Pub Date : 2023-09-07DOI: 10.1017/s0922156523000444
Elizabeth White
Digital open-source evidence has become ubiquitous in the context of modern conflicts, leading to an evolution in investigative practices within the context of mass atrocity crimes and international criminal law. Despite its extensive promulgation, international criminal tribunals have had few opportunities to address the admissibility of user-generated open-source evidence. Through semi-structured interviews with experts and analyses of primary and secondary sources, this article examines the current standards and practices governing the use of user-generated open-source evidence. Current practices illuminate a number of gaps in the realm of digital open-source evidence in international criminal law. This article posits the establishment of a standing international, investigative mechanism as a solution to a need for increased standardization and co-ordination within the realm of user-generated open-source evidence. By standardizing the collection and use of such evidence, investigative bodies will be prepared to more effectively serve the international justice community.
{"title":"Closing cases with open-source: Facilitating the use of user-generated open-source evidence in international criminal investigations through the creation of a standing investigative mechanism","authors":"Elizabeth White","doi":"10.1017/s0922156523000444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0922156523000444","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Digital open-source evidence has become ubiquitous in the context of modern conflicts, leading to an evolution in investigative practices within the context of mass atrocity crimes and international criminal law. Despite its extensive promulgation, international criminal tribunals have had few opportunities to address the admissibility of user-generated open-source evidence. Through semi-structured interviews with experts and analyses of primary and secondary sources, this article examines the current standards and practices governing the use of user-generated open-source evidence. Current practices illuminate a number of gaps in the realm of digital open-source evidence in international criminal law. This article posits the establishment of a standing international, investigative mechanism as a solution to a need for increased standardization and co-ordination within the realm of user-generated open-source evidence. By standardizing the collection and use of such evidence, investigative bodies will be prepared to more effectively serve the international justice community.","PeriodicalId":46816,"journal":{"name":"Leiden Journal of International Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43755864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-29DOI: 10.1017/s0922156523000389
W. Werner
Legal systems across the world contain the obligation to prevent ‘absurd interpretations’ of law. In international law, an instruction to avoid ‘manifestly absurd’ interpretations can be found in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This gives rise to at least two questions that I will take up in this article. First, what is meant by the ‘absurd’ that is to be avoided in legal interpretation. The short answer to this question is: no one knows exactly. The absurd, by its very nature, resists definition in pre-given categories, as I will argue on the basis of four core thinkers on the absurd: Søren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and Thomas Nagel. The second question is more technical and easier to answer: how should lawyers try to avoid absurd interpretations? Here, I turn to absurdist writing and the theatre of the absurd for assistance. Absurdist writing and theatre have developed a number of techniques to make the absurd appear, to let the audience experience that something is fundamentally out of tune. Lawyers use similar techniques, but in reverse and with an opposite purpose: they add exposition, narrative, reasonable language, and stable, rational legal personae. In this way, they boost the rationality and reasonableness of the legal order. However, to come full circle, it is exactly the pretension of rationality and reasonableness that makes the law vulnerable to manifestations of the absurd. The rationality of law is the springboard for the very same absurdity it tries to suppress.
{"title":"Sisyphus in robes: International law, legal interpretation and the absurd","authors":"W. Werner","doi":"10.1017/s0922156523000389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0922156523000389","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Legal systems across the world contain the obligation to prevent ‘absurd interpretations’ of law. In international law, an instruction to avoid ‘manifestly absurd’ interpretations can be found in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This gives rise to at least two questions that I will take up in this article. First, what is meant by the ‘absurd’ that is to be avoided in legal interpretation. The short answer to this question is: no one knows exactly. The absurd, by its very nature, resists definition in pre-given categories, as I will argue on the basis of four core thinkers on the absurd: Søren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and Thomas Nagel. The second question is more technical and easier to answer: how should lawyers try to avoid absurd interpretations? Here, I turn to absurdist writing and the theatre of the absurd for assistance. Absurdist writing and theatre have developed a number of techniques to make the absurd appear, to let the audience experience that something is fundamentally out of tune. Lawyers use similar techniques, but in reverse and with an opposite purpose: they add exposition, narrative, reasonable language, and stable, rational legal personae. In this way, they boost the rationality and reasonableness of the legal order. However, to come full circle, it is exactly the pretension of rationality and reasonableness that makes the law vulnerable to manifestations of the absurd. The rationality of law is the springboard for the very same absurdity it tries to suppress.","PeriodicalId":46816,"journal":{"name":"Leiden Journal of International Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45349907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-22DOI: 10.1017/s092215652300047x
J. Powderly, W. Schabas
{"title":"‘A Plea of Humanity to Law’: In Memoriam for Benjamin Berell Ferencz (1920–2023)","authors":"J. Powderly, W. Schabas","doi":"10.1017/s092215652300047x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s092215652300047x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46816,"journal":{"name":"Leiden Journal of International Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43529213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-17DOI: 10.1017/s0922156523000341
L. Bélanger, J. Morin
Treaty amendments constitute a critical but under-researched aspect of international law. In this article, we present a comprehensive survey of 491 amendment procedures across 691 multilateral environmental agreements. We use this data collection to build a typology of amendment procedures based on various combinations of control, adaptability, and flexibility. We introduce the property space reduction method as a valuable tool for building typology and analysing international law. We find a clear trend towards the inclusion of amendment procedures, which makes treaties increasingly adaptable. This adaptability is generally coupled with flexibility to avoid infringing on consent. As a result, amended treaties risk being increasingly fragmented into differentiated bundles of obligations split among subsets of members. We also examine how key features of treaty membership, such as power distribution, correlate with the occurrence and types of amendment procedures.
{"title":"Treaty amendment procedures: A typology from a survey of multilateral environmental agreements","authors":"L. Bélanger, J. Morin","doi":"10.1017/s0922156523000341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0922156523000341","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Treaty amendments constitute a critical but under-researched aspect of international law. In this article, we present a comprehensive survey of 491 amendment procedures across 691 multilateral environmental agreements. We use this data collection to build a typology of amendment procedures based on various combinations of control, adaptability, and flexibility. We introduce the property space reduction method as a valuable tool for building typology and analysing international law. We find a clear trend towards the inclusion of amendment procedures, which makes treaties increasingly adaptable. This adaptability is generally coupled with flexibility to avoid infringing on consent. As a result, amended treaties risk being increasingly fragmented into differentiated bundles of obligations split among subsets of members. We also examine how key features of treaty membership, such as power distribution, correlate with the occurrence and types of amendment procedures.","PeriodicalId":46816,"journal":{"name":"Leiden Journal of International Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49529781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-14DOI: 10.1017/s0922156523000420
{"title":"LJL volume 36 issue 3 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0922156523000420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0922156523000420","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46816,"journal":{"name":"Leiden Journal of International Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49500492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-14DOI: 10.1017/s0922156523000419
{"title":"LJL volume 36 issue 3 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0922156523000419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0922156523000419","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46816,"journal":{"name":"Leiden Journal of International Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46948792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-07DOI: 10.1017/s0922156523000365
Martin Lolle Christensen
Since its first judgment on the merits in 2013, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Court or ACtHPR) jurisprudence has bourgeoned. In building this jurisprudence, the African Court has borrowed significantly from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This article empirically maps judicial borrowing in the jurisprudence of the African Court and connects this practice to the theoretical framing of the semantic authority of interpretive actors in international law. The article argues that judicial borrowing allows the African Court to borrow the semantic authority of these more established actors in the field of international human rights law. The practice has allowed the Court to boost its interpretive claims. The article posits that the Court is simultaneously internalizing external references: it transforms them into an internal part of its jurisprudence. Therefore, the African Court is transforming what was initially the semantic authority of its homologues in Strasbourg and San José, into assertions of its own semantic authority. This transformation allows the Court to assert itself as the central authority for the interpretation of human rights in Africa. These findings shed new light onto wider scholarly debates on the characteristics of African human rights jurisprudence in the field of international human rights law.
{"title":"In someone else’s words: Judicial borrowing and the semantic authority of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights","authors":"Martin Lolle Christensen","doi":"10.1017/s0922156523000365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0922156523000365","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Since its first judgment on the merits in 2013, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Court or ACtHPR) jurisprudence has bourgeoned. In building this jurisprudence, the African Court has borrowed significantly from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This article empirically maps judicial borrowing in the jurisprudence of the African Court and connects this practice to the theoretical framing of the semantic authority of interpretive actors in international law. The article argues that judicial borrowing allows the African Court to borrow the semantic authority of these more established actors in the field of international human rights law. The practice has allowed the Court to boost its interpretive claims. The article posits that the Court is simultaneously internalizing external references: it transforms them into an internal part of its jurisprudence. Therefore, the African Court is transforming what was initially the semantic authority of its homologues in Strasbourg and San José, into assertions of its own semantic authority. This transformation allows the Court to assert itself as the central authority for the interpretation of human rights in Africa. These findings shed new light onto wider scholarly debates on the characteristics of African human rights jurisprudence in the field of international human rights law.","PeriodicalId":46816,"journal":{"name":"Leiden Journal of International Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44365061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-04DOI: 10.1017/s0922156523000353
Dorothea Endres
Understanding law as a continuous process with circular and interacting phases of selection, construction, and reception makes it possible to account for the variety of actors and resources implicated in the process of incrementally changing a norm of international law. This process is visualized through an analogy to knitting. One can start the knitting project with one needle, but to actually construct anything, more than one needle is necessary: at least two actors need to collaborate and build upon each other’s work. If those two actors neatly agree upon the pattern to be knitted, the resulting product may be uniform and dense, able to cover all situations it is intended for. However, it is not that easy to knit in exactly the same pace and pattern. The constructed law may not fit perfectly all situations it is intended for, because the different actors may have had different patterns in their head. Also, sometimes, the wool is held too tightly, and the net becomes too dense; sometimes the wool is held too loosely, and the net will have holes. With this visualization in mind, we can think of legal changes as continuously intermingling and building upon each other: international law is generally knitted with different colours of wool, each colour representing a different normative resource. Thus, ‘norm knitting’ provides for an analytical tool that makes it possible to demonstrate the variety in ‘successful’ change of a given norm in international law in response to specific challenges which the actors face.
{"title":"Conceptualizing legal change as ‘norm-knitting’ through the example of the environmental human right","authors":"Dorothea Endres","doi":"10.1017/s0922156523000353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0922156523000353","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Understanding law as a continuous process with circular and interacting phases of selection, construction, and reception makes it possible to account for the variety of actors and resources implicated in the process of incrementally changing a norm of international law. This process is visualized through an analogy to knitting. One can start the knitting project with one needle, but to actually construct anything, more than one needle is necessary: at least two actors need to collaborate and build upon each other’s work. If those two actors neatly agree upon the pattern to be knitted, the resulting product may be uniform and dense, able to cover all situations it is intended for. However, it is not that easy to knit in exactly the same pace and pattern. The constructed law may not fit perfectly all situations it is intended for, because the different actors may have had different patterns in their head. Also, sometimes, the wool is held too tightly, and the net becomes too dense; sometimes the wool is held too loosely, and the net will have holes. With this visualization in mind, we can think of legal changes as continuously intermingling and building upon each other: international law is generally knitted with different colours of wool, each colour representing a different normative resource. Thus, ‘norm knitting’ provides for an analytical tool that makes it possible to demonstrate the variety in ‘successful’ change of a given norm in international law in response to specific challenges which the actors face.","PeriodicalId":46816,"journal":{"name":"Leiden Journal of International Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44631997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-02DOI: 10.1017/s0922156523000390
Ori Pomson
What is striking about recent scholarship on the application of customary international law to cyber activities is how little has been dedicated to the preliminary question of how one identifies the applicability of existing rules of customary international law to cyber operations. Yet, the answer to this preliminary question holds the key to answering many of the questions which arise regarding whether existing rules of customary international law apply to cyber activities. This article seeks to answer the preliminary question. After providing background on the nature of customary international law, and in light of recent scholarly trends and what is often implied in literature on cyber activities, it makes the argument that rules of customary international law are not interpretable. Accordingly, reference must be made to state practice accepted as law for the purpose of identifying applicable customary international law; the article provides guidance on how this should be done. For a precedent of state practice to be relevant to determining the existence of a customary rule applicable to a cyber activity, pursuant to the International Court’s jurisprudence, the precedent must not have significant distinguishing features from the cyber activity concerned. For determining whether a precedent of opinio juris recognizes the existence of a customary rule applicable to the cyber activity, it is necessary to determine whether the relevant state pronouncement intended to accept as law a rule applicable thereto. In anticipation of objections, the article also addresses the practicability of the approach laid out.
{"title":"Methodology of identifying customary international law applicable to cyber activities","authors":"Ori Pomson","doi":"10.1017/s0922156523000390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0922156523000390","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What is striking about recent scholarship on the application of customary international law to cyber activities is how little has been dedicated to the preliminary question of how one identifies the applicability of existing rules of customary international law to cyber operations. Yet, the answer to this preliminary question holds the key to answering many of the questions which arise regarding whether existing rules of customary international law apply to cyber activities. This article seeks to answer the preliminary question. After providing background on the nature of customary international law, and in light of recent scholarly trends and what is often implied in literature on cyber activities, it makes the argument that rules of customary international law are not interpretable. Accordingly, reference must be made to state practice accepted as law for the purpose of identifying applicable customary international law; the article provides guidance on how this should be done. For a precedent of state practice to be relevant to determining the existence of a customary rule applicable to a cyber activity, pursuant to the International Court’s jurisprudence, the precedent must not have significant distinguishing features from the cyber activity concerned. For determining whether a precedent of opinio juris recognizes the existence of a customary rule applicable to the cyber activity, it is necessary to determine whether the relevant state pronouncement intended to accept as law a rule applicable thereto. In anticipation of objections, the article also addresses the practicability of the approach laid out.","PeriodicalId":46816,"journal":{"name":"Leiden Journal of International Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43521277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-29DOI: 10.1017/s0922156523000328
Eric Loefflad
While many international lawyers are familiar with Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546), very few have even heard of Paulus Vladimiri (1370–1435) – a Polish priest and jurist who made striking similar arguments to Vitoria on legal universality and the rights of non-Christians a full century before Vitoria. This divergence of consciousness, I argue, provides a unique opportunity to explore questions of canon, reception, and the role of ‘founding fathers’ within international legal thought. Centring Vladimiri as an ‘Eastern European’ figure, I argue that his non-reception is largely the result of how Eastern Europe implicitly functions as a distinctly liminal space within international legal thought that makes any possible ‘founding father’ from this region immensely difficult to imagine. I examine this dynamic through the differing postwar efforts of the Polish jurists Kazimierz Grzybowski and C. H. Alexandrowicz to include Vladimiri within the international legal canon. In examining the background structures of twentieth-century international law, I conclude that, in a manner directly connected to the liminality of Eastern Europe, neither Soviet nor Third World nor Western imaginations could easily receive Vladimiri within their fundamentally political narratives of normative order that shaped their international legal approaches. However, despite this historic non-reception, I argue that Vladimiri, and the question of Eastern Europe more generally, holds great promise in our current global moment. Particularly, engaging Eastern Europe’s liminal character offers a more sociologically grounded alternative to the reductionist Schmittian view of international law as a product of inescapable conflict in a world of exclusionary ‘greater spaces’.
{"title":"In search of Paulus Vladimiri: Canon, reception, and the (in)conceivability of an Eastern European ‘founding father’ of international law","authors":"Eric Loefflad","doi":"10.1017/s0922156523000328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0922156523000328","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 While many international lawyers are familiar with Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546), very few have even heard of Paulus Vladimiri (1370–1435) – a Polish priest and jurist who made striking similar arguments to Vitoria on legal universality and the rights of non-Christians a full century before Vitoria. This divergence of consciousness, I argue, provides a unique opportunity to explore questions of canon, reception, and the role of ‘founding fathers’ within international legal thought. Centring Vladimiri as an ‘Eastern European’ figure, I argue that his non-reception is largely the result of how Eastern Europe implicitly functions as a distinctly liminal space within international legal thought that makes any possible ‘founding father’ from this region immensely difficult to imagine. I examine this dynamic through the differing postwar efforts of the Polish jurists Kazimierz Grzybowski and C. H. Alexandrowicz to include Vladimiri within the international legal canon. In examining the background structures of twentieth-century international law, I conclude that, in a manner directly connected to the liminality of Eastern Europe, neither Soviet nor Third World nor Western imaginations could easily receive Vladimiri within their fundamentally political narratives of normative order that shaped their international legal approaches. However, despite this historic non-reception, I argue that Vladimiri, and the question of Eastern Europe more generally, holds great promise in our current global moment. Particularly, engaging Eastern Europe’s liminal character offers a more sociologically grounded alternative to the reductionist Schmittian view of international law as a product of inescapable conflict in a world of exclusionary ‘greater spaces’.","PeriodicalId":46816,"journal":{"name":"Leiden Journal of International Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43933477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：