The pragmatic notion of assertion has an important inferential role in logic. There are also many notational forms to express assertions in logical systems. This paper reviews, compares and analyses languages with signs for assertions, including explicit signs such as Frege’s and Dalla Pozza’s logical systems and implicit signs with no specific sign for assertion, such as Peirce’s algebraic and graphical logics and the recent modification of the latter termed Assertive Graphs. We identify and discuss the main ‘points’ of these notations on the logical representation of assertions, and evaluate their systems from the perspective of the philosophy of logical notations. Pragmatic assertions turn out to be useful in providing intended interpretations of a variety of logical systems.
{"title":"Some Logical Notations for Pragmatic Assertions","authors":"Pietarinen Ahti-Veikko, Carrara Massimiliano, Chiffi Daniele","doi":"10.2143/LEA.251.0.3288642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.251.0.3288642","url":null,"abstract":"The pragmatic notion of assertion has an important inferential role in logic. There are also many notational forms to express assertions in logical systems. This paper reviews, compares and analyses languages with signs for assertions, including explicit signs such as Frege’s and Dalla Pozza’s logical systems and implicit signs with no specific sign for assertion, such as Peirce’s algebraic and graphical logics and the recent modification of the latter termed Assertive Graphs. We identify and discuss the main ‘points’ of these notations on the logical representation of assertions, and evaluate their systems from the perspective of the philosophy of logical notations. Pragmatic assertions turn out to be useful in providing intended interpretations of a variety of logical systems.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"18 1","pages":"297-315"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79035708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.251.0.3288641
Bellucci Francesco, L. Xinwen, Pietarinen Ahti-Veikko
{"title":"On Linear Existential Graphs","authors":"Bellucci Francesco, L. Xinwen, Pietarinen Ahti-Veikko","doi":"10.2143/LEA.251.0.3288641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.251.0.3288641","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"280 1","pages":"261-296"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80130851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.251.0.3288643
Dave Beisecker
{"title":"Regions of Force: Peirce, Frege, Carroll, and Bilateral Proof Trees","authors":"Dave Beisecker","doi":"10.2143/LEA.251.0.3288643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.251.0.3288643","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"59 1","pages":"317"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83882263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.248.0.3287321
P. D. Brabanter
{"title":"What do we mean when we talk of object-language and metalanguage in the theory of natural languages?","authors":"P. D. Brabanter","doi":"10.2143/LEA.248.0.3287321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.248.0.3287321","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"94 1","pages":"351-378"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88094366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.247.0.3287265
E. Weber, Inge De Bal
{"title":"Causation & technical problem solving : an analysis of causal knowledge underlying proposed solutions for technical problems","authors":"E. Weber, Inge De Bal","doi":"10.2143/LEA.247.0.3287265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.247.0.3287265","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"25 1","pages":"285-318"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84066691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.245.0.3285706
Minghui Ma, Pietarinen Ahti-Veikko
{"title":"A Graphical Deep Inference System for Intuitionistic Logic","authors":"Minghui Ma, Pietarinen Ahti-Veikko","doi":"10.2143/LEA.245.0.3285706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.245.0.3285706","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"2 1","pages":"73-114"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74446093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-04DOI: 10.2143/LEA.237.0.3285353
R. Hinnion
This paper shows that one can construct pure term models for intensional set theory ruled by the modal logic S4.
本文证明了可以构造由模态逻辑S4支配的内涵集合论的纯项模型。
{"title":"Pure term models for modal, intensional set theory","authors":"R. Hinnion","doi":"10.2143/LEA.237.0.3285353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.237.0.3285353","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that one can construct pure term models for intensional set theory ruled by the modal logic S4.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"54 1","pages":"513-520"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86723233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.243.0.3285130
H. Duijf
Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality typically rely on members to form a personal intention of sorts, viewed as a mental state. This tendency is opposed by recent economic literature on team-directed reasoning (as studied by Bacharach, Gold, and Sugden), which focuses on the reasoning process leading up to the formation of the members’ intentions. Our formal analysis bridges these paradigms and criticizes the team- directed reasoning account on two counts: first, team-directed reasoning is supposed to transcend traditional game and decision theory by adopting a certain collectivistic reasoning method. However, we show that team-directed reasoning yields the same action recommendations as a certain I-mode we-intention type. Accordingly, an important part of we-mode reasoning can be reduced to I-mode reasoning with certain preferences. Second, contrary to the claims of team-directed-reasoning theorists, we refute that team-directed reasoning surpasses pro-group intentions in selecting cooperatively rational solutions. That is, in some scenarios team-directed reasoning fails to guarantee successful cooperation whereas pro-group intentions succeed in doing so. We therefore propose to revise team-directed reasoning and introduce a third we-intention type, called participatory intentions. We prove that participatory intentions guarantee that a best group action is performed whenever either team-directed reasoning or pro-group intentions do.
{"title":"Beyond team-directed reasoning: participatory intentions contribute to a theory of collective agency","authors":"H. Duijf","doi":"10.2143/LEA.243.0.3285130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.243.0.3285130","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality typically rely on members to form a personal intention of sorts, viewed as a mental state. This tendency is opposed by recent economic literature on team-directed reasoning (as studied by Bacharach, Gold, and Sugden), which focuses on the reasoning process leading up to the formation of the members’ intentions. Our formal analysis bridges these paradigms and criticizes the team- directed reasoning account on two counts: first, team-directed reasoning is supposed to transcend traditional game and decision theory by adopting a certain collectivistic reasoning method. However, we show that team-directed reasoning yields the same action recommendations as a certain I-mode we-intention type. Accordingly, an important part of we-mode reasoning can be reduced to I-mode reasoning with certain preferences. Second, contrary to the claims of team-directed-reasoning theorists, we refute that team-directed reasoning surpasses pro-group intentions in selecting cooperatively rational solutions. That is, in some scenarios team-directed reasoning fails to guarantee successful cooperation whereas pro-group intentions succeed in doing so. We therefore propose to revise team-directed reasoning and introduce a third we-intention type, called participatory intentions. We prove that participatory intentions guarantee that a best group action is performed whenever either team-directed reasoning or pro-group intentions do.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"73 1","pages":"269-298"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84248747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-09-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.239.0.3237150
F. Buekens, Massimiliano Carrara, D. Chiffi, C. Florio
{"title":"Some Preliminaries on Assertion and Denial","authors":"F. Buekens, Massimiliano Carrara, D. Chiffi, C. Florio","doi":"10.2143/LEA.239.0.3237150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.239.0.3237150","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"27 1","pages":"203-207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83708375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-09-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.239.0.3237151
F. Buekens
This paper examines the communicative function of public pronouncements about what is tasty, agreeable or attractive, followed by an equally public endorsement or rejection. The typical and expected reaction to contributions like 'This is tasty' or 'The roller coaster is fun' in a conversational setting is not 'how come?' or 'How do you know that?', but a reply that reveals one's own attitude towards an object or state of affairs, thus revealing conflict or alignment over the issue at hand. Judgements of taste (their content and the speech acts performed) are explored in the context of a cooperative view of communication developed by Michael Tomasello, which classifies communicative actions in terms of what we want from others when we communicate to them. We also use game theory. The game-theoretical connotation for a public dispute over what to like or to prefer is a co-ordination game like Battle of the Sexes. Speech act theory traditionally allows that speakers can perform different speech acts simultaneously. Combining both views, we argue that the public pronouncements that give rise to seemingly faultless disagreement have informative, requestive and alignment-seeking dimensions, which make different propositional contents salient. In a dispute over whether something is tasty (fun,...) a speaker and her intended audience usually play two games the game of letting others know something (about oneself), and the alignment of attitudes game, i.e. the game of making moves in the direction of seeking alignment over what to prefer, or what would be preferable, in a given situation. Both games make different propositions salient. I conclude with a brief evaluation of current disputes over what's tasty (comical,...) between contextualists and assessment relativists in matters of personal taste.
{"title":"Saying 'Yes' and 'No' in Matters of Personal Taste","authors":"F. Buekens","doi":"10.2143/LEA.239.0.3237151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.239.0.3237151","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the communicative function of public pronouncements about what is tasty, agreeable or attractive, followed by an equally public endorsement or rejection. The typical and expected reaction to contributions like 'This is tasty' or 'The roller coaster is fun' in a conversational setting is not 'how come?' or 'How do you know that?', but a reply that reveals one's own attitude towards an object or state of affairs, thus revealing conflict or alignment over the issue at hand. Judgements of taste (their content and the speech acts performed) are explored in the context of a cooperative view of communication developed by Michael Tomasello, which classifies communicative actions in terms of what we want from others when we communicate to them. We also use game theory. The game-theoretical connotation for a public dispute over what to like or to prefer is a co-ordination game like Battle of the Sexes. Speech act theory traditionally allows that speakers can perform different speech acts simultaneously. Combining both views, we argue that the public pronouncements that give rise to seemingly faultless disagreement have informative, requestive and alignment-seeking dimensions, which make different propositional contents salient. In a dispute over whether something is tasty (fun,...) a speaker and her intended audience usually play two games the game of letting others know something (about oneself), and the alignment of attitudes game, i.e. the game of making moves in the direction of seeking alignment over what to prefer, or what would be preferable, in a given situation. Both games make different propositions salient. I conclude with a brief evaluation of current disputes over what's tasty (comical,...) between contextualists and assessment relativists in matters of personal taste.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"37 1","pages":"209-226"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80779050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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