Bulletin of Economic Research最新文献

The COVID-19 pandemic implied measures, such as school closures at the outbreak of the pandemic, negatively affected children's human capital. However, in some places, the situation later resulted in a reduction in class sizes in order to avoid the spread of SARS-Cov-2 in schools. We take advantage of this unexpected event to evaluate the effect on school performance of a significant class size reduction implemented in Spain, when schools were reopened. We find a positive and significant effect of the class size reduction of 0.11 standard deviations on overall students' performance. Given the situation and nature of our data, we interpret our estimates as a lower bound for the true effect of the reduction in class size. We conclude that the reduction in class size served, on average, to at least compensate for the other negative effects on learning. Our findings also point out the importance of evaluating the quality of the new and inexperienced additional teachers that need to be hired when implementing a general reduction of class size.

This study explores the effect of partial passive ownership (PPO) in a successive two-round endogenous timing game wherein firms choose research and development (R&D) investments in the first round and then subsequently choose quantities in the second round. We show that each firm prefers to be a quantity leader independent of the timing of R&D decisions, but the welfare-inferior Cournot competition is an equilibrium of an endogenous production timing game. Moreover, we discover that the equilibrium of an endogenous R&D timing game crucially depends on the PPO level and R&D spillovers rate, while the R&D timing coordination may not be socially desirable unless both are low or high. Our findings suggest that the R&D leadership position of a PPO holder can play an anticompetitive role in the coordination of R&D competition with higher R&D spillovers rates and PPO levels.

The widely used economic policy uncertainty index relies on newspaper reports' word count and may be influenced by media coverage biases. This empirical study explores the response of the economic policy uncertainty index to permanent and transitory shocks, which are identified using a structural vector autoregressive model. We find an overreaction in the economic policy uncertainty index to a permanent shock, suggesting media reporting's temporary overeagerness. Specifically, we demonstrate that the index responds negatively and transiently to a permanent shock, followed by reversed, prolonged responses. However, the negative and transient effects of a transitory shock on the index are milder.

This study examines how optimal specific or ad valorem taxation in a free-entry Cournot oligopoly market is affected by a change in another exogenously given tax. We derive the sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the optimal tax rate, which are related to the concavity of the marginal revenue and the log-concavity of the first derivative of the average cost function. By guaranteeing the uniqueness, we can conduct a comparative statics analysis on the optimal tax rate. We show that a marginal increase in another tax can paradoxically reduce prices and decrease the optimal tax rate.

Service offshoring raises the fear of job loss for high-skilled workers, unlike goods offshoring, because workers at home compete with highly educated workers in low-income countries. This paper examines whether the increase in the United States's service offshoring to India has reduced the domestic employment of the occupations with greater exposure to Indian service imports. To account for endogeneity, I instrument for the growth of the United States's service imports from India by exploiting the change in Indian exports to European countries. Service offshoring reduces total employment from 2000 to 2006; however, this effect disappears overall and becomes positive for college-educated workers in the later period from 2006 to 2016. Unlike goods offshoring, the employment effect is largely driven by college-educated workers, and the employment growth in the later period is larger.

In recent years, the wave of mergers and acquisitions in the capital market has risen. As a result, the goodwill impairment (GI) of listed firms has been frequent. This study empirically examines the association between the foreign-background characteristics of executives and firm GI risk using data from 2008 to 2020 for A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen, China. The results show that there is a positive relationship between the foreign background of executives and the risk of GI of firms. Further results show that executives with foreign working backgrounds have a more significant positive impact on GI risk than executives with foreign study backgrounds. In addition, the positive effect of the foreign background of executives of non-state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on GI risk is more profound than that of SOEs. However, internal controls and institutional investors’ shareholdings weaken the positive association between executives’ foreign backgrounds and GI risk. This study provides evidence of the determinants of GI in firms and the economic consequences of the foreign-background characteristics of executives.

Previous literature has shown the detrimental impact of corruption on innovation. Conversely, the grease-the-wheel effect, in bribing fuelling firm innovation, has found some empirical support too. Past studies show that foreign-owned firms largely outperform domestic firms in innovation activities. However, little is known about how corruption in developing countries might shape the advantages of foreign-owned firms to innovate. We explored whether bribery, as an institutional dysfunctionality, is differently associated with innovation in the context of foreign owned versus domestically owned firms that operate in overall low research and development intensive economies and engage in exporting. By applying recursive bivariate probit regression, we investigated the link between bribery and innovation engagement among 4118 domestically and foreign-owned exporting firms from 34 developing countries, using data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys and other databases. We find evidence on the grease-the-wheel effect so that bribery has a stimulating effect on innovation among domestically as well as foreign-owned exporting firms. These findings underscore the importance for developing countries of finding institutional and policy solutions to coordination failure in combatting corruption.

This paper makes comparative statics in a model in which oligopolistic and monopolistically competitive firms that are heterogeneous in productivity compete. We demonstrate that (i) entry of oligopolistic incumbents, (ii) reduction in entry cost of monopolistically competitive entrants, and (iii) market size expansion improve the average productivity in the whole economy. However, (i) and (iii) raise welfare, but (ii) may lower welfare because of the presence of oligopolistic firms.

“Broadband China” (BC), the new Chinese government implementation in 2013, has led to substantial investments in internet infrastructure development. Furthermore, accurately evaluating its effects is of great significance. BC is taken as a quasinatural experiment in this paper. Data from 278 Chinese cities from 2007 to 2019 are used to evaluate this policy influence on city innovation ability by building a regression discontinuity (RD) design model. In addition, its heterogeneity and mechanism are also analyzed. The results show that (1) city innovation ability is significantly improved by the BC policy, and this is still valid after robustness tests. (2) The influence of the BC policy on city innovation ability is heterogeneous and more significant in more prosperous regions, such as in the eastern regions and in large cities. (3) Mechanism analysis shows that the city innovation ability is enhanced by improving knowledge spillover and stimulating entrepreneurial activities.

We examine the welfare implications of two tariff regimes when firms have a forward-looking view on trade policy. Discriminatory tariffs lead to Cournot competition, whereas uniform tariffs lead to diverse competition modes. If exporters are identical in production costs, all the trading countries are better off under the uniform rather than discriminatory tariff regime, which suggests a possibility that countries reach an agreement on the most-favored nation (MFN) as a preferred tariff regime. For asymmetric costs among exporters; however, the competition mode determined endogenously under the uniform tariffs does matter for the welfare comparison. If Cournot competition emerges, then each country's preference is consistent with conventional wisdom. That is, the importing country and high-cost exporters prefer a discriminatory tariff while low-cost exporters have a uniform tariff regime. However, if the uniform regime leads to either Bertrand or asymmetric competition mode, then the cost gap between exporters would be the determinant factor. Only when the cost gap is sufficiently small, the uniform tariff, required by the MFN clause of the World Trade Organization, can be beneficial to all trading countries.