Internalists and externalists fundamentally disagree about how moral judgments motivate. Internalists think that mor ally good people should have de re desires to do right things, and agents who are motivated by the de dicto desire to do whatever is right are moral fetishists. In contrast, exter nalists accept that morally good people can have both the relevant de re and de dicto desires. My aim is to provide an argument for internalism, which goes beyond the context in which both sides currently debate the relevant de re and de dicto desires. I will first introduce R. Jay Wallace's under standing of a fetish, according to which to have a fetish is to devote interest and attention to objects that do not deserve such responses. Then, I will argue that the relevant de dicto desire in the debate is fetishistic because rightness itself is not a worthwhile goal to have in our moral deliberation and motivation. Moral agents who are motivated by the de dicto desire to do whatever is right, even
{"title":"Why\u0000 de dicto\u0000 desires are fetishistic","authors":"Xiao Zhang","doi":"10.1111/RATI.12317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/RATI.12317","url":null,"abstract":"Internalists and externalists fundamentally disagree about how moral judgments motivate. Internalists think that mor ally good people should have de re desires to do right things, and agents who are motivated by the de dicto desire to do whatever is right are moral fetishists. In contrast, exter nalists accept that morally good people can have both the relevant de re and de dicto desires. My aim is to provide an argument for internalism, which goes beyond the context in which both sides currently debate the relevant de re and de dicto desires. I will first introduce R. Jay Wallace's under standing of a fetish, according to which to have a fetish is to devote interest and attention to objects that do not deserve such responses. Then, I will argue that the relevant de dicto desire in the debate is fetishistic because rightness itself is not a worthwhile goal to have in our moral deliberation and motivation. Moral agents who are motivated by the de dicto desire to do whatever is right, even","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/RATI.12317","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42211495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Knowledge norms of belief and belief formation: When the time is ripe to actualize one's epistemic potential","authors":"F. Hofmann","doi":"10.1111/RATI.12309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/RATI.12309","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/RATI.12309","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44581059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The social ontology of promising","authors":"S. Norris","doi":"10.1111/RATI.12308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/RATI.12308","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/RATI.12308","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47745744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Knowledge‐norms in a common‐law crucible","authors":"Cosim J. Sayid","doi":"10.1111/RATI.12307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/RATI.12307","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/RATI.12307","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46861708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The moral error theory, it seems, could be true. The mere possibility of its truth might also seem inconsequential. But it is not. For, I argue, there is a sense in which the moral error theory is possible that generates an argument against both non- cognitivism and moral naturalism. I argue that it is an epistemic possibility that morality is subject to some form of wholesale error of the kind that would make the moral error theory true. Denying this possibility has three unwelcome consequences such that allowing for and explaining it is an adequacy condition on meta- ethical theories. Non- cognitivism and moral naturalism, I argue, cannot capture the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error and so are false. My argument additionally provides independent reason to accept Derek Parfit's claim that if moral non- naturalism is false then nothing matters. I conclude that whether wholesale moral
{"title":"On the possibility of wholesale moral error","authors":"Farbod Akhlaghi","doi":"10.1111/RATI.12303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/RATI.12303","url":null,"abstract":"The moral error theory, it seems, could be true. The mere possibility of its truth might also seem inconsequential. But it is not. For, I argue, there is a sense in which the moral error theory is possible that generates an argument against both non- cognitivism and moral naturalism. I argue that it is an epistemic possibility that morality is subject to some form of wholesale error of the kind that would make the moral error theory true. Denying this possibility has three unwelcome consequences such that allowing for and explaining it is an adequacy condition on meta- ethical theories. Non- cognitivism and moral naturalism, I argue, cannot capture the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error and so are false. My argument additionally provides independent reason to accept Derek Parfit's claim that if moral non- naturalism is false then nothing matters. I conclude that whether wholesale moral","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/RATI.12303","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46008455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to moral error theory, there are no ethical facts. Error theorists often defend this view with the metaphysical argument from queerness. This argument purports to show that it is most reasonable to believe that ethical facts do not exist, because such facts are metaphysically queer and explanatorily redundant. This paper argues that even if we assume that ethical facts are metaphysically queer and explanatorily redundant, the argument from queerness does not warrant the rejection of ethical facts. It only shows that it is most reasonable to refrain from believing that ethical facts exist. The argument from queerness therefore merely supports metaethical scepticism: that is, it merely supports agnosticism about the existence of ethical facts. This is cause for optimism, because metaethical scepticism is less of a threat to our
{"title":"Debunking the argument from queerness","authors":"Erik Kassenberg","doi":"10.1111/RATI.12306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/RATI.12306","url":null,"abstract":"According to moral error theory, there are no ethical facts. Error theorists often defend this view with the metaphysical argument from queerness. This argument purports to show that it is most reasonable to believe that ethical facts do not exist, because such facts are metaphysically queer and explanatorily redundant. This paper argues that even if we assume that ethical facts are metaphysically queer and explanatorily redundant, the argument from queerness does not warrant the rejection of ethical facts. It only shows that it is most reasonable to refrain from believing that ethical facts exist. The argument from queerness therefore merely supports metaethical scepticism: that is, it merely supports agnosticism about the existence of ethical facts. This is cause for optimism, because metaethical scepticism is less of a threat to our","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/RATI.12306","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42624213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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