Pub Date : 2020-08-29DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00290-9
C. Guerriero
{"title":"Property rights, transaction costs, and the limits of the market","authors":"C. Guerriero","doi":"10.1007/s10101-023-00290-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00290-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-34"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41643715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-27DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00240-9
Alexander Mayer, S. Napel
{"title":"Weighted voting on the IMF Managing Director","authors":"Alexander Mayer, S. Napel","doi":"10.1007/s10101-020-00240-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-020-00240-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"21 1","pages":"237 - 244"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10101-020-00240-9","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45603951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-23DOI: 10.1007/s10101-021-00255-w
Thomas J. Miceli, Murat C. Mungan
{"title":"The limit of law: factors influencing the decision to make harmful acts illegal","authors":"Thomas J. Miceli, Murat C. Mungan","doi":"10.1007/s10101-021-00255-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-021-00255-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"22 1","pages":"293 - 307"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10101-021-00255-w","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48451919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-19DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00238-3
Mario Ferrero
{"title":"A theory of revolutionary organizations","authors":"Mario Ferrero","doi":"10.1007/s10101-020-00238-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-020-00238-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"21 1","pages":"245 - 273"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10101-020-00238-3","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52490808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-15DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00239-2
Byungwon Woo, Daniel Verdier
{"title":"A unifying theory of positive and negative incentives in international relations: sanctions, rewards, regime types, and compliance","authors":"Byungwon Woo, Daniel Verdier","doi":"10.1007/s10101-020-00239-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-020-00239-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"21 1","pages":"215 - 236"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10101-020-00239-2","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52490927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-28DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00237-4
Mounir Mahmalat, Declan Curran
How does fractionalization affect political collaboration on reform? We develop a theory to explain observable variation in legislative output over time and policy areas. We show how the properties of a reform project determine the extent to which fractionalization affects political collaboration on reform. We apply our framework to the case of Lebanon and present mixed-methods evidence based on a novel comprehensive dataset of legislative activity and 32 interviews with parliamentarians, ex-ministers, and other high ranking officials. Our findings contribute to explaining ambiguous evidence in the literature on the political economy of reform.
{"title":"Fractionalization and reform: a framework of political collaboration with application to Lebanon","authors":"Mounir Mahmalat, Declan Curran","doi":"10.1007/s10101-020-00237-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-020-00237-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How does fractionalization affect political collaboration on reform? We develop a theory to explain observable variation in legislative output over time and policy areas. We show how the properties of a reform project determine the extent to which fractionalization affects political collaboration on reform. We apply our framework to the case of Lebanon and present mixed-methods evidence based on a novel comprehensive dataset of legislative activity and 32 interviews with parliamentarians, ex-ministers, and other high ranking officials. Our findings contribute to explaining ambiguous evidence in the literature on the political economy of reform.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138536272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-03DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00236-5
J. Pavlik, A. Young
{"title":"Medieval European traditions in representation and state capacity today","authors":"J. Pavlik, A. Young","doi":"10.1007/s10101-020-00236-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-020-00236-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"21 1","pages":"133 - 186"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10101-020-00236-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49024516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-02-07DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00235-6
J. Faria, F. Mixon
{"title":"The Peter and Dilbert Principles applied to academe","authors":"J. Faria, F. Mixon","doi":"10.1007/s10101-020-00235-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-020-00235-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"21 1","pages":"115 - 132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10101-020-00235-6","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41994709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-25DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00234-7
Jinhee Jo, Lawrence S. Rothenberg
Studies of the line item veto have traditionally focused on whether it leads to less spending than an all-or-nothing veto and have only produced modest results. However, other impacts that differences in rule choice might effectuate have not been investigated in detail. We examine the role of veto rules for budgetary volatility, the extent to which expenditures vary. Theoretically, we model budget choices given all-or-nothing, line item, and item-reduction vetoes and demonstrate that more encompassing veto authority does not necessarily decrease spending but should result in more political gridlock, implying less volatility. We then analyze the model’s prediction by examining American state budget expenditures from 1978 to 2007. Whether one looks at budget categories or total spending, volatility is greater with the all-or-nothing veto relative to more stringent alternatives. Hence, delegating greater authority to executives such as governors, perhaps unexpectedly, likely strengthens expectations about future budgets while reducing the responsiveness of spending to changing preferences or circumstances.
{"title":"Budgetary choices and institutional rules: veto rules and budget volatility","authors":"Jinhee Jo, Lawrence S. Rothenberg","doi":"10.1007/s10101-020-00234-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-020-00234-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Studies of the line item veto have traditionally focused on whether it leads to less spending than an all-or-nothing veto and have only produced modest results. However, other impacts that differences in rule choice might effectuate have not been investigated in detail. We examine the role of veto rules for <i>budgetary volatility</i>, the extent to which expenditures vary. Theoretically, we model budget choices given all-or-nothing, line item, and item-reduction vetoes and demonstrate that more encompassing veto authority does not necessarily decrease spending but should result in more political gridlock, implying less volatility. We then analyze the model’s prediction by examining American state budget expenditures from 1978 to 2007. Whether one looks at budget categories or total spending, volatility is greater with the all-or-nothing veto relative to more stringent alternatives. Hence, delegating greater authority to executives such as governors, perhaps unexpectedly, likely strengthens expectations about future budgets while reducing the responsiveness of spending to changing preferences or circumstances.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140888864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-21DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00233-3
Mehdi Feizi, Rasoul Ramezanian, Saeed Malek Sadati
Different voting paradoxes identified by social choice theorists have rarely been documented in real-world elections. The collected data from the opinion polls in the 2017 Iranian presidential election provides substantial empirical evidence indicating that during the electoral campaigns, strong Borda paradox (the Condorcet loser wins plurality.) and weak Borda paradox (An alternative that is not the Condorcet winner wins plurality.) have occurred. At the same time, there was no evidence of a Condorcet paradox, i.e., a cycle among the top three candidates. The results support the empirical relevance of theoretical paradoxes in social choice and a call for the importance of voting procedures.
{"title":"Borda paradox in the 2017 Iranian presidential election: empirical evidence from opinion polls","authors":"Mehdi Feizi, Rasoul Ramezanian, Saeed Malek Sadati","doi":"10.1007/s10101-019-00233-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-019-00233-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Different voting paradoxes identified by social choice theorists have rarely been documented in real-world elections. The collected data from the opinion polls in the 2017 Iranian presidential election provides substantial empirical evidence indicating that during the electoral campaigns, strong Borda paradox (the Condorcet loser wins plurality.) and weak Borda paradox (An alternative that is not the Condorcet winner wins plurality.) have occurred. At the same time, there was no evidence of a Condorcet paradox, i.e., a cycle among the top three candidates. The results support the empirical relevance of theoretical paradoxes in social choice and a call for the importance of voting procedures.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140888859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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