We develop a new method for estimating production frontiers that allows the identification of sources of firm productivity variability. Our novel approach enhances the understanding of productivity growth and its sources, and the role of firm dynamics on growth. The empirical results using Australian firm-level data demonstrate that the approach can provide important insights, which can better inform policy formulation.
{"title":"Productivity Measurement With Big Data: A Data-Driven Approach Capturing Firm Heterogeneity","authors":"Shipei Zeng, Kevin J. Fox","doi":"10.1111/1467-8462.70014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8462.70014","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop a new method for estimating production frontiers that allows the identification of sources of firm productivity variability. Our novel approach enhances the understanding of productivity growth and its sources, and the role of firm dynamics on growth. The empirical results using Australian firm-level data demonstrate that the approach can provide important insights, which can better inform policy formulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":46348,"journal":{"name":"Australian Economic Review","volume":"58 4","pages":"289-298"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8462.70014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145659612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article reviews the experience in Australia with working from home (WFH). It briefly examines what is meant by WFH, highlighting the distinction between extension and replacement WFH and the importance of identifying those who work full days from home. It then presents evidence on the changing incidence of WFH in Australia and the types of workers who are most likely to work from home following the pandemic. It shows that around one in four workers regularly worked at least one full day from home in 2023, with hybrid work arrangements being more prevalent than working all days from home. Furthermore, WFH was concentrated in high-skilled white-collar office jobs. Finally, the growing body of research on the impacts of WFH on both workers and employers is reviewed. While there are both benefits and drawbacks, the Australian evidence mostly points to beneficial outcomes of WFH for workers. Far less is known about the impacts on employers, with Australian research being especially scarce.
{"title":"Working From Home: The Australian Experience","authors":"Inga Laβ, Mark Wooden","doi":"10.1111/1467-8462.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8462.70010","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article reviews the experience in Australia with working from home (WFH). It briefly examines what is meant by WFH, highlighting the distinction between extension and replacement WFH and the importance of identifying those who work full days from home. It then presents evidence on the changing incidence of WFH in Australia and the types of workers who are most likely to work from home following the pandemic. It shows that around one in four workers regularly worked at least one full day from home in 2023, with hybrid work arrangements being more prevalent than working all days from home. Furthermore, WFH was concentrated in high-skilled white-collar office jobs. Finally, the growing body of research on the impacts of WFH on both workers and employers is reviewed. While there are both benefits and drawbacks, the Australian evidence mostly points to beneficial outcomes of WFH for workers. Far less is known about the impacts on employers, with Australian research being especially scarce.</p>","PeriodicalId":46348,"journal":{"name":"Australian Economic Review","volume":"58 2","pages":"154-162"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8462.70010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Drawing on HILDA Survey data, this article provides an overview of changes in the Australian labour market since 2001 with a view to identifying whether these changes have the potential to contribute to a rise in disaffection in the community. Over the period since 2001 as a whole, employment and wage growth have been relatively broadly experienced across the community. However, some deterioration in labour market outcomes is evident for young men, and there is tentative evidence of rising disaffection among low-wage employees. Moreover, while the post-pandemic period has seen strong employment growth, real after-tax wages declined appreciably between 2021 and 2023, although these wage declines have been broadly felt.
{"title":"Have Changes in the Australian Labour Market This Century Contributed to Rising Voter Disaffection?","authors":"Roger Wilkins","doi":"10.1111/1467-8462.70012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8462.70012","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Drawing on HILDA Survey data, this article provides an overview of changes in the Australian labour market since 2001 with a view to identifying whether these changes have the potential to contribute to a rise in disaffection in the community. Over the period since 2001 as a whole, employment and wage growth have been relatively broadly experienced across the community. However, some deterioration in labour market outcomes is evident for young men, and there is tentative evidence of rising disaffection among low-wage employees. Moreover, while the post-pandemic period has seen strong employment growth, real after-tax wages declined appreciably between 2021 and 2023, although these wage declines have been broadly felt.</p>","PeriodicalId":46348,"journal":{"name":"Australian Economic Review","volume":"58 2","pages":"140-153"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8462.70012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144245045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kushneel Prakash, Sefa Awaworyi Churchill, Russell Smyth
This study examines how energy poverty shapes voting intentions in Australia. We compare support for the major parties (Labor and the Liberal National Coalition) with support for the minor parties. We also examine how energy poverty influences two-party preferred voting intentions between the two major parties (Coalition and Labor). We find that energy-poor households have 8 percentage points lower probability of supporting either major party compared to alternatives and that energy poor households are 1.4 times more likely to intend to vote for right wing populist minor parties than other minor parties or independents. When comparing Labor and the Coalition directly, energy poverty reduces support for Labor by 3.7 percentage points, reflecting Labor's stronger climate policies that voters likely associate with higher energy costs, while the Coalition's fossil fuel-aligned stance appears to resonate more with energy stressed households. The findings contribute to economic voting theories by demonstrating how sector-specific financial stress can reshape political behaviour.
{"title":"Perception and Reality of Energy Poverty in Australia: Do They Shape Voting Intentions?","authors":"Kushneel Prakash, Sefa Awaworyi Churchill, Russell Smyth","doi":"10.1111/1467-8462.70011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8462.70011","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines how energy poverty shapes voting intentions in Australia. We compare support for the major parties (Labor and the Liberal National Coalition) with support for the minor parties. We also examine how energy poverty influences two-party preferred voting intentions between the two major parties (Coalition and Labor). We find that energy-poor households have 8 percentage points lower probability of supporting either major party compared to alternatives and that energy poor households are 1.4 times more likely to intend to vote for right wing populist minor parties than other minor parties or independents. When comparing Labor and the Coalition directly, energy poverty reduces support for Labor by 3.7 percentage points, reflecting Labor's stronger climate policies that voters likely associate with higher energy costs, while the Coalition's fossil fuel-aligned stance appears to resonate more with energy stressed households. The findings contribute to economic voting theories by demonstrating how sector-specific financial stress can reshape political behaviour.</p>","PeriodicalId":46348,"journal":{"name":"Australian Economic Review","volume":"58 2","pages":"131-139"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8462.70011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144245044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Support for minor parties and independents at Australian Federal elections more than doubled in two decades from 15% in 2007 to 33% in 2025. Relatedly, there has been consistent rises in popularist parties around the world, especially right-wing parties, this century. This includes Italy, France, Greece, Sweden, Netherlands, Hungary, Austria, Germany, USA, Poland, Belgium, and for a short period, the UK. In this policy forum, we examine whether this drift from centralist Australian political parties parallels the trends and drivers present in other Western economies.</p><p>Populism typically presents enticingly simple answers to address complex problems. The binary populist narrative of the ‘pure people’ against the ‘corrupt elite’ undermines democratic systems and erodes the rule of law (Hisarciklioglu et al. <span>2022</span>; Aktas <span>2024</span>). Studies suggest several motives: cultural conservativism (coupled with anti-immigration); distrust of institutions and elite experts; and economic insecurity from declining employment opportunities, globalism and poor career paths. These can be summarised as the loss of one's self-perceived ‘entitled’ status (Ali et al. <span>2023</span>; Friedrichs <span>2025</span>; Aktas <span>2024</span>).</p><p>The less economically secure strata of society, those on low wages; the long-term unemployed, and people from declining industries, see elections as an opportunity to punish the political and economic mainstream. This anger is often fuelled by candidates who play into this antagonism – somewhat reminiscent of Europe post-WWI. Aktas (<span>2024</span>) claims that the disaffected strata in Europe are frustrated with mainstream political parties' responses to economic and social problems.</p><p>Despite Australia's largely absolute rejection of extreme right platitudes in the 2025 federal election, which resembled right-wing politicians in the USA and Canada, it is clear that Australia must remain vigilant. Botha et al. (<span>2025</span>) argue that although Australia has not yet experienced the extreme polarisation and democratic erosion observed elsewhere, current trends put Australia on a similar trajectory. The three studies in this Policy Forum use unit record (person-level) data over an extended period to identify the disaffected citizens who are attracted to the minor parties and to investigate which factors appear to be driving these views.</p><p>The first study by Prakash et al. (<span>2025</span>) finds a negative association between experiencing energy poverty and voting intentions. They find that energy-poor households are 8 percentage points less likely to support either major party compared to alternatives and that energy-poor households are 1.4 times more likely to vote for right-wing populist minor parties compared with other minor parties or independents. They believe that experiencing energy poverty reduces support for renewable climate policies due to the perception that they raise
在澳大利亚联邦选举中,小党派和独立党派的支持率在20年间翻了一番多,从2007年的15%上升到2025年的33%。与此相关的是,本世纪以来,世界各地的民粹主义政党,尤其是右翼政党,一直在不断崛起。这包括意大利、法国、希腊、瑞典、荷兰、匈牙利、奥地利、德国、美国、波兰、比利时,以及英国。在这个政策论坛上,我们研究了这种来自澳大利亚中央集权政党的漂移是否与其他西方经济体的趋势和驱动因素相似。民粹主义通常为解决复杂问题提供诱人的简单答案。“纯粹的人民”反对“腐败的精英”的二元民粹主义叙事破坏了民主制度,侵蚀了法治(Hisarciklioglu等人,2022;Aktas 2024)。研究表明了几个动机:文化保守主义(加上反移民);对机构和精英专家的不信任;以及就业机会减少、全球化和糟糕的职业道路带来的经济不安全感。这些可以概括为一个人自我感知的“有权”地位的丧失(Ali et al. 2023;弗里德里希·2025;Aktas 2024)。社会中经济保障较差的阶层,工资较低的阶层;长期失业者和来自衰退行业的人,将选举视为惩罚政治和经济主流的机会。这种愤怒往往是由那些利用这种对抗的候选人助长的——这有点让人想起一战后的欧洲。Aktas(2024)声称,欧洲的不满阶层对主流政党对经济和社会问题的反应感到沮丧。尽管澳大利亚在2025年的联邦选举中基本上绝对拒绝了极右翼的陈词滥调,但很明显,澳大利亚必须保持警惕,这与美国和加拿大的右翼政客很相似。Botha等人(2025)认为,尽管澳大利亚尚未经历其他地方观察到的极端两极分化和民主侵蚀,但目前的趋势使澳大利亚走上了类似的轨道。本政策论坛的三项研究在较长时期内使用单位记录(个人层面)数据来确定被小党派吸引的心怀不满的公民,并调查哪些因素似乎推动了这些观点。普拉卡什等人(2025)的第一项研究发现,经历能源贫困与投票意愿之间存在负相关关系。他们发现,与其他选择相比,能源贫乏的家庭支持任何一个主要政党的可能性要低8个百分点,而能源贫乏的家庭投票给右翼民粹主义小政党的可能性是其他小政党或独立人士的1.4倍。他们认为,经历能源贫困会减少对可再生气候政策的支持,因为人们认为这些政策“在穷人的背上”提高了家庭能源成本。西班牙和瑞典也发现了能源贫困与投票意向之间的联系(Bolet et al. 2024;Brännlund等人2024;Brännlund和Peterson 2024)。Botha等人(2025)的第二篇文章追踪了自1995年以来的消费者情绪,揭示了经济悲观情绪是广泛的,而不是局限于特定的选区。对经济抱有负面预期的选民更有可能支持小党派或独立人士,这种联系自2010年代中期以来得到了加强。真实的和感知的经济不满,特别是自全球金融危机(GFC)以来,都与未满足的政策要求和对政府绩效的长期不满有关。考虑到澳大利亚在全球金融危机期间和之后相对稳定的宏观经济状况,这是令人惊讶的。他们认为,主要政党支持率下降的原因是人们对其表现的看法,而不是实际的经济危机本身。他们警告说,如果对不平等、住房负担能力和基本医疗成本等根本问题没有可信的回应,政治不满可能会加剧。选民们越来越认为联盟党和工党政府对他们的需求反应迟钝。在最后一篇文章中,威尔金斯(2025)深入研究了劳动力市场的经验。他利用HILDA的数据表明,自2001年以来,没有大学学历的年轻人获得全职工作的机会明显减少。这一点在全球金融危机到来至2018年期间尤为明显。相比之下,工资谈判制度保护了低薪工人,年龄在18-39岁之间、没有大学学历的男性的平均工资增长与年龄较大的男性相当(2001年至2023年期间为19%)。威尔金斯接着声称,澳大利亚的工资决定体系受到的监管比美国更严格,这确保了低技能工人的工资增长与高技能工人相当,甚至更高。 这种黯淡的就业结果反映在主观幸福感上。所研究的三项满意度指标的变化,对收入分布中处于底层五分之一的男性雇员来说是最不利的。排在最后五分之一的男性在俱乐部会员和对他人的信任程度上也经历了最大的下降。对于女性来说,没有一致的模式。威尔金斯指出,尽管有一些迹象表明工资与“不满”指标的变化之间存在联系,但本世纪的工资变化似乎不太可能成为选民不满的主要驱动因素。所有作者都就如何防止滑向欧美式民粹主义发表了评论。根据Botha等人(2025)的说法,处理首次购房者补贴和税收优惠而不解决供应限制的住房政策可能会弄巧成拙。同样,政府未能将皇家委员会的建议落实到老年护理、银行和残疾人服务中,这可能是引起不满的一个因素。在世界其他地方,评论人士关注的是社交媒体和党派媒体在扭曲公众认知和塑造政策辩论方面的作用,这些辩论不一定反映更广泛的社会关注。自愿投票国家担心的是传统民主问责机制的削弱,因为政治家可以通过迎合极端意识形态来确保权力,并让边缘的自愿选民相信投票无论如何都是徒劳的。显然不存在速效的权宜之计,政客们可以简单地改变一些微不足道的政策杠杆来应对这些复杂的反应。要解决经济和政治上的不满,需要深思熟虑的解决方案,可能需要选民的广泛支持。在2025年的澳大利亚大选中,偏左的工党(Labor party)取得压倒性胜利是完全没有预料到的。如果2025年的艾博年政府不能对这些现实或感知到的问题做出适当的政策回应,那么在下一次选举中,钟摆完全有可能向另一个方向摆动。特朗普领导下的美国目前的局势就是一个例子,证明了这种以前难以想象的可能性对澳大利亚来说是现实的。
{"title":"Disaffection in Australia","authors":"John P. de New, Elizabeth Webster","doi":"10.1111/1467-8462.70013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8462.70013","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Support for minor parties and independents at Australian Federal elections more than doubled in two decades from 15% in 2007 to 33% in 2025. Relatedly, there has been consistent rises in popularist parties around the world, especially right-wing parties, this century. This includes Italy, France, Greece, Sweden, Netherlands, Hungary, Austria, Germany, USA, Poland, Belgium, and for a short period, the UK. In this policy forum, we examine whether this drift from centralist Australian political parties parallels the trends and drivers present in other Western economies.</p><p>Populism typically presents enticingly simple answers to address complex problems. The binary populist narrative of the ‘pure people’ against the ‘corrupt elite’ undermines democratic systems and erodes the rule of law (Hisarciklioglu et al. <span>2022</span>; Aktas <span>2024</span>). Studies suggest several motives: cultural conservativism (coupled with anti-immigration); distrust of institutions and elite experts; and economic insecurity from declining employment opportunities, globalism and poor career paths. These can be summarised as the loss of one's self-perceived ‘entitled’ status (Ali et al. <span>2023</span>; Friedrichs <span>2025</span>; Aktas <span>2024</span>).</p><p>The less economically secure strata of society, those on low wages; the long-term unemployed, and people from declining industries, see elections as an opportunity to punish the political and economic mainstream. This anger is often fuelled by candidates who play into this antagonism – somewhat reminiscent of Europe post-WWI. Aktas (<span>2024</span>) claims that the disaffected strata in Europe are frustrated with mainstream political parties' responses to economic and social problems.</p><p>Despite Australia's largely absolute rejection of extreme right platitudes in the 2025 federal election, which resembled right-wing politicians in the USA and Canada, it is clear that Australia must remain vigilant. Botha et al. (<span>2025</span>) argue that although Australia has not yet experienced the extreme polarisation and democratic erosion observed elsewhere, current trends put Australia on a similar trajectory. The three studies in this Policy Forum use unit record (person-level) data over an extended period to identify the disaffected citizens who are attracted to the minor parties and to investigate which factors appear to be driving these views.</p><p>The first study by Prakash et al. (<span>2025</span>) finds a negative association between experiencing energy poverty and voting intentions. They find that energy-poor households are 8 percentage points less likely to support either major party compared to alternatives and that energy-poor households are 1.4 times more likely to vote for right-wing populist minor parties compared with other minor parties or independents. They believe that experiencing energy poverty reduces support for renewable climate policies due to the perception that they raise","PeriodicalId":46348,"journal":{"name":"Australian Economic Review","volume":"58 2","pages":"115-116"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8462.70013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144245046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ferdi Botha, William Nolan, Viet Hoang Nguyen, Kyle Peyton
Support for minor parties and independents in Australia doubled from 15% in 2007 to 30% in 2022, ending decades of relative electoral stability. Using nearly 30 years of monthly consumer survey data, we examine whether this realignment is rooted in economic disaffection. Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), growth in real GDP and GDP per capita has slowed markedly, while consumer sentiment—reflecting individuals' retrospective and prospective evaluations of their personal finances and the broader economy—has fallen to record lows. This increase in economic pessimism is evident across major demographic groups, suggesting that disaffection is broad-based rather than confined to particular constituencies. Voters with negative economic expectations are significantly more likely to support minor parties or independents, and this association has strengthened since the mid-2010s. The Greens have gained disproportionate support from younger voters, while other minor parties and independents have attracted more support from older cohorts. These findings show that declining economic prosperity—both real and perceived—has played an important role in Australia's post-GFC shift away from the two major parties. This is consistent with the view that voters are responding rationally to unmet policy demands and long-standing dissatisfaction with government performance.
{"title":"Rational Disaffection? The Economic Origins of Minor-Party Voting in Australia","authors":"Ferdi Botha, William Nolan, Viet Hoang Nguyen, Kyle Peyton","doi":"10.1111/1467-8462.70008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8462.70008","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Support for minor parties and independents in Australia doubled from 15% in 2007 to 30% in 2022, ending decades of relative electoral stability. Using nearly 30 years of monthly consumer survey data, we examine whether this realignment is rooted in economic disaffection. Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), growth in real GDP and GDP per capita has slowed markedly, while consumer sentiment—reflecting individuals' retrospective and prospective evaluations of their personal finances and the broader economy—has fallen to record lows. This increase in economic pessimism is evident across major demographic groups, suggesting that disaffection is broad-based rather than confined to particular constituencies. Voters with negative economic expectations are significantly more likely to support minor parties or independents, and this association has strengthened since the mid-2010s. The Greens have gained disproportionate support from younger voters, while other minor parties and independents have attracted more support from older cohorts. These findings show that declining economic prosperity—both real and perceived—has played an important role in Australia's post-GFC shift away from the two major parties. This is consistent with the view that voters are responding rationally to unmet policy demands and long-standing dissatisfaction with government performance.</p>","PeriodicalId":46348,"journal":{"name":"Australian Economic Review","volume":"58 2","pages":"117-130"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8462.70008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144245117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}