Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy最新文献

英文中文

Constructivist and well-being based justifications of human rights. Rivals or allies? 建构主义和基于福祉的人权理由。对手还是盟友？

IF 0.8 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2280867

Christian Baatz

引用次数: 0

Who are the people? Associative freedom and the democratic boundary problem 人民是谁？结社自由与民主边界问题

IF 0.8 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-17 DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2280744

Frank Dietrich

引用次数: 0

Normative behaviourism: groups it cannot reach? 规范行为主义：无法触及的群体？

IF 0.8 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-15 DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2281149

Simon Stevens

引用次数: 0

Boundaries and varieties of republicanism 共和主义的边界和多样性

Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2280946

Adrián Herranz

ABSTRACTThis paper addresses a neglected question in republican political philosophy: what are the conditions for a set of arguments to be considered republican? While republicanism traditionally confers a fundamental role to the democratic ideal of participation in decision-making, recent contributions argue that freedom could be promoted by facilitating exit where possible. The strong version of the latter argument states that when exit is possible, it constitutes the most important contribution to republican freedom, and it preserves the goal of isolating individual choices, i.e. it precludes collective decision-making from interfering with them, and so it intends to limit the scope of public concern considered legitimate. I examine this argument to discuss the boundaries and varieties of republicanism: (i) the boundaries establish that an argument should be couched and substantively articulated in distinctively republican terms; (ii) the strong version of the exit argument does not fall within the boundaries because it is in tension with core republican commitments to self-government and civic virtues; (iii) once we abide by the boundaries we may encounter a diversity of proposals differing on the more concrete level of institutional design and empirical assumptions – these are the varieties of republicanism.KEYWORDS: Republicanismfreedomvirtuedemocracyliberalism AcknowledgementPrevious versions of this paper were presented in Louvain (Chaire Hoover d’éthique économique et sociale), Pavia, and Braga. I am also grateful to Iñigo González-Ricoy, José Luis Martí, Rubén Marciel, Luke Newberry and the anonymous reviewer for their comments.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. By ‘classical liberalism’ (Freeman, Citation2011; De Dijn, Citation2020, pt. 3) I mean the political tradition that builds its core normative requirements around a defence of private property and related ‘economic freedoms’, including thinkers like Constant, Paley, Guizot, Mises, Hayek or Friedman.2. I do not elaborate on cases that may break this general claim, such as increasing our power by being dependent on other agents on which we rely on collective action, or diminishing our power due to collective action problems produced by exit and uncoordinated choices.3. Taylor highlights that the exit view relies on market-coordinated individual preferences rather than collective decisions or bureaucratic discretion (Taylor, Citation2017, pp. 46–49). Lovett initially considered that introducing a basic income involves a strong reform program in the economic sphere, so that it ‘would replace most other public welfare programs, and eliminate the need for much workplace regulation and the minimum wage’ (Lovett, Citation2010, p. 199). Now, he seems more cautious about introducing a more plural institutional design. He stresses the need to curb economic inequality, the empirically determined nature of institutional design and the p

除了自身利益，我们还会发现内在动机或社会偏好——如互惠、承诺或同情——通过这些，我们也会重视他人的福利或利益，以及我们与他人的关系。Falk和Szech (Citation2013)做了一个有趣的实验，为挤出理论提供了支持。在实验中，受试者在不同的环境中决定是接受钱还是拯救一只老鼠的生命。该研究将一个人被面试官要求做出选择的场景与与其他受试者进行双边和多边交易的场景进行了比较。他们发现，如果这个决定是在与他人的交易中做出的(尤其是在多边交易中)，实验对象更倾向于接受杀死老鼠的决定。公民教育被广泛认为是共和思想的核心部分。更不用说古代的paideia，它在卢梭的作品中臭名昭著。我不注重这种创造美德的手段。我的观点是，制度和动机之间的联系超出了公民教育的范畴，还涉及到我提到的其他方面，尤其是声音和美德之间的联系。这项工作受益于AGAUR FI资助，是西班牙科学、创新和大学部资助的“正义与工作:非标准工作的规范分析”研究项目的一部分。关于contributorsAdrián HerranzAdrián的说明Herranz是庞培法布拉大学的博士候选人。他的研究兴趣包括共和政治哲学、经济民主、劳资关系以及与前者相关的社会理论。

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引用次数: 0

A Lockean account of the moral status of undocumented immigrants 洛克式的对无证移民道德地位的描述

Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-09 DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2280878

J.K. Numao

ABSTRACTThis article aims to show that Locke’s discussion of tacit consent and the right to punish aliens in the Second Treatise of Government has important bearings on the moral status of undocumented immigrants. It argues that Locke conceptualized both friendly and hostile aliens, counting the former as tacit consenters to whom host states owed rights and protection. Moreover, it highlights how his approach, unlike theorists before and after him, was one that saw individuals as capable of shaping their own relationship with the host. The article also examines Locke’s discussion of the federative power of the state, which includes the power to vet aliens within the country. Seen through this Lockean lens, the article argues that the vast majority of undocumented immigrants can be understood as tacit consenters or potential citizens who should be judged by how they choose to relate to the host, and not by their country of origin. While noting that the Lockean approach is not incompatible with border control, the article also shows how it puts the onus on the host to justify the power it exercises and to engage in dialogue with undocumented immigrants about what their status should be in the country.KEYWORDS: Lockeirregular migrationundocumented immigrantstacit consentpunishment AcknowledgmentsI would like to thank everyone who attended the online Locke working group workshop on June 25th, 2021. I have benefited greatly from their questions and comments. I would especially like to thank Douglas Casson who was the commentator for my session on this occasion. I would also like to thank Takuya Furuta and Brian Smith for reading an earlier version of this paper. Finally, I would like to thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable feedback.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. By this, I mean irregular migration as it tends to be understood today. For example, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines this type of migration as the ‘Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination’. https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms (Accessed on September 9, 2021). However, what may be considered ‘irregular’ by today’s standards may not have been irregular, but quite ‘regular’, in seventeenth-century England. What I am doing therefore is to consider the implications of Locke’s comments for the debate over irregular immigration today. I am grateful to Brian Smith for his suggestion to clarify this point.2. References to Locke (Citation1988) will be by book (Roman numeral) and paragraph number (Arabic numeral).3. The irrevocability of citizenship may be puzzling to some and may make Locke’s theory less appealing. I make no effort in this article to explain or defend it, simply regarding it as a part of Locke’s argument. At the same time, I do not t

也许有一个有趣的问题是关于惩罚一个外籍默许者对另一个来自不同国家的外籍默许者所犯的罪行。其他有趣的案例可能包括虚张声势和否认敌对意图。此外，在上述逃亡的前默许者的案件中，如果国家决定惩罚这个人，国家将使用其联邦权力。“外国人在一国管辖范围内应受惩处的罪行，首先是他们所属的国家所犯的罪行，并且他们参与了该国家的罪行;第二，他们自己单独犯下的罪行，对他们所属的国家没有任何指控。第一种情况是外来敌人;第二，外星人朋友的案例”(麦迪逊，引文1900，第364页)。另见麦迪逊(引文1900，第366页):“清除外来敌人是战争力量的一个事件;驱逐异族朋友并不是战争力量的偶然事件。在这一点上，我与道格拉斯·卡森(Douglas Casson)的交流让我受益匪浅。他的评论帮助我澄清了我想表达的观点。其他信息资助keio Gijuku学术发展基金捐助者说明。NumaoJ.K。Numao是日本庆应义塾大学科学技术学院外语文学系副教授。他的研究兴趣是政治理论和政治思想史，尤其是17世纪英国思想家约翰·洛克的思想。他写过的话题从宽容到移民都有。

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引用次数: 0

Response to critics 对批评的回应

Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2265217

Avia Pasternak

ABSTRACTIn this piece I respond to the critiques raised by the contributors to this symposium.Keywords: Collective responsibilitycitizenshipintentional participation Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. In reality, shareholders are shielded from personal responsibility through the practice of limited corporate liability. Kutz rejects this practice and I share his concerns (Kutz, Citation2000, pp. 337–354).2. King (Citation2016) offers an important alternative to this account.Additional informationNotes on contributorsAvia PasternakAvia Pasternak is an associate professor at the Department of Philosophy, The University of Toronto. Her research focuses on questions of political philosophy and public affairs.

在这篇文章中，我对本次研讨会的撰稿人提出的批评做出回应。关键词:集体责任公民有意参与披露声明作者未发现潜在的利益冲突。在现实中，股东通过有限公司责任的实践免于承担个人责任。Kutz反对这种做法，我和他一样担心(Kutz, Citation2000, pp. 337-354)。King (Citation2016)提供了一个重要的替代方案。savia Pasternak是多伦多大学哲学系的副教授。她的研究重点是政治哲学和公共事务问题。

引用次数: 0

The claim-right to exclude and the right to do wrong 排他权和做错事权

Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2265288

Sahar Akhtar

ABSTRACTMost challenges to immigration restrictions have not shown that states lack a claim-right to exclude, or a moral right against outside interference to make membership decisions. And an important, unexamined aspect of the claim-right is that states have the right against interference to wrongfully exclude, or the right to do wrong when making admission decisions. A major implication of this right is that even political or economic measures to affect states’ immigration policies are off the table – significantly compromising the prospect of meaningfully addressing the world’s growing refugee crisis. In the form of a reductio argument, I provide reason to reject this position. Specifically, I try to demonstrate that, in the relevant cases, a plausible moral defense for the right to wrongfully exclude can only be given for states with objectionable character – protecting the very states whose immigration policies we should be most concerned with, which is surely morally counterintuitive.KEYWORDS: Right to excluderaceidentityrefugeeimmigrationopen borders AcknowledgmentsI owe thanks to two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and questions. I am alsograteful for the helpful feedback that I received from the participants at a workshop for the Georgetown Institute for the Study of Markets and Ethics.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine2. https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/. The variance is due mainly to morally irrelevant definitional issues. The traditional conception of a refugee refers to someone who has departed their original state and includes about 32 million people. But about 53 million forcibly displaced people remain in their original states, and their conditions and circumstances typically mirror those of traditional refugees. For more, see: https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/idpersons/pages/issues.aspx3. https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/refugees-asylum-seekers-and-migrants/global-refugee-crisis-statistics-and-facts/See references in my previous note. Andrew Altman and Wellman (Citation2009, esp. pp. 181–182) likewise maintain that wealthy states have moral duties to rescue refugees, which can often only be satisfied by admitting them.4. Some notable works stand out for arguing against the claim-right to exclude (e.g. Abizadeh, Citation2008), but they don’t examine its implications for wrongful exclusions – my focus here.5. I discuss recent work below.6. My arguments also suggest a new critique of individuals’ right to do wrong.7. The only other sustained analysis concerning states seems to be Gerhard Øverland and Barry’s (Citation2011) valuable paper, but its focus is different. It concerns whether a majority has the right to have its democratically-produced, morally wrong decisions complied with/not interfered with by other members, and is thus perhaps more related to issues of democratic authority and political ob

摘要大多数对移民限制的挑战并没有表明国家缺乏排他的权利，或者缺乏反对外部干涉的道德权利来做出成员决定。索赔权的一个重要的、未经审查的方面是，各州有权反对干涉错误地排除，或在作出接纳决定时有权做错。这项权利的一个主要含义是，即使是影响各国移民政策的政治或经济措施也不在讨论范围之内——这严重损害了有意地解决世界日益严重的难民危机的前景。以还原论证的形式，我提供了拒绝这一立场的理由。具体地说，我试图证明，在相关的案例中，为错误排他权提供合理的道德辩护只能针对那些具有令人反感的特征的州——保护那些我们最应该关注其移民政策的州，这在道德上肯定是违反直觉的。关键词:排他权、身份认同、难民、移民、开放边界感谢两位匿名审稿人的宝贵意见和问题。我还要感谢参加乔治城大学市场与伦理研究所(Georgetown Institute for the Study of Markets and Ethics)研讨会的与会者给我的有益反馈。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine2。https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/。这种差异主要是由于与道德无关的定义问题。传统意义上的难民是指离开原籍国的人，大约包括3200万人。但是，约有5300万被迫流离失所的人仍留在原来的国家，他们的条件和处境通常与传统难民相似。欲了解更多信息，请参阅:https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/idpersons/pages/issues.aspx3。https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/refugees-asylum-seekers-and-migrants/global-refugee-crisis-statistics-and-facts/See参考资料在我之前的说明。Andrew Altman和Wellman (Citation2009，特别是第181-182页)同样认为，富裕国家有道义上的责任来拯救难民，这通常只能通过接纳他们来满足。一些著名的著作反对排他权的主张(例如Abizadeh, Citation2008)，但他们没有研究其对不正当排他的影响——这是我在这里的重点。我在下面讨论最近的工作。我的论点也提出了对个人犯错权利的一种新的批判。关于国家的唯一持续的分析似乎是Gerhard Øverland和Barry (Citation2011)的有价值的论文，但其重点是不同的。它涉及多数人是否有权让其民主产生的、道德上错误的决定得到其他成员的遵守/不受干涉，因此可能与民主权威和政治义务的问题更相关，而不是像对外人那样做错事的权利。与此相关的是，它没有讨论移民决定，而移民决定(如第2节将强调的)可能被认为是国家反对外部干涉权利的最核心领域。有时，“排他权”与拒绝公民身份有关(见Fine, Citation2010, pp. 342-43)，但我在这里感兴趣的是拒绝领土接纳。然而，第二节讨论了国家有权做错事的最合理的一般理由。关于自由权利的一般定义，见Waldron (Citation1981, p. 29)。例如，Fine (Citation2013)认为，排他权的自决理由并没有建立排他权的道德容忍度。下面我将讨论Hidalgo (Citation2015)的论文，该论文似乎否认了排他权的可能性。一个值得注意的例外是Abizadeh (Citation2008)，然而它并没有考察请求权对不正当排除的影响(下文讨论)。这里我引用米勒(Citation2016, p. 163)对权利要求的描述。关于Wellman (Citation2008)对索赔权的暗示，见第111-12页;关于单方面的谅解，见第114页顶部。例如，Miller (Citation2016)在第33页、57页和62-63页以及第6章中提到了这种理解。(在这些相同的段落中，正如下面讨论的，作者有时会提到自由权利。)卡伦斯(引文2013，第8页)表明，甚至批评也可能是不允许的。《难民地位公约》第33条第1款，1951年7月28日，美国法典第19编第6259条，美国法典第189编第150.15条。关于身份标准的立场，请看，例如Blake (Citation2002);护理(Citation2013, p. 179, 174-75);米勒(Citation2016, pp. 104-106);威尔曼(引文2008，第109-141页)。简要地说，我将讨论在难民问题上的立场。我非常感谢两位匿名审稿人催促我讨论并详细阐述这个问题。有关这些方面的突出描述，请参阅Allen Buchanan的工作(Citation2003, p. 193, 266, chs)。最近，关于移民司法的令人信服的解释将个别国家的合法性与国家的合法性体系联系在一起:一般来说，为了使国家体系合法，它必须包括一个全球合作的移民计划。国家体系合法性的更具体条件可能涉及难民保护(参见欧文，Citation2020.)，关于非正规移民和基于身份的移民选择的决定(参见布罗克，Citation2020.)，甚至更普遍的排斥(参见伯特伦，Citation2018 .)。这些说法认为，某些移民决定或一组移民决定是对还是错，不能从单个国家的角度来确定，而必须从国家系统的集体角度来考虑。参见Daniel Sharp最近发表的一篇论文(Citation2020)，对这些观点进行了有益的讨论和批判性分析。19.关于更全面的列表，请参见Buchanan (Citation2003);参见米勒(Citation2016, pp. 103-104)对这一观点的讨论，他拒绝了。这也是Criddle和Fox-Decent (Citation2021, pp. 1093-1096)解读这些作者的方式。虽然我不同意这种对合法性的理解，但为了检验RWE.22，我在这里接受它。他写道，“我的意图不是制定任何特定的移民政策... .这些问题应该在每个州内通过民主的方式来决定。(第57页)也见第163.23页。米勒对这一立场表达了极大的道德关切，但似乎认为这是不可避免的。更一般地说，在这里和其他地方(例如第92页)，他建议由一个国家来决定接纳多少难民。他在人权义务的背景下描述了主权民主国家的概念(第7-8页;也见第90-93页)。在218-220页，他将这一点延伸到接纳难民的决定上。另一位开放边界的支持者Chandran Kukathas (Citation2017, p. 714)似乎也接受了这一观点，尽管尚不完全清楚他是否认为排他权只是一种法律权利还是一种道德权利。正如我在下面的注释32中讨论的那样，对于这些作者来说，似乎只有灾难性的后果才会丧失一个国家反对干涉的权利，例如，如果排斥移民会引发战争。一般来说，做错事的权利都是如此。参见Herstein (Citation2012, p. 18)。另见以诺(Citation2002，第363页);高尔斯顿(Citation1983) 29。Enoch (Citation2002, pp. 360-361)认为这样的权利

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引用次数: 0

Introduction to the symposium: intentional citizenship and citizens’ remedial obligation to share the compensation burden 研讨会导言:故意公民与公民分担赔偿负担的救济义务

Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2265211

Jinyu Sun

ABSTRACTIn this introduction, I provide a brief overview of the main arguments defended by Avia Pasternak in her book, ‘Responsible Citizens, Non-Responsible States’ and summarise the critics she will confront from four political and legal theorists who work in the area of individual citizens’ responsibility for state wrongdoings.KEYWORDS: Avia Pasternakintentional citizenshipdistributive effectstate wrongdoingsforward-looking responsibility Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsJinyu SunJinyu Sun is an Associate Researcher at the Department of Sociology, Zhejiang University. Her research interests include collective action, political obligation, and responsibility for injustice.

在这篇引言中，我简要概述了阿维亚·帕斯捷尔纳克(Avia Pasternak)在《负责任的公民，非负责任的国家》一书中所捍卫的主要论点，并总结了她将面临的来自四位政治和法律理论家的批评，他们研究的是个人公民对国家不法行为的责任。关键词:阿维亚·帕斯特尔纳克有意公民分配效应国家不法行为前瞻性责任披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突。作者简介:孙金宇，浙江大学社会学系副研究员。她的研究兴趣包括集体行动、政治义务和对不公正的责任。

引用次数: 0

Responsible citizens of responsible states 负责任国家的负责任公民

Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2265215

Jeff King

Avia Pasternak’s book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of citizen responsibility for historical wrongs. This review nevertheless offers some scepticism about resting citizen liability exclusively on the idea of intentional participation. It argues that the necessity of the state possessing continuing legal responsibility over time is so intrinsic to the function of statehood that the question of citizen liability should be seen as part of the general theory of political obligation. So seen, fair play duties provide a more plausible general ground for citizen liability, even when adapted to unjust regimes. The model of intentional participation may by contrast harbour a muted connection between the ideas of blameworthiness and responsibility that the book in the main wishes to deny. And the practical problems of resting responsibility on intentional participation alone are substantial. Pasternak’s major contribution, untouched by this critique, is to explain how the special obligations undertaken by intentional citizenship strengthen and extend beyond that more foundational duty of responsible citizens.

阿维亚·帕斯捷尔纳克的书对我们理解公民对历史错误的责任做出了重大贡献。然而，这一审查对将公民责任完全建立在有意参与的概念上提出了一些怀疑。它认为，随着时间的推移，国家拥有持续的法律责任的必要性是国家职能所固有的，因此公民责任问题应被视为政治义务一般理论的一部分。由此可见，公平竞争义务为公民责任提供了更合理的一般依据，即使适用于不公正的政权。相比之下，有意参与的模式可能隐藏着一种应受谴责和责任之间的隐晦联系，而这本书主要是想否认这种联系。把责任仅仅放在有意参与上的实际问题是实质性的。帕斯捷尔纳克的主要贡献没有受到这种批评的影响，他解释了有意识的公民所承担的特殊义务是如何加强和扩展到负责任的公民的更基本的义务之外的。

引用次数: 0

Testing intentional citizenship 测试有意入籍

Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2265213

Jinyu Sun

ABSTRACTAvia Pasternak argues that intentional citizens who are genuine participants of their state should share the liability for state wrongdoings. In real-world states, how prevalent is intentional citizenship? This commentary concerns the application of the theoretical model. I argue that there are two problems with Pasternak’s proposal of testing intentional citizenship in reality. First, the difficulty of distinguishing citizens’ ambiguous internal attitudes towards their citizenship is underestimated. Second, the objective aspect of citizens’ status in society, namely, the way they are treated by their state, is more important than their subjective attitudes, but this aspect is neglected by Pasternak.KEYWORDS: intentional citizenshipacceptancecollective liabilitysocial status Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Additional informationNotes on contributorsJinyu SunJinyu Sun is an Associate Researcher at the Department of Sociology, Zhejiang University. Her research interests include collective action, political obligation, and responsibility for injustice.

帕斯捷尔纳克认为，作为国家的真正参与者的故意公民应当分担国家不法行为的责任。在现实世界中，有意入籍有多普遍?这篇评论涉及理论模型的应用。我认为帕斯捷尔纳克提出的在现实中检验有意公民身份的建议存在两个问题。首先，区分公民对其公民身份模棱两可的内在态度的难度被低估了。其次，公民社会地位的客观方面，即国家对待公民的方式，比公民的主观态度更重要，但帕斯捷尔纳克忽略了这一点。关键词:有意入籍接受集体责任社会地位披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突。作者简介:孙金宇，浙江大学社会学系副研究员。她的研究兴趣包括集体行动、政治义务和对不公正的责任。

引用次数: 0

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