While the idea of art as self-expression can sound old-fashioned, it remains widespread—especially if the relevant ‘selves’ can be social collectives, not just individual artists. But self-expression can collapse into individualistic or anthropocentric self-involvement. And compelling successor ideals for artists are not obvious. In this light, I develop a counter-ideal of creative receptivity to basic features of the external world, or artistic objectivity. Objective artists are not trying to express themselves or reach collective self-knowledge. However, they are also not disinterested or emotionless. They can be unmoved by personal feelings and human concerns, but they are still receptive—just attuned to the more elemental forces that creatively inspire them. I elaborate this ideal in dialogue with John Ruskin’s influential critique of the pathetic fallacy. By contextualizing Ruskin’s view vis-à-vis Romantic and Modernist poetics, post-Kantian aesthetics, modern environmental art, and contemporary theories of expressiveness, I show how it indirectly motivates my account. 1. Beyond Self-Expression? The idea of art as self-expression can seem old-fashioned, if not justifiably obsolete. At the very least, it no longer has the explicit pride of place that it did for the Romantic tradition which rose to prominence in the early 19th century, giving new priority to the ‘expressive’ artist.1 For us now, rather, the idea of self-expression has apparently been “collecting dust for some decades,” as one recent commentator puts it— in art and aesthetics, as elsewhere.2 Still, it may have been right to say, forty years ago, that “the assumption that art is an important mode of self-expression and that it is justified on this account” is “ubiquitous” in the art literature of the 20 th century.3 But this assumption has arguably been steadily losing steam ever since. On the other hand, the idea of art as creative self-expression clearly still has a firm hold on many parts of the public imagination. To begin with, it is still ubiquitous outside the cutting edge of aesthetics and art criticism. In pedagogical contexts, for instance, it remains common to view arts and crafts education as cultivating a capacity for “self† University of Michigan, Department of Philosophy; elicht@umich.edu 1 See e.g. Abrams 1953. 2 Green 2007, 3. 3 Osborne 1977, 296–297.
{"title":"Artistic Objectivity: From Ruskin’s ‘Pathetic Fallacy’ to Creative Receptivity","authors":"Eli I. Lichtenstein","doi":"10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA041","url":null,"abstract":"While the idea of art as self-expression can sound old-fashioned, it remains widespread—especially if the relevant ‘selves’ can be social collectives, not just individual artists. But self-expression can collapse into individualistic or anthropocentric self-involvement. And compelling successor ideals for artists are not obvious. In this light, I develop a counter-ideal of creative receptivity to basic features of the external world, or artistic objectivity. Objective artists are not trying to express themselves or reach collective self-knowledge. However, they are also not disinterested or emotionless. They can be unmoved by personal feelings and human concerns, but they are still receptive—just attuned to the more elemental forces that creatively inspire them. I elaborate this ideal in dialogue with John Ruskin’s influential critique of the pathetic fallacy. By contextualizing Ruskin’s view vis-à-vis Romantic and Modernist poetics, post-Kantian aesthetics, modern environmental art, and contemporary theories of expressiveness, I show how it indirectly motivates my account. 1. Beyond Self-Expression? The idea of art as self-expression can seem old-fashioned, if not justifiably obsolete. At the very least, it no longer has the explicit pride of place that it did for the Romantic tradition which rose to prominence in the early 19th century, giving new priority to the ‘expressive’ artist.1 For us now, rather, the idea of self-expression has apparently been “collecting dust for some decades,” as one recent commentator puts it— in art and aesthetics, as elsewhere.2 Still, it may have been right to say, forty years ago, that “the assumption that art is an important mode of self-expression and that it is justified on this account” is “ubiquitous” in the art literature of the 20 th century.3 But this assumption has arguably been steadily losing steam ever since. On the other hand, the idea of art as creative self-expression clearly still has a firm hold on many parts of the public imagination. To begin with, it is still ubiquitous outside the cutting edge of aesthetics and art criticism. In pedagogical contexts, for instance, it remains common to view arts and crafts education as cultivating a capacity for “self† University of Michigan, Department of Philosophy; elicht@umich.edu 1 See e.g. Abrams 1953. 2 Green 2007, 3. 3 Osborne 1977, 296–297.","PeriodicalId":46609,"journal":{"name":"BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46493676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The philosophical discussion about erotic art has often been understood in terms of the possibility of erotic art as a form of visual or auditory art. In this article, I focus on erotic experiences qua proprioceptive experiences and I defend the claim that, under the right circumstances, such experiences can bring about proprioceptive artworks.
{"title":"Erotic Art as Proprioceptive Art","authors":"Jiri Benovsky","doi":"10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA051","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The philosophical discussion about erotic art has often been understood in terms of the possibility of erotic art as a form of visual or auditory art. In this article, I focus on erotic experiences qua proprioceptive experiences and I defend the claim that, under the right circumstances, such experiences can bring about proprioceptive artworks.","PeriodicalId":46609,"journal":{"name":"BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA051","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44173142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By the start of the twenty-first century, the notion of ‘the sublime’ had come to seem incoherent. In the last ten years or so considerable light has been shed by empirical psychologists on a related notion of ‘awe’, and a fruitful dialogue between aestheticians and empirical psychologists has ensued. It is the aim of this paper to synthesize these advances and to offer what I call a ‘two-tiered’ theory of the sublime that shows it to be a coherent aesthetic category. On this theory, sublime experiences begin in an ‘awe response’ (the ‘thin sublime’) and might, with the additional element of temporally-extended reflection, turn into a ‘thick sublime’ response. Building on accounts of the sublime as a species of ‘aesthetic awe’ (Clewis, 2019a and 2019b; Arcangeli, et al., 2020) I aim to show that this two-tiered theory helps to explain why sublime experiences seem to have a basic, primordial core, but also seem to be historically and culturally quite variable (as Nicolson, 1963 [1959]; Battersby, 2007; and McMahon, 2017 have stressed). On this model, the cultural and historical variability comes in largely at the point of the temporally-extended reflection characteristic of the thick sublime, due to the cognitive stock that the subject brings to the encounter. Thus, sublime experiences really lend themselves to being interpreted quite variously by the subject (as well as by the theorist) of these experiences, as, for example, affording insight into the Divine, our moral vocation, or our metaphysical unity with the entire universe, among other lofty thoughts.
到了21世纪初，“崇高”的概念似乎变得不连贯了。在过去十年左右的时间里，经验心理学家对“敬畏”的相关概念进行了相当多的研究，美学家和经验心理学家之间进行了富有成效的对话。本文的目的是综合这些进展，并提供我所谓的“两层”崇高理论，表明它是一个连贯的美学范畴。根据这一理论，崇高体验始于一种“敬畏反应”(“薄崇高”)，并可能随着时间延伸反思的额外元素，转变为一种“厚崇高”反应。将崇高描述为一种“美学敬畏”(clelewis, 2019a和2019b;Arcangeli, et .， 2020)我的目标是证明这种两层理论有助于解释为什么崇高体验似乎有一个基本的、原始的核心，但似乎在历史和文化上也有很大的变化(如Nicolson, 1963 [1959];Battersby, 2007;和麦克马洪，2017年都强调过)。在这个模型中，文化和历史的可变性主要来自于厚重崇高的时间延伸反射特征，这是由于主体带来的认知储备。因此，崇高的经验确实可以被这些经验的主体(以及理论家)以不同的方式解释，例如，提供对神性的洞察，我们的道德使命，或者我们与整个宇宙的形而上学统一，以及其他崇高的思想。
{"title":"A Two-Tiered Theory of the Sublime","authors":"Sandra Shapshay","doi":"10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA047","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 By the start of the twenty-first century, the notion of ‘the sublime’ had come to seem incoherent. In the last ten years or so considerable light has been shed by empirical psychologists on a related notion of ‘awe’, and a fruitful dialogue between aestheticians and empirical psychologists has ensued. It is the aim of this paper to synthesize these advances and to offer what I call a ‘two-tiered’ theory of the sublime that shows it to be a coherent aesthetic category. On this theory, sublime experiences begin in an ‘awe response’ (the ‘thin sublime’) and might, with the additional element of temporally-extended reflection, turn into a ‘thick sublime’ response. Building on accounts of the sublime as a species of ‘aesthetic awe’ (Clewis, 2019a and 2019b; Arcangeli, et al., 2020) I aim to show that this two-tiered theory helps to explain why sublime experiences seem to have a basic, primordial core, but also seem to be historically and culturally quite variable (as Nicolson, 1963 [1959]; Battersby, 2007; and McMahon, 2017 have stressed). On this model, the cultural and historical variability comes in largely at the point of the temporally-extended reflection characteristic of the thick sublime, due to the cognitive stock that the subject brings to the encounter. Thus, sublime experiences really lend themselves to being interpreted quite variously by the subject (as well as by the theorist) of these experiences, as, for example, affording insight into the Divine, our moral vocation, or our metaphysical unity with the entire universe, among other lofty thoughts.","PeriodicalId":46609,"journal":{"name":"BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA047","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43964919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Role realism is a promising realist theory of fictional names. Different versions of this theory have been suggested by Gregory Currie, Peter Lamarque, Stein Haugom Olsen, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. The general idea behind the approach is that fictional characters are to be analysed in terms of roles, which in turn can be understood as sets of properties (or alternatively as kinds or functions from possible worlds to individuals). I will discuss several advantages and disadvantages of this approach. I will then propose a novel hyperintensional version of role realism (which I will call impossibilism), according to which fictional names are analysed in terms of individual concepts that cannot be matched by a reference (a full-blooded individual). I will argue that this account avoids the main disadvantages of standard role realism.
{"title":"Rethinking Role Realism","authors":"Daniela Glavaničová","doi":"10.1093/aesthj/ayaa034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayaa034","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Role realism is a promising realist theory of fictional names. Different versions of this theory have been suggested by Gregory Currie, Peter Lamarque, Stein Haugom Olsen, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. The general idea behind the approach is that fictional characters are to be analysed in terms of roles, which in turn can be understood as sets of properties (or alternatively as kinds or functions from possible worlds to individuals). I will discuss several advantages and disadvantages of this approach. I will then propose a novel hyperintensional version of role realism (which I will call impossibilism), according to which fictional names are analysed in terms of individual concepts that cannot be matched by a reference (a full-blooded individual). I will argue that this account avoids the main disadvantages of standard role realism.","PeriodicalId":46609,"journal":{"name":"BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS","volume":"61 1","pages":"59-74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/aesthj/ayaa034","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47100736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kant’s concern for the universal validity of aesthetic judgment turns on its providing a needed bridge between our understanding of the world as governed by mechanical laws and our ability freely to realize our true humanity. That obliges us to find beauty in nature that is expressive of our ethical and moral values. It shapes the way we should understand aesthetic judgment itself.
{"title":"Natural Beauty, Reflective Judgment and Kant’s Aesthetic Humanism","authors":"A. Savile","doi":"10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA048","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Kant’s concern for the universal validity of aesthetic judgment turns on its providing a needed bridge between our understanding of the world as governed by mechanical laws and our ability freely to realize our true humanity. That obliges us to find beauty in nature that is expressive of our ethical and moral values. It shapes the way we should understand aesthetic judgment itself.","PeriodicalId":46609,"journal":{"name":"BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AESTHJ/AYAA048","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45359938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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