Bulletin of Economic Research最新文献

Using data from 25 EU countries spanning the period 1999–2017, this paper examines the relationship between working-age suicides and changes in long-term unemployment and tests for mitigating effects through the implementation of labor-market policies. The estimates suggest higher suicide risks following a rising rate of long-term unemployment. Passive support policies have a suicide-decreasing impact. Among active policies, a significant suicide-decreasing effect is found for training and direct job creation. The results have important policy implications in that they suggest that strong commitment of governments to passive or to certain types of active labor-market policies can, on average, contribute to social stability and the welfare of populations.

We provide a novel panel model to decompose total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the Greek industry at the firm level while we tackle the contribution of R&D. We, therefore, opt for parametric methodology that provides statistical inference and would validate the results. Our modeling departs from prior strong assumptions such as error terms across firms being independent. In fact, we provide a novel limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation method that adequately deals with the issue of endogeneity and model misspecification. We demonstrate that our model detects variability in terms of TFP growth components across industries and firms. Our results show that R&D would enhance TFP of Greek firms, albeit the crisis has had a detrimental impact. Financial ratios such as liquidity and solvency ratios also affect TFP as we demonstrate that both would enhance TFP. The solvency ratio is important as it provides an estimate of whether the firm can cope with debt. We also note variability across small versus medium and large firms and report that small firms are more productive and spend more of their revenues on R&D. In terms of policy, our evidence warrants higher R&D spending to enhance TFP growth, though R&D funding is a concern.

Remittances are an important source of income for the very countries afflicted by high levels of corruption. However, corruption undermines the development potential of remittances. With this in mind, we propose policy reforms that harness the potential of remittances while mitigating corruption. Unlike previous studies, we point to two channels: (1) the corrupt government's trade-off between its financial interests (corruption), the provision of a public good, and the gains from a higher inflow of remittances; and (2) the household's consumption of the public good relative to that of the privately obtained substitute of the public good.

The school choice problem is of great importance both in theory and practice. This paper studies the (student-optimal) top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) in an axiomatic way. We introduce two new axioms: MBG (mutual best group)-quota-rationality and MBG-robust efficiency. While stability implies MBG-quota rationality, MBG-robust efficiency is weaker than robust efficiency, which is stronger than the combination of efficiency and group strategy proofness. The TTCM is characterized by MBG-quota rationality and MBG-robust efficiency. Our results construct a new basis to compare the TTCM with the other school choice mechanisms, in terms of both fairness and incentive-related axioms.

When measuring poverty in developed countries, the poverty line used to identify the poor is usually relative and set as a percentage of the median (or of the mean) of the total income. In consequence, when poverty is analyzed over a period of time, changes in the poverty level depend on the impact of evolving standards. To eliminate this effect, sometimes, an anchored poverty line is used. Furthermore, changes in the mean of the distribution and in the inequality among the poor may also affect the poverty levels. This note proposes a decomposition of the changes in poverty as the sum of four terms. The first two reflect the impact in poverty of changes in living standards and the other two measure the effect of the distributional growth and redistribution. This decomposition will help policymakers in the implementation of a more specific antipoverty agenda. An application with data from the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions shows the potential of the decomposition proposed.

This paper introduces an asymmetric robust weighted least squares (ARLS) approach to improve the forecasting performance of the heterogeneous autoregressive model for realized volatility. The ARLS approach down-weights extreme observations to limit the bad influence of outliers on the estimated parameters. Compared with existing robust regression methods, our model further takes into account the asymmetry of outliers using a class of kernel functions. Out-of-sample results show the ARLS approach can generate more accurate forecasts of the S&P 500 index realized volatility in the statistical and economic senses. The model that considers the asymmetry of outliers gains superior performance among various robust regression competitors. The forecasting improvements also hold in other international stock markets. More importantly, the source of the predictive ability of the ARLS model comes from the less biased and more efficient parameter estimation.

In hiring decisions, universities explicitly reward focusing on a specific field. I model the use of research specialization (focusing) in hiring as a signal of ability. Without explicit reward for focusing, candidates who focus are more likely to be able. However, if job market rewards focusing, less able candidates who would otherwise be indifferent between focusing or not, start focusing, which leads to smaller likelihood of observing an able candidate among those who focus than among those who do not. Specialization works as an effective ability signal only when generation of good ideas is highly likely for all ability levels.

How do investment subsidies bear on pure redistribution when coupled with capital income taxes? In a heterogeneous agent, neoclassical growth framework it is found that on impact, with no optimizing behavior, investment subsidies are good for growth but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. But when the government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the private sector (the follower), the optimal feedback policy is by construction time-consistent and implies that in a long-run optimum the tax scheme does not distort accumulation. This holds regardless of social preferences. For the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium I find that (pure) redistribution can go either way and capital income taxes are nonzero in the long-run, time-consistent optimum, depending on the social weight of those who receive redistributive transfers, the distribution of pretax factor incomes, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is argued that investment subsidies may be an important indirect tool for redistribution, and may allow for the separation of “efficiency” and “equity” concerns.

This article investigates the impact of microstructure factors on asset pricing in some African stock markets. We use data on stocks listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the “Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières,” and the Nigeria Stock Exchange, and we consider international portfolio management from 2000 to 2014. Generalized least square and fixed effect are estimation methods used to highlight the effect of microstructure variables on expected return. At the same time, panel smooth transition regression (PSTR) modeling is considered to identify the thresholds in this effect. The results show that liquidity and to a lesser extent the number of trading days are the most common significant microstructure variables for all the studied markets. However, other variables’ effects on the return are specific to the considered stock markets. Furthermore, the PSTR estimator reveals that the impact of indicated factors on asset pricing is not linear because it produces a double threshold between return and microstructure.

We examine the relationship between firm-sponsored training and product quality competition within a model of worker–firm bargaining. We develop a quality-adjusted monopolistically competitive setting in which firms invest in training to an extent that reflects: (i) the costs of training, (ii) the extent to which training increases product quality, and (iii) the extent to which product quality increases final product demand. We identify the conditions under which greater sensitivity between product demand and quality results in greater firm-sponsored training.