{"title":"Putting properties first: A platonic metaphysics for natural modalityBy MatthewTugby. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2022. xii + 275 pp. £65.00. ISBN: 978‐0‐19‐885510‐1","authors":"Tyler Hildebrand","doi":"10.1111/rati.12386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12386","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46049661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
: Recent philosophy has seen a resurgence of the realist view of sensible qualities such as color. The view holds that experienced qualities are properties of the objects in the physical environment, not mentally instantiated properties like qualia or merely intentional, illusory ones. Some suggest that this move rids us of the explanatory gap between physical properties and the qualitative features of consciousness. Others say it just relocates the problem of qualities to physical objects in the environment, given that such qualities cannot be derived from the non-qualitative properties of objects, and it doesn’t resolve the problem of consciousness either. I argue that such an outcome is welcome: if the physical world is full of explanatory gaps, then the mind-body explanatory gap is not so special. Moreover, the explanatory gaps regarding qualities of objects are less puzzling than the brain-qualia gap. In order to counter traditional worries concerning realism about the qualities of objects, I introduce ‘imperfect realism’ as an alternative to color pluralism and complex reductionism, which accommodates realism in the face of widespread perceptual error. I conclude with a discussion of how this ‘multiple gaps view’ sits better with a naturalistic framework compared to the Galilean-Cartesian account of qualities.
{"title":"Deflating the hard problem of consciousness by multiplying explanatory gaps","authors":"Işık Sarıhan","doi":"10.1111/rati.12384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12384","url":null,"abstract":": Recent philosophy has seen a resurgence of the realist view of sensible qualities such as color. The view holds that experienced qualities are properties of the objects in the physical environment, not mentally instantiated properties like qualia or merely intentional, illusory ones. Some suggest that this move rids us of the explanatory gap between physical properties and the qualitative features of consciousness. Others say it just relocates the problem of qualities to physical objects in the environment, given that such qualities cannot be derived from the non-qualitative properties of objects, and it doesn’t resolve the problem of consciousness either. I argue that such an outcome is welcome: if the physical world is full of explanatory gaps, then the mind-body explanatory gap is not so special. Moreover, the explanatory gaps regarding qualities of objects are less puzzling than the brain-qualia gap. In order to counter traditional worries concerning realism about the qualities of objects, I introduce ‘imperfect realism’ as an alternative to color pluralism and complex reductionism, which accommodates realism in the face of widespread perceptual error. I conclude with a discussion of how this ‘multiple gaps view’ sits better with a naturalistic framework compared to the Galilean-Cartesian account of qualities.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44054435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are there essential forms in the social domain?","authors":"Ludger Jansen","doi":"10.1111/rati.12383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12383","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43969749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contingency, arbitrariness, and the basis of moral equality","authors":"Giacomo Floris","doi":"10.1111/rati.12382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12382","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42342935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Computing in the nick of time","authors":"J. Ritchie, C. Klein","doi":"10.1111/rati.12378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12378","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44617758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism, a well-known position in scientific metaphysics, together with an argument for the position in analytic metaphysics known as ontological nihilism. I argue that we can ascribe the same schema to both arguments, which indicates that analytic metaphysics can offer an abstract model that scientific metaphysics may find useful.
{"title":"What analytic metaphysics can do for scientific metaphysics","authors":"C. Lee","doi":"10.1111/rati.12379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12379","url":null,"abstract":"The apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism, a well-known position in scientific metaphysics, together with an argument for the position in analytic metaphysics known as ontological nihilism. I argue that we can ascribe the same schema to both arguments, which indicates that analytic metaphysics can offer an abstract model that scientific metaphysics may find useful.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43589763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ruth Barcan Marcus and Minimal Essentialism","authors":"J. Leech","doi":"10.1111/rati.12374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12374","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42919840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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