Hec Forum最新文献

In her Pharmaceutical Freedom, Jessica Flanigan argues that antibiotics can be regulated consistent with her otherwise largely deregulatory view with respect to pharmaceuticals and recreational drugs. I contend in this essay that the reasons for justifying antibiotic regulation are reasons that can be offered to justify the regulation of many other drugs, both pharmaceutical and recreational. After laying out the specifics of Flanigan's view, I suggest that it is amenable to the regulation of drugs like varenicline. Though such drugs can legitimately improve the quality of a patient's life by helping them quit smoking, they could be permissibly regulated if they expose others to impermissible risks. I then argue that recreational drugs like alcohol could be regulated using the same reasoning. In the penultimate section of this essay, I anticipate objections that one might have to my extension of arguments favoring antibiotic regulation to drugs correlated with aggression. Flanigan might find my extrapolation of her view as entirely plausible and accept that her view is relatively friendly to these regulations, or she might reconsider her antibiotic caveat if these regulations are overly paternalistic on her understanding. I conclude by briefly considering the benefits and drawbacks of adopting each view.

In Pharmaceutical Freedom Professor Flanigan argues we ought to grant people self-medication rights for the same reasons we respect people's right to give (or refuse to give) informed consent to treatment. Despite being the most comprehensive argument in favour of self-medication written to date, Flanigan's Pharmaceutical Freedom leaves a number of questions unanswered, making it unclear how the safe-guards Flanigan incorporates to protect people from harming themselves would work in practice. In this paper, I extend Professor Flanigan's account by discussing a hypothetical case to illustrate how these safe-guards could work together to protect people from harms caused by their own ignorance or incompetence.

Jessica Flanigan argues that individuals have the right to self-medicate. Flanigan presents two arguments in defense of this right. The first she calls the epistemic argument and the second she calls the rights-based argument. I argue that the right to self-medicate hangs and falls on the rights-based argument. This is because for the epistemic argument to be sound agents must be assumed to be epistemically competent. But, Flanigan's argument for a constitutionally mandated right to self-medicate models agents as epistemically incompetent. For Flanigan, agents are different at the pharmacy than they are at the polls. I identify this behavioral asymmetry and advocate a symmetric and realistic behavioral postulate for both arguments. The result, however, is that the success of the epistemic argument becomes contingent which fails to justify a constitutionally mandated right. I proceed to raise skepticism about the rights-based argument as well. I conclude that there is reason to be skeptical that these arguments can justify a constitutionally mandated right to self-medicate. Ultimately, a bottom-up approach to pharmaceutical ethics is preferable.

The objective of this article is to explore people's attitudes toward responsibility in the allocation of public health care resources. Special attention is paid to conceptualizations of responsibility involving blame and sanctions. A representative sample of the Norwegian population was asked about various responsibility mechanisms that have been proposed in the theoretical literature on health care and personal responsibility, from denial of treatment to a tax on unhealthy consumer goods. Survey experiments were employed to study treatment effects, such as whether fairness considerations affect attitudes about responsibility. We find that, overall, a substantial minority of the respondents find it fair to let the health care system sanction people-in one way or another-for voluntary behaviors that increase the risk of becoming ill. Quite surprisingly, we find that people are more prone to report that they should themselves be held responsible for unhealthy lifestyles than others.

Organ transplantation from living related donors in Bangladesh first began in October 1982, and became commonplace in 1988. Cornea transplantation from posthumous donors began in 1984 and living related liver and bone marrow donor transplantation began in 2010 and 2014 respectively. The Human Organ Transplantation Act officially came into effect in Bangladesh on 13th April 1999, allowing organ donation from both brain-dead and related living donors for transplantation. Before the legislation, religious leaders issued fatwa, or religious rulings, in favor of organ transplantation. The Act was amended by the Parliament on 8th January, 2018 with the changes coming into effect shortly afterwards on 28th January. However, aside from a few posthumous corneal donations, transplantation of vital organs, such as the kidney, liver, heart, pancreas, and other body parts or organs from deceased donors, has remained absent in Bangladesh. The major question addressed in this article is why the transplantation of vital organs from deceased donors is absent in Bangladesh. In addition to the collection of secondary documents, interviews were conducted with senior transplant physicians, patients and their relatives, and the public, to learn about posthumous organ donation for transplantation. Interviews were also conducted with a medical student and two grief counselors to understand the process of counseling the families and obtaining consent to obtain posthumous cornea donations from brain-dead patients. An interview was conducted with a professional anatomist to understand the processes behind body donation for the purposes of medical study and research. Their narrative reveals that transplant physicians may be reticent to declare brain death as the stipulations of the 1999 act were unclear and vague. This study finds that Bangladeshis have strong family ties and experience anxiety around permitting separating body parts of dead relatives for organ donation for transplantation, or donating the dead body for medical study and research purposes. Posthumous organ donation for transplantation is commonly viewed as a wrong deed from a religious point of view. Religious scholars who have been consulted by the government have approved posthumous organ donation for transplantation on the grounds of necessity to save lives even though violating the human body is generally forbidden in Islam. An assessment of the dynamics of biomedicine, religion and culture leads to the conclusion that barriers to posthumous organ donation for transplantation that are perceived to be religious may actually stem from cultural attitudes. The interplay of faith, belief, religion, social norms, rituals and wider cultural attitudes with biomedicine and posthumous organ donation and transplantation is very complex. Although overcoming the barriers to organ donation for transplantation is challenging, initiation of transplantation of vital organs from deceased donors is necessary within

The prevalence of Clinical ethics support (CES) services is increasing. Yet, questions about what quality of CES entails and how to foster the quality of CES remain. This paper describes the development of a national network (NEON), which aimed to conceptualize and foster the quality of CES in the Netherlands simultaneously. Our methodology was inspired by a responsive evaluation approach which shares some of our key theoretical presuppositions of CES. A responsive evaluation methodology engages stakeholders in developing quality standards of a certain practice, instead of evaluating a practice by predefined standards. In this paper, we describe the relationship between our theoretical viewpoint on CES and a responsive evaluation methodology. Then we describe the development of the network (NEON) and focus on three activities that exemplify our approach. In the discussion, we reflect on the similarities and differences between our approach and other international initiatives focusing on the quality of CES.

This study explored the perceptions of ethics among long-term care employees (N275) in order to test two hypotheses. A cohort cross-sectional survey examined employees' perceptions of an ethics environment, racial-ethnic, and position disparities (HO1; ANOVA), and, secondarily, ethics in relationship to select, research-grounded work features measured as manage disagreements, effectiveness, work satisfaction, and opinions of care, the latter including intention to remain (HO2; Pearson Correlations). Established questionnaires with robust psychometrics were employed. Response rate was 51%. Non-significant differences between sample and population on key variables supported extrapolation of results. Statistically significant differences between racial-ethnic (p < 0.03; F 2.42) and work positions (p <0.0001; F 6.24) were revealed on ethics (3.16; HO1). Statistically significant relationships (p <0.0001; r = 0.26-0.68; HO2) between ethics and employees' work features also were found, confirming both hypotheses. Perceptions of ethics based on racial-ethnic and position disparities, as well as the robust links with employee work features, offered potential avenues for decreasing disparities at work and improving the quality of long-term care. Noted further on ethics item scoring were relatively low scores indicating less involvement in, and access to, ethics discussions and decisions. In contrast, the literature review substantiated the importance of empowerment and retention, which were enhanced by employee involvement in work, notably, discussions and decisions. Thus, implications of ethics committees in long-term care sites as ways to potentially enhance employees' work and quality of care, especially work satisfaction and retention, were explored; relevant concerns raised by the Covid pandemic were, briefly, discussed.