Hec Forum最新文献

The bioethics literature has paid little attention to matters of informed reproductive decision-making among women of childbearing age who have chronic kidney disease (CKD), including women who are on dialysis or women who have had a kidney transplant. Women with CKD receive inconsistent and, sometimes, inadequate reproductive counseling, particularly with respect to information about pursuing pregnancy. We identify four factors that might contribute to inadequate and inconsistent reproductive counseling. We argue that women with CKD should receive comprehensive reproductive counseling, including information about the possibility of pursuing pregnancy, and that more rigorous research on pregnancy in women with CKD, including women on dialysis or who have received a kidney transplant, is warranted to improve informed reproductive decision making in this population.

Would primary care services benefit from the aid of a clinical ethics committee (CEC)? The implementation of CECs in primary care in four Norwegian municipalities was supported and their activities followed for 2.5 years. In this study, the CECs' structure and activities are described, with special emphasis on what characterizes the cases they have discussed. In total, the four CECs discussed 54 cases from primary care services, with the four most common topics being patient autonomy, competence and coercion; professionalism; cooperation and disagreement with next of kin; and priority setting, resource use and quality. Nursing homes and home care were the primary care services most often involved. Next of kin were present in 10 case deliberations, whereas patients were never present. The investigation indicates that it might be feasible for new CECs to attain a high level of activity including case deliberations within the time frame. It also confirms that significant, characteristic and complex moral problems arise in primary care services.

In an attempt to respond effectively to the COVID-19 pandemic, policy makers and scientific experts who advise them have aspired to present a unified front. Leveraging the authority of science, they have at times portrayed politically favored COVID interventions, such as lockdowns, as strongly grounded in scientific evidence-even to the point of claiming that enacting such interventions is simply a matter of "following the science." Strictly speaking, all such claims are false, since facts alone never yield moral-political conclusions. More importantly, attempts to present a unified front have led to a number of other actions and statements by scientists and policy makers that erode the authority of science. These include actions and statements that: (1) mislead the public about epidemiological matters such as mortality rates, cause of death determinations, and computerized modeling, or fail to correct mainstream media sources that interpret such concepts in misleading ways; (2) incorporate moral-political opinions into ostensible statements of fact; and (3) misrepresent or misuse scientific expertise. The fundamental thesis of the paper is not primarily that such actions and statements have proliferated during the COVID-19 epidemic (though I think they have), but rather that they are unscientific and that presenting them as science undermines the authority of science. In the moral-political realm, the great power of science and the source of its authority derives from its agnosticism about fundamental moral-political claims. Science, for instance, has no built-in presumption that we should respect life, promote freedom, or practice toleration; nor does it tell us which of these values to prioritize when values conflict. Because of this agnosticism, science is recognized across a broad diversity perspectives as morally and politically impartial, and authoritative within its proper sphere. When it is infused with partisan bias, it loses that authority.

Evaluating the feasibility and first perceived outcomes of a newly developed clinical ethics support instrument called CURA. This instrument is tailored to the needs of nurses that provide palliative care and is intended to foster both moral competences and moral resilience. This study is a descriptive cross-sectional evaluation study. Respondents consisted of nurses and nurse assistants (n = 97) following a continuing education program (course participants) and colleagues of these course participants (n = 124). Two questionnaires with five-point Likert scales were used. The feasibility questionnaire was given to all respondents, the perceived outcomes questionnaire only to the course participants. Data collection took place over a period of six months. Respondents were predominantly positive on most items of the feasibility questionnaire. The steps of CURA are clearly described (84% of course participants agreed or strongly agreed, 94% of colleagues) and easy to apply (78-87%). The perceived outcomes showed that CURA helped respondents to reflect on moral challenges (71% (strongly) agreed), in perspective taking (67%), with being aware of moral challenges (63%) and in dealing with moral distress (54%). Respondents did experience organizational barriers: only half of the respondents (strongly) agreed that they could easily find time for using CURA. CURA is a feasible instrument for nurses and nurse assistants providing palliative care. However, reported difficulties in organizing and making time for reflections with CURA indicate organizational preconditions ought to be met in order to implement CURA in daily practice. Furthermore, these results indicate that CURA helps to build moral competences and fosters moral resilience.

Recent advancements in therapeutic and diagnostic medicine, along with the creation of large biobanks and methods for monitoring health technologies, have improved the prospects for preventing, treating, and curing illness. These same advancements, however, give rise to a plethora of ethical questions concerning good decision-making and best action. These ethical questions engage policymakers, practitioners, scientists, and researchers from a variety of fields in different ways. Collaborations between professionals in the medical and health sciences and the social sciences and humanities often take an asymmetrical form, as when social scientists use ethnographic approaches to study the moral issues and practices of physicians. The ethics laboratory described in this article is a cross-sectoral and inter-disciplinary forum for collaborative investigation on important moral topics. It offers an experimental way of unpacking implied assumptions, underlying values, and comparable notions from different professional healthcare fields. The aim of this article is to present the ethics laboratory's methodology. The article offers a model and a hermeneutical framework that rests on a dialogical approach to ethical questions. The model and the framework derive from a Danish research project, Personalized Medicine in the Welfare State. This article uses personalized medicine as a point of reference, though it offers an argument for the applicability of the model more broadly.

Clinical ethics consultants occasionally encounter unethical and/or unprofessional behavior as part of their normal job functions. In this article, we explore whether resigning (i.e., threatening resignation or resigning) and whistleblowing are acceptable methods ethics consultants can use to address these situations. Per our analysis, whether one considers ethics consultants private or public employees, loyal to their employer or to patients, families, and the public, resigning and whistleblowing are all acceptable, if not obligatory, actions of ethics consultants in certain circumstances. In this article, we analyze salient characteristics of ethics consultation as a profession as they pertain to resignation and whistleblowing in the context of ethics consultation. We also present tentative criteria for when ethics consultants are justified, if not obligated, to resign or blow the whistle.

Within this paper, we discuss Moral Distress Reflective Debriefs as a promising approach to address and mitigate moral distress experienced by healthcare professionals. We briefly review the empirical and theoretical literature on critical incident stress debriefing and psychological debriefing to highlight the potential benefits of this modality. We then describe the approach that we take to facilitating reflective group discussions in response to morally distressing patient cases ("Moral Distress Reflective Debriefs"). We discuss how the debriefing literature and other clinical ethics activities influenced the development of our approach. In particular, we focus on the role of the clinical ethicist as a facilitator with particular emphasis on encouraging perspective-taking and nurturing ethical attunement in a supportive manner. We suggest that this approach reduces the narrowing effects of frustration and anger that are often reported when individuals experience moral-constraint distress. Finally, we provide an example of Moral Distress Reflective Debriefs, elucidating how this supportive process complements ethics consultation and can mitigate the negative effects of moral distress.

Background:  Healthcare providers who are accountable for patient care safety and quality but who are not empowered to actualize them experience moral distress. Interventions to mitigate moral distress in the healthcare organization are needed.

Objective:  To evaluate the effect on moral distress and clinician empowerment of an established, health-system-wide intervention, Moral Distress Consultation.

Methods:  A quasi-experimental, mixed methods study using pre/post surveys, structured interviews, and evaluation of consult themes was used. Consults were requested by staff when moral distress was present. The purpose of consultation is to identify the causes of moral distress, barriers to action, and strategies to improve the situation. Intervention participants were those who attended a moral distress consult. Control participants were staff surveyed prior to the consult. Interviews were conducted after the consult with willing participants and unit managers. Moral distress was measured using the Moral Distress Thermometer. Empowerment was measured using the Global Empowerment Scale.

Results:  Twenty-one consults were conducted. Analysis included 116 intervention and 30 control surveys, and 11 interviews. A small but significant decrease was found among intervention participants, especially intensive care staff. Empowerment was unchanged. Interview themes support the consult service as an effective mode for open discussion of difficult circumstances and an important aspect of a healthy work environment.

Conclusions:  Moral distress consultation is an organization-wide mechanism for addressing moral distress. Consultation does not resolve moral distress but helps staff identify strategies to improve the situation. Further studies including follow up may elucidate consultation effectiveness.

One of the most significant and persistent debates in secular clinical ethics is the question of ethics expertise, which asks whether ethicists can make justified moral recommendations in active patient cases. A critical point of contention in the ethics expertise debate is whether there is, in fact, a bioethical consensus upon which secular ethicists can ground their recommendations and whether there is, in principle, a way of justifying such a consensus in a morally pluralistic context. In a series of recent articles in this journal, Janet Malek defends a positive view of ethics expertise, claiming that secular ethicists should comport their recommendations with bioethical consensus. In response, Nick Colgrove and Kelly Kate Evans deny the existence of a secular bioethical consensus; question why, even if it did exist, consensus should be considered a reliable way of resolving bioethical questions; and recommend a friendlier approach to clinical ethics based on the thought of H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. In this article, I respond to Colgrove and Evans on all three points. In part one, I show there is a secular bioethical consensus but note it could be better consolidated and created through a more systematic and inclusive process. In part two, I argue that bioethical consensus is morally justified but note that this justification cannot be plausibly based upon claims that it only invokes moral principles available to or shared by all. In part three, I argue Engelhardt's approach cannot be described as "friendlier" to clinical ethics because it is incompatible with many current healthcare laws and policies.