Pub Date : 2014-01-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053511
Vittorio Morato
The notion of validity for modal languages could be defined in two slightly different ways. The first is the original definition given by S. Kripke, for which a formula Φ of a modal language L is valid if and only if it is true in every actual world of every interpretation of L. The second is the definition that has become standard in most textbook presentations of modal logic, for which a formula Φ of L is valid if and only if it is true in every world in every interpretation of L. For simple modal languages, “Kripkean validity” and “Textbook validity” are extensionally equivalent. According to E. Zalta, however, Textbook validity is an “incorrect” definition of validity, because: (i) it is not in full compliance with Tarski’s notion of truth; (ii) in expressively richer languages, enriched by the actuality operator, some obviously true formulas count as valid only if the Kripkean notion is used. The purpose of this paper is to show that (i) and (ii) are not good reasons to favor Kripkean validity over Textbook validity. On the one hand, I will claim that the difference between the two should rather be seen as the result of two different conceptions on how a modal logic should be built from a non-modal basis; on the other, I will show the advantages, for the question at issue, of seeing the actuality operator as belonging to the family of two-dimensional operators.
{"title":"Validity and actuality","authors":"Vittorio Morato","doi":"10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053511","url":null,"abstract":"The notion of validity for modal languages could be defined in two slightly different ways. The first is the original definition given by S. Kripke, for which a formula Φ of a modal language L is valid if and only if it is true in every actual world of every interpretation of L. The second is the definition that has become standard in most textbook presentations of modal logic, for which a formula Φ of L is valid if and only if it is true in every world in every interpretation of L. For simple modal languages, “Kripkean validity” and “Textbook validity” are extensionally equivalent. According to E. Zalta, however, Textbook validity is an “incorrect” definition of validity, because: (i) it is not in full compliance with Tarski’s notion of truth; (ii) in expressively richer languages, enriched by the actuality operator, some obviously true formulas count as valid only if the Kripkean notion is used. The purpose of this paper is to show that (i) and (ii) are not good reasons to favor Kripkean validity over Textbook validity. On the one hand, I will claim that the difference between the two should rather be seen as the result of two different conceptions on how a modal logic should be built from a non-modal basis; on the other, I will show the advantages, for the question at issue, of seeing the actuality operator as belonging to the family of two-dimensional operators.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"121 1","pages":"379-405"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78345570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-01-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053505
Julien Murzi, Massimiliano Carrara
This special issue collects together nine new essays on logical consequence: the relation obtaining between the premises and the conclusion of a logically valid argument. The present paper is a partial, and opinionated, introduction to the contemporary debate on the topic. We focus on two influential accounts of consequence, the model-theoretic and the proof-theoretic, and on the seeming platitude that valid arguments necessarily preserve truth. We briefly discuss the main objections these accounts face, as well as Hartry Field’s contention that such objections show consequence to be a primitive, indefinable notion, and that we must reject the claim that valid arguments necessarily preserve truth. We suggest that the accounts in question have the resources to meet the objections standardly thought to herald their demise and make two main claims: (i) that consequence, as opposed to logical consequence, is the epistemologically significant relation philosophers should be mainly interested in; and (ii) that consequence is a paradoxical notion if truth is.
{"title":"More Reflections on Consequence","authors":"Julien Murzi, Massimiliano Carrara","doi":"10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053505","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053505","url":null,"abstract":"This special issue collects together nine new essays on logical consequence: the relation obtaining between the premises and the conclusion of a logically valid argument. The present paper is a partial, and opinionated, introduction to the contemporary debate on the topic. We focus on two influential accounts of consequence, the model-theoretic and the proof-theoretic, and on the seeming platitude that valid arguments necessarily preserve truth. We briefly discuss the main objections these accounts face, as well as Hartry Field’s contention that such objections show consequence to be a primitive, indefinable notion, and that we must reject the claim that valid arguments necessarily preserve truth. We suggest that the accounts in question have the resources to meet the objections standardly thought to herald their demise and make two main claims: (i) that consequence, as opposed to logical consequence, is the epistemologically significant relation philosophers should be mainly interested in; and (ii) that consequence is a paradoxical notion if truth is.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"49 1","pages":"223-258"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87898452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-01-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.225.0.3011355
K. Zahidi
in Gracely’s decision theoretic puzzle, the Devil’s offer, a subject is offered to take part in a lottery in which she stands to win eternal bliss or eternal torment. her chances of winning the lottery increase as time elapses. expected utility maximization seems to lead to the paradoxical situation in which the subject indefinitely postpones the lottery, resulting in the least desirable outcome. however, as various authors have pointed out with respect to decision problems similar to the Devil’s offer, the reasoning that leads to the paradoxical conclusion is not valid. in particular, distinguishing between a synchronic and diachronic version of decision problems in which the number of choice options is infinite, allows for a fine-grained analysis of the requirements of rational decision making. The aim of this paper is twofold. i will show that Arntzenius et al.’s (2004) analysis of problems that are structurally similar to Gracely’s decision problem can be adapted to show that the latter can be handled within Bayesian decision theory. furthermore, i will discuss a variation on the diachronic version of the Devil’s offer, in which the subject is unaware of the fact that she is confronted with infinitely many choices. This modified version seems to be a genuine case in which the principle of utility maximization leads to a paradoxical result. however, i will show that this paradox is only apparent and that the problem can also be resolved within a broadly Bayesian conception of rationality.
{"title":"Deciding and time : refusing devilish offers","authors":"K. Zahidi","doi":"10.2143/LEA.225.0.3011355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.225.0.3011355","url":null,"abstract":"in Gracely’s decision theoretic puzzle, the Devil’s offer, a subject is offered to take part in a lottery in which she stands to win eternal bliss or eternal torment. her chances of winning the lottery increase as time elapses. expected utility maximization seems to lead to the paradoxical situation in which the subject indefinitely postpones the lottery, resulting in the least desirable outcome. however, as various authors have pointed out with respect to decision problems similar to the Devil’s offer, the reasoning that leads to the paradoxical conclusion is not valid. in particular, distinguishing between a synchronic and diachronic version of decision problems in which the number of choice options is infinite, allows for a fine-grained analysis of the requirements of rational decision making. The aim of this paper is twofold. i will show that Arntzenius et al.’s (2004) analysis of problems that are structurally similar to Gracely’s decision problem can be adapted to show that the latter can be handled within Bayesian decision theory. furthermore, i will discuss a variation on the diachronic version of the Devil’s offer, in which the subject is unaware of the fact that she is confronted with infinitely many choices. This modified version seems to be a genuine case in which the principle of utility maximization leads to a paradoxical result. however, i will show that this paradox is only apparent and that the problem can also be resolved within a broadly Bayesian conception of rationality.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"22 1","pages":"45-57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90564544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-01-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053508
Corine Besson
Classical logic counts sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ as logically true. A standard objection to classical logic is that Alice’s self-identity, for instance, is not a matter of logic because the identity of particular objects is not a matter of logic. For this reason, many philosophers argue that classical logic is not the right logic, and that it should be abandoned in favour of free logic — logic free of existential commitments with respect to singular terms. In most standard free logics, sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ are not logically true. This paper argues that this objection from existential commitments is somewhat superficial and that there is a deeper reason why ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ should not be considered a logical truth. Indeed, a key fundamental thought about the nature of logic is that a logical truth is true in virtue of its logical form. The fundamental problem I raise is that a sentence such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ appears to not even be true in virtue of its logical form. Thus this paper argues that given that such a sentence is not true in virtue of its logical form, it should not be counted as logically true. It moreover argues, on the same grounds, that even the sentences which free logicians regard as logically true shouldn’t be regarded as logically true. So in this sense free logic is no repair to classical logic. I. Introduction The paper is organised as follows. In sections II and III, I outline the standard problem of existential commitments for classical logic, as well as its standard solution in terms of free logic. Doing this will be useful to set up the key issue of the paper. Section IV then moves to considerations about logical form and outlines a new problem for sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ being considered logical truths. Sections IV-XI put forward considerations meant to cast doubt on the idea that sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ are logical truths in the formal sense. Section XII elaborates on these considerations and offers a way of thinking of the relationship of sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ to logical truths proper.
{"title":"A NOTE ON LOGICAL TRUTH","authors":"Corine Besson","doi":"10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053508","url":null,"abstract":"Classical logic counts sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ as logically true. A standard objection to classical logic is that Alice’s self-identity, for instance, is not a matter of logic because the identity of particular objects is not a matter of logic. For this reason, many philosophers argue that classical logic is not the right logic, and that it should be abandoned in favour of free logic — logic free of existential commitments with respect to singular terms. In most standard free logics, sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ are not logically true. This paper argues that this objection from existential commitments is somewhat superficial and that there is a deeper reason why ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ should not be considered a logical truth. Indeed, a key fundamental thought about the nature of logic is that a logical truth is true in virtue of its logical form. The fundamental problem I raise is that a sentence such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ appears to not even be true in virtue of its logical form. Thus this paper argues that given that such a sentence is not true in virtue of its logical form, it should not be counted as logically true. It moreover argues, on the same grounds, that even the sentences which free logicians regard as logically true shouldn’t be regarded as logically true. So in this sense free logic is no repair to classical logic. I. Introduction The paper is organised as follows. In sections II and III, I outline the standard problem of existential commitments for classical logic, as well as its standard solution in terms of free logic. Doing this will be useful to set up the key issue of the paper. Section IV then moves to considerations about logical form and outlines a new problem for sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ being considered logical truths. Sections IV-XI put forward considerations meant to cast doubt on the idea that sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ are logical truths in the formal sense. Section XII elaborates on these considerations and offers a way of thinking of the relationship of sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ to logical truths proper.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"108 1","pages":"309-331"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78071598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Constructive Analysis and Nonstandard Analysis are often characterized as completely antipodal approaches to analysis. We discuss the possibility of capturing the central notion of Constructive Analysis (i.e. algorithm, finite procedure or explicit construction) by a simple concept inside Nonstandard Analysis. To this end, we introduce Omega-invariance and argue that it partially satisfies our goal. Our results provide a dual approach to Erik Palmgren's development of Nonstandard Analysis inside constructive mathematics.
{"title":"On the connection between Nonstandard Analysis and Constructive Analysis","authors":"Sam Sanders","doi":"10.14288/1.0348311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14288/1.0348311","url":null,"abstract":"Constructive Analysis and Nonstandard Analysis are often characterized as completely antipodal approaches to analysis. We discuss the possibility of capturing the central notion of Constructive Analysis (i.e. algorithm, finite procedure or explicit construction) by a simple concept inside Nonstandard Analysis. To this end, we introduce Omega-invariance and argue that it partially satisfies our goal. Our results provide a dual approach to Erik Palmgren's development of Nonstandard Analysis inside constructive mathematics.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"86 6 1","pages":"183-210"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83600163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-01-01DOI: 10.5040/9781492595625.ch-005
M. Conduct
In this paper I take seriously the idea that perceptual experiences, the sensory experiences that we enjoy when perceiving, are mental actions. I provide a picture that identifies them as a species of basic action and in so doing combine disjunctive accounts of experience and action. Disjunctivism about sensory experience is usually put forward to defend naive realism and I argue that a view of perception as a form of action can help the naive realist position. It does so in three ways. First, it offers an account of the determination of phenomenal character that is in accord with the key commitments of naive realism but that is less susceptible to the argument from illusion. Second, it provides an account of the relation between hallucinatory experience and perceptual experience. Third, it takes two different debates about disjunctivism as a thesis about action, and disjunctivism as a thesis about perception, and reduces the latter to just a special case of the former.
{"title":"Perception as action","authors":"M. Conduct","doi":"10.5040/9781492595625.ch-005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781492595625.ch-005","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I take seriously the idea that perceptual experiences, the sensory experiences that we enjoy when perceiving, are mental actions. I provide a picture that identifies them as a species of basic action and in so doing combine disjunctive accounts of experience and action. Disjunctivism about sensory experience is usually put forward to defend naive realism and I argue that a view of perception as a form of action can help the naive realist position. It does so in three ways. First, it offers an account of the determination of phenomenal character that is in accord with the key commitments of naive realism but that is less susceptible to the argument from illusion. Second, it provides an account of the relation between hallucinatory experience and perceptual experience. Third, it takes two different debates about disjunctivism as a thesis about action, and disjunctivism as a thesis about perception, and reduces the latter to just a special case of the former.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"16 1","pages":"259-271"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76808158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Agricultural education has been present in public schools since their development in America. Minnesota was the first state to offer secondary agricultural education with the first school organized in 1888.Phipps and Osborne (1988)noted that agricultural education has developed deep philosophical roots, placing a great deal of emphasis on pragmatism. “The practical application and successful transfer of knowledge, skills, and attitudes into real-world settings is the goal of instruction” (p. 19).Phipps and Osborne (1988)further acknowledged that “agricultural education has been cited as an innovative program model for education, in order to maintain an innovative program, efforts have been made to reshape agricultural education programs to ensure their continued value, relevance, vitality, and quality” (p. 14).
{"title":"Attitudes Toward Mathematics Integration and Related Professional Development Needs of Outstanding Agricultural Education Instructors","authors":"Ryan G. Anderson","doi":"10.21061/JCTE.V27I1.541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21061/JCTE.V27I1.541","url":null,"abstract":"Agricultural education has been present in public schools since their development in America. Minnesota was the first state to offer secondary agricultural education with the first school organized in 1888.Phipps and Osborne (1988)noted that agricultural education has developed deep philosophical roots, placing a great deal of emphasis on pragmatism. “The practical application and successful transfer of knowledge, skills, and attitudes into real-world settings is the goal of instruction” (p. 19).Phipps and Osborne (1988)further acknowledged that “agricultural education has been cited as an innovative program model for education, in order to maintain an innovative program, efforts have been made to reshape agricultural education programs to ensure their continued value, relevance, vitality, and quality” (p. 14).","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83913893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-02-09DOI: 10.2143/LEA.225.0.3011356
M. Cabbolet, H. Swart
Recently, the Elementary Process Theory (EPT) has been developed as a set of fundamental principles that might underlie a gravitational repulsion of matter and antimatter. This paper presents set matrix theory (SMT) as the foundation of the mathematicallogical framework in which the EPT has been formalized: it is, namely, objectionable to use Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) as such. SMT is a generalization of ZF: whereas ZF uses only sets as primitive objects, in the framework of SMT nite matrices with set-valued entries are objects sui generis, with a 1 1 set matrix [x] being identical to the set x. It is proved that every set that can be constructed in ZF can also be constructed in SMT: as a mathematical foundation, SMT is thus not weaker than ZF. In addition, it is shown that SMT is more suitable than ZF for the intended application to physics. The conclusion is that SMT, contrary to ZF, is acceptable as the mathematical-logical foundation of the framework for physics that is determined by the EPT.
{"title":"Set matrix theory as a physically motivated generalization of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory","authors":"M. Cabbolet, H. Swart","doi":"10.2143/LEA.225.0.3011356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.225.0.3011356","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, the Elementary Process Theory (EPT) has been developed as a set of fundamental principles that might underlie a gravitational repulsion of matter and antimatter. This paper presents set matrix theory (SMT) as the foundation of the mathematicallogical framework in which the EPT has been formalized: it is, namely, objectionable to use Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) as such. SMT is a generalization of ZF: whereas ZF uses only sets as primitive objects, in the framework of SMT nite matrices with set-valued entries are objects sui generis, with a 1 1 set matrix [x] being identical to the set x. It is proved that every set that can be constructed in ZF can also be constructed in SMT: as a mathematical foundation, SMT is thus not weaker than ZF. In addition, it is shown that SMT is more suitable than ZF for the intended application to physics. The conclusion is that SMT, contrary to ZF, is acceptable as the mathematical-logical foundation of the framework for physics that is determined by the EPT.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"36 1","pages":"59-82"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86324562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although literacy rates have improved somehow in recent years, there are still large numbers of people that are illiterates in developing countries. This paper examines the impact of severe economic decline and demographic pressures on youth literacy rate in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this study, a cross-sectional data of 39 Sub-Saharan African countries with adequate data information were analyzed. The results from the ANOVA tests indicate that economic decline is statistically significant in explaining youth literacy, while the results from demographic pressures and movement of refugees are inconclusive in explaining youth literacy.
{"title":"Implications Of Severe Economic Decline & Demographic Pressures On Youth Literacy In Sub-Saharan Africa","authors":"C. Okpala","doi":"10.19030/CIER.V2I2.1094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.19030/CIER.V2I2.1094","url":null,"abstract":"Although literacy rates have improved somehow in recent years, there are still large numbers of people that are illiterates in developing countries. This paper examines the impact of severe economic decline and demographic pressures on youth literacy rate in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this study, a cross-sectional data of 39 Sub-Saharan African countries with adequate data information were analyzed. The results from the ANOVA tests indicate that economic decline is statistically significant in explaining youth literacy, while the results from demographic pressures and movement of refugees are inconclusive in explaining youth literacy.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"30 1","pages":"29-32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2011-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84398291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-01-01DOI: 10.15587/1729-4061.2010.2768
Галина Абрамова
Investigate questions about the effects of energy contamination on the environment in assessing the impact on the environment. The system of indices, which allows us to estimate the impact of such contamination and to establish their level. The method for determining the risk of impact of energy pollution in assessing the impact on the environment.
{"title":"On determining the risk exposure of energy contamination in the EIA","authors":"Галина Абрамова","doi":"10.15587/1729-4061.2010.2768","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15587/1729-4061.2010.2768","url":null,"abstract":"Investigate questions about the effects of energy contamination on the environment in assessing the impact on the environment. The system of indices, which allows us to estimate the impact of such contamination and to establish their level. The method for determining the risk of impact of energy pollution in assessing the impact on the environment.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"61 1","pages":"4-10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76952527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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