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Aesthetic selves as objects of interpersonal understanding 作为人际理解对象的审美自我
IF 0.6 3区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-05-02 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2024.2344979
Nicholas Wiltsher
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引用次数: 0
Simulating experiences: unjust credibility deficits without identity prejudices 模拟体验:没有身份偏见的不公正信誉缺失
IF 0.6 3区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-04-29 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2024.2344978
Christiana Werner
This article focuses on unjust credibility deficits in cases of testimony about emotional reactions towards acts of oppression. It argues that the injustice in these cases is not rooted in the hear...
本文重点讨论了在有关对压迫行为的情绪反应的证词案件中存在的不公正的可信度缺失问题。文章认为,这些案件中的不公正现象并非源于听证。
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引用次数: 0
Empathy as a means to understand people 移情是理解他人的一种手段
IF 0.6 3区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-04-29 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2024.2344975
Thomas Schramme
Misunderstanding other people can be interpreted as the result of an insufficient performance of people’s skills to understand other persons and their experiences. But what does understand mean in ...
误解他人可以被解释为人们理解他人及其经验的技能发挥不足的结果。但是,"理解 "在...
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引用次数: 0
Empathising in online spaces 网络空间中的移情
IF 0.6 3区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-04-29 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2024.2344980
Elizabeth Ventham
This paper aims to better understand and account for potential difficulties in empathising with each other in online spaces. I argue that two important differences between online and in-person comm...
本文旨在更好地理解和解释在网络空间中彼此产生共鸣的潜在困难。我认为,在线交流与面对面交流之间有两个重要的不同点。
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引用次数: 0
Empathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy 移情、极端主义和认识论自主性
IF 0.6 3区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-04-24 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2024.2344973
Olivia Bailey
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引用次数: 0
Luck, fate, and fortune: the tychic properties 运气、命运和财富:tychic 特性
IF 0.6 3区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2024.2335221
Marcus William Hunt
The paper offers an account of luck, fate, and fortune. It begins by showing that extant accounts of luck are deficient because they do not identify the genus of which luck is a species. That genus...
本文阐述了运气、命运和财富。文章首先指出,现存关于运气的论述存在缺陷,因为它们没有确定运气作为其一个物种的属。这个属...
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引用次数: 0
Wide computationalism revisited: distributed mechanisms, parsimony and testability 广义计算主义再探:分布式机制、解析性和可检验性
IF 0.6 3区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-03-24 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2024.2332171
Luke Kersten
Recent years have seen a surge of interest in applying mechanistic thinking to computational accounts of implementation and individuation. One recent extension of this work involves so-called ‘wide...
近年来,人们对将机械论思维应用于实现和个体化的计算论述兴趣大增。这项工作最近的一个延伸涉及所谓的 "宽...
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引用次数: 0
On the non-propositional content of our ordinary intentions 关于我们普通意图的非命题内容
IF 0.6 3区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-02-19 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2024.2309402
Xavier Castellà
It is a widely-held thesis that the content of intentions can be characterized in terms of the truth of a proposition. In this paper I try to reject this idea. First, I argue that, at least for ord...
人们普遍认为,意图的内容可以用命题的真理性来描述。在本文中,我试图否定这一观点。首先,我认为,至少对顺序而言,意图的内容是不存在的。
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引用次数: 0
A new argument for ‘thinking-as-speaking’ 思维即发言 "的新论点
IF 0.6 3区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-01-12 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2291583
Tom Frankfort
Sometimes, thinking a thought and saying something to oneself are the same event. Call this the ‘thinking-as-speaking’ thesis. It stands in opposition to the idea that we think something first, and...
有时,思考和自言自语是同一件事。这就是 "想即说 "理论。它与 "我们先思考,然后...
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引用次数: 0
Comparing deterministic agents: A new argument for compatibilism 比较确定性主体:相容论的新论点
3区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-09-21 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2259403
Marcela Herdova
ABSTRACTThis paper offers a new argument for compatibilism about moral responsibility by drawing attention to some overlooked implications of incompatibilism. More specifically, I argue that incompatibilists are committed to some unsavory claims about pairs of agents in deterministic worlds. These include comparative claims about moral responsibility, blameworthiness, desert, punishment, and the fittingness of reactive attitudes. I argue that we have good reasons to reject such comparisons because they fail to account for key differences between deterministic agents. This provides us with reason to embrace compatibilism and reject incompatibilism.KEYWORDS: Compatibilismincompatibilismmoral responsibilitydeterminism AcknowledgmentsFirst and foremost, I would like to thank Stephen Kearns for his comments on many drafts of this paper. I am also very grateful to Randy Clarke, Al Mele, Thomas Reed, and the two anonymous referees for helping me improve the paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 Some further direct arguments for compatibilism include the Paradigm Case argument (Flew Citation1955) and its semantic counterpart (Turner Citation2013), the Mind argument (Hobart Citation1934), and the defense and developments of new dispositionalism (Clarke and Reed Citation2015). Though such arguments are often for the compatibility of free will and determinism, minor adjustments can make them arguments for the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism.2 If moral responsibility requires free will (which is extremely plausible), this paper also serves as an argument that compatibilism about free will is true. I shall not explore this idea further in what follows.3 When I say that Sam is more praiseworthy for donating blood than Dean is for stealing it, I do not mean to claim that Dean is praiseworthy to any (positive) degree, though this may often be conversationally implicated by such a comparison (but I do not think it is entailed). The important point is that there is a difference between Sam and Dean with respect to their praiseworthiness. While Sam is praiseworthy to some (positive) degree, Dean is not. I take this to entail that Sam is more praiseworthy than Dean (which is precisely why I formulate my claims in this way).If one disagrees that there is any such entailment, my point can be expressed differently (though slightly more verbosely): Sam is praiseworthy to a degree greater than any degree, if there is any, to which Dean is praiseworthy. This claim is certainly entailed by the fact that Sam is praiseworthy to some positive degree and Dean is not. The same basic point applies to blameworthiness, guilt, desert, etc., mutatis mutandis. See also endnote 6 for a similar issue regarding the below equality theses. Thank you to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to these issues.4 One may take fittingness (like truth) to be something that doesn’t come in degrees. Perhaps surpri
摘要本文提出了道德责任相容论的新观点,指出了道德责任不相容论中一些被忽视的含义。更具体地说,我认为不相容论者致力于一些关于确定性世界中主体对的令人讨厌的主张。这些包括关于道德责任、应受谴责、应得、惩罚和反应性态度的适宜性的比较主张。我认为,我们有充分的理由拒绝这种比较,因为它们无法解释确定性主体之间的关键差异。这为我们提供了接受相容论和拒绝不相容论的理由。关键词:相容论相容论道德责任决定论首先,我要感谢Stephen Kearns对本文许多草稿的评论。我也非常感谢Randy Clarke, Al Mele, Thomas Reed和两位匿名审稿人帮助我改进论文。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1关于兼容性的一些进一步的直接论证包括范式案例论证(Flew Citation1955)及其语义对应(Turner Citation2013)、心智论证(Hobart Citation1934)以及新配置主义的辩护和发展(Clarke and Reed Citation2015)。虽然这样的论点通常是为了自由意志和决定论的兼容性,但微小的调整可以使它们成为道德责任和决定论的兼容性的论点如果道德责任需要自由意志(这是非常可信的),这篇论文也可以作为自由意志相容论成立的论据。在接下来的文章中,我将不再进一步探讨这个观点当我说山姆献血比迪恩偷血更值得称赞时,我并不是说迪恩在任何(积极的)程度上都值得称赞,尽管这可能经常被这种比较所牵连(但我不认为这是必然的)。重要的一点是,山姆和迪恩在值得赞扬方面是不同的。Sam在某种程度上是值得称赞的,而Dean则不然。我认为这意味着山姆比迪恩更值得称赞(这正是我以这种方式阐述我的主张的原因)。如果有人不同意有任何这样的推论,我的观点可以用不同的方式表达(尽管稍微冗长一些):萨姆在某种程度上比迪恩在任何程度上都值得赞扬,如果有的话。这一说法当然是由以下事实所决定的:Sam在某种程度上是值得赞扬的,而Dean则不然。同样的基本观点也适用于应受谴责、有罪、不受尊重等。另见尾注6,关于下列相等命题的类似问题。感谢一位匿名推荐人使我注意到这些问题人们可能会认为适合性(就像真理一样)是一种没有程度的东西。也许令人惊讶的是,对于我的目的来说,这并没有什么重要的意义。像“憎恨迪恩比憎恨萨姆更合适”这样的说法可以被理解为“憎恨迪恩比憎恨萨姆更合适”,这并不需要以程度来衡量是否合适,而是要求该说法所涉及的态度有些人可能会说,没有道德责任的论点是不相容的。没有什么重要的事与此有关“同样负有道德责任”这个短语的某些用法可能在谈话中暗示某种积极程度的道德责任。我的使用对EMR原则没有这样的含义,或者下面的任何其他原则,经过必要的修改。一个更深层次的担忧是,是否可以从没有(确定性)行为者需要承担道德责任的论断中推断出所有确定性行为者都需要承担同样程度的道德责任(零度)。类似的推论可以说是错误的。例如,Bykvist (Citation2007)认为,从“不存在缺乏价值”到“不存在价值为零”是错误的。考虑另一个例子—逻辑缺乏温度,但这并不意味着逻辑的温度为零(无论我们使用什么温度单位)。逻辑根本不能被恰当地描述为具有任何程度的温度。类似地,人们可能会认为,如果没有道德责任,那么行为人就没有责任等级,而不是每个人都有零责任。鉴于下面的平等命题可以说是建立在无责任主体的责任为零的基础上的,这一推论的可疑性质使这些命题受到质疑。我要感谢一位匿名的推荐人,他让我注意到这个问题和Bykvist的论文,并提供了逻辑示例。我对这种担忧的反应是双重的。首先,对我来说幸运的是,就我的论点而言,这个问题没有什么重要的内容。 即使严格地说,对不相容论者来说,所有确定性行为者都对(相同的)零程度负有责任(或应受谴责等)的说法是错误的,我们也可以把这种表述方式仅仅看作是不相容论者否认这些行为者的责任(或应受谴责等)程度不同的简写。事实上,我们可以重新制定平等论点来反映这一思想。这样重新表述,EMR是这样的:(EMR*)必然地,如果决定论是正确的,没有任何行为人比其他行为人更负有道德责任。在本节中讨论的其余相等的论点在尾注7中以类似的方式重新表述。第二,一种理解最初担忧的方式是这样的:通过声称确定性主体对零度负责,我们犯了某种类别错误。如果没有需要承担的道德责任,那么谈论行为人负有甚至非积极程度的责任也是不合适的。的确,这似乎就是在逻辑和温度的情况中发生的:,说逻辑的温度为零,是一个范畴错误。然而,在我看来,责任情况不涉及类别错误,因此与逻辑/温度的例子不同。不相容论者并不认为在决定论的世界里行为者负责是一个范畴错误,而只是认为(决定论的)行为者不负责。一般来说,我们(正确地)认为责任是对某些代理属性的监督,我们可以或多或少地拥有这些属性。鉴于此,根据代理属性的性质和程度,将代理视为具有不同程度的责任(包括零责任)是合适的。最重要的是,即使是对不负责任的代理人做出平等判断,也不涉及类别错误。(一个关于责任的不可能论者可能会在这里提出异议,坚持认为代理不是那种可以在任何程度上负责的东西,即使是零度。即使这是对的,我也不需要坚持相反的观点,因为我的第一个观点表明,我们可以把我的主要观点放在不需要这样争论的地方为了回应尾注6中提到的一个问题,我在这里对剩下的等式命题进行了重新表述,这些命题不引用确定性主体同样应该受到谴责和赞扬等观点:(EB*)必然地,如果决定论为真,没有哪个主体比其他主体更应该受到谴责(EP*)必然地,如果决定论为真,没有哪个主体比其他主体更值得赞扬(EDP*)必然地,如果决定论为真,没有哪个主体比其他主体更值得赞扬没有代理更值得惩罚比其他任何代理。(EDR *)一定,如果决定论是真的,没有任何代理更值得奖励比其他任何代理。(EDP + *)一定,如果决定论是真的,没有任何形式的代理更值得或任何惩罚的严重性程度比其他任何代理。(EDR + *)一定,如果决定论是真的,没有任何形式的代理更值得或任何回报的伟大程度比其他任何代理。(EFRA *)一定,如果决定论是正确的,则没有任何行为体比其他行为体更适合于任何反应态度的对象。如果决定论是正确的,必然地,没有任何行为体比其他行为体更适合于任何程度的任何反应态度的对象为了强调最后一点,请注意,结果主义的惩罚理由不仅独立于基于应得的惩罚理由,而且也有可能(至少在原则上)纯粹的结果主义考虑可能会导致这样的主张,例如,克劳利受到的惩罚比卡西迪埃尔更严厉,尽管卡西迪埃尔在某种意义上是不相容的,无法证明他更有罪。惩罚的结果主义辩护并不一定能给出与Castiel和Crowley(或我们的其他对儿)应该受到的对待相一致的判决。从本质上讲,这与我的观点是完全一致的,即应该给予什么样的惩罚,甚至应该如何(在道德上)对待一个人,都受到非基于应得的考虑的强烈影响。问题的关键是,这些观点不能解释像我们这三对确定性主体之间的一些道德差异(那些基于沙漠/责任的道德差异)同样的观点也可以用来反对另一种提出的误差理论。有人可能会说我们觉得Dean比Sam更应该受到谴责因为我们看到他比Sam更符合应该受到谴责的条件,我们把这两点混为一谈。再一次,我们表面上拥有对这些案件做出微妙判断所需的技能,并避免
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