Fitch's knowability paradox shows that for each unknown truth there is also an unknowable truth, a result which has been thought both odd in itself and at odds with views which impose epistemic constraints on truth and/or meaningfulness. Here a solution is considered which has received little attention in the debate but which carries prima facie plausibility. The decidability solution is to accept that Fitch sentences are unknowably true but deny the significance of this on the grounds that Fitch sentences are nevertheless decidable. The decidability solution is particularly attractive for those whose primary concern is an epistemic constraint on meaningfulness (‘verificationists’). For those whose main concern is truth (‘anti-realists’), the situation is more complex: Melia takes the solution to exonerate anti-realism completely; Williamson sees it as completely irrelevant. The truth lies between these two extremes: there is one broad anti-realist commitment to which the solution does not apply, but there is also one, the “fundamental tenet” of anti-realism according to Dummett, to which it does.
{"title":"Knowability paradox, decidability solution?","authors":"William Bondi Knowles","doi":"10.1111/rati.12396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12396","url":null,"abstract":"Fitch's knowability paradox shows that for each unknown truth there is also an unknowable truth, a result which has been thought both odd in itself and at odds with views which impose epistemic constraints on truth and/or meaningfulness. Here a solution is considered which has received little attention in the debate but which carries prima facie plausibility. The <i>decidability solution</i> is to accept that Fitch sentences are unknowably true but deny the significance of this on the grounds that Fitch sentences are nevertheless decidable. The decidability solution is particularly attractive for those whose primary concern is an epistemic constraint on meaningfulness (‘verificationists’). For those whose main concern is truth (‘anti-realists’), the situation is more complex: Melia takes the solution to exonerate anti-realism completely; Williamson sees it as completely irrelevant. The truth lies between these two extremes: there is one broad anti-realist commitment to which the solution does not apply, but there is also one, the “fundamental tenet” of anti-realism according to Dummett, to which it does.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139409305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 1967, Alvin Goldman prominently claimed that the traditional JTB analysis is adequate for non-empirical knowledge. Since then, this claim has remained widely unchallenged. In this paper, I show that this claim is false. I provide two examples in which a true belief is a priori justified but epistemically defective such that it does not constitute knowledge. Finally, I submit a novel analysis of a priori knowledge that avoids the Gettier problem. What is particularly important and distinctive about my analysis is that I neither need to make the justification condition so strong that only infallible justification is allowed, nor do I need to explicitly introduce a truth condition.
{"title":"Gettier and the a priori","authors":"Philipp Berghofer","doi":"10.1111/rati.12395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12395","url":null,"abstract":"In 1967, Alvin Goldman prominently claimed that the traditional JTB analysis is adequate for non-empirical knowledge. Since then, this claim has remained widely unchallenged. In this paper, I show that this claim is false. I provide two examples in which a true belief is a priori justified but epistemically defective such that it does not constitute knowledge. Finally, I submit a novel analysis of a priori knowledge that avoids the Gettier problem. What is particularly important and distinctive about my analysis is that I neither need to make the justification condition so strong that only infallible justification is allowed, nor do I need to explicitly introduce a truth condition.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":"181 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138533918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Starting roughly thirty years ago, essences and essentialism has seen a gradual rise in interest and support, not only as measured in the number of publications, but also in terms of applicability to distinct philosophical issues. This special issue showcases this wide applicability. Michail Peramatzis opens with a paper on Aristotle. On Aristotle's hylomorphism, a substance such as Socrates is made up of both material parts and a form, namely that of being a human. The issue of the paper concerns how and what makes these parts into something unified, namely Socrates. Peramatzis defends an integrated reading of Metaphysics Ζ.12, Ζ17, and Η.6, and the position that the compound's unity is derivative of the form's primitive unity. This paper will be of interest not only to scholars of Aristotle, but also to metaphysicians working on hylomorphism and the problem of unity. Naomi Thompson contributes a paper on the relatively recent topic of metaphysical explanation, namely as explanations fundamentally distinct from causal explanations, typically exemplified by the relation of grounding. Her paper provides much needed clarity on the possible antirealist positions available, explores the connections between these positions, and lays out the reasons for and against each of them. This paper will be instrumental in shaping future research on antirealist positions on metaphysical explanation. Robin Hendry defends microstructural essentialism for chemical substances: the position that the molecular structure is what determines the identity of a chemical substance. With a detailed range of examples from chemistry, Hendry explains the notion of structure, presents the arguments for microstructural essentialism, and replies to the counterarguments in the literature. In the final section, the paper discusses the Aristotelian problems of mixture, especially in the case of super-heavy elements like oganesson. Presupposing a broadly Aristotelian view, Hendry argues that oganesson the element does not exist because its characteristic nuclei does not exist long enough to exhibit the element's characteristic powers. Jessica Leech seeks to reintroduce Barcan Marcus' account of the relation between essence and necessity, that of minimal essentialism. Leech shows that Barcan Marcus, in common with several of her contemporaries in the late 60's and early 70's, did recognise the distinction, famously made by Kit Fine, between essential properties and properties that are merely necessary. Moreover, she argues that minimal essentialism is able to adequately deal with the problematic cases raised by Fine, and therefore that Barcan Marcus' account should be a serious contender in the current discussion of modality and essence. Ludger Jansen explores the applicability of essences to the social domain. He argues that essences are to be found for both social kinds and for social identities. However, these two variants exhibit essences with radically distinct characteristics. So
{"title":"Introduction—A return to form","authors":"Petter Sandstad","doi":"10.1111/rati.12394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12394","url":null,"abstract":"Starting roughly thirty years ago, essences and essentialism has seen a gradual rise in interest and support, not only as measured in the number of publications, but also in terms of applicability to distinct philosophical issues. This special issue showcases this wide applicability. Michail Peramatzis opens with a paper on Aristotle. On Aristotle's hylomorphism, a substance such as Socrates is made up of both material parts and a form, namely that of being a human. The issue of the paper concerns how and what makes these parts into something unified, namely Socrates. Peramatzis defends an integrated reading of Metaphysics Ζ.12, Ζ17, and Η.6, and the position that the compound's unity is derivative of the form's primitive unity. This paper will be of interest not only to scholars of Aristotle, but also to metaphysicians working on hylomorphism and the problem of unity. Naomi Thompson contributes a paper on the relatively recent topic of metaphysical explanation, namely as explanations fundamentally distinct from causal explanations, typically exemplified by the relation of grounding. Her paper provides much needed clarity on the possible antirealist positions available, explores the connections between these positions, and lays out the reasons for and against each of them. This paper will be instrumental in shaping future research on antirealist positions on metaphysical explanation. Robin Hendry defends microstructural essentialism for chemical substances: the position that the molecular structure is what determines the identity of a chemical substance. With a detailed range of examples from chemistry, Hendry explains the notion of structure, presents the arguments for microstructural essentialism, and replies to the counterarguments in the literature. In the final section, the paper discusses the Aristotelian problems of mixture, especially in the case of super-heavy elements like oganesson. Presupposing a broadly Aristotelian view, Hendry argues that oganesson the element does not exist because its characteristic nuclei does not exist long enough to exhibit the element's characteristic powers. Jessica Leech seeks to reintroduce Barcan Marcus' account of the relation between essence and necessity, that of minimal essentialism. Leech shows that Barcan Marcus, in common with several of her contemporaries in the late 60's and early 70's, did recognise the distinction, famously made by Kit Fine, between essential properties and properties that are merely necessary. Moreover, she argues that minimal essentialism is able to adequately deal with the problematic cases raised by Fine, and therefore that Barcan Marcus' account should be a serious contender in the current discussion of modality and essence. Ludger Jansen explores the applicability of essences to the social domain. He argues that essences are to be found for both social kinds and for social identities. However, these two variants exhibit essences with radically distinct characteristics. So","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135774194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper we provide an analysis of dynamic dispositionalism. It is usually claimed that dispositions are dynamic properties. However, there is no exhaustive analysis of dynamism in the dispositional literature. We will argue that the dynamic character of dispositions can be analyzed in terms of three features: (i) temporal extension, (ii) necessary change and (iii) future orientedness. Roughly, we will defend the idea that dynamism entails a continuous view of time, to be analyzed in mathematical terms, where intervals are its constitutive elements, whose duration lasts as much as a certain change takes to occur (in support of i). Such changes are the necessary components for the flowing of time because we think there cannot be time without change, (thus supporting ii) and that the forward‐looking feature of properties is what determines the direction of time (as per iii). The paper is structured in 5 sections. In the first section, we set the problem: we outline and criticize some dispositional theories that defend an unsatisfying notion of dynamism. In the second, third and fourth sections we defend each desideratum for a disposition to be dynamic. Finally, we draw some conclusions and consider potential future research.
{"title":"Dynamic all the way down","authors":"Donatella Donati, Simone Gozzano","doi":"10.1111/rati.12392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12392","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper we provide an analysis of dynamic dispositionalism. It is usually claimed that dispositions are dynamic properties. However, there is no exhaustive analysis of dynamism in the dispositional literature. We will argue that the dynamic character of dispositions can be analyzed in terms of three features: (i) temporal extension, (ii) necessary change and (iii) future orientedness. Roughly, we will defend the idea that dynamism entails a continuous view of time, to be analyzed in mathematical terms, where intervals are its constitutive elements, whose duration lasts as much as a certain change takes to occur (in support of i). Such changes are the necessary components for the flowing of time because we think there cannot be time without change, (thus supporting ii) and that the forward‐looking feature of properties is what determines the direction of time (as per iii). The paper is structured in 5 sections. In the first section, we set the problem: we outline and criticize some dispositional theories that defend an unsatisfying notion of dynamism. In the second, third and fourth sections we defend each desideratum for a disposition to be dynamic. Finally, we draw some conclusions and consider potential future research.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136013277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Trolley Problem, edited by Hallvard Lillehammer, is worth reading for a number of reasons. The Trolley Problem has sparked heated philosophical debate for over four decades, as well as scientific research, pop-culture references and memes. Sadly, among all this the actual questions the Trolley Problem set out to illustrate sometimes have a tendency to disappear into the background. As several of the authors in this volume point out, the Trolley Problem is sometimes thought to refer to the single case in which a Bystander has to choose whether to turn a runaway trolley onto a side-track. This is somewhat of an (over)simplification. For most writing on it, the Trolley Problem is about finding convincing explanations of the difference in permissibility between different cases featuring trolleys—such as the classic case, where someone is faced with the choice of switching a runaway trolley to a sidetrack, or the ‘Bridge’ case, where someone is faced with the choice of pushing a person off a bridge to stop a trolley. However, there are several different interpretations of the problem in circulation, and this may contribute to the confusion. One reason to recommend this volume, part of Cambridge University Press's ‘Classic Philosophical Arguments’ series, is that it does a genuinely good job of cutting through some of the noise. Its twelve chapters offer a range of reflections on the Trolley Problem, ‘trolleyology’, and related issues. Given the variety of issues covered, space does not permit me to discuss any one chapter in great detail. Instead, for the purposes of this review, I will comment on some more general points. First, however, I will briefly outline the range of topics covered in this volume. It encompasses traditional (deontological) discussions of the Trolley Problem, as well as virtue ethical approaches, moral psychology, cross-cultural empirical analysis, and applied philosophy. The first chapter, by Lillehammer, provides a helpful overview of the history of the Trolley Problem, and includes reflections on Foot, Thomson and Kamm, as well as a response to Barbara Fried's important critique of the Trolley Problem (see Fried, 2012). The first set of chapters, by William J. FitzPatrick, Peter A. Graham, F.M. Kamm, Dana Kay Nelkin and Samuel Rickless, and Fiona Woollard, tackle various aspects of the Trolley Problem from a broadly deontological perspective. In his chapter, FitzPatrick argues that Judith Jarvis Thompson (in)famous change of heart with regards to the classic case was unwarranted. Instead, he suggests that the problem can be explained by appeal to reasonable norms of shared risk. Next, Graham focuses on the question of whether it is merely permissible or obligatory to turn the trolley in the standard case. He takes aim at Helen Frowe, who argues that it is obligatory. Contrary to Frowe, Graham maintains that it is (merely) permissible to turn the trolley by appealing to previous work by Kamm (2007, 2016). Following Graham,
范·齐尔称，一个品行尚可的人在面对这种情况时，不太可能把桥上的人当成一个可以用来让电车停下来的“重物”。正如她所指出的，她的学生们——当看到一个不那么重要的桥案的例子时——会提出标准的建议:“(男人们)应该大喊大叫，吹口哨，挥舞手臂，向工人跑去，寻找更远的轨道上的重物，等等。”到目前为止，没有人建议(旁观者)应该考虑把这个大个子推到赛道上。(第128页)她的总体论点是，美德伦理学的支持者可以支持电车案例的共同直觉，包括桥牌。然而，这是出于与义务论者所呼吁的完全不同的原因。接下来的两章是一场有趣的辩论，一方是盖伊·卡哈内和吉姆·埃弗雷特，另一方是约书亚·d·格林。Kahane和Everett考虑了电车问题在当代心理学研究中的应用，而这项研究的方式通常是在道德的义务论和功利主义方法之间的对比中进行的。他们声称这种框架具有误导性——首先，因为研究人员归类为“功利主义”的一些反应充其量是切线功利主义(更经常是利己主义或简单的结果主义);其次，因为他们怀疑很难从这些案例中归纳出更普遍的道德推理主张。另一方面，格林利用电车问题和相关案例进行了广泛的心理学研究，他完全可以被认为是这一领域的先驱。在这里，他(佩斯·卡哈恩和埃弗雷特，以及其他几位批评家)认为，对人们如何应对电车问题的实证研究，极大地提高了我们对道德判断的心理机制的理解。他特别声称，他的实证研究已经证明了关于道德困境的直觉的证据性或正当性局限性。娜塔莉·戈尔德(Natalie Gold)在她的章节中也引用了一些实证研究，但她的兴趣在于那些研究来自不同(文化)背景的人如何应对电车问题的研究。她对这些文献进行了批判性和详细的调查，并表明从这些研究中出现的画面是混合的。有可能从这些研究中得出结论，不同文化之间对电车案件的判断确实存在差异，但可用于此分析的研究数量相对较少。此外，戈尔德认为，将这些差异视为道德建构主义的证据是合理的。最后，最后两章重点介绍了电车问题在应用哲学中的两个领域的应用:斯文·尼霍姆(Sven Nyholm)考虑了自动驾驶汽车的伦理，埃齐奥·迪·努奇(Ezio Di Nucci)考虑了医疗保健背景下的电车问题，特别是COVID-19大流行。两者都在应用伦理学、公共政策和法律的背景下，对电车问题的使用(以及偶尔的滥用)进行了有趣、批判性的讨论。在这本书中，有许多重要的主题和问题出现在前面，这意味着虽然拿起它读一章或另一章肯定是有价值的，但读整本书也会有回报——或者至少是与你的学术兴趣领域相对应的章节集。这是本书值得一读的第二个原因。然而，正如一开始所指出的，在更广泛的文献中，并不总是清楚电车问题到底是什么。也许令人惊讶的是，这本书也没有为这个问题提供一个明确的答案。事实上，有趣的是，即使在一本关于电车问题的书中，不同的章节也提供了微妙的不同解释。例如，woolard——像Lillehammer和其他一些贡献者一样——指出了解释经典案例和Bridge等案例之间感知可容许性差异的问题。因此，用伍拉德的话来说，真正的电车问题“是解释为什么(在经典电车情况下)你被允许改变电车方向，而在很多情况下，直觉上你不允许杀死一个人来救五个人”(第101页)。但菲茨帕特里克提出了一个微妙的不同解释:他认为相关的问题是:“(标准情况下)所涉及的这种转移是什么，它使通常禁止杀人救人的禁令成为例外(假设我们在其他情况下接受这种非结果主义约束的某种版本)?”(第27页)。最后，格雷厄姆提出了一个问题，即是否允许或必须让电车转向，这是他所关注的核心问题。
{"title":"The trolley problemBy HallvardLillehammer (Ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2023. ix + 267 pp. £74.99 (hb)/£26.99 (pb) ISBN: 9781009255592","authors":"Sara van Goozen","doi":"10.1111/rati.12393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12393","url":null,"abstract":"The Trolley Problem, edited by Hallvard Lillehammer, is worth reading for a number of reasons. The Trolley Problem has sparked heated philosophical debate for over four decades, as well as scientific research, pop-culture references and memes. Sadly, among all this the actual questions the Trolley Problem set out to illustrate sometimes have a tendency to disappear into the background. As several of the authors in this volume point out, the Trolley Problem is sometimes thought to refer to the single case in which a Bystander has to choose whether to turn a runaway trolley onto a side-track. This is somewhat of an (over)simplification. For most writing on it, the Trolley Problem is about finding convincing explanations of the difference in permissibility between different cases featuring trolleys—such as the classic case, where someone is faced with the choice of switching a runaway trolley to a sidetrack, or the ‘Bridge’ case, where someone is faced with the choice of pushing a person off a bridge to stop a trolley. However, there are several different interpretations of the problem in circulation, and this may contribute to the confusion. One reason to recommend this volume, part of Cambridge University Press's ‘Classic Philosophical Arguments’ series, is that it does a genuinely good job of cutting through some of the noise. Its twelve chapters offer a range of reflections on the Trolley Problem, ‘trolleyology’, and related issues. Given the variety of issues covered, space does not permit me to discuss any one chapter in great detail. Instead, for the purposes of this review, I will comment on some more general points. First, however, I will briefly outline the range of topics covered in this volume. It encompasses traditional (deontological) discussions of the Trolley Problem, as well as virtue ethical approaches, moral psychology, cross-cultural empirical analysis, and applied philosophy. The first chapter, by Lillehammer, provides a helpful overview of the history of the Trolley Problem, and includes reflections on Foot, Thomson and Kamm, as well as a response to Barbara Fried's important critique of the Trolley Problem (see Fried, 2012). The first set of chapters, by William J. FitzPatrick, Peter A. Graham, F.M. Kamm, Dana Kay Nelkin and Samuel Rickless, and Fiona Woollard, tackle various aspects of the Trolley Problem from a broadly deontological perspective. In his chapter, FitzPatrick argues that Judith Jarvis Thompson (in)famous change of heart with regards to the classic case was unwarranted. Instead, he suggests that the problem can be explained by appeal to reasonable norms of shared risk. Next, Graham focuses on the question of whether it is merely permissible or obligatory to turn the trolley in the standard case. He takes aim at Helen Frowe, who argues that it is obligatory. Contrary to Frowe, Graham maintains that it is (merely) permissible to turn the trolley by appealing to previous work by Kamm (2007, 2016). Following Graham,","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":"200 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136295137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosophers have often debated the truth of microstructural essentialism about chemical substances: whether or not the structure of a chemical substance at the molecular scale is what makes it the substance it is. Oddly they have tended to pursue this debate without identifying what a structure is, and with some confusion and about what a chemical substance is. In this paper I draw on chemistry to rectify those omissions, providing a pluralist account of structure, clarifying what (according to chemistry) a chemical substance is and defending microstructural essentialism, as I understand that position. I then give an account of the existence of composite substances and objects in chemistry, an issue that goes back to Aristotle.
{"title":"Structure, essence and existence in chemistry","authors":"R. Hendry","doi":"10.1111/rati.12387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12387","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers have often debated the truth of microstructural essentialism about chemical substances: whether or not the structure of a chemical substance at the molecular scale is what makes it the substance it is. Oddly they have tended to pursue this debate without identifying what a structure is, and with some confusion and about what a chemical substance is. In this paper I draw on chemistry to rectify those omissions, providing a pluralist account of structure, clarifying what (according to chemistry) a chemical substance is and defending microstructural essentialism, as I understand that position. I then give an account of the existence of composite substances and objects in chemistry, an issue that goes back to Aristotle.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48929514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There has been some debate recently about whether we can come to know what an experience is like that we have not been through ourselves. Mostly, this debate focuses on general phenomenal knowledge. It is asked, for instance, whether we can come to know what it is like to be a refugee generally speaking (as opposed to being some specific refugee). In this paper, I want to add to this debate by trying to come to know how and to what extent someone who has been through the experience in question acquires this sort of general knowledge. I suggest that this form of general phenomenal knowledge is only acquired if the experience one has undergone is typical for the group in question.
{"title":"From individual to general experience","authors":"A. Berninger","doi":"10.1111/rati.12390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12390","url":null,"abstract":"There has been some debate recently about whether we can come to know what an experience is like that we have not been through ourselves. Mostly, this debate focuses on general phenomenal knowledge. It is asked, for instance, whether we can come to know what it is like to be a refugee generally speaking (as opposed to being some specific refugee). In this paper, I want to add to this debate by trying to come to know how and to what extent someone who has been through the experience in question acquires this sort of general knowledge. I suggest that this form of general phenomenal knowledge is only acquired if the experience one has undergone is typical for the group in question.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45086507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Immanuel Kant promised, ‘as Your Majesty's loyal subject’, to abstain from all public lectures about religion. All past commentators agree this phrase permitted Kant to return to the topic after the King died. But it is not part of the ‘at‐issue content’. Consequently, ‘as Your Majesty's loyal subject’ is no more an escape clause than the corresponding phrase in ‘I guarantee, as your devoted fan, that these guitar strings will not break’. Just as the guarantee stands regardless of whether the guarantor ceases to be your devoted fan, the compliance conditions of Kant's promise are not affected by Kant's ceasing to be the king's loyal subject. For good or ill, Kant made a lying promise to King Friedrich Wilhelm II in 1794.
{"title":"Kant and the king: Lying promises, conventional implicature, and hypocrisy","authors":"R. Sorensen, Ian Proops","doi":"10.1111/rati.12389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12389","url":null,"abstract":"Immanuel Kant promised, ‘as Your Majesty's loyal subject’, to abstain from all public lectures about religion. All past commentators agree this phrase permitted Kant to return to the topic after the King died. But it is not part of the ‘at‐issue content’. Consequently, ‘as Your Majesty's loyal subject’ is no more an escape clause than the corresponding phrase in ‘I guarantee, as your devoted fan, that these guitar strings will not break’. Just as the guarantee stands regardless of whether the guarantor ceases to be your devoted fan, the compliance conditions of Kant's promise are not affected by Kant's ceasing to be the king's loyal subject. For good or ill, Kant made a lying promise to King Friedrich Wilhelm II in 1794.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44239461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to moral non‐naturalism, the kind of genuine or robust normativity that is characteristic of moral requirements cannot be accounted for within a wholly naturalistic worldview, but requires us to posit a domain of non‐natural properties and facts. The main argument for this core non‐naturalist claim appeals to what David Enoch calls the ‘just‐too‐different intuition’. According to Enoch, robust normativity cannot be natural, since it is just too different from anything natural. Derek Parfit makes essentially the same claim under the heading of ‘the normativity objection’, and several other non‐naturalists have said similar things. While some naturalists may be tempted to reject this argument as methodologically or dialectically illegitimate, we argue instead that there are important limits to what the just‐too‐different intuition can show, even setting all other worries aside. More specifically, we argue that the just‐too‐different argument will backfire on any positive, independent specification of the distinction between the natural and the non‐natural. The upshot is that the just‐too‐different argument can show significantly less than non‐naturalists have suggested.
{"title":"The limits of the just‐too‐different argument","authors":"Ragnar Francén, Victor Moberger","doi":"10.1111/rati.12391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12391","url":null,"abstract":"According to moral non‐naturalism, the kind of genuine or robust normativity that is characteristic of moral requirements cannot be accounted for within a wholly naturalistic worldview, but requires us to posit a domain of non‐natural properties and facts. The main argument for this core non‐naturalist claim appeals to what David Enoch calls the ‘just‐too‐different intuition’. According to Enoch, robust normativity cannot be natural, since it is just too different from anything natural. Derek Parfit makes essentially the same claim under the heading of ‘the normativity objection’, and several other non‐naturalists have said similar things. While some naturalists may be tempted to reject this argument as methodologically or dialectically illegitimate, we argue instead that there are important limits to what the just‐too‐different intuition can show, even setting all other worries aside. More specifically, we argue that the just‐too‐different argument will backfire on any positive, independent specification of the distinction between the natural and the non‐natural. The upshot is that the just‐too‐different argument can show significantly less than non‐naturalists have suggested.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41555829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosophical aesthetics has recently been expanding its purview—with exciting work on everyday aesthetics, somaesthetics, gustatory aesthetics, and the aesthetics of imperceptibilia like mathematics and human character—reclaiming territory that was lost during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the discipline begun concentrating almost exclusively on the philosophy of art and restricted the aesthetic realm to the distally perceptible. Yet there remains considerable reluctance towards acknowledging the aesthetic character of many of these objects. This raises an important question—partly made salient again by the ongoing expansion of the aesthetic domain, and partly by the fact that many still seem resistant to this aesthetic diversification—which aestheticians seem to avoid: what, if anything, constrains the scope of beauty or the aesthetic? I argue that form, construed as comprising a degree, however minimal, of experienceable complexity, is necessary and sufficient for an object's candidature for the possession of aesthetic properties. Such a condition serves to discriminate between attempts to expand the scope of the aesthetic that are legitimate and those that are not. If correct, my view suggests that the aesthetic realm, though not limitless, is very broad indeed—but this, I think, is as it should be.
{"title":"Delineating beauty: On form and the boundaries of the aesthetic","authors":"Panos Paris","doi":"10.1111/rati.12388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12388","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical aesthetics has recently been expanding its purview—with exciting work on everyday aesthetics, somaesthetics, gustatory aesthetics, and the aesthetics of imperceptibilia like mathematics and human character—reclaiming territory that was lost during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the discipline begun concentrating almost exclusively on the philosophy of art and restricted the aesthetic realm to the distally perceptible. Yet there remains considerable reluctance towards acknowledging the aesthetic character of many of these objects. This raises an important question—partly made salient again by the ongoing expansion of the aesthetic domain, and partly by the fact that many still seem resistant to this aesthetic diversification—which aestheticians seem to avoid: what, if anything, constrains the scope of beauty or the aesthetic? I argue that form, construed as comprising a degree, however minimal, of experienceable complexity, is necessary and sufficient for an object's candidature for the possession of aesthetic properties. Such a condition serves to discriminate between attempts to expand the scope of the aesthetic that are legitimate and those that are not. If correct, my view suggests that the aesthetic realm, though not limitless, is very broad indeed—but this, I think, is as it should be.","PeriodicalId":46553,"journal":{"name":"Ratio","volume":"32 23","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41270409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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