Pub Date : 2016-01-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.234.0.3159742
Clayton Peterson, J. Marquis
The aim of the present paper is to introduce a method to test the validity of legal inferences. We begin by presenting the rationale of our method and then we expose the philosophical foundations of our analysis. If formal philosophy is to be of help to legal discourse, then it must first reflect upon the law's fundamental characteristics that should be taken into account. Our analysis shows that (Canadian) legal discourse possesses three fundamental characteristics which ought to be considered if one wants to represent the formal structure of legal arguments. These characteristics are the presupposed consistency of legal discourse, the fact that there is a hierarchy between norms and obligations to preserve this consistency and the fact that legal inferences are subjected to the principle of deontic consequences. We present a formal deontic logic which is built according to these characteristics and provide the completeness results. Finally, we present a semi-formal method (based on the proposed deontic logic) to test the validity of legal inferences. This paper contributes to the literature insofar as it provides a method that covers a portion of the intuitive validity of legal inferences which is not covered by other frameworks.
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Pub Date : 2015-01-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.231.0.3141819
Raoul Gervais, E. Weber, J. Bouwel
In this paper, we show that the so-called "green cheese" and "red herring" problems, which have been raised in connection to Bas van Fraassen's pragmatic theory of scientific explanation, lead to two theoretical (or epistemological) tasks for philosophers of science and two practical (or methodological) tasks. After clarifying these tasks we argue that the theoretical tasks are extremely difficult. We are pessimistic about their accomplishment and motivate this. The practical/methodological tasks are easier to handle, and we make some substantial contributions with respect to these tasks. Finally, we compare our practical/methodological results to Kareem Khalifa's hands-on contextualism.
在本文中，我们展示了所谓的“绿奶酪”和“红鲱鱼”问题，这些问题是与Bas van Fraassen的科学解释的实用主义理论有关的，给科学哲学家带来了两个理论(或认识论)任务和两个实践(或方法论)任务。在明确了这些任务之后，我们认为理论任务是极其困难的。我们对他们的成就感到悲观，并鼓励他们这样做。实践/方法任务更容易处理，我们在这些任务方面做出了一些实质性的贡献。最后，我们将我们的实践/方法结果与Kareem Khalifa的实践语境主义进行比较。
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Pub Date : 2015-01-01DOI: 10.1515/9783110687538-001
S. Tsohatzidis
The present paper considers certain obviously valid types of inferences involving indirect speech reports, and argues that their validity is incompatible with Davidson’s so-called “paratactic” analysis of the logical form of such reports (Davidson 1969). It further claims that this particular failure of the Davidsonian analysis has a special significance for Davidson’s overall project of using what he terms a “Tarski-style” truth theory as a theory of natural language meaning (Davidson 1967): that project assumes that grasp of the concepts of truth and falsity is essential to natural language interpretation, yet Davidson’s analysis cannot characterize as valid certain natural language inferences whose recognition as valid is arguably constitutive of one’s grasp of the concepts of truth and falsity.
{"title":"1. Truth ascriptions, falsity ascriptions, and the paratactic analysis of indirect discourse","authors":"S. Tsohatzidis","doi":"10.1515/9783110687538-001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110687538-001","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper considers certain obviously valid types of inferences involving indirect speech reports, and argues that their validity is incompatible with Davidson’s so-called “paratactic” analysis of the logical form of such reports (Davidson 1969). It further claims that this particular failure of the Davidsonian analysis has a special significance for Davidson’s overall project of using what he terms a “Tarski-style” truth theory as a theory of natural language meaning (Davidson 1967): that project assumes that grasp of the concepts of truth and falsity is essential to natural language interpretation, yet Davidson’s analysis cannot characterize as valid certain natural language inferences whose recognition as valid is arguably constitutive of one’s grasp of the concepts of truth and falsity.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"54 1","pages":"527-534"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74469295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.231.0.3141814
Andrea Iacona
This paper outlines a formal account of tensed sentences that is consistent with Ockhamism, a view according to which future contingents are either true or false. The account outlined substantively differs from attempts that have been made so far to provide a formal apparatus for such view, in that it does not involve some expressly modied version of branching time semantics. The system on which it is based is the simplest quantified modal logic.
{"title":"Ockhamism and Quantified Modal Logic","authors":"Andrea Iacona","doi":"10.2143/LEA.231.0.3141814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.231.0.3141814","url":null,"abstract":"This paper outlines a formal account of tensed sentences that is consistent with Ockhamism, a view according to which future contingents are either true or false. The account outlined substantively differs from attempts that have been made so far to provide a formal apparatus for such view, in that it does not involve some expressly modied version of branching time semantics. The system on which it is based is the simplest quantified modal logic.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"15 1","pages":"355-372"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83449760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-12-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.228.0.3078180
J. D. Winter, Laszlo Kosolosky
We offer several new arguments for the view that existing research agendas in the health sciences and the agricultural sciences are morally deficient. More specifically, the following kinds of distortion of the agenda are discussed: in the health sciences, the health problems of the poor are more or less neglected, as well as non-medicinal solutions to health problems, and in the agricultural sciences, insufficient attention is paid to agroecology. We justify the claim that these three kinds of distortion are problematic on ethical grounds, showing that they are moral failures. Instead of starting from one ethical theory to show this, we present different ethical justifications, based on different ethical theories (Bentham’s utilitarianism, Rawls’s theory of justice, Pogge’s rights-based account of minimal justice, Kitcher’s ethical theory, and classical liberalism). This should make our conclusion (i.e. that the distorted research agendas in the health sciences and the agricultural sciences pose a moral problem) at least initially convincing to adherents of different ethical theories.
{"title":"Health, Food, and Science","authors":"J. D. Winter, Laszlo Kosolosky","doi":"10.2143/LEA.228.0.3078180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.228.0.3078180","url":null,"abstract":"We offer several new arguments for the view that existing research agendas in the health sciences and the agricultural sciences are morally deficient. More specifically, the following kinds of distortion of the agenda are discussed: in the health sciences, the health problems of the poor are more or less neglected, as well as non-medicinal solutions to health problems, and in the agricultural sciences, insufficient attention is paid to agroecology. We justify the claim that these three kinds of distortion are problematic on ethical grounds, showing that they are moral failures. Instead of starting from one ethical theory to show this, we present different ethical justifications, based on different ethical theories (Bentham’s utilitarianism, Rawls’s theory of justice, Pogge’s rights-based account of minimal justice, Kitcher’s ethical theory, and classical liberalism). This should make our conclusion (i.e. that the distorted research agendas in the health sciences and the agricultural sciences pose a moral problem) at least initially convincing to adherents of different ethical theories.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"125 11 1","pages":"701-726"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80511455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-09-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053509
Toby Meadows
This paper provides a way of dealing with paradoxes associated with consequence relations via a generalisation of Kripke's fixed point technique. In particular, we focus on Beall and Murzi's paradox, although the framework outlined should have more general application. We first attempt to locate this problem among the existing corpus of semantic paradoxes. We then examine two canonical approaches to the issue and conclude with an inductive construction which, in some fashion, goes beyond those approaches.
{"title":"Fixed Points for Consequence Relations","authors":"Toby Meadows","doi":"10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053509","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a way of dealing with paradoxes associated with consequence relations via a generalisation of Kripke's fixed point technique. In particular, we focus on Beall and Murzi's paradox, although the framework outlined should have more general application. We first attempt to locate this problem among the existing corpus of semantic paradoxes. We then examine two canonical approaches to the issue and conclude with an inductive construction which, in some fashion, goes beyond those approaches.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"16 1","pages":"333-357"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72703055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-03-28DOI: 10.2143/LEA.235.0.3170109
J. Arenhart, D. Krause
We discuss the idea that superpositions in quantum mechanics may involve contradictions or contradictory properties. A state of superposition such as the one comprised in the famous Schrodinger’s cat, for instance, is sometimes said to attribute contradictory properties to the cat: being dead and alive at the same time. If that were the case, we would be facing a revolution in logic and science, since we would have one of our greatest scientific achievements showing that real contradictions exist.We analyze that claim by employing the traditional square of opposition.We suggest that it is difficult to make sense of the idea of contradiction in the case of quantum superpositions. From a metaphysical point of view the suggestion also faces obstacles, and we present some of them.
{"title":"Contradiction, Quantum Mechanics, and the Square of Opposition","authors":"J. Arenhart, D. Krause","doi":"10.2143/LEA.235.0.3170109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.235.0.3170109","url":null,"abstract":"We discuss the idea that superpositions in quantum mechanics may involve contradictions or contradictory properties. A state of superposition such as the one comprised in the famous Schrodinger’s cat, for instance, is sometimes said to attribute contradictory properties to the cat: being dead and alive at the same time. If that were the case, we would be facing a revolution in logic and science, since we would have one of our greatest scientific achievements showing that real contradictions exist.We analyze that claim by employing the traditional square of opposition.We suggest that it is difficult to make sense of the idea of contradiction in the case of quantum superpositions. From a metaphysical point of view the suggestion also faces obstacles, and we present some of them.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"20 1","pages":"273-281"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78205857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-02-28DOI: 10.2143/LEA.228.0.3078176
S. Awodey, K. Kishida, Hans-Christoph Kotzsch
We define the notion of a model of higher-order modal logic in an arbitrary elementary topos E. In contrast to the well-known in- terpretation of (non-modal) higher-order logic, the type of propositions is not interpreted by the subobject classifier E, but rather by a suit- able complete Heyting algebra H. The canonical map relating H and E both serves to interpret equality and provides a modal operator on H in the form of a comonad. Examples of such structures arise from surjec- tive geometric morphisms f : F → E, where H = f∗F. The logic differs from non-modal higher-order logic in that the principles of functional and propositional extensionality are not longer valid but may be replaced by modalized versions. The usual Kripke, neighborhood, and sheaf seman- tics for propositional and first-order modal logic are subsumed by this notion.
我们定义了任意初等拓扑E中高阶模态逻辑模型的概念。与众所周知的(非模态)高阶逻辑的内解释不同，命题的类型不是由子分类器E来解释，而是由一个可适应的完备Heyting代数H来解释。这种结构的例子来自于射射几何态射f: f→E，其中H = f * f。这种逻辑与非模态高阶逻辑的不同之处在于，功能和命题外延性的原则不再有效，而是可以被模态化的版本所取代。对于命题和一阶模态逻辑，通常的Kripke语义、邻域语义和束语义都包含在这个概念中。
{"title":"Topos Semantics for Higher-Order Modal Logic","authors":"S. Awodey, K. Kishida, Hans-Christoph Kotzsch","doi":"10.2143/LEA.228.0.3078176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.228.0.3078176","url":null,"abstract":"We define the notion of a model of higher-order modal logic in an arbitrary elementary topos E. In contrast to the well-known in- terpretation of (non-modal) higher-order logic, the type of propositions is not interpreted by the subobject classifier E, but rather by a suit- able complete Heyting algebra H. The canonical map relating H and E both serves to interpret equality and provides a modal operator on H in the form of a comonad. Examples of such structures arise from surjec- tive geometric morphisms f : F → E, where H = f∗F. The logic differs from non-modal higher-order logic in that the principles of functional and propositional extensionality are not longer valid but may be replaced by modalized versions. The usual Kripke, neighborhood, and sheaf seman- tics for propositional and first-order modal logic are subsumed by this notion.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"12 1","pages":"591-636"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89362966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-01-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.226.0.3032652
Darrell P. Rowbottom
I argue that so-called ‘background knowledge’ in confirmation theory has little, if anything, to do with ‘knowledge’ in the sense of mainstream epistemology. I argue that it is better construed as ‘background information’, which need not be believed in, justified, or true.
{"title":"Information versus knowledge in confirmation theory","authors":"Darrell P. Rowbottom","doi":"10.2143/LEA.226.0.3032652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.226.0.3032652","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that so-called ‘background knowledge’ in confirmation theory has little, if anything, to do with ‘knowledge’ in the sense of mainstream epistemology. I argue that it is better construed as ‘background information’, which need not be believed in, justified, or true.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"335 1","pages":"137-149"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75340270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-01-01DOI: 10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053513
F. Paoli
In [31], I defended a minimalist account of meaning for logical constants as a way to ward off Quine’s meaning variance charge against deviant logics. Its key idea was that some deviant propositional logics share with classical logic the operational meanings of all their connectives, as encoded in their sequent calculus operational rules, yet validate different sequents than classical logic — therefore, we can have genuine rivalry between logics without meaning variance. In his [19], Ole Hjortland levelled several objections at this view. The aim of this paper is to address these criticisms, highlighting at the same time the role played by logical consequence in this version of semantic minimalism.
{"title":"Semantic minimalism for logical constants","authors":"F. Paoli","doi":"10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053513","url":null,"abstract":"In [31], I defended a minimalist account of meaning for logical constants as a way to ward off Quine’s meaning variance charge against deviant logics. Its key idea was that some deviant propositional logics share with classical logic the operational meanings of all their connectives, as encoded in their sequent calculus operational rules, yet validate different sequents than classical logic — therefore, we can have genuine rivalry between logics without meaning variance. In his [19], Ole Hjortland levelled several objections at this view. The aim of this paper is to address these criticisms, highlighting at the same time the role played by logical consequence in this version of semantic minimalism.","PeriodicalId":46471,"journal":{"name":"Logique et Analyse","volume":"5 1","pages":"439-461"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73442953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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