Pub Date : 2023-05-05DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2204092
A. Sneddon
{"title":"Towards a theory of offense","authors":"A. Sneddon","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2204092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2204092","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42891338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2193603
Jonathan J. Hall
{"title":"Uncertainty and the act of making a difficult choice","authors":"Jonathan J. Hall","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2193603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2193603","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44423120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-28DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2205416
S. de Haan
ABSTRACT ‘If I experience X, is it because of the illness, the medication, or is it ‘just me’?’ (Karp 2009) [Is it me or my Meds? Living with Antidepressants. Harvard University Press]. This issue is known as self-illness ambiguity (SIA) (Sadler 2007) ["The Psychiatric Significance of the Personal Self." Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes 70 (2): 113–129]. In her paper Know Thyself: Bipolar Disorder and Self-concept, Carls-Diamante (2022) [“Know Thyself: Bipolar Disorder and Self-Concept.” Philosophical Explorations, 1–17] offers a taxonomy of different ways in which Bipolar Disorder can be related to one’s self and self-concept. In contrast to the essentialist model of mental disorders she seems to adopt, I propose a different outlook on SIA, following an enactive approach to psychiatric disorders as disorders of sense-making. One’s way of making sense of the world and/or oneself can become stuck in a rigid pattern that is stronger than oneself and at odds with how one would want to be. I argue that it is helpful to distinguish between the experiential SIA of specific experiences (Am I over/underreacting?) and the long term concerns of existential SIA (How to live my life in accordance with what matters to me despite/while having certain vulnerabilities?). I conclude that knowing oneself is not an intra-individual matter, nor primarily a matter of reflection: it is rather a relational and material practice of trying to live your life in accordance with what matters to you.
摘要“如果我经历了X，是因为疾病、药物，还是‘只有我’？”（卡普2009）[是我还是我的药？与抗抑郁药共存。哈佛大学出版社]。这个问题被称为自我疾病模糊（SIA）（Sadler 2007）[“个人自我的精神病学意义”。《精神病学：人际和生物过程》70（2）：113-129]。Carls Diamante（2022）在她的论文《了解Thyself:双相情感障碍和自我概念》（Know Thyself：Bipolar Disorder and Self concept）中[《哲学探索》，1-17]提供了双相情感疾病与自我和自我概念相关的不同方式的分类法。与她似乎采用的精神障碍的本质主义模式相反，我对SIA提出了不同的看法，将精神障碍视为有意义的障碍。一个人理解世界和/或自己的方式可能会陷入一种僵化的模式，这种模式比自己更强大，与一个人想要成为的样子不一致。我认为，区分特定经历的经验SIA（我是否反应过度/反应不足？）和存在主义SIA的长期担忧（尽管存在某些脆弱性，但如何按照对我重要的事情生活？）是有帮助的。我的结论是，了解自己不是一个个体内部的问题，也不是一个主要的反思问题：它是一种关系和物质实践，试图按照对你来说重要的事情来生活。
{"title":"What do my problems say about me?","authors":"S. de Haan","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2205416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2205416","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT ‘If I experience X, is it because of the illness, the medication, or is it ‘just me’?’ (Karp 2009) [Is it me or my Meds? Living with Antidepressants. Harvard University Press]. This issue is known as self-illness ambiguity (SIA) (Sadler 2007) [\"The Psychiatric Significance of the Personal Self.\" Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes 70 (2): 113–129]. In her paper Know Thyself: Bipolar Disorder and Self-concept, Carls-Diamante (2022) [“Know Thyself: Bipolar Disorder and Self-Concept.” Philosophical Explorations, 1–17] offers a taxonomy of different ways in which Bipolar Disorder can be related to one’s self and self-concept. In contrast to the essentialist model of mental disorders she seems to adopt, I propose a different outlook on SIA, following an enactive approach to psychiatric disorders as disorders of sense-making. One’s way of making sense of the world and/or oneself can become stuck in a rigid pattern that is stronger than oneself and at odds with how one would want to be. I argue that it is helpful to distinguish between the experiential SIA of specific experiences (Am I over/underreacting?) and the long term concerns of existential SIA (How to live my life in accordance with what matters to me despite/while having certain vulnerabilities?). I conclude that knowing oneself is not an intra-individual matter, nor primarily a matter of reflection: it is rather a relational and material practice of trying to live your life in accordance with what matters to you.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"159 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46993625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-28DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2203709
Roy Dings, L. D. De Bruin
Although the concept of self-illness ambiguity is relatively new, the phenomenon is not. It seems likely that people have struggled with the oftentimes ambiguous relation between themselves and their illness ever since the dawn of modern (mental) health care. It is therefore exciting, both from a philosophical as well as clinical point of view, that the concept of self-illness ambiguity is increasingly gaining attention. The history of this concept can be traced back to the late 1980s and early 1990s, when qualitative research started to elucidate how complex the relation between ‘self’ and ‘illness’ is from the perspective of the diagnosed individual (see e.g. Estroff 1989; Estroff et al. 1991). Sociologist David Karp coined the term ‘illness ambiguity’ (e.g. Karp 1992, 1994) to explicate the confusion that often arose when psychiatric patients tried to clarify this relation. Psychiatrist John Sadler, drawing on some of this pioneering qualitative research, offered the first philosophical analysis of this phenomenon and coined the term ‘self-illness ambiguity’ to underscore that both sides of the relation are complex and may as such contribute to the ambiguity of the self-illness relation (Sadler 2003, 2007). Recent years have also witnessed a renewed interest in the ‘self’ in the context of psychiatry, not only because of theoretical considerations (e.g. Tekin 2019), but also because of developing trends in mental health care, such as recovery-oriented care, self-management and person-centered care (e.g. Glas 2019; Slors and Strijbos 2020). This in turn has led to a renewed interest in the phenomenon of self-illness ambiguity (e.g. Dings 2020; Dings and Glas 2020). However, there are still various questions about and domains of self-illness ambiguity that demand further consideration. This special issue seeks to facilitate and focus the debates surrounding these questions and to further philosophical and empirical investigations into key domains of self-illness ambiguity.
虽然自我疾病模糊的概念相对较新，但这种现象并不存在。自从现代(精神)卫生保健出现以来，人们似乎一直在与自己和疾病之间的模糊关系作斗争。因此，无论是从哲学角度还是从临床角度来看，自我疾病的模糊性概念越来越受到关注，这都是令人兴奋的。这一概念的历史可以追溯到20世纪80年代末和90年代初，当时定性研究开始从被诊断个体的角度阐明“自我”和“疾病”之间的关系是多么复杂(见e.g. Estroff 1989;Estroff et al. 1991)。社会学家David Karp创造了“疾病模糊”一词(e.g. Karp 1992,1994)来解释当精神病患者试图澄清这种关系时经常出现的困惑。精神病学家John Sadler借鉴了一些开创性的定性研究，对这一现象进行了第一次哲学分析，并创造了“自我疾病模糊”一词，以强调关系的双方都是复杂的，并且可能因此导致自我疾病关系的模糊(Sadler 2003, 2007)。近年来，人们对精神病学背景下的“自我”重新产生了兴趣，这不仅是因为理论方面的考虑(如Tekin 2019)，还因为精神卫生保健的发展趋势，如康复导向护理、自我管理和以人为本的护理(如Glas 2019;Slors and Strijbos 2020)。这反过来又导致了对自我疾病模糊现象的重新关注(例如，丁斯2020;叮当和玻璃，2020)。然而，关于自我疾病模棱两可的领域仍然存在各种问题，需要进一步考虑。本期特刊旨在促进和聚焦围绕这些问题的辩论，并进一步对自我疾病模糊的关键领域进行哲学和实证调查。
{"title":"Editorial: self-illness ambiguity and narrative identity","authors":"Roy Dings, L. D. De Bruin","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2203709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2203709","url":null,"abstract":"Although the concept of self-illness ambiguity is relatively new, the phenomenon is not. It seems likely that people have struggled with the oftentimes ambiguous relation between themselves and their illness ever since the dawn of modern (mental) health care. It is therefore exciting, both from a philosophical as well as clinical point of view, that the concept of self-illness ambiguity is increasingly gaining attention. The history of this concept can be traced back to the late 1980s and early 1990s, when qualitative research started to elucidate how complex the relation between ‘self’ and ‘illness’ is from the perspective of the diagnosed individual (see e.g. Estroff 1989; Estroff et al. 1991). Sociologist David Karp coined the term ‘illness ambiguity’ (e.g. Karp 1992, 1994) to explicate the confusion that often arose when psychiatric patients tried to clarify this relation. Psychiatrist John Sadler, drawing on some of this pioneering qualitative research, offered the first philosophical analysis of this phenomenon and coined the term ‘self-illness ambiguity’ to underscore that both sides of the relation are complex and may as such contribute to the ambiguity of the self-illness relation (Sadler 2003, 2007). Recent years have also witnessed a renewed interest in the ‘self’ in the context of psychiatry, not only because of theoretical considerations (e.g. Tekin 2019), but also because of developing trends in mental health care, such as recovery-oriented care, self-management and person-centered care (e.g. Glas 2019; Slors and Strijbos 2020). This in turn has led to a renewed interest in the phenomenon of self-illness ambiguity (e.g. Dings 2020; Dings and Glas 2020). However, there are still various questions about and domains of self-illness ambiguity that demand further consideration. This special issue seeks to facilitate and focus the debates surrounding these questions and to further philosophical and empirical investigations into key domains of self-illness ambiguity.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"147 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49030858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-16DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2199013
G. Glas
ABSTRACT The article investigates the concept of self-illness ambiguity (SIA), which was recently re-introduced in the philosophy of psychiatry literature. SIA refers to situations in which patients are uncertain about whether features (symptoms, signs) of their illness should be attributed to their illness or to their ‘selves’. Identification of these features belongs to a more encompassing process of self- definition and -interpretation. The paper introduces a distinction between the notions of self-relatedness, self-referentiality (or: implicit self-signification), self-awareness and self-interpretation. Each of these notions offers a different perspective on SIA, but these perspectives do not exclude one another. A further distinction will be developed between primary, secondary and tertiary forms of self-referentiality. The practical and conceptual relevance of these distinctions will be illustrated with case vignettes. Throughout the paper our findings will placed in the context of other philosophical work on the self, especially in the field of narrative theory (Ricoeur), phenomenology (Ratcliffe) and philosophy of mind. The article closes with a brief discussion about the appropriateness of the term ambiguity and the potential of SIA as concept in the context of clinical psychiatry. Directions for future work will be indicated.
{"title":"Dimensions of self-illness ambiguity – a clinical and conceptual approach","authors":"G. Glas","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2199013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2199013","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article investigates the concept of self-illness ambiguity (SIA), which was recently re-introduced in the philosophy of psychiatry literature. SIA refers to situations in which patients are uncertain about whether features (symptoms, signs) of their illness should be attributed to their illness or to their ‘selves’. Identification of these features belongs to a more encompassing process of self- definition and -interpretation. The paper introduces a distinction between the notions of self-relatedness, self-referentiality (or: implicit self-signification), self-awareness and self-interpretation. Each of these notions offers a different perspective on SIA, but these perspectives do not exclude one another. A further distinction will be developed between primary, secondary and tertiary forms of self-referentiality. The practical and conceptual relevance of these distinctions will be illustrated with case vignettes. Throughout the paper our findings will placed in the context of other philosophical work on the self, especially in the field of narrative theory (Ricoeur), phenomenology (Ratcliffe) and philosophy of mind. The article closes with a brief discussion about the appropriateness of the term ambiguity and the potential of SIA as concept in the context of clinical psychiatry. Directions for future work will be indicated.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"165 - 178"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48819645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-10DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2185660
Fredric Gilbert, Joel Smith
ABSTRACT Bluhm and Cabrera advance that Sadler’s ‘Archimedean point’ is an example of integration of sub-perspectives by an overall self, as such a self who may be reconciled and understood to be caused by DBS systems. Although this suggests great avenues to explore, we stress that the Archimedean viewpoint is strictly bound to a metaphorical domain. We argue that what is needed to help (prospective) DBS patients is not a metaphorical viewpoint, but a scientific viewpoint, rooted in empirical evidence.
{"title":"Empirical imperatives in understanding self-related changes","authors":"Fredric Gilbert, Joel Smith","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2185660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2185660","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Bluhm and Cabrera advance that Sadler’s ‘Archimedean point’ is an example of integration of sub-perspectives by an overall self, as such a self who may be reconciled and understood to be caused by DBS systems. Although this suggests great avenues to explore, we stress that the Archimedean viewpoint is strictly bound to a metaphorical domain. We argue that what is needed to help (prospective) DBS patients is not a metaphorical viewpoint, but a scientific viewpoint, rooted in empirical evidence.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"26 1","pages":"155 - 158"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43889396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-28DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2183241
R. Fabry
{"title":"What is the relationship between grief and narrative?","authors":"R. Fabry","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2023.2183241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2183241","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49593125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：