Journal of Pension Economics & Finance最新文献

This paper investigates the relationship between growth and quality of pension funds. It measures growth in terms of changes in the number of participants and cash flow transfers and appreciates the quality of the funds through the set of information on past results and costs published in the official prospectuses. The results show that growth rewards the best performing funds in the long term, while annual performance and costs have no relevance. Nevertheless, other factors, such as market power and commercial pressure, appear to be more powerful. The existence of conditions of market power capable of attracting investors beyond the actual quality of pension products is undesirable as it harms future pensioners. These results have implications for the Authority, as mandatory information should be suitable to induce investors to identify the best products and direct individual choices toward the public objective of a more efficient market.

Declining labor force participation of older men throughout the 20th century and recent increases in participation have generated substantial interest in understanding the effect of public pensions on retirement. The National Bureau of Economic Research's International Social Security (ISS) Project, a long-term collaboration among researchers in a dozen developed countries, has explored this and related questions. The project employs a harmonized approach to conduct within-country analyses that are combined for meaningful cross-country comparisons. The key lesson is that the choices of policy makers affect the incentive to work at older ages and these incentives have important effects on retirement behavior.

This paper addresses the retirement income planning problem from the perspective of the four main building blocks of retirement income: state pension, mortality credits, investment strategies, and drawdown schedules. We detail how these building blocks interact to form a retiree's overall retirement income portfolio, and what trade-offs and interactions must be considered. We find that while access to each building block increases the retiree's certainty equivalent consumption, the most substantial contributor to this increase is from utilization of the mortality credit building block (i.e., annuities).

The papers in this 20th Anniversary Special Issue reflect to a large extent how the fields of pension economics and pension finance have developed in the past two decades, although there remain very clear connections to the research published in the Journal's first issue. While there has been great progress in research on pensions and retirement economics over the last 20 years, there remain important outstanding questions for future study.

Is it possible to achieve almost riskless, nonfluctuating investment payoffs in the long run, at a fraction of the traditional funding requirement, using equity investments? What is their shortfall risk? These questions are motivated by the need to increase yields, while limiting the variability of investment results. We show how to use contingent claims, denominated in units of a stock index, to achieve an almost riskless investment outcome. To control the risk of the proposed hedge portfolios, we introduce an overfunded scheme and show its reliability using bootstrapping. Results show that a modest amount of overfunding is an effective risk-management approach that brings the probability of not achieving the target to less than 1 percent. Our results are based on the use of the minimal market model and a change of numeraire. Robustness tests support their validity under different market specifications.

Twenty years ago, the adjustment to monthly Social Security benefits for early or delayed claiming was, on average, roughly actuarially fair, although some subsets of individuals could gain from delay. Since then, delaying claiming has become much more attractive thanks to three factors: a more generous delayed retirement credit, improvements in mortality, and historically low real interest rates. In this article, I examine how these three factors influence optimal claiming behavior. I also discuss empirical patterns of claiming across individuals and over time, as well as explanations for these patterns. I argue that although many people appear to claim suboptimally early, this behavior may be changing as information spreads about the importance of the claiming decision. Finally, I discuss policy toward claiming and the impact that an increase in strategic claiming could have on Social Security's finances.