{"title":"Norms and Necessity by Amie L.ThomassonNew York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020, $74, xi+232 pp.","authors":"K. Büttner","doi":"10.1111/rati.12325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12325","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/rati.12325","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41406597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to be an aesthetic realist","authors":"Elizabeth Tropman","doi":"10.1111/rati.12324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12324","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/rati.12324","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44183333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Some moral propositions are so obviously true that we refuse to doubt them, even where we believe that many people disagree. Following Fritz and McPherson, I call our behaviour in such cases ‘moral steadfastness’. In this paper, I argue for two metaethical implications of moral steadfastness. I first argue that morally steadfast behaviour is sufficiently prevalent to present an important challenge for some prominent analogies between moral epistemology and non-moral forms of epistemology. These analogies are often pressed by moral realists. I then argue that moral quasi-realism, unlike realism, can explain and vindicate our presumption that moral steadfastness is frequently rational. On the assumption that we frequently act as it is rational to act, quasi-realism is therefore well placed to explain why we are so frequently morally steadfast. I conclude that this is an important respect in which quasi-realism is explanatorily preferable to realism.
{"title":"Moral realism, quasi‐realism and moral steadfastness","authors":"J. Chamberlain","doi":"10.1111/rati.12322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12322","url":null,"abstract":"Some moral propositions are so obviously true that we refuse to doubt them, even where we believe that many people disagree. Following Fritz and McPherson, I call our behaviour in such cases ‘moral steadfastness’. In this paper, I argue for two metaethical implications of moral steadfastness. I first argue that morally steadfast behaviour is sufficiently prevalent to present an important challenge for some prominent analogies between moral epistemology and non-moral forms of epistemology. These analogies are often pressed by moral realists. I then argue that moral quasi-realism, unlike realism, can explain and vindicate our presumption that moral steadfastness is frequently rational. On the assumption that we frequently act as it is rational to act, quasi-realism is therefore well placed to explain why we are so frequently morally steadfast. I conclude that this is an important respect in which quasi-realism is explanatorily preferable to realism.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/rati.12322","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48952453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why illusionism about consciousness is unbelievable","authors":"C. D. Brown","doi":"10.1111/rati.12321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12321","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/rati.12321","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48955925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to an influential tradition in speech act theory, it takes more than linguistic mastery and normative entitlement to do things with words; one's words must also be given a suitable reception or social uptake. Working within this tradition, I identify and characterize the phenomenon of discursive paternalism . Discursive paternalism occurs when a party to a speaker's act takes control of the uptake the act receives, with the aim of curating the speaker's commitments. This is done without the prior consent or knowledge of
{"title":"Discursive paternalism","authors":"Leo Townsend","doi":"10.1111/rati.12316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12316","url":null,"abstract":"According to an influential tradition in speech act theory, it takes more than linguistic mastery and normative entitlement to do things with words; one's words must also be given a suitable reception or social uptake. Working within this tradition, I identify and characterize the phenomenon of discursive paternalism . Discursive paternalism occurs when a party to a speaker's act takes control of the uptake the act receives, with the aim of curating the speaker's commitments. This is done without the prior consent or knowledge of","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/rati.12316","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45746262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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