Doris’ and Bell’s accounts are respectively misguided criticisms and inadequate defences of these emotions. Their mistake lies in an invalid transition from the claim that these emotions are intentionally directed towards persons to the claim that they deliver global evaluations of those towards whom they are directed. By rejecting this inference, it will be shown that these emotions can deliver nuanced and fitting evaluations in a way Doris’ objection overlooks and Bell’s response precludes us from articulating.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46505400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-19DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1989477
H. Naar
ABSTRACT According to a popular view, emotions are perceptual experiences of some kind. A common objection to this view is that, by contrast with perception, emotions are subject to normative reasons. In response, perceptualists have typically maintained that the fact that emotions can be justified does not prevent them from being perception-like in some fundamental way. Given the problems that this move might raise, a neglected alternative strategy is to deny that there are normative reasons for emotions in the first place. The aim of this paper is to offer the first sustained discussion of arguments for skepticism about normative reasons for emotions. I argue that none of the obvious ways to argue against reasons for emotions casts genuine doubt on them, and thus that unless another argument is given an appeal to reasons for emotions continues to constitute a legitimate strategy to assess various theories of emotion.
{"title":"Skepticism about reasons for emotions","authors":"H. Naar","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1989477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1989477","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT According to a popular view, emotions are perceptual experiences of some kind. A common objection to this view is that, by contrast with perception, emotions are subject to normative reasons. In response, perceptualists have typically maintained that the fact that emotions can be justified does not prevent them from being perception-like in some fundamental way. Given the problems that this move might raise, a neglected alternative strategy is to deny that there are normative reasons for emotions in the first place. The aim of this paper is to offer the first sustained discussion of arguments for skepticism about normative reasons for emotions. I argue that none of the obvious ways to argue against reasons for emotions casts genuine doubt on them, and thus that unless another argument is given an appeal to reasons for emotions continues to constitute a legitimate strategy to assess various theories of emotion.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45271978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-14DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1985598
Alfonso Anaya
ABSTRACT There is a recent surge in interest in agential accounts of perception, i.e. accounts where activity plays a central role in accounting for the nature of perceptions. Within this camp, Lisa Miracchi has argued that her Competence View (CoV) of perception has the resources to strike a double feat: to provide an alternative to current representationalist hegemony while avoiding endorsing relationalism about perception. If successful, CoV could be seen as inaugurating a third way, beyond relationalism and representationalism. Unfortunately, CoV faces serious problems which render it untenable in its present form. First, CoV cannot accommodate straightforward perceptual and hallucinatory phenomena – specifically, distinguishable hallucination, first perceptions, and hallucinations of implausible objects. Second, close inspection of the main locus of disagreement between relationalism and experience-first approaches shows that CoV has more in common with experience-first approaches than Miracchi acknowledges. Thus, contrary to Miracchi’s advertising, CoV is not a perception-first alternative to representationalism. Within the agential camp, in contrast to CoV, Susanna Schellenberg’s view (the Capacity View) can avoid many of the challenges faced by CoV. However, it is unable to make sense of distinguishable hallucination. This means that both agential accounts of perception face serious problems.
{"title":"Incompetent perceivers, distinguishable hallucinations, and perceptual phenomenology. Some problems for activity views of perception","authors":"Alfonso Anaya","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1985598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1985598","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT There is a recent surge in interest in agential accounts of perception, i.e. accounts where activity plays a central role in accounting for the nature of perceptions. Within this camp, Lisa Miracchi has argued that her Competence View (CoV) of perception has the resources to strike a double feat: to provide an alternative to current representationalist hegemony while avoiding endorsing relationalism about perception. If successful, CoV could be seen as inaugurating a third way, beyond relationalism and representationalism. Unfortunately, CoV faces serious problems which render it untenable in its present form. First, CoV cannot accommodate straightforward perceptual and hallucinatory phenomena – specifically, distinguishable hallucination, first perceptions, and hallucinations of implausible objects. Second, close inspection of the main locus of disagreement between relationalism and experience-first approaches shows that CoV has more in common with experience-first approaches than Miracchi acknowledges. Thus, contrary to Miracchi’s advertising, CoV is not a perception-first alternative to representationalism. Within the agential camp, in contrast to CoV, Susanna Schellenberg’s view (the Capacity View) can avoid many of the challenges faced by CoV. However, it is unable to make sense of distinguishable hallucination. This means that both agential accounts of perception face serious problems.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48768620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-24DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2021.1980604
Elia Haemmerli
ABSTRACT Intentional explanations are explanations of actions that specify the motive for which the action was done. A central question is whether causality plays a role in such explanations. Causalists insist that it does. One of the most pressing problems for Causalism is often taken to be the possibility that what an agent does is caused by her motive despite the agent not acting intentionally. This is known as the problem of deviant causal chains. Recently, Causalism has received a new defence by Hyman, which includes a treatment of the problem of deviant causal chains. This paper assesses Hyman’s account by focusing on its commitments. First, to get a clear view of the relation between Causalism and the problem of deviant causal chains it distinguishes the question whether intentional explanations are causal explanations from the question whether they admit of an analysis in causal terms. Secondly, it is argued that Hyman, against his inclination, is committed to the existence of such an analysis. Thirdly, synthesising insights from Hyman and Davidson, an analysis of intentional explanations in dispositional terms is proposed and defended against putative counterexamples.
{"title":"Hyman on intentional explanations and the problem of deviant causal chains","authors":"Elia Haemmerli","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1980604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1980604","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Intentional explanations are explanations of actions that specify the motive for which the action was done. A central question is whether causality plays a role in such explanations. Causalists insist that it does. One of the most pressing problems for Causalism is often taken to be the possibility that what an agent does is caused by her motive despite the agent not acting intentionally. This is known as the problem of deviant causal chains. Recently, Causalism has received a new defence by Hyman, which includes a treatment of the problem of deviant causal chains. This paper assesses Hyman’s account by focusing on its commitments. First, to get a clear view of the relation between Causalism and the problem of deviant causal chains it distinguishes the question whether intentional explanations are causal explanations from the question whether they admit of an analysis in causal terms. Secondly, it is argued that Hyman, against his inclination, is committed to the existence of such an analysis. Thirdly, synthesising insights from Hyman and Davidson, an analysis of intentional explanations in dispositional terms is proposed and defended against putative counterexamples.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48077885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Keiser, B. McGee, Mary Hennenfent, Chuck Nusinov, Linda Triska
{"title":"Civilized or Not?","authors":"D. Keiser, B. McGee, Mary Hennenfent, Chuck Nusinov, Linda Triska","doi":"10.4324/9781003235057-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003235057-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72834969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-09DOI: 10.4324/9781003235057-11
D. Keiser, B. McGee, Mary Hennenfent, Chuck Nusinov, Linda Triska
{"title":"Ancient Inventions","authors":"D. Keiser, B. McGee, Mary Hennenfent, Chuck Nusinov, Linda Triska","doi":"10.4324/9781003235057-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003235057-11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73361642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Keiser, B. McGee, Mary Hennenfent, Chuck Nusinov, Linda Triska
{"title":"Explore Your Nutritional Habits","authors":"D. Keiser, B. McGee, Mary Hennenfent, Chuck Nusinov, Linda Triska","doi":"10.4324/9781003235057-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003235057-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84915816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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