Pub Date : 2024-01-26DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00307-3
Anthony M. Marino
This paper studies side activities, including political activities, in the context of a hidden action agency problem. Given increases in the number of employees working from home and increases in managerial political engagement, such activities have become more prevalent. We examine the impact of these activities on the optimal contact, the agent’s welfare, the firm’s profit, and total welfare. For the case of political activities, we study the impact of external negative and positive feedback as the result of these activities on the optimal contract and all equilibrium variables. We ask whether the firm should encourage or discourage these activities.
{"title":"Political and non-political side activities in an agency framework","authors":"Anthony M. Marino","doi":"10.1007/s10101-023-00307-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00307-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies side activities, including political activities, in the context of a hidden action agency problem. Given increases in the number of employees working from home and increases in managerial political engagement, such activities have become more prevalent. We examine the impact of these activities on the optimal contact, the agent’s welfare, the firm’s profit, and total welfare. For the case of political activities, we study the impact of external negative and positive feedback as the result of these activities on the optimal contract and all equilibrium variables. We ask whether the firm should encourage or discourage these activities.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139589230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-27DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00306-4
Daniel Bruno Davis, Ronald U. Mendoza, Jurel K. Yap
Corruption plays a central role in underdevelopment in the Philippines, yet there is no reliable, non-aggregate, and periodic measurement for corruption in the country. This study demonstrates the use of statistical techniques to synthesize information from public procurement contracts into one indicator to measure corruption risk for each province in the Philippines from 2004 to 2018. The results show corruption risk decreased from the 2004 term to 2013, and increased to an all-time high in 2016. Regression analysis also shows that two measures of political power concentration among clans—a Hirschman–Herfindahl Index applied to the political sphere (Political HHI), and the Size of the Largest Dynasty per Province—is significantly and positively linked to the corruption risk indicator at least at the 5% significance level. This result coheres with emerging literature on political dynasties, suggesting that these debilitate checks and balances and increase the risk of impunity and malgovernance at the local level, particularly in the Philippines. This study highlights the importance of studying corruption vis-à-vis the evolving issue of political dynasties amassing power, and provides further evidence that reforms are required in this area to promote development in democracies.
{"title":"Corruption risk and political dynasties: exploring the links using public procurement data in the Philippines","authors":"Daniel Bruno Davis, Ronald U. Mendoza, Jurel K. Yap","doi":"10.1007/s10101-023-00306-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00306-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Corruption plays a central role in underdevelopment in the Philippines, yet there is no reliable, non-aggregate, and periodic measurement for corruption in the country. This study demonstrates the use of statistical techniques to synthesize information from public procurement contracts into one indicator to measure corruption risk for each province in the Philippines from 2004 to 2018. The results show corruption risk decreased from the 2004 term to 2013, and increased to an all-time high in 2016. Regression analysis also shows that two measures of political power concentration among clans—a Hirschman–Herfindahl Index applied to the political sphere (Political HHI), and the Size of the Largest Dynasty per Province—is significantly and positively linked to the corruption risk indicator at least at the 5% significance level. This result coheres with emerging literature on political dynasties, suggesting that these debilitate checks and balances and increase the risk of impunity and malgovernance at the local level, particularly in the Philippines. This study highlights the importance of studying corruption vis-à-vis the evolving issue of political dynasties amassing power, and provides further evidence that reforms are required in this area to promote development in democracies.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139080253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-16DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00305-5
Shanshan Wu, C. James Hueng
Using a unique dataset of publicly listed companies in China, we show that the collaborative environmental governance between the central and local governments reduces the effect of local enforcement of regulations on firms’ environmentally responsible behaviors. This is consistent with the fact that the Chinese central government uses a command-and-control type of regulations under which the local governments bear the full cost of enforcing the regulations. The local governments do not have the incentive to override the central supervision and therefore, simply lower their standard of enforcement and comply with the central supervision. However, this finding mainly reflects the results from the state-owned enterprises. For the private firms, the central supervision instead strengthens the impact of local enforcement. The heterogeneous results can be explained by the fact that the private firms are more financially constrained compared to the state-owned enterprises. They have the incentives to avoid the costs of complying with the regulations by paying a fine or colluding with the local regulators. The central supervision reduces the asymmetric information and increases the non-compliant firms’ chance to get caught for violations or collusion. This explains why once the central government intervenes, those private firms have to improve their environmentally responsible behaviors.
{"title":"Central-local collaborative environmental governance and firm-level environmental performance: the role of firm ownership","authors":"Shanshan Wu, C. James Hueng","doi":"10.1007/s10101-023-00305-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00305-5","url":null,"abstract":"Using a unique dataset of publicly listed companies in China, we show that the collaborative environmental governance between the central and local governments reduces the effect of local enforcement of regulations on firms’ environmentally responsible behaviors. This is consistent with the fact that the Chinese central government uses a command-and-control type of regulations under which the local governments bear the full cost of enforcing the regulations. The local governments do not have the incentive to override the central supervision and therefore, simply lower their standard of enforcement and comply with the central supervision. However, this finding mainly reflects the results from the state-owned enterprises. For the private firms, the central supervision instead strengthens the impact of local enforcement. The heterogeneous results can be explained by the fact that the private firms are more financially constrained compared to the state-owned enterprises. They have the incentives to avoid the costs of complying with the regulations by paying a fine or colluding with the local regulators. The central supervision reduces the asymmetric information and increases the non-compliant firms’ chance to get caught for violations or collusion. This explains why once the central government intervenes, those private firms have to improve their environmentally responsible behaviors.","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"231 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136078623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-08DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00302-8
Teferi Mergo, Alain-Désiré Nimubona, Horatiu Alin Rus
{"title":"Ethnically asymmetric political representation and the provision of public goods: theory and evidence from Ethiopia","authors":"Teferi Mergo, Alain-Désiré Nimubona, Horatiu Alin Rus","doi":"10.1007/s10101-023-00302-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00302-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"164 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135251711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-02DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00303-7
Jun Yeung Hong, Sung Min Jeon, Gun Lee
{"title":"Younger CEO and older managers: focusing on tournament incentives","authors":"Jun Yeung Hong, Sung Min Jeon, Gun Lee","doi":"10.1007/s10101-023-00303-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00303-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"147 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135893299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00304-6
Joshua C. Hall, Michael C. Carroll, Yang Zhou
{"title":"Crises and Community Resilience: Introduction to the Special Issue","authors":"Joshua C. Hall, Michael C. Carroll, Yang Zhou","doi":"10.1007/s10101-023-00304-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00304-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"24 1","pages":"259 - 261"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42825816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-31DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00301-9
D. Joe
{"title":"Discipline by turnout","authors":"D. Joe","doi":"10.1007/s10101-023-00301-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00301-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44635309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-14DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00299-0
H. Jung
{"title":"Do young politicians make a difference? Evidence from local public expenditure in South Korea","authors":"H. Jung","doi":"10.1007/s10101-023-00299-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00299-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44214721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-13DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00295-4
Desiree A. Desierto
{"title":"Corruption for competence","authors":"Desiree A. Desierto","doi":"10.1007/s10101-023-00295-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00295-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"178 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136066075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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