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Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology最新文献

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Justification, Coherence, and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-Finding 法律事实认定中的正当性、连贯性和认知责任
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2008-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2489867
Amalia Amaya
This paper argues for a coherentist theory of the justification of evidentiary judgments in law, according to which a hypothesis about the events being litigated is justified if and only if it is such that an epistemically responsible fact-finder might have accepted it as justified by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. It claims that this version of coherentism has the resources to address a main problem facing coherence theories of evidence and legal proof, namely, the problem of the coherence bias. The paper then develops an aretaic approach to the standards of epistemic responsibility which govern legal factfinding. It concludes by exploring some implications of the proposed account of the justification of evidentiary judgments in law for the epistemology of legal proof.
本文论证了法律上证据判断正当性的一致性理论,根据该理论,关于诉讼事件的假设是正当的,当且仅当它是这样的,一个认识论上负责任的事实发现者可能会接受它,因为它在类似情况下的一致性是正当的。它声称,这种版本的连贯性具有解决证据和法律证明的连贯性理论所面临的主要问题的资源,即连贯性偏见的问题。然后,本文发展了一种管理法律事实认定的认知责任标准的方法。最后,本文探讨了法律证明认识论中所提出的证据判断正当性解释的一些含义。
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引用次数: 13
Conspiracy Theories 阴谋论
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2007-12-20 DOI: 10.1353/epi.2007.0019
D. Coady
Current thinking about conspiracy theories is dominated by epistemological and psychological approaches. The former see the study of conspiracy theories as a branch of epistemology and insist that each theory should be judged on its evidential merits. On this account, a conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event which cites a conspiracy as a salient cause. Psychological approaches explain belief in conspiracy theories by reference to individual personality traits and generic cognitive biases. Despite their popularity, both epistemological and psychological approaches are flawed. After identifying their flaws, a case is made for a different perspective which focuses on the political function of conspiracy theories. A conspiracy theory is not just an explanation of an event which cites a conspiracy as a salient cause. Conspiracy theories have a range of additional features which distinguish them from ordinary theories about conspiracies and make them unlikely to be true. The political approach sees many conspiracy theories as forms of political propaganda and is especially mindful of the role of conspiracy theories in promoting extremist ideologies.
目前关于阴谋论的思考主要是认识论和心理学的方法。前者将阴谋论的研究视为认识论的一个分支,并坚持认为每个理论都应该根据其证据价值来判断。在这种情况下,阴谋论是对一个事件的解释,它引用阴谋作为一个突出的原因。心理学方法通过参考个人人格特征和一般认知偏见来解释对阴谋论的信仰。尽管它们很受欢迎,但认识论和心理学方法都有缺陷。在确定了它们的缺陷之后,本文提出了一个不同的观点,该观点侧重于阴谋论的政治功能。阴谋论不只是把阴谋作为一个突出原因来解释一个事件。阴谋论有一系列额外的特征,这些特征将它们与普通的阴谋论区分开来,使它们不太可能是真的。政治方法将许多阴谋论视为政治宣传的形式,并特别注意阴谋论在促进极端主义意识形态方面的作用。
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引用次数: 37
The Benefits of Multiple Biased Observers 多重偏见观察者的好处
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2007-05-26 DOI: 10.1353/EPI.2007.0002
R. Goodin
We know that we can learn much from the reports of multiple competent, independent, unbiased observers. There are also things we can learn from the reports of competent but biased observers. Specifically, when reports go against the grain of an agent's known biases, we can be relatively confident in the veracity of those reports. Triangulating on the truth via that mechanism requires a multiplicity of observers with distinct biases, each of whose reports might be one-way decisive in that fashion. It also presupposes that all observers share the same fundamental epistemic standards.
我们知道,我们可以从多位称职、独立、无偏见的观察员的报告中学到很多东西。我们也可以从有能力但有偏见的观察员的报告中学到一些东西。具体来说,当报告与代理人已知的偏见相悖时,我们可以相对确信这些报告的真实性。通过这种机制对真相进行三角测量,需要具有不同偏见的众多观察者,他们的每一个报告都可能以这种方式具有单向决定性。它还假定所有的观察者都有相同的基本认知标准。
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引用次数: 3
Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge 经验知识中的客观性与视角
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2007-01-30 DOI: 10.1353/epi.0.0005
R. Kukla
Epistemologists generally think that genuine warrant that is available to anyone must be available to everyone who is exposed to the relevant causal inputs and is able and willing to properly exercise her rationality. The motivating idea behind this requirement is roughly that an objective view is one that is not bound to a particular perspective. In this paper I ask whether the aperspectivality of our warrants is a precondition for securing the objectivity of our claims. I draw upon a Sellarsian account of perception in order to argue that it is not; rather, inquirers can have contingent properties and perspectives that give them access to forms of rational warrant and objective knowledge that others do not have. The universal accessibility of reasons, on my account, is not a precondition for the legitimacy of any actual warrant, but rather a regulative ideal governing inquiry and communication.
认识论家通常认为,任何人都能得到的真正的保证,必须对每一个接触到相关因果输入的人都能得到,并且能够并且愿意适当地运用自己的理性。Â这一要求背后的激励思想大致是,客观观点是不受特定观点约束的观点。Â在本文中,我问我们的认股权证的洞察力是否是确保我们的要求的客观性的先决条件。Â我引用了塞拉斯对知觉的描述,以证明它不是;相反,询问者可以有偶然的属性和视角,使他们能够获得其他人没有的理性保证和客观知识。在我看来,理由的普遍可及性并不是任何实际搜查令合法性的先决条件,而是一种管理调查和沟通的规范理想。
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引用次数: 15
Masking Disagreement among Experts 掩盖专家之间的分歧
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2006-06-01 DOI: 10.1353/EPI.0.0001
J. Beatty
There are many reasons why scientific experts may mask disagreement and endorse a position publicly as "jointly accepted." In this paper I consider the inner workings of a group of scientists charged with deciding not only a technically difficult issue, but also a matter of social and political importance: the maximum acceptable dose of radiation. I focus on how, in this real world situation, concerns with credibility, authority, and expertise shaped the process by which this group negotiated the competing virtues of reaching consensus versus reporting accurately the nature and degree of disagreement among them.
有很多原因可以解释为什么科学专家可能会掩盖分歧,并公开支持“共同接受”的立场。在这篇论文中,我考虑了一群科学家的内部工作,他们不仅负责决定一个技术上困难的问题,而且还负责决定一个具有社会和政治重要性的问题:最大可接受的辐射剂量。我关注的是,在这个现实世界的情况下,对可信度、权威和专业知识的关注如何塑造了这个过程,通过这个过程,这个群体协商达成共识的竞争美德,而不是准确地报告他们之间分歧的性质和程度。
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引用次数: 58
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Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology
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