Journal of Cognition and Culture最新文献

Copying has been a productive paradigm for the study of cultural learning. Copying is about information transmission, the success of which is measured by the similarity of knowledge between models and learners. In this paper, we identify some shortcomings in the use of copying mechanisms (e.g., imitation, emulation) as explanations of cultural learning, emphasizing their focus on the flow of information (from expert to novice) instead of on the specific interactions involved during episodes of learning. We argue that the micro-interactions between models and learners and how they coordinate with one another better explain how knowledge is passed on between individuals. We propose to understand cultural learning as a form of interpersonal coordination, i.e., as the result of dynamic interactions involving mutual behavioral alignment between two interacting agents. We sketch how a coordination framework provides a richer picture of cultural learning, with more explanatory power than the copying paradigm.

Trying to preserve cultural forms as faithfully as possible is a key motivation for cultural transmission. This paper reviews two possible accounts of it. One, evolutionary conservatism, is premised on the superiority of accumulated cultural knowledge compared to individual judgement – a theme that runs strongly through both the cultural evolution literature and conservative political philosophy. I argue for a clear distinction between evolutionary conservatism, and status quo conservatism as motivated by loss- and risk-aversion. I proceed to tackle some outstanding issues regarding status quo conservatism: its association with attachment to social hierarchies; the kind of cultural practices that tend to elicit it; and the question why an attitude motivated by considerations of costs and benefits might be manifested as a rigid or absolute principle. Seeing some cultural practices as equilibria in a coordination game helps answer these questions.

Theories of cultural evolution tend to agree that teaching is one of the most powerful social learning mechanisms whereby knowledge gets passed on from one generation to the next. Researchers have mainly focused on the communicative signals adults produce when teaching. Natural pedagogy theory, for example, discusses how adults’ use of ostensive communication leads children to adopt a learning stance and interpret the information they receive as generalizable (Gergely & Csibra, 2013). A consequence of this is that children are almost exclusively cast in the role of beneficiaries of others’ pedagogy. We argue that young children are not just receptive to teaching – they have pedagogical skills that have not been recognized by theories of cultural evolution. Children’s pedagogical competence manifests in their selective and learner-sensitive teaching of others. We urge theories of cultural evolution to recognize that children receive knowledge not just from adults but also from other children.

Cultural evolution is substantially driven by agentic forces and rather less by the random variation and natural selection that dominate the evolution of genes. Reinforcement based decisions (attractors) keep cultural evolution tolerably on track of genetic fitness. Reinforcement can come from a variety of proximate mechanisms ranging from rather general-purpose appetites and emotions to highly specific cognitive features. Cognitive features must be substantially built by social and individual learning to be compatible with the vast cultural diversity we observe in space and over time. At the same time gene-based components of reinforcement keep culture generally on track of genetic fitness. This essay asks whether the available neuroscientific evidence on brain function is more compatible with this cultural niche hypothesis or the much more directly gene-based cognitive niche alternative. Future neuroscience may provide a complete proximate account of the biological foundations of culture.

Culture and cultural transmission is underpinned by social learning, allowing an individual to adopt the traditions of one’s cultural group by interacting with others. Here I describe studies which demonstrate the role of imitation, the copying of methods and outcomes of behaviour, on cultural sustainability and innovation. Through diffusion studies with children using artificial fruits, the transmission of behaviour within and across groups was investigated. The results show that children are faithful to the methods and outcomes they witness, including copying irrelevant actions. Children in open diffusion studies acquired more than one solution, but sub-groups were established, conforming to a solution with other solutions being held in one’s repertoire. Imitation is a critical skill underpinning the adoption and transmission of culture, with other mechanisms, such as asocial learning, teaching and emulation playing a less pertinent role.

The mechanisms of selection, assimilation and transmission at work in cultural accumulation need to include evaluative processes for detecting informational lacunae and repair mechanisms. Novelty, interest, learnability of alternative concepts and practices need to be permanently monitored at the individual and at the group level. It is proposed that the evaluative mechanisms that control cultural accumulation are themselves subject to cultural evolution. This article outlines a plausible sequence of evolutionary steps from curiosity-based exploration to inquisitive communication and to collective epistemic deliberation. Procedural metacognition, based on affective monitoring, regulates curiosity and early forms of inquisitive communication. Explicit metacognition, based on transmitted concepts, rules and practices regulates collective epistemic deliberation. It successively expands across cultures the epistemic sensitivity to a range of distinct norms such as evidentiality, consistency, explanatory power and consensuality.

The purpose of this paper is to stimulate productive research on institutions from within cultural evolutionary science and, especially, philosophy of science. It aims to achieve this goal by distinguishing between three types of question a theory of institutions ought to answer; by comparing and analyzing three theories of institutions; and by raising, for each theory, potential challenges and questions. Theories analyzed include a cognitive psychological theory, an ecological theory, and self-interested enforcement theory. Common features of the theories are identified where possible. Emphasis is placed on stating constructive criticisms and research questions. The paper concludes with comments about the uncertain ontology of institutions and about consequences of building cultural evolutionary theories of institutions on formal models of institutions.

Sociologists and social psychologists have long seen reputation management as an important human motivation. More recently, evolutionary analyses have helped understand the function of reputation management, demonstrating the fitness consequences of being thought of as dominant, moral, or competent. Here, I argue that reputation management likely plays an important, but understudied, role in cultural evolution – whether one takes the perspective of dual inheritance theory or of cultural attraction theory. I illustrate the importance of reputation management through its role in the spread of non-actionable beliefs – beliefs which have few or no behavioral consequences, but which constitute a large part of culture.