Pub Date : 2023-07-25DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2237976
Harold Langsam
{"title":"Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies","authors":"Harold Langsam","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2237976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2237976","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43445498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-17DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2232798
A. Hossein Khani
A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Alex Byrne, Bill Child, and others have discussed attributing such a view to Donald Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based or First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account, such as Crispin Wright’s, according to which, as an a priori matter, facts about intentional content are constituted by the judgments of the subject herself, formed under certain optimal or cognitively ideal conditions. I will argue for two claims: (1) Attributing a Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account to Davidson is unjustified; Davidson’s view is much closer to a non-reductionist First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account. (2) Third-Personal accounts rest on a misconstrual of the role of an interpreter in the First-Personal accounts; the notion of an interpreter still plays an essential role in the latter ones.
{"title":"Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts","authors":"A. Hossein Khani","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2232798","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2232798","url":null,"abstract":"A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Alex Byrne, Bill Child, and others have discussed attributing such a view to Donald Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based or First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account, such as Crispin Wright’s, according to which, as an a priori matter, facts about intentional content are constituted by the judgments of the subject herself, formed under certain optimal or cognitively ideal conditions. I will argue for two claims: (1) Attributing a Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account to Davidson is unjustified; Davidson’s view is much closer to a non-reductionist First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account. (2) Third-Personal accounts rest on a misconstrual of the role of an interpreter in the First-Personal accounts; the notion of an interpreter still plays an essential role in the latter ones.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48795517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-12DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2229858
M. Salcedo-Gómez, C. García
{"title":"Functional systems as explanatory tools in psychiatry","authors":"M. Salcedo-Gómez, C. García","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2229858","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2229858","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45801980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-23DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2227202
A. Eshleman
{"title":"A moral freedom to which we might aspire","authors":"A. Eshleman","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2227202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2227202","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49093045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-05DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2204092
A. Sneddon
{"title":"Towards a theory of offense","authors":"A. Sneddon","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2204092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2204092","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42891338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2193603
Jonathan J. Hall
{"title":"Uncertainty and the act of making a difficult choice","authors":"Jonathan J. Hall","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2193603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2193603","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44423120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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