The paper examines the claim that a virtuous cycle of more secure land rights, more land-saving investments, and denser populations requires the development of institutions that regulate competition over land. We construct a contest model that links the tenure-security-investment relationship to the efforts of land users to enhance land rights themselves and the role of institutional protection. We study the effect of population growth on a close-to-subsistence economy, including the possibility that it weakens institutional protection. We derive sufficient conditions for a positive effect on land investment, but also show that population growth can push the economy into a low-productivity trap.
{"title":"Securing Land Rights under Rapid Population Growth: The Feasibility of Institutional Land Rights Protection in Africa","authors":"R. Haagsma, P. Mouche","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0024","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines the claim that a virtuous cycle of more secure land rights, more land-saving investments, and denser populations requires the development of institutions that regulate competition over land. We construct a contest model that links the tenure-security-investment relationship to the efforts of land users to enhance land rights themselves and the role of institutional protection. We study the effect of population growth on a close-to-subsistence economy, including the possibility that it weakens institutional protection. We derive sufficient conditions for a positive effect on land investment, but also show that population growth can push the economy into a low-productivity trap.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"24 1","pages":"312-350"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88242438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Multiple Causes and Stacked Inferences","authors":"U. Schweizer","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Variation with Risk-Averse Buyers and Demand Uncertainty","authors":"O. Gorelkina","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0022","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"41 1","pages":"204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79541561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Three Concepts of Probabilistic Causation in the Law","authors":"D. Canale","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"44 1","pages":"18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73919446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Voting Games: An Experimental Investigation","authors":"F. Bolle, Philipp E Otto","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0030","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"10 1","pages":"496"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73932938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper considers, in a principal-agent framework, whether or not providing interim performance evaluations is more efficient when agents can manipulate the very performance reports by which they are evaluated. Providing interim performance evaluation introduces possible dependence of subsequent strategies on interim reports. Such dependence, while alleviating previous-period incentive compatibility constraints, also increases the (expected) later-period performance manipulation costs. The first effect provides a risk-sharing benefit whereas the second effect increases the expected compensation cost to the agent (in utilities). Correspondingly, providing interim performance evaluation is better when the manager is sufficiently risk-averse so that the risk-reduction effect dominates.
{"title":"Are Interim Performance Evaluations Optimal when the Evaluations are Subject to Manipulation","authors":"Xu Jiang","doi":"10.1628/JITE-2021-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/JITE-2021-0006","url":null,"abstract":"The paper considers, in a principal-agent framework, whether or not providing interim performance evaluations is more efficient when agents can manipulate the very performance reports by which they are evaluated. Providing interim performance evaluation introduces possible dependence of subsequent strategies on interim reports. Such dependence, while alleviating previous-period incentive compatibility constraints, also increases the (expected) later-period performance manipulation costs. The first effect provides a risk-sharing benefit whereas the second effect increases the expected compensation cost to the agent (in utilities). Correspondingly, providing interim performance evaluation is better when the manager is sufficiently risk-averse so that the risk-reduction effect dominates.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"23 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82158588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To limit the loss of competitiveness when domestic firms are subject to stronger regulation than international competitors, a cap-and-trade policy can be associated either with partial grandfathering or with border adjustment. We compare the two policies from a domestic social-welfare point of view when distributional concerns matter. We exhibit the conditions under which these policies have to be implemented, and we show that exportside border adjustment welfare-dominates partial grandfathering. However, the former policy results in a higher profit in the export sector but both a lower consumer surplus and lower profits of domestic-market-oriented firms.
{"title":"Pollution Permit Market and International Trade-Exposed Sector: Differentiated Allocations versus Border Adjustment","authors":"M. Mougeot, Florence Naegelen","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0031","url":null,"abstract":"To limit the loss of competitiveness when domestic firms are subject to stronger regulation than international competitors, a cap-and-trade policy can be associated either with partial grandfathering or with border adjustment. We compare the two policies from a domestic social-welfare point of view when distributional concerns matter. We exhibit the conditions under which these policies have to be implemented, and we show that exportside border adjustment welfare-dominates partial grandfathering. However, the former policy results in a higher profit in the export sector but both a lower consumer surplus and lower profits of domestic-market-oriented firms.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"40 1","pages":"473"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85653602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes interdependences between optimal trade policy and preferred liability doctrine to assess infringement damages, when intellectual property rights are probabilistic, in a model of import competition between a foreign patentee and a domestic infringer. It shows two reversal results. First, a regime switch from protectionism to free trade reverses stakeholders' preferences over liability doctrines. Second, the optimal trade policy changes from an import tariff under the lost-profit rule to import subsidization under the unjust-enrichment rule, unless the patent is weak. It is found that free trade is not optimal, except for a few knife-edge cases.
{"title":"Probabilistic Patents, Alternative Damage Rules, and Optimal Tariffs","authors":"Apurva Dey, A. Kaushik, Rupayan Pal","doi":"10.1628/JITE-2020-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/JITE-2020-0001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes interdependences between optimal trade policy and preferred liability doctrine to assess infringement damages, when intellectual property rights are probabilistic, in a model of import competition between a foreign patentee and a domestic infringer. It shows two reversal results. First, a regime switch from protectionism to free trade reverses stakeholders' preferences over liability doctrines. Second, the optimal trade policy changes from an import tariff under the lost-profit rule to import subsidization under the unjust-enrichment rule, unless the patent is weak. It is found that free trade is not optimal, except for a few knife-edge cases.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"6 1","pages":"276-311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73241358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Multiple Causes and Stacked Inferences","authors":"F. Parisi","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Life you do Not Save: Reflections on the Causal Element in the Notion of a Decision's Consequences","authors":"J. Reiss","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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