Pub Date : 2022-04-11DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2062657
Maria Snegovaya, K. Petrov
ABSTRACT Recent studies of Putin-era elites have focused primarily on the role of siloviki. We bring the focus back to an analysis of the elite continuity within the Soviet regime. By compiling a dataset of the Putin-regime elites, we track their professional and family backgrounds to discover that the proportion of Putin-regime elites with Soviet nomenklatura origin (which comprised only 1–3% of the population during the Soviet period) constitutes approximately 60% of contemporary elites. Most have ties in the middle and lower, rather than the top, ranks of the nomenklatura. In addition, the share of those with nomenklatura backgrounds in Putin-era elites is significantly higher than the share of siloviki. These results reflect a noticeable continuity between the Soviet-era and Putin-regime elites 30 years after the transition. This often-ignored characteristic helps understand the absence of an elite split and a high degree of elite compliance with re-autocratization in Putin’s Russia.
{"title":"Long Soviet shadows: the nomenklatura ties of Putin elites","authors":"Maria Snegovaya, K. Petrov","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2062657","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2062657","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recent studies of Putin-era elites have focused primarily on the role of siloviki. We bring the focus back to an analysis of the elite continuity within the Soviet regime. By compiling a dataset of the Putin-regime elites, we track their professional and family backgrounds to discover that the proportion of Putin-regime elites with Soviet nomenklatura origin (which comprised only 1–3% of the population during the Soviet period) constitutes approximately 60% of contemporary elites. Most have ties in the middle and lower, rather than the top, ranks of the nomenklatura. In addition, the share of those with nomenklatura backgrounds in Putin-era elites is significantly higher than the share of siloviki. These results reflect a noticeable continuity between the Soviet-era and Putin-regime elites 30 years after the transition. This often-ignored characteristic helps understand the absence of an elite split and a high degree of elite compliance with re-autocratization in Putin’s Russia.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"38 1","pages":"329 - 348"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49451590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-07DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2061817
Pál Susánszky, Á. Kopper, F. T. Zsigo
ABSTRACT Recently several European countries shifted to illiberalism and made attempts to dominate the media and political narratives. The question we raise is how media populism in Hungary contributes to the buttressing of the regime by discrediting protests. We offer a four-level media analysis. First, we ask whether the pro-government media is characterized by so-called selection bias. Second, we focus on framingbias relying on ideas presented by the protest paradigm. Third, we highlight the tone of disdain that characterizes numerous pro-governmental utterances. Finally, we point out the significance of iconic frames. Contrary to our expectations, we found no selection bias, but there was a clear framing bias in pro-governmental media, which was made harsher by the derogatory tone of pro-governmental media and the dog-whistling produced by iconic frames. By identifying how media populism operates, our aim is to offer a way to grasp democratic backsliding by concentrating on the media.
{"title":"Media framing of political protests – reporting bias and the discrediting of political activism","authors":"Pál Susánszky, Á. Kopper, F. T. Zsigo","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2061817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2061817","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recently several European countries shifted to illiberalism and made attempts to dominate the media and political narratives. The question we raise is how media populism in Hungary contributes to the buttressing of the regime by discrediting protests. We offer a four-level media analysis. First, we ask whether the pro-government media is characterized by so-called selection bias. Second, we focus on framingbias relying on ideas presented by the protest paradigm. Third, we highlight the tone of disdain that characterizes numerous pro-governmental utterances. Finally, we point out the significance of iconic frames. Contrary to our expectations, we found no selection bias, but there was a clear framing bias in pro-governmental media, which was made harsher by the derogatory tone of pro-governmental media and the dog-whistling produced by iconic frames. By identifying how media populism operates, our aim is to offer a way to grasp democratic backsliding by concentrating on the media.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"38 1","pages":"312 - 328"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49111517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-28DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2035127
Thomas D. Sherlock
ABSTRACT The treatment of Jews by the state and society in Russia is an important measure of Russia’s civic and political character. The evidence presented in this paper indicates that Russian Jews now enjoy the greatest freedom from antisemitism in modern Russian history. The explanation for the decline of antisemitism is found in two categories: the political and the societal. At the level of “high politics,” the post-Soviet Russian state has abandoned Soviet policies that promoted or condoned the persecution and discrimination of Jews. This development was preceded and reinforced by the bottom-up growth in Russian society of a more tolerant attitude toward Jews. The first two sections of the paper explain the decline in antisemitism at elite and mass levels in Russia, underscoring mutually supportive institutional, political, and socio-cultural changes. The final part of the paper suggests that public expressions of antisemitism may re-emerge due to the weakening of the factors that have thus far restrained this prejudice.
{"title":"Antisemitism in Russia: evaluating its decline and potential resurgence","authors":"Thomas D. Sherlock","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2035127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2035127","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The treatment of Jews by the state and society in Russia is an important measure of Russia’s civic and political character. The evidence presented in this paper indicates that Russian Jews now enjoy the greatest freedom from antisemitism in modern Russian history. The explanation for the decline of antisemitism is found in two categories: the political and the societal. At the level of “high politics,” the post-Soviet Russian state has abandoned Soviet policies that promoted or condoned the persecution and discrimination of Jews. This development was preceded and reinforced by the bottom-up growth in Russian society of a more tolerant attitude toward Jews. The first two sections of the paper explain the decline in antisemitism at elite and mass levels in Russia, underscoring mutually supportive institutional, political, and socio-cultural changes. The final part of the paper suggests that public expressions of antisemitism may re-emerge due to the weakening of the factors that have thus far restrained this prejudice.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"38 1","pages":"175 - 205"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48182413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-04DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2030645
M. Wijermars, T. Lokot
ABSTRACT This paper examines the practices, performance, and perceptions of the messaging platform Telegram as an actor in the 2020 Belarus protests, using publicly available data from Telegram’s public statements, protest-related Telegram groups, and media coverage. Developing a novel conceptualization of platform actorness, we critically assess Telegram’s role in the protests and examine whether Telegram is seen as playing an active role in Belarusian contentious politics. We find that Telegram’s performance and practices drive citizens to form affective connections to the platform and to perceive Telegram as an ally in their struggle against repressions and digital censorship. Meanwhile, the Belarusian state uses Telegram’s aversion to censorship and content moderation to intervene in contentious politics by co-opting grassroots approaches and mimicking manipulative efforts of other authoritarian regimes. Our conceptual framework is applicable to post-Soviet authoritarian contexts, but can also serve as a useful heuristic for analyzing platform actorness in other regime types.
{"title":"Is Telegram a “harbinger of freedom”? The performance, practices, and perception of platforms as political actors in authoritarian states","authors":"M. Wijermars, T. Lokot","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2030645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2030645","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines the practices, performance, and perceptions of the messaging platform Telegram as an actor in the 2020 Belarus protests, using publicly available data from Telegram’s public statements, protest-related Telegram groups, and media coverage. Developing a novel conceptualization of platform actorness, we critically assess Telegram’s role in the protests and examine whether Telegram is seen as playing an active role in Belarusian contentious politics. We find that Telegram’s performance and practices drive citizens to form affective connections to the platform and to perceive Telegram as an ally in their struggle against repressions and digital censorship. Meanwhile, the Belarusian state uses Telegram’s aversion to censorship and content moderation to intervene in contentious politics by co-opting grassroots approaches and mimicking manipulative efforts of other authoritarian regimes. Our conceptual framework is applicable to post-Soviet authoritarian contexts, but can also serve as a useful heuristic for analyzing platform actorness in other regime types.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"38 1","pages":"125 - 145"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47395202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-04DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2030126
J. O’Loughlin, G. Toal
ABSTRACT Examining geopolitical orientations in a representative survey of Belarus in early 2020, we adopt a critical geopolitical perspective that highlights geopolitical cultures as fields of contestation and debate over a state’s identity, orientation, and enduring interests. We examine support among 1210 Belarusians to four foreign policy options for the country – neutrality as the best foreign policy, joining the European Union, staying in the Eurasian Economic Union, or developing close relations with both these organizations. We also analyze responses to where Belarus should be on an 11-point scale from aligned with the West to aligned with Russia. In early 2020, Belarusians indicated divided geopolitical preferences in the same way as other post-Soviet societies along demographic, ideological, and attitudinal cleavages. Lukashenka’s quarter-century dictatorship has left Belarus in a condition of nascent (geo)political polarization. The 2020 electoral crisis alone did not polarize Belarus; it was already a dividing polity.
{"title":"The geopolitical orientations of ordinary Belarusians: survey evidence from early 2020","authors":"J. O’Loughlin, G. Toal","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2030126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2030126","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Examining geopolitical orientations in a representative survey of Belarus in early 2020, we adopt a critical geopolitical perspective that highlights geopolitical cultures as fields of contestation and debate over a state’s identity, orientation, and enduring interests. We examine support among 1210 Belarusians to four foreign policy options for the country – neutrality as the best foreign policy, joining the European Union, staying in the Eurasian Economic Union, or developing close relations with both these organizations. We also analyze responses to where Belarus should be on an 11-point scale from aligned with the West to aligned with Russia. In early 2020, Belarusians indicated divided geopolitical preferences in the same way as other post-Soviet societies along demographic, ideological, and attitudinal cleavages. Lukashenka’s quarter-century dictatorship has left Belarus in a condition of nascent (geo)political polarization. The 2020 electoral crisis alone did not polarize Belarus; it was already a dividing polity.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"38 1","pages":"43 - 61"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47456029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2034134
O. Onuch, Gwendolyn Sasse
ABSTRACT Do geopolitical orientations distinguish anti-Lukashenka protesters from non-protesters in Belarus? Employing data from an original online protest survey among 18+year-old citizens of Belarus residing in the country (MOBILISE 2020, n= 17,174) fielded 18August2020–29January2021, this paper compares protesters (n = 11,719) to non-protesters (n = 5,455) to better understand the dispositions that distinguish them. First, our logistic regression analysis finds robust evidence of polarization along geopolitical lines (with protesters preferring apro-EU and an anti-Russia orientation). Second, we show that pro-EU foreign policy preferences of protesters are neither temporally determined nor driven by the crisis, and are thus foundational among the positions held by anti-regime protesters. Third, we find that pro-EU and anti-Russia attitudes align with liberal democratic dispositions. Our study calls for the more systematic integration of foreign policy preferences into the comparative study of mobilization.
{"title":"Anti-regime action and geopolitical polarization: understanding protester dispositions in Belarus","authors":"O. Onuch, Gwendolyn Sasse","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2034134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2034134","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Do geopolitical orientations distinguish anti-Lukashenka protesters from non-protesters in Belarus? Employing data from an original online protest survey among 18+year-old citizens of Belarus residing in the country (MOBILISE 2020, n= 17,174) fielded 18August2020–29January2021, this paper compares protesters (n = 11,719) to non-protesters (n = 5,455) to better understand the dispositions that distinguish them. First, our logistic regression analysis finds robust evidence of polarization along geopolitical lines (with protesters preferring apro-EU and an anti-Russia orientation). Second, we show that pro-EU foreign policy preferences of protesters are neither temporally determined nor driven by the crisis, and are thus foundational among the positions held by anti-regime protesters. Third, we find that pro-EU and anti-Russia attitudes align with liberal democratic dispositions. Our study calls for the more systematic integration of foreign policy preferences into the comparative study of mobilization.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"38 1","pages":"62 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44730767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-27DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2042138
O. Onuch, Gwendolyn Sasse
ABSTRACT His symposium employs established social science theory to frame and place into comparative perspective the case of Belarusian mass mobilization that began in August 2020. We not only argue and explain how this is a case of mass mobilization that occurred in a competitive authoritarian context, but also that is a far more “typical” example (rather than an outlier) of protest mobilization occurring in political repressive contexts. We propose both empirical and methodological guidance for the study and analysis of such cases, whilst warning against accepting initial reports of mass protest phenomena at face value. Examining how each study presented in this special issue makes a measured and innovative empirical and conceptual contribution, correcting or revisiting accepted “truths,” providing a new framing and/or analyzing original data. The case of Belarus before and after August 2020 underlines the importance and the empirical and ethical challenges of studying stability and change in public opinion and state-society relations in authoritarian settings.
{"title":"The Belarus crisis: people, protest, and political dispositions","authors":"O. Onuch, Gwendolyn Sasse","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2042138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2042138","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT His symposium employs established social science theory to frame and place into comparative perspective the case of Belarusian mass mobilization that began in August 2020. We not only argue and explain how this is a case of mass mobilization that occurred in a competitive authoritarian context, but also that is a far more “typical” example (rather than an outlier) of protest mobilization occurring in political repressive contexts. We propose both empirical and methodological guidance for the study and analysis of such cases, whilst warning against accepting initial reports of mass protest phenomena at face value. Examining how each study presented in this special issue makes a measured and innovative empirical and conceptual contribution, correcting or revisiting accepted “truths,” providing a new framing and/or analyzing original data. The case of Belarus before and after August 2020 underlines the importance and the empirical and ethical challenges of studying stability and change in public opinion and state-society relations in authoritarian settings.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"38 1","pages":"1 - 8"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46541774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-27DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2037196
Graeme B. Robertson
ABSTRACT Despite nationwide mass protests in August 2020, the regime of Aleksandr Lukashenka remains in power in Belarus. In this essay, I discuss three articles focusing on the origins of the protests, the role of social media platforms and the strategies and results of state repression. Together they provide new insights on the events in Belarus and deepen our understanding of contemporary urban revolutions.
{"title":"Protest, platforms, and the state in the Belarus crisis","authors":"Graeme B. Robertson","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2037196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2037196","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Despite nationwide mass protests in August 2020, the regime of Aleksandr Lukashenka remains in power in Belarus. In this essay, I discuss three articles focusing on the origins of the protests, the role of social media platforms and the strategies and results of state repression. Together they provide new insights on the events in Belarus and deepen our understanding of contemporary urban revolutions.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"38 1","pages":"146 - 149"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59722263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-25DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2034357
R. Kanet, Dina Moulioukova
ABSTRACT We track the major developments in Soviet-African relations as a prelude to recently revived Russian policy. Russian policy today is much less ideological than that of the Soviet Union and relies more on the establishment of mutually beneficial economic relations. Soviet/Russian policy in Africa over six decades has been motivated by more than by traditional security concerns. In the case of the former, the effort to encourage and speed up a global communist revolution, along with geopolitical competition with the US and the West were central. Now, although geopolitical competition remains an element of Russian policy, the major interest has been markets for exports and access to energy and minerals as part of the goal of re-establishing Russia as a major global power.
{"title":"Russia’s return to Africa: a renewed challenge to the West?","authors":"R. Kanet, Dina Moulioukova","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2034357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2034357","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We track the major developments in Soviet-African relations as a prelude to recently revived Russian policy. Russian policy today is much less ideological than that of the Soviet Union and relies more on the establishment of mutually beneficial economic relations. Soviet/Russian policy in Africa over six decades has been motivated by more than by traditional security concerns. In the case of the former, the effort to encourage and speed up a global communist revolution, along with geopolitical competition with the US and the West were central. Now, although geopolitical competition remains an element of Russian policy, the major interest has been markets for exports and access to energy and minerals as part of the goal of re-establishing Russia as a major global power.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"38 1","pages":"427 - 439"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42739083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-25DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2029034
Félix Krawatzek, J. Langbein
ABSTRACT For more than two decades a key pillar of regime stability in Belarus was legitimation through economic stability and security, prompting experts to speak of a “social contract” between the state and its citizens. The 2020 protests, however, convey significant dissatisfaction with the Lukashenka regime across a broad social and generational base. By comparing survey data from late 2020 with data from 2011 and 2018, we examine changing attitudes towards democracy and state involvement in economic affairs. We find a departure from paternalist values, implying an erosion of the value base for the previous social contract. Belarusian society has become more supportive of liberal political and economic values. This trend is particularly driven by the older generation and does not exclude Lukashenka’s support base. Meanwhile, attitudes towards democracy and the market have implications for people’s social and institutional trust, preference for democracy, and political participation.
{"title":"Attitudes towards democracy and the market in Belarus: what has changed and why it matters","authors":"Félix Krawatzek, J. Langbein","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2029034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2029034","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT For more than two decades a key pillar of regime stability in Belarus was legitimation through economic stability and security, prompting experts to speak of a “social contract” between the state and its citizens. The 2020 protests, however, convey significant dissatisfaction with the Lukashenka regime across a broad social and generational base. By comparing survey data from late 2020 with data from 2011 and 2018, we examine changing attitudes towards democracy and state involvement in economic affairs. We find a departure from paternalist values, implying an erosion of the value base for the previous social contract. Belarusian society has become more supportive of liberal political and economic values. This trend is particularly driven by the older generation and does not exclude Lukashenka’s support base. Meanwhile, attitudes towards democracy and the market have implications for people’s social and institutional trust, preference for democracy, and political participation.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"38 1","pages":"107 - 124"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41804312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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