{"title":"Political Aesthetics: Addison and Shaftesbury on Taste, Morals and Society","authors":"Endre Szécsényi","doi":"10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAB006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAB006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46609,"journal":{"name":"BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAB006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44440226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I examine the role of attention in Kant’s aesthetic theory in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. While broadly Kantian aestheticians have defended the claim that there is a distinct way that we attend to objects in aesthetic experience, Kant himself is not usually acknowledged as offering an account of aesthetic attention. On the basis of Kant’s more general account of attention in other texts and his remarks on attention in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, I reconstruct Kant’s account of aesthetic attention. On his account, aesthetic attention is simultaneously directed at the form of an object and at the judging subject’s own mental states as she attends to the object. In the experience of beauty, we specifically attend to the harmonious relation between the faculties of imagination and understanding.
{"title":"Kant on Aesthetic Attention","authors":"Jessica J. Williams","doi":"10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA057","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, I examine the role of attention in Kant’s aesthetic theory in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. While broadly Kantian aestheticians have defended the claim that there is a distinct way that we attend to objects in aesthetic experience, Kant himself is not usually acknowledged as offering an account of aesthetic attention. On the basis of Kant’s more general account of attention in other texts and his remarks on attention in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, I reconstruct Kant’s account of aesthetic attention. On his account, aesthetic attention is simultaneously directed at the form of an object and at the judging subject’s own mental states as she attends to the object. In the experience of beauty, we specifically attend to the harmonious relation between the faculties of imagination and understanding.","PeriodicalId":46609,"journal":{"name":"BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA057","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43974012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Whole Picture: The colonial story of the art in our museums & why we need to talk about it","authors":"D. Dixon","doi":"10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA056","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46609,"journal":{"name":"BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA056","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48491198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I argue that ‘art’, though an open concept, is not undefinable. I propose a particular kind of definition, a disjunctive definition, which comprises extant theories of art. I co-opt arguments from the philosophy of science, likening the concept ‘art’ to the concept ‘species’, to argue that we ought to be theoretical pluralists about art. That is, there are a number of legitimate, perhaps incompatible, criteria for a theory of art. In this paper, I consider three: functionalist definitions, procedural definitions, and an intentional-historical definition. The motivation for this pluralism comes from an analysis of practice, because the term is of apparent value to practitioners. However, a closer analysis of the concept reveals that, while disjunctive definitions help us to understand how we use certain terms (in other words, their pragmatic value), they lack ontological import. In sum, I attempt to glean lessons from the philosophy of science about the philosophy of art. If my analysis is correct, we ought to be eliminative pluralists about art as a concept.
{"title":"Practice-Centered Pluralism and a Disjunctive Theory of Art","authors":"Caleb C. Hazelwood","doi":"10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA039","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, I argue that ‘art’, though an open concept, is not undefinable. I propose a particular kind of definition, a disjunctive definition, which comprises extant theories of art. I co-opt arguments from the philosophy of science, likening the concept ‘art’ to the concept ‘species’, to argue that we ought to be theoretical pluralists about art. That is, there are a number of legitimate, perhaps incompatible, criteria for a theory of art. In this paper, I consider three: functionalist definitions, procedural definitions, and an intentional-historical definition. The motivation for this pluralism comes from an analysis of practice, because the term is of apparent value to practitioners. However, a closer analysis of the concept reveals that, while disjunctive definitions help us to understand how we use certain terms (in other words, their pragmatic value), they lack ontological import. In sum, I attempt to glean lessons from the philosophy of science about the philosophy of art. If my analysis is correct, we ought to be eliminative pluralists about art as a concept.","PeriodicalId":46609,"journal":{"name":"BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA039","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43981295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his attack on the notion of immediate experience (Erlebnis), Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that aesthetic experience should be absorbed into hermeneutics because alone it cannot account for the historical nature of experience (Erfahrung); predicated on an ontological theory of art, the unfathomable, therefore, is the sense we have of these infinite hermeneutic depths. I argue that this account is methodologically and existentially unacceptable: methodologically because it is overly speculative, and existentially because it betrays authentic existence. I critique Gadamer from the perspective of William James’ Pragmatism and argue, inverting Gadamer’s main thesis, that hermeneutics should be reduced to aesthetic experience. The meaning that emerges in aesthetic experience does not ‘rise up’ from the depths but is immanent in what James calls ‘pure experience’. The unfathomable, therefore, is not a glimpse into the metaphysical abyss but a phenomenological insight into the immanent structure of experience.
{"title":"Aesthetic Experience and the Unfathomable: A Pragmatist Critique of Hermeneutic Aesthetics","authors":"Mark Gilks","doi":"10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA042","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In his attack on the notion of immediate experience (Erlebnis), Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that aesthetic experience should be absorbed into hermeneutics because alone it cannot account for the historical nature of experience (Erfahrung); predicated on an ontological theory of art, the unfathomable, therefore, is the sense we have of these infinite hermeneutic depths. I argue that this account is methodologically and existentially unacceptable: methodologically because it is overly speculative, and existentially because it betrays authentic existence. I critique Gadamer from the perspective of William James’ Pragmatism and argue, inverting Gadamer’s main thesis, that hermeneutics should be reduced to aesthetic experience. The meaning that emerges in aesthetic experience does not ‘rise up’ from the depths but is immanent in what James calls ‘pure experience’. The unfathomable, therefore, is not a glimpse into the metaphysical abyss but a phenomenological insight into the immanent structure of experience.","PeriodicalId":46609,"journal":{"name":"BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA042","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49591051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aestheticians generally agree that the aesthetic features of an object depend upon the non-aesthetic features of an object, and that this dependence can be captured by some formulation of the supervenience relation. I argue that the aesthetic depends upon the non-aesthetic in various and importantly different ways; that these dependence relations cannot be explained by supervenience; that appeals to supervenience create puzzles that aestheticians have neither fully appreciated nor resolved; and that appealing to various realization relations avoids these puzzles and allows for a richer description of how the aesthetic depends upon the non-aesthetic.
{"title":"Supervenience and Realization: Aesthetic Objects and their Properties","authors":"M. Watkins","doi":"10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA052","url":null,"abstract":"Aestheticians generally agree that the aesthetic features of an object depend upon the non-aesthetic features of an object, and that this dependence can be captured by some formulation of the supervenience relation. I argue that the aesthetic depends upon the non-aesthetic in various and importantly different ways; that these dependence relations cannot be explained by supervenience; that appeals to supervenience create puzzles that aestheticians have neither fully appreciated nor resolved; and that appealing to various realization relations avoids these puzzles and allows for a richer description of how the aesthetic depends upon the non-aesthetic.","PeriodicalId":46609,"journal":{"name":"BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45324113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While the idea of art as self-expression can sound old-fashioned, it remains widespread—especially if the relevant ‘selves’ can be social collectives, not just individual artists. But self-expression can collapse into individualistic or anthropocentric self-involvement. And compelling successor ideals for artists are not obvious. In this light, I develop a counter-ideal of creative receptivity to basic features of the external world, or artistic objectivity. Objective artists are not trying to express themselves or reach collective self-knowledge. However, they are also not disinterested or emotionless. They can be unmoved by personal feelings and human concerns, but they are still receptive—just attuned to the more elemental forces that creatively inspire them. I elaborate this ideal in dialogue with John Ruskin’s influential critique of the pathetic fallacy. By contextualizing Ruskin’s view vis-à-vis Romantic and Modernist poetics, post-Kantian aesthetics, modern environmental art, and contemporary theories of expressiveness, I show how it indirectly motivates my account. 1. Beyond Self-Expression? The idea of art as self-expression can seem old-fashioned, if not justifiably obsolete. At the very least, it no longer has the explicit pride of place that it did for the Romantic tradition which rose to prominence in the early 19th century, giving new priority to the ‘expressive’ artist.1 For us now, rather, the idea of self-expression has apparently been “collecting dust for some decades,” as one recent commentator puts it— in art and aesthetics, as elsewhere.2 Still, it may have been right to say, forty years ago, that “the assumption that art is an important mode of self-expression and that it is justified on this account” is “ubiquitous” in the art literature of the 20 th century.3 But this assumption has arguably been steadily losing steam ever since. On the other hand, the idea of art as creative self-expression clearly still has a firm hold on many parts of the public imagination. To begin with, it is still ubiquitous outside the cutting edge of aesthetics and art criticism. In pedagogical contexts, for instance, it remains common to view arts and crafts education as cultivating a capacity for “self† University of Michigan, Department of Philosophy; elicht@umich.edu 1 See e.g. Abrams 1953. 2 Green 2007, 3. 3 Osborne 1977, 296–297.
{"title":"Artistic Objectivity: From Ruskin’s ‘Pathetic Fallacy’ to Creative Receptivity","authors":"Eli I. Lichtenstein","doi":"10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA041","url":null,"abstract":"While the idea of art as self-expression can sound old-fashioned, it remains widespread—especially if the relevant ‘selves’ can be social collectives, not just individual artists. But self-expression can collapse into individualistic or anthropocentric self-involvement. And compelling successor ideals for artists are not obvious. In this light, I develop a counter-ideal of creative receptivity to basic features of the external world, or artistic objectivity. Objective artists are not trying to express themselves or reach collective self-knowledge. However, they are also not disinterested or emotionless. They can be unmoved by personal feelings and human concerns, but they are still receptive—just attuned to the more elemental forces that creatively inspire them. I elaborate this ideal in dialogue with John Ruskin’s influential critique of the pathetic fallacy. By contextualizing Ruskin’s view vis-à-vis Romantic and Modernist poetics, post-Kantian aesthetics, modern environmental art, and contemporary theories of expressiveness, I show how it indirectly motivates my account. 1. Beyond Self-Expression? The idea of art as self-expression can seem old-fashioned, if not justifiably obsolete. At the very least, it no longer has the explicit pride of place that it did for the Romantic tradition which rose to prominence in the early 19th century, giving new priority to the ‘expressive’ artist.1 For us now, rather, the idea of self-expression has apparently been “collecting dust for some decades,” as one recent commentator puts it— in art and aesthetics, as elsewhere.2 Still, it may have been right to say, forty years ago, that “the assumption that art is an important mode of self-expression and that it is justified on this account” is “ubiquitous” in the art literature of the 20 th century.3 But this assumption has arguably been steadily losing steam ever since. On the other hand, the idea of art as creative self-expression clearly still has a firm hold on many parts of the public imagination. To begin with, it is still ubiquitous outside the cutting edge of aesthetics and art criticism. In pedagogical contexts, for instance, it remains common to view arts and crafts education as cultivating a capacity for “self† University of Michigan, Department of Philosophy; elicht@umich.edu 1 See e.g. Abrams 1953. 2 Green 2007, 3. 3 Osborne 1977, 296–297.","PeriodicalId":46609,"journal":{"name":"BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46493676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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