In the wake of the #MeToo movement, liberal feminism has garnered the spotlight on equal rights for women. However, what factors contribute to men and women developing liberal feminist ideologies? This is important to understand as this ideology is predictive of support for political and social policies that are currently under debate in the United States. In this survey study (149 heterosexual men and 233 heterosexual women) we examined attitudinal and ideological variables that underlie liberal feminist ideology. The results of this study indicate that heterosexual men scored significantly lower on liberal feminist ideology and significantly higher on traditional attitudes toward women, hostile and benevolent sexism, gender-specific justification, rape myths, and conservative political affiliation compared to heterosexual women. Furthermore, traditional attitudes toward women, hostile and benevolent sexism, gender-specific justification, rape myths, political leanings, and gender accounted for almost 70% of the variance in liberal feminist ideology. Participant gender did not moderate the regression analyses, suggesting that men and women are influenced similarly in determining what attitudes predict liberal feminist ideologies. Implications for support for public policy are addressed.
{"title":"What makes a liberal feminist? Identifying predictors of heterosexual women and men's liberal feminist ideology","authors":"Brenda Russell, Debra Oswald, MaryKate Cotter","doi":"10.1111/asap.12383","DOIUrl":"10.1111/asap.12383","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the wake of the #MeToo movement, liberal feminism has garnered the spotlight on equal rights for women. However, what factors contribute to men and women developing liberal feminist ideologies? This is important to understand as this ideology is predictive of support for political and social policies that are currently under debate in the United States. In this survey study (149 heterosexual men and 233 heterosexual women) we examined attitudinal and ideological variables that underlie liberal feminist ideology. The results of this study indicate that heterosexual men scored significantly lower on liberal feminist ideology and significantly higher on traditional attitudes toward women, hostile and benevolent sexism, gender-specific justification, rape myths, and conservative political affiliation compared to heterosexual women. Furthermore, traditional attitudes toward women, hostile and benevolent sexism, gender-specific justification, rape myths, political leanings, and gender accounted for almost 70% of the variance in liberal feminist ideology. Participant gender did not moderate the regression analyses, suggesting that men and women are influenced similarly in determining what attitudes predict liberal feminist ideologies. Implications for support for public policy are addressed.</p>","PeriodicalId":46799,"journal":{"name":"Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy","volume":"24 1","pages":"241-260"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/asap.12383","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139808337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Egidio Riva, Mario Lucchini, Marta G. Pancheva, Carlotta Piazzoni, Dean Lillard
This paper draws on a subsample (N = 851) of respondents to ITA.LI—Italian Lives—a recently established panel study on a probability sample of individuals aged 16+ living in Italy—to track changes in the affective (positive and negative emotions such as energy and sadness) and cognitive (life satisfaction) components of well-being during different COVID-19 policy phases, classified according to the severity of key government responses.
An event-study design is employed, which uses mixed-effects ordered logistic models to investigate the change in SWB scores. Given the nested nature of the data, multilevel modeling is chosen as the most appropriate method of analysis.
The results reveal the levels of affective and cognitive well-being were significantly lower during the lockdown period than before the pandemic outbreak potentially reflecting both the direct effects of the confinement and other potential sources of distress, such as trends in infection rates and related media alarm. Once the lockdown was lifted, there was no evidence of an immediate and general improvement in well-being. In the following policy phase, with the lifting of most containment measures, there were significant signs of full recovery concerning energy, but the scores for the other well-being components remained relatively lower than those observed before the onset of COVID-19.
{"title":"Trajectories of affective and cognitive well-being at times of COVID-19 containment policies in Italy","authors":"Egidio Riva, Mario Lucchini, Marta G. Pancheva, Carlotta Piazzoni, Dean Lillard","doi":"10.1111/asap.12384","DOIUrl":"10.1111/asap.12384","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper draws on a subsample (<i>N</i> = 851) of respondents to ITA.LI—Italian Lives—a recently established panel study on a probability sample of individuals aged 16+ living in Italy—to track changes in the affective (positive and negative emotions such as energy and sadness) and cognitive (life satisfaction) components of well-being during different COVID-19 policy phases, classified according to the severity of key government responses.</p><p>An event-study design is employed, which uses mixed-effects ordered logistic models to investigate the change in SWB scores. Given the nested nature of the data, multilevel modeling is chosen as the most appropriate method of analysis.</p><p>The results reveal the levels of affective and cognitive well-being were significantly lower during the lockdown period than before the pandemic outbreak potentially reflecting both the direct effects of the confinement and other potential sources of distress, such as trends in infection rates and related media alarm. Once the lockdown was lifted, there was no evidence of an immediate and general improvement in well-being. In the following policy phase, with the lifting of most containment measures, there were significant signs of full recovery concerning energy, but the scores for the other well-being components remained relatively lower than those observed before the onset of COVID-19.</p>","PeriodicalId":46799,"journal":{"name":"Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy","volume":"24 2","pages":"532-551"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139808835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For many people, COVID-19 vaccination now informs social identity, triggering prejudice and discrimination toward those with a different vaccination status. As this may jeopardize social cohesion, we investigated the effects of three brief, theory-informed interventions for reducing ingroup bias in a preregistered experimental intervention study in Germany, assigning vaccinated participants (N = 2016) to one of four conditions: crossed categorization (emphasizing commonalities between vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals), recategorization (framing vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals as members of a superordinate ingroup), counter-stereotypic categorization (encouraging participants to think about mismatched stereotypes), or a control condition (no intervention). As compared to the control condition, crossed categorization and counter-stereotypic categorization were found to reduce (evaluative) ingroup bias but the observed effects were weak and mostly diminished when controlling for demographic characteristics and vaccination status identification. Overall, the results indicate that none of the three interventions substantially reduced prejudice and discrimination toward the unvaccinated.
{"title":"Experimental testing of three categorization-based interventions to reduce prejudice and discrimination against the unvaccinated in the aftermath of COVID-19","authors":"Philipp Sprengholz, Cornelia Betsch, Robert Böhm","doi":"10.1111/asap.12386","DOIUrl":"10.1111/asap.12386","url":null,"abstract":"<p>For many people, COVID-19 vaccination now informs social identity, triggering prejudice and discrimination toward those with a different vaccination status. As this may jeopardize social cohesion, we investigated the effects of three brief, theory-informed interventions for reducing ingroup bias in a preregistered experimental intervention study in Germany, assigning vaccinated participants (<i>N</i> = 2016) to one of four conditions: crossed categorization (emphasizing commonalities between vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals), recategorization (framing vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals as members of a superordinate ingroup), counter-stereotypic categorization (encouraging participants to think about mismatched stereotypes), or a control condition (no intervention). As compared to the control condition, crossed categorization and counter-stereotypic categorization were found to reduce (evaluative) ingroup bias but the observed effects were weak and mostly diminished when controlling for demographic characteristics and vaccination status identification. Overall, the results indicate that none of the three interventions substantially reduced prejudice and discrimination toward the unvaccinated.</p>","PeriodicalId":46799,"journal":{"name":"Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy","volume":"24 2","pages":"552-566"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/asap.12386","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139807835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ankica Kosic, Corine Stella Kana Kenfack, Eleonora Dionisi
The aim of this study is to examine whether the relationship between populist orientation and attitudes towards the anti-COVID vaccine and government measures is mediated by conspiracy beliefs and health risk perceptions, and whether these relationships are moderated by trust in institutions. Data were collected in Italy using a questionnaire (N = 390). The results largely supported our hypotheses of moderated mediation. Basically, while previous studies suggest that populist attitudes are positively associated with conspiracy theories, vaccine hesitancy and limited compliance with government measures, this study shows that these relationships are stronger when people do not trust institutions.
{"title":"The relationship between populism and attitudes on vaccine against COVID-19: Trust in institutions as a moderation factor","authors":"Ankica Kosic, Corine Stella Kana Kenfack, Eleonora Dionisi","doi":"10.1111/asap.12378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/asap.12378","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The aim of this study is to examine whether the relationship between populist orientation and attitudes towards the anti-COVID vaccine and government measures is mediated by conspiracy beliefs and health risk perceptions, and whether these relationships are moderated by trust in institutions. Data were collected in Italy using a questionnaire (<i>N</i> = 390). The results largely supported our hypotheses of moderated mediation. Basically, while previous studies suggest that populist attitudes are positively associated with conspiracy theories, vaccine hesitancy and limited compliance with government measures, this study shows that these relationships are stronger when people do not trust institutions.</p>","PeriodicalId":46799,"journal":{"name":"Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy","volume":"24 1","pages":"150-169"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/asap.12378","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140345828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ruth H. Warner, Eyad J. Naseralla, Hailey A. Hatch
Previous research suggests that individuals may not report sexual harassment for a variety of reasons. There is evidence that women who report and do not report sexual harassment both face negative evaluations. The current studies investigated a potential explanation for these contradictory findings—the perceived deservingness of consequences for the alleged harasser. Across three studies, we examined evaluations of a woman who reported (versus did not report) an uncomfortable situation as sexual harassment as well as examining whether the alleged harasser was perceived as deserving punishment or not. In Study 1, participants rated the woman less favorably when she reported behavior most participants considered not to be sexual harassment compared to when she did not report. In Studies 2 and 3, using a scenario perceived as more ambiguous, we found that participants who believed that the alleged harasser deserved punishment evaluated the woman more favorably when she reported. In Study 3, however, whether or not the alleged harasser was actually punished for his actions had little effect on evaluations of the harassment target. Ultimately, findings suggest that differences in evaluations on reporting sexual harassment may be rooted in whether the alleged harasser is perceived as deserving punishment or not.
{"title":"The effects of official reporting and perceived deservingness on evaluations of sexual harassment responses","authors":"Ruth H. Warner, Eyad J. Naseralla, Hailey A. Hatch","doi":"10.1111/asap.12379","DOIUrl":"10.1111/asap.12379","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Previous research suggests that individuals may not report sexual harassment for a variety of reasons. There is evidence that women who report and do not report sexual harassment both face negative evaluations. The current studies investigated a potential explanation for these contradictory findings—the perceived deservingness of consequences for the alleged harasser. Across three studies, we examined evaluations of a woman who reported (versus did not report) an uncomfortable situation as sexual harassment as well as examining whether the alleged harasser was perceived as deserving punishment or not. In Study 1, participants rated the woman less favorably when she reported behavior most participants considered not to be sexual harassment compared to when she did not report. In Studies 2 and 3, using a scenario perceived as more ambiguous, we found that participants who believed that the alleged harasser deserved punishment evaluated the woman more favorably when she reported. In Study 3, however, whether or not the alleged harasser was actually punished for his actions had little effect on evaluations of the harassment target. Ultimately, findings suggest that differences in evaluations on reporting sexual harassment may be rooted in whether the alleged harasser is perceived as deserving punishment or not.</p>","PeriodicalId":46799,"journal":{"name":"Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy","volume":"24 1","pages":"215-240"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139495388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conspiracy theories about criminal justice reform are an unexplored domain with unique relationships to system justification and resistance to criminal justice reform. Across two studies, we developed and began to validate a measure of conspiracies about criminal justice reform, the CCJR. The CCJR was predicted by system justification, general conspiracy mentality, and political ideology (Study 1). The CCJR also mediated the relationship between system justification and resistance to information about criminal justice reform (Study 2). These studies suggest that conspiracy theories contribute to opposition to criminal justice reform, and that criminal justice reform-related conspiracy theories serve a system-justifying function, that is, atypical of conspiracy theories. These findings suggest new avenues for research on both conspiracy theories and criminal justice reform.
{"title":"Plotting against justice: Conspiracy theory endorsement and opposition to criminal justice reform","authors":"Aaron L. Pomerantz, Marie Altgilbers Roweton","doi":"10.1111/asap.12380","DOIUrl":"10.1111/asap.12380","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Conspiracy theories about criminal justice reform are an unexplored domain with unique relationships to system justification and resistance to criminal justice reform. Across two studies, we developed and began to validate a measure of conspiracies about criminal justice reform, the CCJR. The CCJR was predicted by system justification, general conspiracy mentality, and political ideology (Study 1). The CCJR also mediated the relationship between system justification and resistance to information about criminal justice reform (Study 2). These studies suggest that conspiracy theories contribute to opposition to criminal justice reform, and that criminal justice reform-related conspiracy theories serve a system-justifying function, that is, atypical of conspiracy theories. These findings suggest new avenues for research on both conspiracy theories and criminal justice reform.</p>","PeriodicalId":46799,"journal":{"name":"Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy","volume":"24 1","pages":"133-149"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139464277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is well-established that news outlets cater to audiences with particular political leanings and present news about important events, such as disease outbreaks, differently. However, the mechanisms through which selected media exposure influences behavior are not well established. Two surveys examined the roles of attitudes and social norms as pathways through which political predispositions (political ideology, partisanship) and news media choices influence health behavior decisions. Using early Covid-19 as a case study, both studies (a student sample [n = 315]; an adult sample [n = 518]) found liberal news viewing was related to positive attitudes and norms about health prevention and subsequently more enacted preventive behaviors among liberals but not conservatives. Interestingly, watching conservative news outlets was not associated with attitudes and norms about health prevention, nor was it related to behavior. Partisanship, but not political ideology, directly predicted participants’ preventive behavior. These findings suggest that party identification serves as a heuristic for conservatives’ and Republicans’ attitudes and behavior, which are not influenced by news media choice. Partisan differences in media preferences influenced the adoption of preventive behavior via the reasoned action pathways for Democrats but not Republicans, suggesting distinct messaging strategies for health communication based on political leaning.
{"title":"The partisan pandemic: Applying the reasoned action approach to understand the effects of politicizing a public health crisis","authors":"Shay Xuejing Yao, Dustin Carnahan, Nancy Rhodes","doi":"10.1111/asap.12377","DOIUrl":"10.1111/asap.12377","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is well-established that news outlets cater to audiences with particular political leanings and present news about important events, such as disease outbreaks, differently. However, the mechanisms through which selected media exposure influences behavior are not well established. Two surveys examined the roles of attitudes and social norms as pathways through which political predispositions (political ideology, partisanship) and news media choices influence health behavior decisions. Using early Covid-19 as a case study, both studies (a student sample [<i>n</i> = 315]; an adult sample [<i>n</i> = 518]) found liberal news viewing was related to positive attitudes and norms about health prevention and subsequently more enacted preventive behaviors among liberals but not conservatives. Interestingly, watching conservative news outlets was not associated with attitudes and norms about health prevention, nor was it related to behavior. Partisanship, but not political ideology, directly predicted participants’ preventive behavior. These findings suggest that party identification serves as a heuristic for conservatives’ and Republicans’ attitudes and behavior, which are not influenced by news media choice. Partisan differences in media preferences influenced the adoption of preventive behavior via the reasoned action pathways for Democrats but not Republicans, suggesting distinct messaging strategies for health communication based on political leaning.</p>","PeriodicalId":46799,"journal":{"name":"Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy","volume":"24 1","pages":"170-191"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139373778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We aimed to understand the cues individuals use to assess social class, and their relation to social theories. Participant (N = 235) open-ended survey responses were coded in response to the following: “If you can at least sometimes tell if someone is (#1) working-class/poor OR (#2) middle-/upper-class, how can you tell? What are all of the characteristics, behaviors, and/or other indicators that communicate their social class to you?” Based on participant comments, we created six themes: embodied cultural capital, material/economic capital, taste, status/position, institutional cultural capital, and social capital. First, we found spontaneous participant responses reflected several classic social class theories. Second, while the content often differed in terms of how participants discussed the working-class/poor compared to the middle-/upper-class, there was only one significant difference in frequency of response. Specifically, participants were more likely to express the embodied cultural capital theme when asked about the working-class/poor. Finally, participants with some more privileged identities (e.g., racially white, those with higher education, straight/heterosexual participants) were more likely to focus on symbolic or non-material aspects of class compared to participants with some less privileged identities (e.g., participants with lower incomes in their families of origin), who focused more on material and economic cues in determining a person's class.
{"title":"The hidden cues of social class: What do people rely on when determining someone else's social class?","authors":"Jessica M. Kiebler, Abigail J. Stewart","doi":"10.1111/asap.12373","DOIUrl":"10.1111/asap.12373","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We aimed to understand the cues individuals use to assess social class, and their relation to social theories. Participant (<i>N</i> = 235) open-ended survey responses were coded in response to the following: “<i>If you can at least sometimes tell if someone is (#1) working-class/poor</i> OR (#2) <i>middle-/upper-class, how can you tell? What are all of the characteristics, behaviors, and/or other indicators that communicate their social class to you?”</i> Based on participant comments, we created six themes: embodied cultural capital, material/economic capital, taste, status/position, institutional cultural capital, and social capital. First, we found spontaneous participant responses reflected several classic social class theories. Second, while the content often differed in terms of how participants discussed the working-class/poor compared to the middle-/upper-class, there was only one significant difference in frequency of response. Specifically, participants were more likely to express the embodied cultural capital theme when asked about the working-class/poor. Finally, participants with some more privileged identities (e.g., racially white, those with higher education, straight/heterosexual participants) were more likely to focus on symbolic or non-material aspects of class compared to participants with some less privileged identities (e.g., participants with lower incomes in their families of origin), who focused more on material and economic cues in determining a person's class.</p>","PeriodicalId":46799,"journal":{"name":"Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy","volume":"24 1","pages":"73-101"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/asap.12373","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139078048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Terrorist attacks, war, violent acts, and their media coverage remind us of our own mortality, which may provoke stress and coping mechanisms. The terror management health model (TMHM) proposes that even subliminal thoughts about existential threats trigger worldview defense and self-esteem-related behaviors. Based on the TMHM, our field experiment (N = 228) examines the impact of a terrorist attack on death-thought accessibility, the choice between alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, and if the impact on this choice is moderated by the importance of alcohol to one's self-esteem (i.e., alcohol-based self-esteem), and the consciousness of the terrorist attack. Results show that thoughts about the terrorist attack increased death-thought accessibility. The salience of the terrorist attack had no main effect on beverage choice, but alcohol-based self-esteem predicted choosing an alcoholic beverage. However, in the unconscious thought condition, participants who had low alcohol-based self-esteem and were provoked with death-related thoughts about terrorism were more likely to choose an alcoholic beverage. In the conscious thought condition, participants who had high alcohol-based self-esteem were less likely to choose alcohol. This study suggests that thoughts about terrorism and, therefore, the threat of death, can be provoked in everyday situations and affect substance use behaviors with potentially adverse health consequences.
{"title":"Health consequences of a death threat: How terrorist attacks impact drinking","authors":"Franziska Pradel, Sebastian Sattler","doi":"10.1111/asap.12375","DOIUrl":"10.1111/asap.12375","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Terrorist attacks, war, violent acts, and their media coverage remind us of our own mortality, which may provoke stress and coping mechanisms. The terror management health model (TMHM) proposes that even subliminal thoughts about existential threats trigger worldview defense and self-esteem-related behaviors. Based on the TMHM, our field experiment (<i>N</i> = 228) examines the impact of a terrorist attack on death-thought accessibility, the choice between alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, and if the impact on this choice is moderated by the importance of alcohol to one's self-esteem (i.e., alcohol-based self-esteem), and the consciousness of the terrorist attack. Results show that thoughts about the terrorist attack increased death-thought accessibility. The salience of the terrorist attack had no main effect on beverage choice, but alcohol-based self-esteem predicted choosing an alcoholic beverage. However, in the unconscious thought condition, participants who had low alcohol-based self-esteem and were provoked with death-related thoughts about terrorism were more likely to choose an alcoholic beverage. In the conscious thought condition, participants who had high alcohol-based self-esteem were less likely to choose alcohol. This study suggests that thoughts about terrorism and, therefore, the threat of death, can be provoked in everyday situations and affect substance use behaviors with potentially adverse health consequences.</p>","PeriodicalId":46799,"journal":{"name":"Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy","volume":"24 1","pages":"283-302"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/asap.12375","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139055195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prosecutors are the key decision-makers when it comes to plea bargaining, which is responsible for the resolution of about 90% of criminal cases. We distributed a mixed-method survey to a national sample of 180 prosecutors to ask about their key considerations when initiating and prosecuting a criminal case. Additionally, the survey asked prosecutors to provide any information they wanted to share regarding plea bargaining. We then conducted a qualitative content analysis to comprehensively identify the factors the prosecutors discussed. We found several factors that prosecutors take into consideration when starting to evaluate a criminal case: attributes of the criminal defendant (e.g., criminal history), victim input (e.g., victim wishes), and factors specific to the case (e.g., evidence strength). Further, when asked if they would like to share anything regarding plea bargaining, some prosecutors stressed the necessity of the plea system, some shared their punishment orientations, and others discussed how they determine punishment on a case-by-case basis. Overall, prosecutors tended to stress criminal history as largely influential in their plea decision-making. This study provides insight into prosecutorial plea bargain decision-making while providing opportunity for future research.
{"title":"Prosecutors’ considerations when initiating plea bargaining","authors":"Casey N. Tisdale, Ashley M. Votruba","doi":"10.1111/asap.12374","DOIUrl":"10.1111/asap.12374","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Prosecutors are the key decision-makers when it comes to plea bargaining, which is responsible for the resolution of about 90% of criminal cases. We distributed a mixed-method survey to a national sample of 180 prosecutors to ask about their key considerations when initiating and prosecuting a criminal case. Additionally, the survey asked prosecutors to provide any information they wanted to share regarding plea bargaining. We then conducted a qualitative content analysis to comprehensively identify the factors the prosecutors discussed. We found several factors that prosecutors take into consideration when starting to evaluate a criminal case: attributes of the criminal defendant (e.g., criminal history), victim input (e.g., victim wishes), and factors specific to the case (e.g., evidence strength). Further, when asked if they would like to share anything regarding plea bargaining, some prosecutors stressed the necessity of the plea system, some shared their punishment orientations, and others discussed how they determine punishment on a case-by-case basis. Overall, prosecutors tended to stress criminal history as largely influential in their plea decision-making. This study provides insight into prosecutorial plea bargain decision-making while providing opportunity for future research.</p>","PeriodicalId":46799,"journal":{"name":"Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy","volume":"24 1","pages":"192-214"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/asap.12374","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139055196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}