Pub Date : 2024-06-20DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263324
Silje A Langvatn
This article assesses Frank I. Michelman’s constitution-centered and proceduralist interpretation of Rawls’ conception of political legitimacy and argues that it merits attention because it highlights the institutional aspects of Rawls’ understanding of political legitimacy for constitutional democracies. However, the article also questions Michelman’s interpretation of Rawls’ ‘liberal principle of legitimacy’ (LPL) and the later ‘idea of political legitimacy based on the criterion of reciprocity’ (ILBR). As Michelman rightly points out, for the exercise of political power to be legitimate in a constitutional democracy, it must be in accordance with a constitution that is itself legitimate or reasonably acceptable to free and equal citizens. Yet, the article argues that Rawls’ two legitimacy formulations are attempts to make an additional point: Namely that when democratic citizens exercise political power in ‘the fundamental political issues’, or in issues that shape the basic justice of society or the essentials of the constitution itself, they must respect the ideal of public reason – or ensure themselves and other citizens that their exercise of political power is in accordance with the underlying basic political-moral ideas of persons and society that make the constitution itself acceptable to them. The LPL and the ILBR are conceptions of political legitimacy, not in the sense of setting up a criterion for when a specific law is legitimate, but in the sense of outlining civic or “office-specific” constraints that citizens and public officials must put on their reasoning and exercise of political power in the fundamental political issues for the practice of a constitutional democracy to be legitimate, or well-ordered, reasonably just, and stable for the right reasons – in the long run. The article also discusses why Rawls saw the need to reformulate the LPL, and how the later ILBR assigns a new significance to citizens’ actual use of public reason and their intersubjective deliberation.
本文评估了弗兰克-米歇尔曼（Frank I. Michelman）对罗尔斯政治合法性概念的宪法中心主义和程序主义解释，并认为这种解释值得关注，因为它强调了罗尔斯对宪政民主国家政治合法性理解的制度方面。然而，文章也对米歇尔曼对罗尔斯的 "自由主义合法性原则"（LPL）以及后来的 "基于互惠标准的政治合法性思想"（ILBR）的解释提出了质疑。米歇尔曼正确地指出，在宪政民主中，政治权力的行使若要合法，就必须符合宪法，而宪法本身就是合法的，或者说是自由平等的公民可以合理接受的。然而，文章认为，罗尔斯的两种合法性表述都试图表达另外一个观点：也就是说，当民主公民在 "基本政治问题 "上行使政治权力时，或者在影响社会基本正义或宪法本身要义的问题上行使政治权力时，他们必须尊重公共理性的理想--或者确保他们自己和其他公民的政治权力的行使符合使宪法本身为他们所接受的基本的人与社会的政治道德观念。LPL和ILBR是关于政治合法性的概念，其意义不在于为具体法律何时合法设定标准，而在于概述公民或 "特定职位 "对公民和公职人员在基本政治问题上推理和行使政治权力所必须施加的约束，以使宪政民主的实践从长远来看是合法的，或者说是有序的、合理公正的和出于正确原因的稳定的。文章还讨论了罗尔斯为何认为有必要重新表述《公共理性原则》，以及后来的《国际公共理性原则》如何赋予公民实际运用公共理性及其主体间商议以新的意义。
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Pub Date : 2024-06-20DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263262
Frank I Michelman
This response to commentaries composing a symposium on my book ‘Constitutional Essentials: On the Constitutional Theory of Political Liberalism’ (2022) includes restatements of some major themes from the book, as prompted by thoughts from the commentators.
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Pub Date : 2024-04-15DOI: 10.1177/01914537241245739
Austin Cottrell
{"title":"Book Review: Toward a Critical Theory of Nature: Capital, Ecology and Dialectics","authors":"Austin Cottrell","doi":"10.1177/01914537241245739","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537241245739","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"124 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140602369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-12DOI: 10.1177/01914537241244824
Sarah Bufkin
Since its 2007 publication, Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice has sparked a vigorous conversation in analytic philosophy about how social power corrodes individual’s epistemic capacities and distorts collective meaning-making in unjust ways. Yet for all its normative insights into social silencing, I argue that Fricker’s theorization of epistemic dysfunction remains too individualized, cognitivist, and dematerialized to account for racialized imaginaries. Rather than view racisms as normal and normative in racist cultures, Fricker frames identity-driven prejudice as a troubling aberration from otherwise unblemished epistemic and moral norms. This leads her into adopting an overly voluntarist and idealist theory of social change that centres training better knowers rather than unmaking racialized worlds. Ultimately, I contend that we should return to a materialist theory of ideology, following the work of Stuart Hall. Doing so jettisons the narrow focus on individual epistemic failures and instead problematizes how certain social ideas consolidate and reproduce racial hierarchies.
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Pub Date : 2024-04-08DOI: 10.1177/01914537241244822
Jan-Werner Müller
Mass assembly on squares tends to be associated both with democracy and authoritarian as well as populist regimes (where assembly is connected to acclamation). The article elucidates the specific democratic functions of mass assembly, and how they can be facilitated both legally and spatially. In case of the former, it provides a critical analysis of indispensable core components of the right to assemble (which has recently been hollowed out in many jurisdictions); in matters of space, the article proposes characteristics of squares that might facilitate and represent different forms of democratic assembly (without claiming that such characteristics could ever guarantee democratic outcomes). Some recent empirical evidence for how squares have enabled the increasingly important phenomenon of “urban civic revolutions” is also discussed.
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Pub Date : 2024-04-05DOI: 10.1177/01914537241244820
Domonkos Sik
The article aims at elaborating a non-speculative concept of social pathology. In the first section, various conceptualizations (e.g. Habermas, Honneth) are critically revaluated. It is argued that (a) applying the originally medical concept of ‘pathology’ on social entities has untenable connotations (due to the lacking social equivalent of death); (b) grounding social pathology on the level of ‘social suffering’ is not in accordance with the actors’ horizon shaped by biomedical- and psy-discourses. To avoid these dead-ends, social pathologies are reinterpreted as structural distortions causing diseases or mental disorders. To refine this initial definition, in the second section, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of chiasm is used as an ontological framework translating between medical and social diagnoses. The proposed concept of social pathology refers to those patterns of disrupted pre-intentional, intentional and mediated intertwining, which manifest as ill or psychopathological chiasm. In the third section, two case studies are elaborated: the intersubjective structures of depressed and asthmatic chiasm. Finally, the implications for critical theory and praxis are overviewed.
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Pub Date : 2024-04-02DOI: 10.1177/01914537241238368
Joy Gordon
The notion of economic violence has long been recognized in the work of Johan Galtung and others. The work of Thomas Pogge and the field of global justice have addressed the impact of economic disparities between the Global North and the Global South, and their impact on human well-being, and social and economic development more broadly. Patents, publication in scholarly journals, academic collaborations, access to academic journals, and so forth do not on their face seem to be closely tied to indicators of human well-being. However, disparities in knowledge production, including access to academic resources and publication venues, are tied directly or indirectly to infrastructure, food security, health and mortality rates, employment, and gender equity.
{"title":"Violence, economic development, and knowledge production","authors":"Joy Gordon","doi":"10.1177/01914537241238368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537241238368","url":null,"abstract":"The notion of economic violence has long been recognized in the work of Johan Galtung and others. The work of Thomas Pogge and the field of global justice have addressed the impact of economic disparities between the Global North and the Global South, and their impact on human well-being, and social and economic development more broadly. Patents, publication in scholarly journals, academic collaborations, access to academic journals, and so forth do not on their face seem to be closely tied to indicators of human well-being. However, disparities in knowledge production, including access to academic resources and publication venues, are tied directly or indirectly to infrastructure, food security, health and mortality rates, employment, and gender equity.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140581779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-18DOI: 10.1177/01914537241241025
Riccardo Mario Cucciolla
In May 2023, Reset Dialogues on Civilizations organized the international conference ‘Nationalism, Nation-Building, and the Decline of Empires’ in Dublin. The purpose was to gather a group of historians, political scientists, theorists, philosophers, and experts who could grasp the significant trends, over the long term, in nationalism, nation-building, and imperial issues and could create a forum for dialogue that would compare different, and in many ways related, contexts, defining the challenges of the contemporary politics in the international scene.
{"title":"Introduction: Nationalism, nation-building, and the decline of empires","authors":"Riccardo Mario Cucciolla","doi":"10.1177/01914537241241025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537241241025","url":null,"abstract":"In May 2023, Reset Dialogues on Civilizations organized the international conference ‘Nationalism, Nation-Building, and the Decline of Empires’ in Dublin. The purpose was to gather a group of historians, political scientists, theorists, philosophers, and experts who could grasp the significant trends, over the long term, in nationalism, nation-building, and imperial issues and could create a forum for dialogue that would compare different, and in many ways related, contexts, defining the challenges of the contemporary politics in the international scene.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140165657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-16DOI: 10.1177/01914537241235571
Leonard D’Cruz
This article offers a novel reconstruction of Foucault’s methodology that emphasises his respect for the natural sciences. Foucault’s work has long been suspected of reducing knowledge to power, and thus collapsing into unconstrained relativism and methodological incoherence. These concerns are predicated on a misunderstanding of Foucault’s overall approach, which takes the form of a historico-critical project rather than a normative epistemology. However, Foucault does sometimes make normative epistemological judgements, especially about the human sciences. Furthermore, there are outstanding questions about what secures the descriptive rigour of the genealogical method. To address these issues, I develop two claims that will significantly enrich our understanding of Foucault’s methodology. The first is that Foucault’s respect for the natural sciences is crucial in making sense of his normative epistemological judgements. The second is that the descriptive rigour of his genealogical method derives from the fact it is modelled on empirical inquiry.
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