Pub Date : 2023-10-09DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2248811
Sophie Smith
ABSTRACTThis essay raises three questions: What has myth been? What can myth do? And does recognising the centrality of mythmaking and imaginative narration to political theory across time have implications for how we approach political theory's modern history? First, I suggest that discussions of myth in early modern England were embedded within broader debates about the nature and power of poetry. This raises questions about how we delineate the criteria for myth as opposed to other forms of imaginative narration. Then I ask whether myths are not simply obfuscating, as often assumed, but also potentially truth-making? Finally, if a constitutive aspect of political theory across time has been a preoccupation with myth, this gives us further ground (if such further ground is needed) to attend to feminist theorists in the 1960s and 70s, for whom a central task was to expose and debunk prevailing myths.KEYWORDS: MythThomas MoreFrancis Baconpoetryimaginationfeminist theory Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Note that this allows, on Keum’s terms, literary myth to include both stories said to originate from those civilizations themselves as well as stories about ancient or remote civilizations which do not necessarily originate from those contexts.2. I don’t think the distinction for Keum here can simply be a matter of explicit naming, either: where literary myths are those that are explicitly named as such and deep myths are those which are not so named. Not least because she treats as literary myths certain stories – like that recounted by Raphael Hythloday in Utopia – which are not referred to as ‘myths’ either by their tellers or by their audience.3. ‘Fables’ is the translation here but it is worth noting that the word Cebes, Socrates’s interlocutor, uses to refer to Aesop’s speech in this instance is logos.4. Though we should not underestimate the extent to which Plato was engaged by movement women in the US, both inside and outside the academy. For an early example of the inclusion of the Republic on a women’s movement reading list see Cisler (Citation1968).Additional informationNotes on contributorsSophie SmithSophie Smith is Associate Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford and a Tutorial Fellow of University College. Her research focuses on early modern political thought and twentieth-century intellectual history, especially the history of feminist political theory.
{"title":"Poetry, myth and storytelling in the history of political theory","authors":"Sophie Smith","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2248811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2248811","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis essay raises three questions: What has myth been? What can myth do? And does recognising the centrality of mythmaking and imaginative narration to political theory across time have implications for how we approach political theory's modern history? First, I suggest that discussions of myth in early modern England were embedded within broader debates about the nature and power of poetry. This raises questions about how we delineate the criteria for myth as opposed to other forms of imaginative narration. Then I ask whether myths are not simply obfuscating, as often assumed, but also potentially truth-making? Finally, if a constitutive aspect of political theory across time has been a preoccupation with myth, this gives us further ground (if such further ground is needed) to attend to feminist theorists in the 1960s and 70s, for whom a central task was to expose and debunk prevailing myths.KEYWORDS: MythThomas MoreFrancis Baconpoetryimaginationfeminist theory Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Note that this allows, on Keum’s terms, literary myth to include both stories said to originate from those civilizations themselves as well as stories about ancient or remote civilizations which do not necessarily originate from those contexts.2. I don’t think the distinction for Keum here can simply be a matter of explicit naming, either: where literary myths are those that are explicitly named as such and deep myths are those which are not so named. Not least because she treats as literary myths certain stories – like that recounted by Raphael Hythloday in Utopia – which are not referred to as ‘myths’ either by their tellers or by their audience.3. ‘Fables’ is the translation here but it is worth noting that the word Cebes, Socrates’s interlocutor, uses to refer to Aesop’s speech in this instance is logos.4. Though we should not underestimate the extent to which Plato was engaged by movement women in the US, both inside and outside the academy. For an early example of the inclusion of the Republic on a women’s movement reading list see Cisler (Citation1968).Additional informationNotes on contributorsSophie SmithSophie Smith is Associate Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford and a Tutorial Fellow of University College. Her research focuses on early modern political thought and twentieth-century intellectual history, especially the history of feminist political theory.","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135147077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-09DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2265212
David Miller
According to Avia Pasternak, citizens can be held responsible for their state’s wrongdoing if and only if they contribute to maintaining it by acting as intentional participants in its activities. I examine two specific aspects of this general claim. First, I ask whether intentional participation requires that the citizen should accept the state, in the sense of not viewing her membership as unwillingly forced upon her, and conclude that it does not. Second I explore how the claim applies in the case where there has been a discontinuity in the form of the state. I argue that it is not a condition of collective liability today that the predecessor state’s subjects should have been intentional participants at the time at which the wrongdoing occurred.
{"title":"Intentional participation in the state","authors":"David Miller","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2265212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2265212","url":null,"abstract":"According to Avia Pasternak, citizens can be held responsible for their state’s wrongdoing if and only if they contribute to maintaining it by acting as intentional participants in its activities. I examine two specific aspects of this general claim. First, I ask whether intentional participation requires that the citizen should accept the state, in the sense of not viewing her membership as unwillingly forced upon her, and conclude that it does not. Second I explore how the claim applies in the case where there has been a discontinuity in the form of the state. I argue that it is not a condition of collective liability today that the predecessor state’s subjects should have been intentional participants at the time at which the wrongdoing occurred.","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":"291 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135141380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2265214
Richard Vernon
ABSTRACTAvia Pasternak’s Responsible Citizens, Irresponsible States makes a case for concluding that ‘intentional citizens’ of states should be held liable, in the sense of being chargeable for remedial costs, when their state has caused wrongful damage to another state. In making this case, the book steers a course between purely ascriptive views that assign liability on the basis of membership alone, and intentionalist views that require a stronger connection with the fault. The exemptions from liability that the book acknowledges, however, may raise questions about its overall case, by implicating more individualized ideas of intention. Even so, the argument may be read as a compelling forward-looking warning about the risks of citizenship.KEYWORDS: Pasternakcollective responsibilityobedience responsibilityrisks of citizenship Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsRichard VernonRichard Vernon is a Distinguished Professor at the Department of Political Science, Western University. He works on contemporary political theory, especially issues of global and historical justice, and selected issues (such as toleration and citizenship) in the history of political thought.
{"title":"Obedience responsibility","authors":"Richard Vernon","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2265214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2265214","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTAvia Pasternak’s Responsible Citizens, Irresponsible States makes a case for concluding that ‘intentional citizens’ of states should be held liable, in the sense of being chargeable for remedial costs, when their state has caused wrongful damage to another state. In making this case, the book steers a course between purely ascriptive views that assign liability on the basis of membership alone, and intentionalist views that require a stronger connection with the fault. The exemptions from liability that the book acknowledges, however, may raise questions about its overall case, by implicating more individualized ideas of intention. Even so, the argument may be read as a compelling forward-looking warning about the risks of citizenship.KEYWORDS: Pasternakcollective responsibilityobedience responsibilityrisks of citizenship Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsRichard VernonRichard Vernon is a Distinguished Professor at the Department of Political Science, Western University. He works on contemporary political theory, especially issues of global and historical justice, and selected issues (such as toleration and citizenship) in the history of political thought.","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135482379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-21DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2260235
Stefano Merlo
The democratic management of macroeconomic externalities between Members of the Economic and Monetary Union requires abandoning the legal entrenchment of fiscal rules as well as their technocratic administration. The fiscal constitution of the EMU can instead become an instrument that guarantees European citizens’ and peoples’ reciprocal non-domination. This republican goal can be attained once a core set of fiscal principles are agreed upon and later interpreted in a political way by the Council and the European Commission. To be non-dominating the interpretations of these executive bodies on the management of macroeconomic externalities must be subject to a ‘dual contestatory system’. Citizens should not only control, through their national parliaments, what their own governments decide, but also what a collective of governments decide at the EU level. This requires stepping up of the contestatory powers of the European Parliament. Finally, this kind of democratic control should be epistemically supported and facilitated by a network of national Independent Fiscal Institutions who should allow citizens and parliaments to monitor what executives decide both at the national and at the EU level.
{"title":"A republican fiscal constitution for the EMU","authors":"Stefano Merlo","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2260235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2260235","url":null,"abstract":"The democratic management of macroeconomic externalities between Members of the Economic and Monetary Union requires abandoning the legal entrenchment of fiscal rules as well as their technocratic administration. The fiscal constitution of the EMU can instead become an instrument that guarantees European citizens’ and peoples’ reciprocal non-domination. This republican goal can be attained once a core set of fiscal principles are agreed upon and later interpreted in a political way by the Council and the European Commission. To be non-dominating the interpretations of these executive bodies on the management of macroeconomic externalities must be subject to a ‘dual contestatory system’. Citizens should not only control, through their national parliaments, what their own governments decide, but also what a collective of governments decide at the EU level. This requires stepping up of the contestatory powers of the European Parliament. Finally, this kind of democratic control should be epistemically supported and facilitated by a network of national Independent Fiscal Institutions who should allow citizens and parliaments to monitor what executives decide both at the national and at the EU level.","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136153835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-21DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2260241
Hanna Schübel
The potential upscaling of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies to meet states’ net-zero targets may enable individuals to remove emissions by purchasing carbon removal certificates. In this paper, I argue for two concepts of individual responsibility to capture the moral responsibility of individuals to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through CDR technologies. The first is that of liability, a direct responsibility to remove carbon in order to minimize one’s carbon footprint. The second is a shared political responsibility to remove carbon that individuals have by virtue of being part of weak collectives responsible for mitigating climate change or by virtue of participating in structures that contribute to climate change. I argue that the concept of shared political responsibility can be used to determine how CDR technologies should or should not be implemented. Finally, I discuss how these two responsibilities are related.
{"title":"Individuals’ responsibilities to remove carbon","authors":"Hanna Schübel","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2260241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2260241","url":null,"abstract":"The potential upscaling of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies to meet states’ net-zero targets may enable individuals to remove emissions by purchasing carbon removal certificates. In this paper, I argue for two concepts of individual responsibility to capture the moral responsibility of individuals to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through CDR technologies. The first is that of liability, a direct responsibility to remove carbon in order to minimize one’s carbon footprint. The second is a shared political responsibility to remove carbon that individuals have by virtue of being part of weak collectives responsible for mitigating climate change or by virtue of participating in structures that contribute to climate change. I argue that the concept of shared political responsibility can be used to determine how CDR technologies should or should not be implemented. Finally, I discuss how these two responsibilities are related.","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136235921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-30DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2253116
M. V. Costa
{"title":"Civic virtue in non-ideal republics","authors":"M. V. Costa","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2253116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2253116","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47684827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-22DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2245651
E. Page, Göran Duus-Otterström
{"title":"Correcting unjust enrichment: explaining and defending the duty to disgorge the benefits of wrongdoing","authors":"E. Page, Göran Duus-Otterström","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2245651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2245651","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48974514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-21DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2248813
Bryan Garsten
{"title":"The great reconciliation of reason and myth","authors":"Bryan Garsten","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2248813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2248813","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46494045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-21DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2248809
Tae-Yeoun Keum
{"title":"Introduction: Myths of Plato, myths of modernity","authors":"Tae-Yeoun Keum","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2248809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2248809","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45189877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-21DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2248812
K. Hoekstra
{"title":"Philosophical discourse and myth","authors":"K. Hoekstra","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2023.2248812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2248812","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48053814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：