This is a reply to Duncan Pritchard's response to my critique of his normative account of ignorance. Pritchard suggests that I take a Normative Condition on board in my own account of ignorance. Pritchard's suggestion has drastic revisionary and deflationary implications for how we use words like “ignorance” and “ignorant”. I explain why I believe this is unnecessary: one can perfectly well be ignorant without displaying any kind of intellectual fault. Pritchard does convincingly show, though, that the Signifcance Condition of my account of ignorance needs revision. I explain that we can revise it by allowing for both subjective and objective significance.
{"title":"Norms and Significance in Ignorance. Reply to Duncan Pritchard","authors":"Rik Peels","doi":"10.1111/phis.70016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70016","url":null,"abstract":"This is a reply to Duncan Pritchard's response to my critique of his normative account of ignorance. Pritchard suggests that I take a Normative Condition on board in my own account of ignorance. Pritchard's suggestion has drastic revisionary and deflationary implications for how we use words like “ignorance” and “ignorant”. I explain why I believe this is unnecessary: one can perfectly well be ignorant without displaying any kind of intellectual fault. Pritchard does convincingly show, though, that the Signifcance Condition of my account of ignorance needs revision. I explain that we can revise it by allowing for both subjective and objective significance.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"299 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146169472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Julien Dutant, Clayton Littlejohn, Sven Rosenkranz
It has recently been argued that purported evidential and zetetic norms issue contradictory verdicts and that such contradictions best be resolved in favor of zetetic norms. The paper argues that this line of argument proves unsuccessful. First, natural formulations of what one ought to do if inquiring into a given matter resemble anankastic conditionals that don't allow for detachment of normatively significant verdicts. Second, even if suitably reformulated, zetetic norms issue, at best, verdicts with a distinctly practical flavor that contrasts with the epistemic flavor characteristic of evidential norms. While there are conflicts between normative verdicts of different flavors, the phenomenon is familiar and, in the cases in question, doesn't force a zetetic turn , that is, a reorientation of epistemology that gives zetetic norms precedence over evidential norms.
{"title":"Zetetic Flyovers","authors":"Julien Dutant, Clayton Littlejohn, Sven Rosenkranz","doi":"10.1111/phis.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70009","url":null,"abstract":"It has recently been argued that purported evidential and zetetic norms issue contradictory verdicts and that such contradictions best be resolved in favor of zetetic norms. The paper argues that this line of argument proves unsuccessful. First, natural formulations of what one ought to do if inquiring into a given matter resemble anankastic conditionals that don't allow for detachment of normatively significant verdicts. Second, even if suitably reformulated, zetetic norms issue, at best, verdicts with a distinctly practical flavor that contrasts with the epistemic flavor characteristic of evidential norms. While there are conflicts between normative verdicts of different flavors, the phenomenon is familiar and, in the cases in question, doesn't force a <jats:italic>zetetic turn</jats:italic> , that is, a reorientation of epistemology that gives zetetic norms precedence over evidential norms.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146169475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public evidence plays a central role in the justification of scientific theories—but does its importance extend beyond science, for instance, to political or religious belief? To address this question, we first need a clear account of public evidence. This article develops such an account, characterizing public evidence as non‐experiential evidence that meets the non‐factive epistemic conditions for common knowledge. I argue that public evidence not only underwrites the justification of scientific theories but also constrains how experience can justify belief more generally. The result is a novel account of public evidence with broad applicability across domains of inquiry.
{"title":"Out in the Open: Public Evidence and the Limits of Experience","authors":"Ted Poston","doi":"10.1111/phis.70006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70006","url":null,"abstract":"Public evidence plays a central role in the justification of scientific theories—but does its importance extend beyond science, for instance, to political or religious belief? To address this question, we first need a clear account of public evidence. This article develops such an account, characterizing public evidence as non‐experiential evidence that meets the non‐factive epistemic conditions for common knowledge. I argue that public evidence not only underwrites the justification of scientific theories but also constrains how experience can justify belief more generally. The result is a novel account of public evidence with broad applicability across domains of inquiry.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146169477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article develops and defends the idea that some of our biases have an externalist character, with particular attention to cases in which the phenomenon arises in political contexts. A person who consistently defers to biased sources can count as biased even while responding impeccably to their total evidence. On the basis of such cases, I argue for three connected theses: Externalism about Bias (a person's biases do not supervene on their internal states and the causal relations among those states); Rationality is Compatible with Bias ; and Rationality Requires Bias (in certain environments, full rationality can require being biased, in a pejorative sense of “biased”). These theses are supported by compelling judgments about cases, independently of commitment to any specific theory of bias. They are also naturally accommodated by the norm‐theoretic account of bias, on which biases involve systematic departures from genuine norms. I argue that many central attributions of bias to human believers are grounded in departures from the externalist norm of truth. Finally, I draw a further consequence: Because many biases are environmentally constituted, the empirically documented unreliability of introspection as a method for detecting bias is not a contingent fact but holds of necessity.
{"title":"Political Epistemology, Rationality, and Externalism About Bias","authors":"Thomas Kelly","doi":"10.1111/phis.70005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70005","url":null,"abstract":"This article develops and defends the idea that some of our biases have an externalist character, with particular attention to cases in which the phenomenon arises in political contexts. A person who consistently defers to biased sources can count as biased even while responding impeccably to their total evidence. On the basis of such cases, I argue for three connected theses: Externalism about Bias (a person's biases do not supervene on their internal states and the causal relations among those states); Rationality is Compatible with Bias ; and Rationality Requires Bias (in certain environments, full rationality can require being biased, in a pejorative sense of “biased”). These theses are supported by compelling judgments about cases, independently of commitment to any specific theory of bias. They are also naturally accommodated by the norm‐theoretic account of bias, on which biases involve systematic departures from genuine norms. I argue that many central attributions of bias to human believers are grounded in departures from the externalist norm of truth. Finally, I draw a further consequence: Because many biases are environmentally constituted, the empirically documented unreliability of introspection as a method for detecting bias is not a contingent fact but holds of necessity.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"131 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146169474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the rationality of affective responses to virtual phenomena. I argue that at least some such responses can be perfectly rational, but that virtual realism and virtual irrealism—competing views about the metaphysics of the virtual—differ in their verdicts about the possible rationality of certain types of responses. Realism says that virtual objects are real; irrealism says that they're nonexistent fictions. I argue that while both views can accommodate the rationality of certain affective responses to the virtual, irrealism, unlike realism, significantly restricts the range of possibly rational responses. I suggest that this asymmetry may provide a promising path forward in the metaphysical debate, because we can leverage intuitive judgments about which affective responses to the virtual can be rational in assessing the relative plausibility of realism and irrealism.
{"title":"Rational Feelings for Virtual Things?","authors":"Christopher Howard","doi":"10.1111/phis.70007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70007","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the rationality of affective responses to virtual phenomena. I argue that at least some such responses can be perfectly rational, but that virtual realism and virtual irrealism—competing views about the metaphysics of the virtual—differ in their verdicts about the possible rationality of certain types of responses. Realism says that virtual objects are real; irrealism says that they're nonexistent fictions. I argue that while both views can accommodate the rationality of certain affective responses to the virtual, irrealism, unlike realism, significantly restricts the range of possibly rational responses. I suggest that this asymmetry may provide a promising path forward in the metaphysical debate, because we can leverage intuitive judgments about which affective responses to the virtual can be rational in assessing the relative plausibility of realism and irrealism.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146169481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines a tension between three plausible claims: that violations of formal coherence requirements are paradigmatically irrational; that formal incoherence is best modeled as belief fragmentation; and that fragmentation need not be irrational. I argue that the first claim must be weakened. Some formally incoherent collections of belief are not irrational, because they are not appropriately subject to rational evaluation. Drawing on a Scanlonian notion of judgment‐sensitivity, I propose that only incoherence that is remediable through reasoning constitutes irrationality. This view explains why fragmentation in domains such as perception and motor control is epistemically suboptimal without being irrational, while preserving a role for coherence norms in cases where coordination across fragments is possible.
{"title":"Can the Fragmentationist Accept a Formal Account of Irrationality?","authors":"Daniel Greco","doi":"10.1111/phis.70004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70004","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines a tension between three plausible claims: that violations of formal coherence requirements are paradigmatically irrational; that formal incoherence is best modeled as belief fragmentation; and that fragmentation need not be irrational. I argue that the first claim must be weakened. Some formally incoherent collections of belief are not irrational, because they are not appropriately subject to rational evaluation. Drawing on a Scanlonian notion of judgment‐sensitivity, I propose that only incoherence that is remediable through reasoning constitutes irrationality. This view explains why fragmentation in domains such as perception and motor control is epistemically suboptimal without being irrational, while preserving a role for coherence norms in cases where coordination across fragments is possible.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"92 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146169485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rik Peels's Ignorance: A Philosophical Study is excellent, bold in scope, and rich with distinctions. It is fastidiously researched and deserves praise for being both an important advance within the field and an accessible introduction to it. Although touching on several threads of Peels's treatment of ignorance, I will pay special attention how Peels's account interacts with the questions one is animated by. In particular, I argue that erotetic ignorance does not reduce to propositional ignorance and that one can be ignorant of insignificant truths.
{"title":"Ignorance, Questions, and Significance","authors":"Christopher Willard‐Kyle","doi":"10.1111/phis.70015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70015","url":null,"abstract":"Rik Peels's <jats:italic>Ignorance: A Philosophical Study</jats:italic> is excellent, bold in scope, and rich with distinctions. It is fastidiously researched and deserves praise for being both an important advance within the field and an accessible introduction to it. Although touching on several threads of Peels's treatment of ignorance, I will pay special attention how Peels's account interacts with the questions one is animated by. In particular, I argue that erotetic ignorance does not reduce to propositional ignorance and that one can be ignorant of insignificant truths.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146169482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his recent monograph— Ignorance: A Philosophical Study —Rik Peels offers a critique of the normative account of ignorance that I have developed and defended in recent work. I hereby respond to that critique. I argue that Peels’ response, even by its own lights, in fact concedes far more to the idea that there is a normative condition on ignorance than he realizes. Indeed, I conclude that Peels would be wise to embrace the normative condition on ignorance that I propose and try to incorporate it into his own theory of ignorance.
{"title":"In Defense of the Normative Account of Ignorance","authors":"Duncan Pritchard","doi":"10.1111/phis.70018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70018","url":null,"abstract":"In his recent monograph— <jats:italic>Ignorance: A Philosophical Study</jats:italic> —Rik Peels offers a critique of the normative account of ignorance that I have developed and defended in recent work. I hereby respond to that critique. I argue that Peels’ response, even by its own lights, in fact concedes far more to the idea that there is a normative condition on ignorance than he realizes. Indeed, I conclude that Peels would be wise to embrace the normative condition on ignorance that I propose and try to incorporate it into his own theory of ignorance.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"101 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146169483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his reply to my book Ignorance: A Philosophical Study , Christopher Willard‐Kyle zooms in on erotetic ignorance and the Significance Condition of my account of ignorance. Erotetic ignorance is lacking the answers to certain questions when the question is sound and when there is an answer to the question. Willard‐Kyle shows that my arguments for the idea that erotetic ignorance reduces to propositional ignorance are wanting. In this response, I address each of his concerns about this claim and also my earlier suggestion that an account of ignorance needs to take a Significance Condition on board. I argue that my thesis that erotetic ignorance reduces to propositional ignorance was, thus put, indeed too crude and Willard‐Kyle's sharp arguments and convincing examples made me see that. However, a refined and more complex version of the thesis can meet his worries.
{"title":"Erotetic Ignorance, Propositional Ignorance, and Questions of Significance. Reply to Christopher Willard‐Kyle","authors":"Rik Peels","doi":"10.1111/phis.70017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70017","url":null,"abstract":"In his reply to my book <jats:italic>Ignorance: A Philosophical Study</jats:italic> , Christopher Willard‐Kyle zooms in on erotetic ignorance and the Significance Condition of my account of ignorance. Erotetic ignorance is lacking the answers to certain questions when the question is sound and when there is an answer to the question. Willard‐Kyle shows that my arguments for the idea that erotetic ignorance reduces to propositional ignorance are wanting. In this response, I address each of his concerns about this claim and also my earlier suggestion that an account of ignorance needs to take a Significance Condition on board. I argue that my thesis that erotetic ignorance reduces to propositional ignorance was, thus put, indeed too crude and Willard‐Kyle's sharp arguments and convincing examples made me see that. However, a refined and more complex version of the thesis can meet his worries.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"97 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146153475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article takes issue with two prominent views in the current debate around epistemic partiality in friendship. Strong views of epistemic partiality hold that friendship may require biased beliefs in direct conflict with epistemic norms. Weak views hold that friendship may place normative expectations on belief formation but in a manner that does not violate these norms. It is argued that neither view succeeds in explaining the relationship between epistemic norms and friendship norms. Weak views inadvertently endorse a form of motivated reasoning, failing to resolve the normative clash they seek to avoid. Strong views turn out to be incoherent once we consider the question of whether the requirement to form an epistemically partial belief is independent of whether the belief in question would be true. It is then argued that an epistemology of friendship should recognise the special role that understanding plays in friendship. On this view, friendship normatively requires understanding the truth about our friends. This entails that epistemic partiality, far from being a requirement, is in fact at odds with good friendship.
{"title":"Understanding friendship","authors":"Michel Croce, Matthew Jope","doi":"10.1111/phis.12268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12268","url":null,"abstract":"This article takes issue with two prominent views in the current debate around epistemic partiality in friendship. Strong views of epistemic partiality hold that friendship may require biased beliefs in direct conflict with epistemic norms. Weak views hold that friendship may place normative expectations on belief formation but in a manner that does not violate these norms. It is argued that neither view succeeds in explaining the relationship between epistemic norms and friendship norms. Weak views inadvertently endorse a form of motivated reasoning, failing to resolve the normative clash they seek to avoid. Strong views turn out to be incoherent once we consider the question of whether the requirement to form an epistemically partial belief is independent of whether the belief in question would be true. It is then argued that an epistemology of friendship should recognise the special role that understanding plays in friendship. On this view, friendship normatively requires understanding the truth about our friends. This entails that epistemic partiality, far from being a requirement, is in fact at odds with good friendship.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142486787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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