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When the purchasing officer looks the other way: on the waste effects of debauched local environment in public works execution 当采购官员以另一种方式看待:在公共工程执行中，堕落的当地环境造成的浪费效应
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economics of Governance
Pub Date : 2019-02-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00223-5
C. Guccio, D. Lisi, I. Rizzo
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引用次数: 11
The impact of state intervention and bankruptcy authorization laws on local government deficits 国家干预和破产授权法对地方政府赤字的影响
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economics of Governance
Pub Date : 2019-02-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00222-6
Lang Yang

Local governments in the United States can file for bankruptcy to restructure their debt if allowed by state laws. While some states legislate an unconditional authorization, others conditionally permit local filings, do not give authorization, or intervene in local crises. This paper investigates the impact of state policy adoption on local governments’ revenue to expense ratio, a measure of deficit. While bankruptcy authorizations do not show an impact at the mean, a median locality decreases the revenue–expense ratio after the state adopts an authorization unconditional on state intervention, suggesting a moral hazard effect. Localities with conditionally high deficits, however, increase the ratio upon the adoption of a conditional authorization, possibly because they want to avoid being subjective to conditions placed by states.

如果州法律允许，美国地方政府可以申请破产以重组债务。有些州立法无条件授权，有些州则有条件地允许地方申请破产，或不授权，或在地方危机时进行干预。本文研究了州政府采取的政策对地方政府收入支出比（衡量赤字的指标）的影响。虽然破产授权在均值上没有显示出影响，但中位数地方在州政府无条件干预的情况下通过授权后，收入与支出的比率会下降，这表明存在道德风险效应。然而，有条件高赤字的地方在通过有条件授权后会提高该比率，这可能是因为它们希望避免主观地接受州政府提出的条件。
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引用次数: 0
Medieval European traditions in representation and state capacity today 中世纪的欧洲传统在今天的代表权和国家能力
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economics of Governance
Pub Date : 2019-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3251355
J. Pavlik, A. Young
Rich economies are characterized by the coincidence of, on the one hand, high state capacity and, on the other, well-functioning markets and the rule of law. They have states that are powerful and centralized and yet also limited . Furthermore, relatively low rates of shadow economic activity and tax evasion suggest that citizens perceive their states’ limitations to be credible. This suggests that a state’s ability to be credibly limited may facilitate its investments in state capacity. Consistent with this, we explore the potential link between historical traditions of representative governance institutions and state capacity today. We report that medieval and early modern representative assembly experiences positively correlate with higher tax revenues, smaller shadow economies, greater state control of violence and yet fewer state resources dedicated to violence. Relative to tax revenues, the evidence regarding shadow economies and violence is more robust to various controls and samples.
富裕经济体的特点是，一方面国家能力高，另一方面市场和法治运作良好。他们的国家既强大又集中，但也很有限。此外，相对较低的影子经济活动率和逃税率表明，公民认为他们所在州的限制是可信的。这表明，一个国家受到可信限制的能力可能会促进其对国家能力的投资。与此相一致的是，我们探索了代议制治理机构的历史传统与当今国家能力之间的潜在联系。我们报告说，中世纪和现代早期的代议制议会经历与更高的税收、更小的影子经济、更大的国家对暴力的控制以及更少的国家暴力资源呈正相关。相对于税收，关于影子经济和暴力的证据对各种控制和样本更为有力。
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引用次数: 13
The role of matching grants as a commitment device in the federation model with a repeated soft budget setting 在重复软预算设置的联合会模式中，配套补助金作为一种承诺手段的作用
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economics of Governance
Pub Date : 2019-01-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00221-7
Nobuo Akai, Motohiro Sato
This paper revisits the soft budget versus the hard budget constraint in federations. By extending Besfamille and Lockwood (Int Econ Rev 49:577–593, 2008), who examine a case where the soft budget is ex ante favorable, we consider a model that allows the federal government to use a matching grant as an ex post policy instrument. We establish that this instrument acts as a commitment device and may improve social welfare compared with the situation in which the government’s ex ante policy options are limited to a hard or soft budget.
本文重新审视了联邦中的软预算与硬预算约束。Besfamille 和 Lockwood（Int Econ Rev 49：577-593，2008 年）研究了事前软预算有利的情况，通过对他们的研究进行扩展，我们考虑了一个允许联邦政府使用配套赠款作为事后政策工具的模型。我们认为，与政府的事前政策选择仅限于硬预算或软预算的情况相比，该工具作为一种承诺工具，可能会改善社会福利。
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引用次数: 0
The state economic modernity index: an index of state building, state size and scope, and state economic power 国家经济现代化指数:国家建设、国家规模和范围、国家经济实力的指标
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economics of Governance
Pub Date : 2019-01-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-018-00220-0
Ryan H. Murphy
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引用次数: 1
Environmental policy efficiency: measurement and determinants 环境政策效率:测量和决定因素
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economics of Governance
Pub Date : 2019-01-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-018-0219-y
Antonis Adam, Sofia Tsarsitalidou
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引用次数: 13
A test of the institutionally-induced equilibrium hypothesis: on the limited fiscal impact of two celebrity governors 制度诱发均衡假说的检验：关于两位名人州长的有限财政影响
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economics of Governance
Pub Date : 2018-12-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-018-0218-z
Roger D. Congleton, Yang Zhou
The governorships of Jesse Ventura of Minnesota and Arnold Schwarzenegger of California provide two natural experiments for testing the institutionally induced stability hypothesis. Both men rose to their governorships through unique career and electoral paths that would reduce the stabilizing effects of partisan commitments and electoral competition, which would tend to increase their impact on public policy. Nonetheless, our evidence suggests that despite their unique backgrounds and paths to office neither governor had a statistically significant impact on their state’s expenditures or deficits.
明尼苏达州的杰西-文图拉（Jesse Ventura）和加利福尼亚州的阿诺德-施瓦辛格（Arnold Schwarzenegger）担任州长一职，为检验制度诱导稳定假说提供了两个自然实验。两人都是通过独特的职业生涯和选举途径升任州长的，这将减少党派承诺和选举竞争的稳定效应，从而增加他们对公共政策的影响。尽管如此，我们的证据表明，尽管两人的背景和就职之路都很独特，但两位州长都没有对本州的支出或赤字产生统计意义上的显著影响。
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引用次数: 0
Selection rates and bureaucratic performance 遴选率和官僚绩效
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economics of Governance
Pub Date : 2018-11-21 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-018-0217-0
Daniel Gibbs
Bureaucratic personnel policy influences agency performance by affecting both the types of bureaucrats who are selected for employment and the actions that bureaucrats take. An effective policy selects intrinsically motivated bureaucrats for promotion or retention and provides incentives for bureaucrats to exert a high level of effort. I investigate a retention and promotion policy used in a number of U.S. government agencies in which only a previously specified percentage of bureaucrats in a cohort are retained after one period. The proportion of bureaucrats retained after a review is referred to as a “selection rate”. Using a formal model, I show that the adoption of a selection rate facilitates the separation of intrinsically motivated and unmotivated bureaucrats where they would otherwise pool, allowing bureaucratic personnel managers to screen out unmotivated bureaucrats. Effective screening by itself, however, is not welfare-enhancing because screening removes unmotivated bureaucrats’ incentives to exert effort. Compared to alternative welfare-reducing screening mechanisms which bring about screening through monitoring or wage policy, selection rates facilitate welfare-enhancing screening by inducing motivated types to exert additional effort in order to distinguish themselves from unmotivated bureaucrats. I find that selection rates are most effective where material or ego rents from government employment are high and where the policy rewards that motivated bureaucrats realize are low. These properties of selection rates explain their adoption in several U.S. government agencies’ personnel systems, most notably the military officer corps.
官僚人事政策通过影响被选拔聘用的官僚类型和官僚采取的行动来影响机构绩效。有效的政策会选择具有内在动机的官员进行晋升或留任，并激励官员付出高水平的努力。我对美国一些政府机构采用的留任和晋升政策进行了调查，在该政策中，只有事先规定比例的官僚才能在一个时期后留任。审查后留任的官员比例被称为 "遴选率"。通过一个正式的模型，我证明了遴选率的采用有利于将有内在动机和无内在动机的官僚分离开来，使官僚机构的人事管理者能够筛选出无内在动机的官僚。然而，有效的筛选本身并不能提高福利，因为筛选消除了不思进取的官僚努力工作的动力。与通过监督或工资政策实现筛选的其他降低福利的筛选机制相比，遴选率通过诱导有积极性的类型付出额外努力，以将自己与无积极性的官僚区分开来，从而促进了提高福利的筛选。我发现，在政府雇佣的物质或自我租金较高，而有积极性的官僚实现的政策回报较低的情况下，选择率最为有效。遴选率的这些特性解释了为什么美国一些政府机构的人事制度会采用遴选率，尤其是军官制度。
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引用次数: 0
Expenditure visibility and voter memory: a compositional approach to the political budget cycle in Indian states, 1959–2012 支出可见性和选民记忆：1959年至2012年印度各州政治预算周期的组成方法
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economics of Governance
Pub Date : 2018-11-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-018-0216-1
J. Ferris, B. Dash
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引用次数: 9
Does participatory budgeting improve decentralized public service delivery? Experimental evidence from rural Russia 参与式预算是否改善了分散的公共服务提供?来自俄罗斯农村的实验证据
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economics of Governance
Pub Date : 2018-11-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-018-0214-3
Diether W. Beuermann, M. Amelina
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引用次数: 35
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