Cambridge Law Journal最新文献_第4页

PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL IN THE SUPREME COURT: BANQUO'S GHOST? 最高法院的禁止反言:班柯的幽灵?

IF 1.5 2区社会学 Q1 LAW

Cambridge Law Journal

Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0008197323000119

B. Sloan

THE facts of Guest v Guest [2022] UKSC 27, [2022] 3 W.L.R. 911 fitted a familiar pattern. For over 30 years, Andrew worked and lived on Tump Farm, owned by his parents, David and Josephine, for low wages. David promised Andrew (taking account of other familial expectations) a sufficient share of the farm to enable him to run a viable farming business on the parents’ deaths. The parents made wills accordingly. But following a falling out, Andrew was removed from the wills and left Tump Farm. The judge’s undisturbed conclusion ([2019] EWHC 869 (Ch)) was that Andrew had made out a proprietary estoppel claim against his still-living parents: he had relied to his detriment on David’s non-contractual promises, such that it was unconscionable for David to resile from them. The case invited the Supreme Court to consider a fundamental question, effectively for the first time in living memory at the highest level: should successful estoppel claimants like Andrew generally have their expectations fulfilled, should they generally be limited to having their detriment reversed, or was the correct approach a third way? The precise answer divided the panel, which issued two lengthy judgments (lacking explicit direct engagement with each other) over 10 months after the one-day hearing. Leading the majority, Lord Briggs (with whom Ladies Rose and Arden agreed) identified the objective of an estoppel remedy as compensating for the unconscionability caused by the defendant promisor in repudiating their representations. The preferable and simplest way of remedying that unconscionability was to assume (not presume) that claimants should have their expectations fulfilled. This was to be the “starting point” in “many cases”, although “considerations of practicality, justice between the parties and fairness to third parties may call for a reduced or different award” (at [94]). Lord Briggs grounded his approach in previous case law, identifying satisfying expectations as the “main driver of the remedy” (at [22]). Following a detailed review, he concluded that “there is not a single English authority favouring the approach that the essential aim of the remedy was to protect the claimant’s reliance interest and therefore to compensate for the detriment” (at [52]). Inter alia, he emphasised that the “minimum equity”-based approach in Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch. 179, 198 was not about identifying expectation and detriment and then awarding whichever was cheaper for the defendant. Rather, Scarman L.J. in Crabb was concerned with the “minimum equity to do justice” (emphasis added), with “justice” meaning remedying the unconscionability in the repudiation of the Cambridge Law Journal, 82(1), March 2023, pp. 13–16 © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/lic

Guest v Guest【2022】UKSC 27，【2022】3 W.L.R.911的事实符合一种熟悉的模式。安德鲁在汤普农场工作和生活了30多年，汤普农场由他的父母大卫和约瑟芬所有，工资很低。大卫向安德鲁承诺（考虑到其他家庭期望）有足够的农场份额，使他能够在父母去世后经营一家可行的农业企业。父母据此立了遗嘱。但在一次争吵之后，安德鲁被从遗嘱中删除，并离开了汤普农场。法官未受干扰的结论（【2019】EWHC 869（Ch））是，安德鲁对他仍然在世的父母提出了一项专有的禁止反悔主张：他依赖大卫的非合同承诺，因此大卫放弃这些承诺是不合理的。该案邀请最高法院考虑一个基本问题，这是人们记忆中第一次在最高级别有效地考虑：像安德鲁这样成功的禁止反言索赔人是否应该普遍实现他们的期望，他们是否应该普遍局限于扭转他们的损害，还是正确的方法是第三种方法？准确的答案使专家组产生了分歧，在为期一天的听证会后的10个多月里，专家组发布了两份冗长的判决书（缺乏明确的直接接触）。布里格斯勋爵（Lord Briggs）（罗斯女士和阿登女士对此表示赞同）以多数票领先，将禁止反悔补救的目标确定为对被告承诺人否认其陈述所造成的不合理行为的补偿。纠正这种不合理行为的最好和最简单的方法是假设（而不是假设）索赔人应该实现他们的期望。这是“许多案件”的“起点”，尽管“考虑到实用性、当事方之间的公正性和对第三方的公平性，可能需要减少或不同的裁决”（见[94]）。布里格斯勋爵在以前的判例法中确立了他的方法，认为满足期望是“补救措施的主要驱动力”（见[22]）。经过详细审查，他得出结论，“没有一个英国权威机构赞成补救措施的基本目的是保护索赔人的信赖利益，从而赔偿损失”（见[52]）。除其他外，他强调，Crabb诉Arun District Council[1976]第179198章中基于“最低公平”的方法并不是确定期望和损害，然后判给对被告来说更便宜的人。相反，Scarman L.J.在Crabb案中关注的是“伸张正义的最低公平”（重点增加），“正义”意味着纠正《剑桥法律杂志》，82（1），2023年3月，第13-16页©作者，2023。剑桥大学出版社代表剑桥大学法学院出版。这是一篇开放获取的文章，根据知识共享署名许可证的条款分发(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)，允许在任何媒体上不受限制地重复使用、分发和复制，前提是正确引用了原作。doi:10.1017/S0008197323000119

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引用次数: 0

CLJ volume 82 issue 1 Cover and Back matter CLJ第82卷第1期封面和封底

IF 1.5 2区社会学 Q1 LAW

Cambridge Law Journal

Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0008197323000168

引用次数: 0

The Redress of Law: Globalisation, Constitutionalism and Market Capture. By Emilios Christodoulidis. [Cambridge University Press, 2021. xiv + 592 pp. Hardback £95.00. ISBN 978-1-108-48703-0.] 法律救济:全球化、宪政与市场占有。埃米利奥斯·克里斯托杜利迪斯著。剑桥大学出版社，2021年。592页，精装本95.00英镑。ISBN 978-1-108-48703-0。)

IF 1.5 2区社会学 Q1 LAW

Cambridge Law Journal

Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0008197323000041

Costas Douzinas

引用次数: 0

CREDIT WHERE CREDIT'S DUE: THE SUPREME COURT TAKE ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND CREDITORS’ INTERESTS 应贷尽贷：最高法院承担董事职责与债权人利益

IF 1.5 2区社会学 Q1 LAW

Cambridge Law Journal

Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0008197323000120

Pedro Schilling de Carvalho, Bobby V. Reddy

引用次数: 1

Economic Torts and Economic Wrongs. Edited by John Eldridge, Michael Douglas and Claudia Carr. [Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2021. xiv + 344 pp. Hardback £85.00. ISBN 978-1-50993-475-1.]

IF 1.5 2区社会学 Q1 LAW

Cambridge Law Journal

Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0008197323000028

John Murphy

Writing extrajudicially, just a few years after delivering his leading speech in OBG Ltd. v Allan [2008] 1 A.C. 1, Lord Hoffmann suggested that, in the wake of that decision it was now fair to say that “the economic torts have run their course”. But despite their Lordships’ best endeavours in OBG to render the economic torts an area of interest to legal historians alone, cases involving these torts have continued to trouble courts all over the Commonwealth. Accordingly, in spite of what Lord Hoffmann hoped for in the wake of OBG, there is still a good deal of life left in these torts; and they continue to pose puzzles a-plenty. Against this background, a new book dealing with these actions was always destined to be eye-catching, especially when one bears in mind that the economic torts have been largely overlooked by most torts scholars. Furthermore, an especially attractive feature of this book is that it offers a collection of essays that is properly representative of the makeup of the private law community: there is none of the familiar dominance of contributions from male scholars based in England and Wales. However, as Shakespeare warned us several centuries ago, “all that glisters is not gold”. And that, I am afraid, is my overwhelming view of Economic Torts and Economic Wrongs. To be clear: the book is by no means a disaster. It comprises a collection of essays written by academics and practitioners located in various different jurisdictions and it undoubtedly contains some very worthwhile contributions. The problem, however, is that these are outnumbered by others that, for all their novelty, seem somehow to be misplaced. Before addressing the particular merits of some of the key essays in this volume, I think it is worth flagging up from the start what I take to be a serious omission in the editors’ introductory chapter. For this, instead of supplying a road map to the essays that follow, and a brief account of the arguments they advance, provides the reader with, in essence, a very swift (and therefore not very detailed) account of the way the economic torts have developed over the last century or so. Reference is made to a number of the landmark cases, and this is all well and good. But the reader is offered no guide to the particular conception of “economic torts” adopted by the editors. This is a great pity because, without such a guide, it is hard to fathom why quite a few of the essays that appear in this book should be thought to belong here. For all that there is well-known disagreement around the margins about just which torts comprise this particular family of actions, most torts scholars would consider some of the essays in this book as being fish out of water. There is, for example, an essay on defamation; and there are two on private nuisance. There is an essay concerned with “an award of equitable compensation against a defaulting fiduciary” (p. 232) and a related one entitled “Misfeasance by Directors”. There is also a con

在发表OBG Ltd. v Allan [2008] 1 A.C. 1案的主要演讲仅仅几年之后，Hoffmann勋爵在法外写作中表示，在那个决定之后，现在可以说“经济侵权已经走到了尽头”。但是，尽管他们在OBG中尽了最大的努力，使经济侵权成为法律历史学家唯一感兴趣的领域，但涉及这些侵权的案件继续困扰着整个英联邦的法院。因此，尽管霍夫曼勋爵在OBG之后所希望的那样，这些侵权行为仍有很大的生命力;而且他们继续给我们带来很多难题。在这种背景下，一本讨论这些行为的新书注定会引人注目，尤其是当人们考虑到大多数侵权行为学者在很大程度上忽视了经济侵权行为时。此外，这本书的一个特别吸引人的特点是，它提供了一组论文，这些论文恰当地代表了私法社区的构成:没有人们所熟悉的英格兰和威尔士男性学者的主导贡献。然而，正如几个世纪前莎士比亚警告我们的那样，“闪光的不一定都是金子”。恐怕这就是我对经济侵权和经济错误的压倒性观点。需要说明的是:这本书绝不是一场灾难。它收录了来自不同司法管辖区的学者和从业人员撰写的论文，其中无疑包含了一些非常有价值的贡献。然而，问题是，这些人的数量远远超过了其他的人，尽管这些人很新颖，但似乎在某种程度上是错位的。在讨论本卷中一些关键文章的特殊优点之前，我认为有必要从一开始就指出，我认为编辑们的引言章节中有一个严重的遗漏。因此，本书没有为后面的文章提供一个路线图，也没有对它们提出的论点做一个简短的说明，而是在本质上为读者提供了一个非常迅速(因此不是非常详细)的关于经济侵权行为在上个世纪左右发展方式的说明。参考了一些具有里程碑意义的案例，这一切都很好。但是读者并没有被告知编辑们所采用的“经济侵权”的具体概念。这是一个很大的遗憾，因为没有这样的指导，很难理解为什么这本书中出现的许多文章应该被认为属于这里。众所周知，关于哪些侵权行为构成了这一特定行为家族，在书的边缘存在着分歧，但大多数侵权学者会认为本书中的一些文章是离开水的鱼。例如，有一篇关于诽谤的文章;还有两个是私人滋扰。有一篇文章是关于“对违约受托人的公平赔偿”(第232页)和一篇相关的文章，题为“董事的不当行为”。还有一篇关于合法行为胁迫的文章(许多读者无疑会认为这是一个与合同法有关的话题，而不是侵权法)。没错:一些作者对这些远不明显的内容负责，他们解释了为什么他们认为自己的文章属于这本书——编辑们在“引言”中反复描述这本书是关于经济侵权的。但这只会强化他们对“经济侵权”这一特定概念的规定(最好是辩护)。对于他们来说，仅仅断言(而不是展开)“‘经济侵权’是一个比迄今为止所承认的更广泛、更多样化的法律范畴”(第7页)的主张显然是不够的。剑桥法律杂志，82(1)，2023年3月，第174-177页©作者，2023。剑桥大学出版社代剑桥大学法学院出版，doi:10.1017/S0008197323000028

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引用次数: 0

Fintech Regulation in China: Principles, Policies and Practices. By Robin Hui Huang. [Cambridge University Press, 2021. xvi + 298 pp. Hardback £84.99. ISBN 978-1-108-48811-2.] 中国金融科技监管：原则、政策和实践。黄彦宏。[剑桥大学出版社，2021。xvi+298页。精装版84.99英镑。ISBN 978-1-108-48811-2-]

IF 1.5 2区社会学 Q1 LAW

Cambridge Law Journal

Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0008197323000065

Lerong Lu

引用次数: 3

THE UNEXPLORED CONTRACT AND INSOLVENCY LAW DIMENSIONS OF HEDLEY BYRNE V HELLER heley byrne诉heller案中未探索的合同和破产法维度

IF 1.5 2区社会学 Q1 LAW

Cambridge Law Journal

Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0008197323000077

D. Campbell, D. Milman

Abstract It has been argued in previous work that Hedley Byrne v Heller addressed no actual mischief. In the case itself, the defendant's credit reference about Easipower Ltd. was neither a misstatement nor negligently given, and in general the indemnification of reliance on negligent statements is far better regulated by contract than it can possibly be by negligent misstatement. This paper expands on the significance of contract relative to tort in Hedley Byrne, but mainly argues that the mischief perceived by the claimant was caused by the operation of the statutory regime regulating Easipower's insolvency. This makes regarding Hedley Byrne as a necessary response to “the privity of contract fallacy” even more implausible.

在以前的工作中，有人认为Hedley Byrne诉Heller案没有涉及实际的损害。在本案中，被告关于Easipower Ltd.的信用资料既不是错报，也不是过失提供的，一般而言，依赖过失陈述的赔偿受合同的约束要远远好于过失错报的约束。本文对Hedley Byrne案中合同对侵权行为的重要性进行了扩展，但主要认为索赔人认为的损害是由管理easypower破产的法定制度的运作造成的。这使得把Hedley Byrne看作是对“合同的秘密谬论”的必要回应变得更加难以置信。

引用次数: 0

Fundamental Rights and the Legal Obligations of Business. By David Bilchitz. [Cambridge University Press, 2022. xxii + 499 pp. Hardback £110.00. ISBN 978-1-108-84194-8.] 企业的基本权利和法律义务。大卫·比尔奇茨著。剑桥大学出版社，2022。xxii + 499页，精装本110.00英镑。ISBN 978-1-108-84194-8。)

IF 1.5 2区社会学 Q1 LAW

Cambridge Law Journal

Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S000819732300003X

Nick Friedman

Following the publication of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in 2011, and subsequent attempts at the national and international level to enforce human rights in the commercial sphere (like the UK’s Modern Slavery Act 2015), there has been renewed scholarly interest in the human rights duties of corporations. “Business and human rights” is a difficult area of inquiry: making sound policy proposals requires attention to the intersection of human rights, corporate law, tort, both private and public international law, and other legal fields besides. Moreover, it frequently requires a theory of these fields, including a theory about which field should be deployed to solve certain problems under certain conditions. Depending on the author’s aims, it can also require engagement with economics and with difficult philosophical issues concerning the nature of the corporation. This call for interdisciplinarity is what makes “business and human rights” an exciting field of study, but the difficulty of answering that call has created a body of scholarship that sometimes feels superficial or theoretically thin. In this regard, David Bilchitz is exceptional. Bilchitz is one of the leading figures in the field; he has been working on tricky pieces of the business and human rights puzzle for a long time. He has captured the depth and breadth of his knowledge in his latest book, Fundamental Rights and the Legal Obligations of Business, which is stunning in its sophisticated coverage of numerous legal fields as well as some associated areas of philosophy. The book is divided into three parts. After an initial chapter on the nature and purpose of the corporation (to which I return below), Part I describes and critiques various models of legal reasoning that courts have adopted to address human rights infringements by corporations. Most of the chapters in this part describe models which assume that human rights obligations bind only the state. Chapter 2 focuses on the state’s duty under international law to protect a person’s human rights from violation by a third party (say, another individual or a corporation). Chapter 3 describes the “indirect application model” that exists in some national legal systems. It is the domestic analogue of the international law duty to protect: once again, human rights obligations fall on states only, requiring them to enact legislation and develop their common law with a view to preventing human rights violations by corporate actors. Chapter 4 describes what Bilchitz calls the “expanding the state” model, which redraws the boundaries of the state to extend human rights obligations to at least some kinds of state-like corporations. The overriding critique of all three foregoing models is that they wrongly suppose that corporations themselves bear no human rights obligations, and so depend on circuitous reasoning to implicate the state in a corporation’s human rights abuses. By closely analysi

2011年《联合国商业与人权指导原则》出版后，以及随后在国家和国际层面试图在商业领域强制执行人权（如英国2015年的《现代奴隶制法》），学术界对公司的人权义务重新产生了兴趣。“商业与人权”是一个很难研究的领域：提出合理的政策建议需要关注人权、公司法、侵权行为、国际私法和公法以及其他法律领域的交叉点。此外，它经常需要这些领域的理论，包括在特定条件下应该部署哪个领域来解决某些问题的理论。根据作者的目的，它也可能需要参与经济学和与公司性质有关的棘手哲学问题。这种对跨学科性的呼吁使“商业与人权”成为一个令人兴奋的研究领域，但回应这一呼吁的困难创造了一个有时感觉肤浅或理论上单薄的学术体系。在这方面，大卫·比尔奇茨是个例外。比尔奇茨是该领域的领军人物之一；长期以来，他一直致力于商业和人权领域的棘手问题。他在最新出版的《企业的基本权利和法律义务》一书中捕捉到了自己知识的深度和广度，该书对众多法律领域以及一些相关的哲学领域进行了深入的报道，令人惊叹。这本书分为三个部分。在关于公司的性质和目的的第一章（我将在下文返回）之后，第一部分描述并批评了法院为处理公司侵犯人权行为而采用的各种法律推理模式。本部分的大部分章节描述了假设人权义务只对国家具有约束力的模式。第2章着重于国家根据国际法保护个人人权不受第三方（如另一个人或公司）侵犯的义务。第三章介绍了一些国家法律体系中存在的“间接适用模式”。这在国内类似于国际法的保护义务：再次，人权义务只属于国家，要求它们制定立法和制定普通法，以防止公司行为者侵犯人权。第4章描述了Bilchitz所说的“扩大国家”模式，该模式重新划定了国家的边界，将人权义务至少扩展到一些类似国家的公司。对上述三种模式最重要的批评是，它们错误地认为公司本身不承担人权义务，因此依赖迂回的推理将国家卷入公司侵犯人权的行为中。通过仔细分析采用这些模式的判例法，Bilchitz令人信服地表明，法院不能（事实上也没有）将相关义务归因于国家，而不首先对国家必须保护人民免受什么影响有一些看法，也就是说，对公司在人权方面可能不应该做什么有一些看法。因此，接受这些模式的法院隐含地、不可避免地确定了公司的人权义务，同时声称这些义务只对国家有约束力。在这些批评的基础上，Bilchitz在第5章中提出了他喜欢的推理模式——“直接义务模式”——明确地说，《剑桥法律杂志》，82（1），2023年3月，第181–184页©作者，2023。剑桥大学出版社代表剑桥大学法学院出版doi:10.1017/S000819732300003X

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引用次数: 0

The Province and Politics of the Economic Torts. By John Murphy. [London: Hart Publishing, 2022. xxx + 287 pp. Hardback £85.00. ISBN 978-1-50992-731-9.] 经济侵权的省际与政治。约翰·墨菲著。[伦敦:哈特出版社，2022.]xxx + 287页，精装本85.00英镑。ISBN 978-1-50992-731-9。)

IF 1.5 2区社会学 Q1 LAW

Cambridge Law Journal

Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0008197323000016

Sarah Green

引用次数: 0

UNDUE RETICENCE ON UNDUE INFLUENCE? 过度的沉默对过度的影响?

IF 1.5 2区社会学 Q1 LAW

Cambridge Law Journal

Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0008197323000132

A. Mills

VITIATING factors in contract law raise difficult and interesting questions. Lawful act duress has been subject to detailed scrutiny in Times Travel (UK) Ltd. v Pakistan International Airline Corp [2021] UKSC 40, [2021] 3 W.L.R. 727, albeit the decision has been subject to criticism (see Morgan [2022] C.L.J. 16). The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Heller v Uber Technologies 2020 S.C.C. 16 shone some light on unconscionable bargains (see Hunt [2021] C.L.J. 25). Now it was the turn of undue influence in Nature Resorts Ltd. v First Citizens Bank Ltd. [2022] UKPC 10, [2022] 1 W.L.R. 2788. Unfortunately, the Privy Council’s approach arguably raises almost as many questions as it answers. The Privy Council’s primary decision is that there was no basis for departing from the Court of Appeal’s decision that any presumption of undue influence would, on the facts, have been rebutted. Much more interesting, however, are the brief observations made regarding the presumptions which may be engaged in the doctrine of undue influence. The decision of the majority was given by Lord Briggs and Lord Burrows J.J.S.C.; Lady Arden J.S.C. dissented on a point concerning companies legislation, not discussed further in this note. The appeal concerned the sale of shares in the appellant company, Nature Resorts Ltd. (“NRL”), which owned the Culloden Estate in Tobago. The purchasers agreed to buy 75 per cent of the shares in NRL from the sole shareholder, Mr. Dankou. To facilitate this purchase, they obtained a loan from the Respondent bank. The terms included that the bank would have the security of a mortgage over the Culloden Estate. The bank instructed a lawyer, Richard Wheeler, to prepare the documents relating to the mortgage and the charge over the shares. The purchasers defaulted on their loan, and the bank decided to exercise its power of sale under the mortgage. NRL sought to set aside the deed of mortgage on the basis of undue influence exercised by Wheeler over Dankou, one of the issues being whether it should be presumed that Wheeler abused the professional relationship between himself and Dankou (and NRL), procuring the transaction under challenge. This claim failed before the High Court of Justice of Trinidad and Tobago, and likewise before the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago. The High Court had held that there was no presumption of undue influence; the Court of Appeal held that there was such a presumption, but it had been rebutted. The Privy Council dismissed NRL’s appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal was justified in finding that any presumption of undue influence had been rebutted; the Privy Council further held that the High Court had been right in the first place that there was no presumption which needed rebutting. Cambridge Law Journal, 82(1), March 2023, pp. 21–24 © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge. doi:10.1017/S0008197323000132

合同法中的损害因素提出了一些困难而有趣的问题。在Times Travel (UK) Ltd.诉巴基斯坦国际航空公司一案[2021]UKSC 40， [2021] 3 W.L.R. 727中，合法胁迫行为受到了详细的审查，尽管该决定受到了批评(参见Morgan [2022] C.L.J. 16)。加拿大最高法院在Heller诉Uber Technologies (2020 S.C.C. 16)一案中的判决对不合理交易提供了一些启示(见Hunt [2021] C.L.J. 25)。现在轮到不当影响自然度假村有限公司诉第一公民银行有限公司[2022]UKPC 10， [2022] 1 W.L.R. 2788。不幸的是，枢密院的做法引发的问题和解决的问题一样多。枢密院的主要决定是，没有理由背离上诉法院的决定，即任何关于不正当影响的推定都将在事实上被驳斥。然而，更有趣的是对不当影响学说中可能涉及的假设所作的简短观察。多数人的决定是由布里格斯勋爵和巴罗斯勋爵J.J.S.C.;Arden女士J.S.C.对有关公司立法的一点不同意，在本说明中没有进一步讨论。上诉涉及出售上诉人自然度假村有限公司(“NRL”)的股份，该公司拥有多巴哥的Culloden地产。收购者同意从唯一股东丹口先生手中收购NRL 75%的股份。为了方便购买，他们从被告银行获得了一笔贷款。合同条款包括银行将对卡洛登庄园进行抵押担保。银行指示律师理查德·惠勒(Richard Wheeler)准备有关抵押贷款和股票指控的文件。买方拖欠贷款，银行决定行使抵押贷款下的销售权。NRL试图以Wheeler对丹口施加不当影响为基础撤销抵押契据，问题之一是是否应推定Wheeler滥用其与丹口(及NRL)之间的职业关系，促成了被质疑的交易。这一主张在特立尼达和多巴哥高等法院败诉，同样在特立尼达和多巴哥上诉法院败诉。高等法院曾裁定，不存在不正当影响的推定;上诉法院认为存在这样一种推定，但已被反驳。枢密院驳回了NRL的上诉，认为上诉法院有理由认定任何不当影响的假设都已被反驳;枢密院进一步认为，高等法院首先是正确的，不存在需要反驳的推定。剑桥法律杂志，82(1)，2023年3月，第21-24页©作者(s)， 2023。剑桥大学出版社代表剑桥大学法学院出版。doi: 10.1017 / S0008197323000132

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引用次数: 0