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The role of the past in public policy: empirical evidence of the long-term effect of past policy and politics on the local budget balance 过去在公共政策中的作用:过去的政策和政治对地方预算平衡的长期影响的经验证据
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2019-12-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00232-4
Stefanie Vanneste, Stijn Goeminne

The main focus of this paper is on the role of the past in budgetary policy and the impact of a multitude of relevant political characteristics on the local budget balance in a dynamic context. Although the importance of past policy was stated approximately 6 decades ago by Lindblom (Public Adm Rev 19(2):79–88, 1959), dynamic studies are relatively underexposed in recent literature on the budget balance at the local government level. The studies that do take into account the dynamics surprisingly do not focus on the past but treat it as a control variable. This paper exhibits the theoretical background of introducing past performance into the analysis. It is also noticeable that the dynamic studies thus far only test the partisan and the political budget cycle hypotheses. In the empirical part of this study, we add government fragmentation and government power to the dynamic analysis, and we look for both short- and long-term effects on the budget balance. In doing so, we test the impact of multiple political characteristics simultaneously on a dataset of all Flemish local governments for the period 1995–2017. The results from the dynamic panel analysis show that past performance is of importance, as are the electoral budget cycle and the power of the government. The importance of the government power for the budget balance is a new insight in dynamic research. As we focus on the long-term impact of the explanatory variables due to the dynamics, we avoid the underestimation of the impact of politics on the budget balance in the long run.

本文的重点是过去在预算政策中的作用,以及在动态背景下多种相关政治特征对地方预算平衡的影响。尽管林德布洛姆(Public Adm Rev 19(2):79-88,1959 年)在大约 60 年前就指出了过去政策的重要性,但在近期有关地方政府预算平衡的文献中,动态研究相对较少。那些考虑到动态性的研究出人意料地没有关注过去,而是将其作为一个控制变量。本文介绍了在分析中引入过去绩效的理论背景。同样值得注意的是,迄今为止的动态研究只检验了党派假设和政治预算周期假设。在本研究的实证部分,我们在动态分析中加入了政府分化和政府权力,并寻求对预算平衡的短期和长期影响。为此,我们对 1995-2017 年期间所有佛兰德地方政府的数据集同时检验了多种政治特征的影响。动态面板分析的结果表明,过去的绩效、选举预算周期和政府权力都很重要。政府权力对预算平衡的重要性是动态研究中的一个新见解。由于我们关注解释变量的动态长期影响,因此避免了低估政治对预算平衡的长期影响。
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引用次数: 0
The autocratic gamble: evidence from robust variance tests 专制赌博:来自稳健方差检验的证据
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2019-11-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00245-4
Fabio Monteforte, J. Temple
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引用次数: 0
Does enfranchisement affect fiscal policy? Theory and empirical evidence on Brazil 选举权会影响财政政策吗?巴西的理论和经验证据
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2019-10-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00230-6
Rodrigo Schneider, Diloá Athias, Mauricio Bugarin

This paper studies the effect of political participation on public spending at the local level in Brazil. In particular, we look at the phased-in implementation of electronic voting in the late 1990s—which enfranchised poorer voters by decreasing the number of invalid votes—to identify the causal effect of political participation on public spending. We build a theoretical political economy model which allows voters to cast, not purposefully, an invalid vote, and show that when poorer voters’ likelihood of casting a valid vote increases, public social spending increases as well. We test this prediction empirically using a difference-in-differences model where municipalities using electronic voting constitute our treatment group. We find that an increase of 1 percentage point in the valid vote to turnout ratio for state representatives increases health spending by 1.8%; education by 1.4%; public employment by 1.25%; intergovernmental transfers by 1%; and local taxes by 2.6%.

本文研究了政治参与对巴西地方公共支出的影响。特别是,我们研究了 20 世纪 90 年代末分阶段实施的电子投票--它通过减少无效票的数量赋予了贫困选民投票权--以确定政治参与对公共开支的因果效应。我们建立了一个政治经济学理论模型,该模型允许选民投无效票,而不是故意投无效票,并表明当贫困选民投有效票的可能性增加时,社会公共开支也会增加。我们使用差分模型对这一预测进行了实证检验,在该模型中,使用电子投票的城市构成了我们的处理组。我们发现,州代表的有效投票与投票率每增加 1 个百分点,医疗支出就会增加 1.8%;教育支出增加 1.4%;公共就业增加 1.25%;政府间转移支付增加 1%;地方税收增加 2.6%。
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引用次数: 0
Democratizing Tech Giants! A roadmap 让科技巨头民主化!一个路线图
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2019-10-24 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00244-5
H. Gersbach
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引用次数: 0
Do victims of crime trust less but participate more in social organizations? 犯罪受害者是否对社会组织的信任度较低但参与度较高?
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2019-10-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00227-1
Matteo Pazzona

We explore how crime victimization affects two of the main dimensions of social capital: trust and participation in social groups. Using a large database that includes many Latin American countries, we find that victimization lowers trust, especially in other people and the police. However, participation in social groups is increased as a result of this event. These findings suggest that the net effect of victimization on social capital is miscalculated unless all of its dimensions are taken into account.

我们探讨了犯罪受害如何影响社会资本的两个主要方面:信任和参与社会团体。通过使用包括许多拉丁美洲国家在内的大型数据库,我们发现,受害会降低信任度,尤其是对他人和警察的信任度。然而,社会群体的参与度却因这一事件而提高。这些发现表明,除非考虑到受害对社会资本的所有影响,否则受害对社会资本的净影响会被误估。
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引用次数: 0
Is it the gums, teeth or the bite? Effectiveness of dimensions of enforcement in curbing corruption 是牙龈、牙齿还是被咬了?执法层面在遏制腐败方面的有效性
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2019-09-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00228-0
S. Capasso, R. Goel, James W. Saunoris
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引用次数: 17
Production inefficiency, cross-ownership and regional tax-range coordination 生产效率低下、跨所有制与区域税幅协调
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2019-09-24 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00229-z
Mutsumi Matsumoto
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引用次数: 0
Intergroup inequality and the breakdown of prosociality 群体间的不平等和亲社会性的瓦解
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2019-07-05 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00226-2
Rustam Romaniuc, Gregory J. DeAngelo, D. Dubois, Bryan C. McCannon
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引用次数: 3
Political incentives in firms’ financial reporting: evidence from the crackdown on corrupt municipal officials 企业财务报告中的政治动机:来自反腐市政官员的证据
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2019-05-31 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00225-3
X. Wang, Xian Gu
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引用次数: 4
Step-by-step group contests with group-specific public-good prizes 分步骤开展小组竞赛,并颁发针对特定小组的公益奖品
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2019-03-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00224-4
Katsuya Kobayashi
The achievements reached by group members’ effort, which accompanies the possibility of members’ free-riding, affect the outcomes of competition among groups. In some cases, each achievement has the binary characteristic of “one or nothing.” For example, research groups face the challenge of making a scientific finding or not. The groups compete for a scientific breakthrough by making the related findings in a “step-by-step” manner. One finding could fail because of a mistake caused by a slight lack of effort by one member. Such a characteristic of “one or nothing” motivates group members without any incentive scheme. This study analyzes group contests with group-specific public-good prizes, in which we introduce a step function with the characteristics of “one or nothing” and “step-by-step” as a group impact function. We show the existence of the Nash equilibrium at which no group member free-rides on the others and at which more achievements than those reachable by a single member are reached.
群体成员努力所取得的成就,伴随着成员搭便车的可能性,影响着群体间竞争的结果。在某些情况下,每项成就都具有 "非此即彼 "的二元特征。例如,研究小组面临着是否能取得科学发现的挑战。各小组通过 "循序渐进 "的方式取得相关发现,争夺科学突破。一个发现可能因为某个成员稍不努力而导致失误,从而失败。这种 "不成功便成仁 "的特点在没有任何激励计划的情况下也能调动小组成员的积极性。本研究分析了有团体特定公益奖品的团体竞赛,其中我们引入了一个具有 "一无 "和 "逐步 "特征的阶跃函数作为团体影响函数。我们证明了纳什均衡的存在,在这种均衡中,没有任何一个小组成员可以免费搭乘其他人的顺风车,而且所取得的成就比单个成员所能取得的成就还要多。
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引用次数: 0
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Economics of Governance
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