Pub Date : 2022-11-15DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2143116
Max Schaub
ABSTRACT This paper presents the results of the first-ever representative survey on the demographic and attitudinal legacies of the Armenian genocide. The data, collected in 2018, maps the varied geographical origins of the citizens of contemporary Armenia and traces their links to the genocide. Around half of contemporary Armenians descend from refugees of the genocide, while about a third had family members killed. The data also inform debates on how violence transforms societies. Respondents who lost family members during the genocide show elevated levels of ethnocentrism, and lower levels of prosocial behaviour. However, rather than victimization being associated with militarism and hawkishness, the same individuals tend to be less supportive of military solutions. Even though the genocide took place more than a century ago, its demographic and attitudinal legacies remain clearly visible in contemporary Armenia.
{"title":"Demographic and attitudinal legacies of the Armenian genocide","authors":"Max Schaub","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2143116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2143116","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper presents the results of the first-ever representative survey on the demographic and attitudinal legacies of the Armenian genocide. The data, collected in 2018, maps the varied geographical origins of the citizens of contemporary Armenia and traces their links to the genocide. Around half of contemporary Armenians descend from refugees of the genocide, while about a third had family members killed. The data also inform debates on how violence transforms societies. Respondents who lost family members during the genocide show elevated levels of ethnocentrism, and lower levels of prosocial behaviour. However, rather than victimization being associated with militarism and hawkishness, the same individuals tend to be less supportive of military solutions. Even though the genocide took place more than a century ago, its demographic and attitudinal legacies remain clearly visible in contemporary Armenia.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42526765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-14DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2142427
Dina Rosenberg, Eugenia Tarnikova
ABSTRACT In this paper we study the effect of the internet and social media on government approval. On the one hand, the internet exposes people to independent information, which makes them possibly more critical of the government. On the other, many countries use the internet for propaganda, which might increase support for the government. We study these effects via the example of Russia. We utilize data from an existing survey: the resulting dataset contains data on 17,824 individual-level observations from 64 regions in Russia, 2010–2019. We find that more intensive internet use and access to social media are associated with a decrease in government approval. Yet, the influence of social media is more nuanced. The Russian-language homegrown network VKontakte increases public approval of the government. To partially account for self-selection bias, we use the propensity score matching method. Our results remain robust and allow us to make causal inferences.
{"title":"How the internet and social media reduce government approval: empirical evidence from Russian regions","authors":"Dina Rosenberg, Eugenia Tarnikova","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2142427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2142427","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper we study the effect of the internet and social media on government approval. On the one hand, the internet exposes people to independent information, which makes them possibly more critical of the government. On the other, many countries use the internet for propaganda, which might increase support for the government. We study these effects via the example of Russia. We utilize data from an existing survey: the resulting dataset contains data on 17,824 individual-level observations from 64 regions in Russia, 2010–2019. We find that more intensive internet use and access to social media are associated with a decrease in government approval. Yet, the influence of social media is more nuanced. The Russian-language homegrown network VKontakte increases public approval of the government. To partially account for self-selection bias, we use the propensity score matching method. Our results remain robust and allow us to make causal inferences.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44524162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-20DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2097458
J. Hagemejer, Joanna Tyrowicz
ABSTRACT We analyze the link between resource misallocation resulting from central planning and subsequent long-term economic growth under a market-based system. We construct two novel data sets for Poland. We show that misalignment of resources under central planning coincides with lower subsequent economic growth, despite the fact that market mechanisms are reinstated. This result is robust even three decades after the collapse of central planning. We provide several explanations for these patterns.
{"title":"Central planning casts long shadows: new evidence on misallocation and growth","authors":"J. Hagemejer, Joanna Tyrowicz","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2097458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2097458","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We analyze the link between resource misallocation resulting from central planning and subsequent long-term economic growth under a market-based system. We construct two novel data sets for Poland. We show that misalignment of resources under central planning coincides with lower subsequent economic growth, despite the fact that market mechanisms are reinstated. This result is robust even three decades after the collapse of central planning. We provide several explanations for these patterns.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48415883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-26DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2093030
Gilles Favarel-garrigues
ABSTRACT Lev Protiv presents itself as a “social project” intertwining civic involvement, moral policing, and entertaining YouTube content. Promoting a healthy lifestyle and claiming to defend innocent youth, Moscow vigilantes have patrolled public spaces since 2014 in search of people consuming alcohol or smoking, for the purpose of enforcing the law. However, their targets are not only drunkards and youth subculture, but also police who are reluctant to implement the law. Financially supported by the government for two years in 2014 and 2015, and earning money thanks to its YouTube channel, why is Lev Protiv’s vigilante activity, openly challenging state authority, tolerated in an authoritarian regime? Based on analysis of raid videos and ethnographic observation, this paper shows that Lev Protiv has imposed a particular form of police oversight from below, forcing law enforcement officers to act as vigilante auxiliaries, partially in line with the governmental management of civil society.
Lev Protiv将自己呈现为一个“社会项目”，它将公民参与、道德监管和YouTube娱乐内容交织在一起。自2014年以来，莫斯科的义务警员提倡健康的生活方式，并声称要保护无辜的年轻人，他们在公共场所巡逻，寻找喝酒或吸烟的人，以执行法律。然而，他们的目标不仅是酗酒者和青少年亚文化，还有不愿执行法律的警察。在2014年和2015年的两年里，他得到了政府的财政支持，并通过其YouTube频道赚钱，为什么列夫普罗蒂夫公开挑战国家权威的义务警察活动在威权政权中被容忍?基于对突袭录像的分析和民族志观察，本文表明列夫普罗提夫从下而上实施了一种特殊形式的警察监督，迫使执法人员充当义务警员的辅助人员，这在一定程度上符合政府对公民社会的管理。
{"title":"“You’re a disgrace to the uniform!” Lev Protiv’s challenge to the police in Moscow streets and on YouTube","authors":"Gilles Favarel-garrigues","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2093030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2093030","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Lev Protiv presents itself as a “social project” intertwining civic involvement, moral policing, and entertaining YouTube content. Promoting a healthy lifestyle and claiming to defend innocent youth, Moscow vigilantes have patrolled public spaces since 2014 in search of people consuming alcohol or smoking, for the purpose of enforcing the law. However, their targets are not only drunkards and youth subculture, but also police who are reluctant to implement the law. Financially supported by the government for two years in 2014 and 2015, and earning money thanks to its YouTube channel, why is Lev Protiv’s vigilante activity, openly challenging state authority, tolerated in an authoritarian regime? Based on analysis of raid videos and ethnographic observation, this paper shows that Lev Protiv has imposed a particular form of police oversight from below, forcing law enforcement officers to act as vigilante auxiliaries, partially in line with the governmental management of civil society.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48188217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-06DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2082823
K. Ash, Miroslav Shapovalov
ABSTRACT Volodymyr Zelensky and his party Sluha Narodu won Ukraine’s 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections after espousing populist rhetoric. Yet their brand of populism diverged from the far left, the far right, and the center. We propose that Zelensky and Sluha Narodu campaigned as “anti-polarization” populists, drawing on opposition to pre-existing polarization in the Ukrainian political establishment while capitalizing on weak party identification among Ukrainian voters. We utilize electoral results, data from a survey carried out immediately prior to the 2019 parliamentary elections, and interviews to identify Sluha Narodu’s sources of support. We find Sluha Narodu’s supporters were more likely to hold moderately strong or neutral opinions on key issues in Ukrainian politics and to mix both the Russian and Ukrainian languages in their daily lives. Interviews suggest these voters valued character in choosing Sluha Narodu over what were conventionally understood to be salient issues in Ukrainian politics.
{"title":"Populism for the ambivalent: anti-polarization and support for Ukraine’s Sluha Narodu party","authors":"K. Ash, Miroslav Shapovalov","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2082823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2082823","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Volodymyr Zelensky and his party Sluha Narodu won Ukraine’s 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections after espousing populist rhetoric. Yet their brand of populism diverged from the far left, the far right, and the center. We propose that Zelensky and Sluha Narodu campaigned as “anti-polarization” populists, drawing on opposition to pre-existing polarization in the Ukrainian political establishment while capitalizing on weak party identification among Ukrainian voters. We utilize electoral results, data from a survey carried out immediately prior to the 2019 parliamentary elections, and interviews to identify Sluha Narodu’s sources of support. We find Sluha Narodu’s supporters were more likely to hold moderately strong or neutral opinions on key issues in Ukrainian politics and to mix both the Russian and Ukrainian languages in their daily lives. Interviews suggest these voters valued character in choosing Sluha Narodu over what were conventionally understood to be salient issues in Ukrainian politics.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43912725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-03DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2084280
Joanna Szostek, Dariya Orlova
ABSTRACT This article investigates and compares how people in diverse peripheral regions of Ukraine understood democracy, their role as citizens in a democracy, and the meaning of “good citizenship” in 2021, the year before Russia’s full-scale invasion. We conduct thematic analysis of focus group discussions to demonstrate gaps and inconsistencies in the understandings of democracy articulated by our participants. We find that a utopian understanding of democracy is common, in which authorities are expected to “listen to the people” and keep them satisfied, but the need for government to manage conflicting interests is not recognized. Understandings of good citizenship are inclusive and pro-social, but mostly detached from institutional politics. We observe similarity across regions in how democracy is understood in the abstract. However, the meaning ascribed to democracy often varied when discussion moved from the abstract to particular country examples – a finding relevant beyond the Ukrainian case, for survey-based research on public understandings of democracy more generally.
{"title":"Understandings of democracy and “good citizenship” in Ukraine: utopia for the people, participation in politics not required","authors":"Joanna Szostek, Dariya Orlova","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2084280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2084280","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article investigates and compares how people in diverse peripheral regions of Ukraine understood democracy, their role as citizens in a democracy, and the meaning of “good citizenship” in 2021, the year before Russia’s full-scale invasion. We conduct thematic analysis of focus group discussions to demonstrate gaps and inconsistencies in the understandings of democracy articulated by our participants. We find that a utopian understanding of democracy is common, in which authorities are expected to “listen to the people” and keep them satisfied, but the need for government to manage conflicting interests is not recognized. Understandings of good citizenship are inclusive and pro-social, but mostly detached from institutional politics. We observe similarity across regions in how democracy is understood in the abstract. However, the meaning ascribed to democracy often varied when discussion moved from the abstract to particular country examples – a finding relevant beyond the Ukrainian case, for survey-based research on public understandings of democracy more generally.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42630503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-16DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2077060
Diana T. Kudaibergenova, M. Laruelle
ABSTRACT In January 2022 mass protests spread quickly across the whole of Kazakhstan, becoming the largest mass mobilization in the country’s modern history. We analyze these mass protests through the framework of regime-society relations, arguing that a ey failure of the regime built by Nazarbayev is the inability to reconcile its neoliberal prosperity rhetoric with citizens’ calls for a welfare state. We then explore how a tradition of protests has been developing since 2011 and address the structural components of regime (in)stability and how they contributed to violence in the protests.
{"title":"Making sense of the January 2022 protests in Kazakhstan: failing legitimacy, culture of protests, and elite readjustments","authors":"Diana T. Kudaibergenova, M. Laruelle","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2077060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2077060","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In January 2022 mass protests spread quickly across the whole of Kazakhstan, becoming the largest mass mobilization in the country’s modern history. We analyze these mass protests through the framework of regime-society relations, arguing that a ey failure of the regime built by Nazarbayev is the inability to reconcile its neoliberal prosperity rhetoric with citizens’ calls for a welfare state. We then explore how a tradition of protests has been developing since 2011 and address the structural components of regime (in)stability and how they contributed to violence in the protests.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48013164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-27DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2063633
Marina Zaloznaya, Jennifer L. Glanville, W. Reisinger
ABSTRACT While corruption of different types has been shown to lower popular political trust in democratic regimes, evidence from non-democracies remains inconsistent. In some post-Soviet countries, for instance, widespread bribery and nepotism in the government co-exist with enduring popularity of top political leadership. Drawing on an unusually nuanced dataset from Russia (N = 2,350), we show that, in general, encounters with corruption in the public sector are associated with citizens’ lower trust of their government. At the same time, we theorize two caveats that attenuate this relationship, contributing to inconsistent findings in previous studies. First, we find that the negative association between corruption and political trust is significantly weaker when such corruption is beneficial to ordinary people. Second, citizens tend to “penalize” local rather than central government officials, which, we argue, is a result of top leaders’ ability to manipulate public discourse around corruption.
{"title":"Explaining Putin’s impunity: public sector corruption and political trust in Russia","authors":"Marina Zaloznaya, Jennifer L. Glanville, W. Reisinger","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2063633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2063633","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT While corruption of different types has been shown to lower popular political trust in democratic regimes, evidence from non-democracies remains inconsistent. In some post-Soviet countries, for instance, widespread bribery and nepotism in the government co-exist with enduring popularity of top political leadership. Drawing on an unusually nuanced dataset from Russia (N = 2,350), we show that, in general, encounters with corruption in the public sector are associated with citizens’ lower trust of their government. At the same time, we theorize two caveats that attenuate this relationship, contributing to inconsistent findings in previous studies. First, we find that the negative association between corruption and political trust is significantly weaker when such corruption is beneficial to ordinary people. Second, citizens tend to “penalize” local rather than central government officials, which, we argue, is a result of top leaders’ ability to manipulate public discourse around corruption.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41500153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-11DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2062657
Maria Snegovaya, K. Petrov
ABSTRACT Recent studies of Putin-era elites have focused primarily on the role of siloviki. We bring the focus back to an analysis of the elite continuity within the Soviet regime. By compiling a dataset of the Putin-regime elites, we track their professional and family backgrounds to discover that the proportion of Putin-regime elites with Soviet nomenklatura origin (which comprised only 1–3% of the population during the Soviet period) constitutes approximately 60% of contemporary elites. Most have ties in the middle and lower, rather than the top, ranks of the nomenklatura. In addition, the share of those with nomenklatura backgrounds in Putin-era elites is significantly higher than the share of siloviki. These results reflect a noticeable continuity between the Soviet-era and Putin-regime elites 30 years after the transition. This often-ignored characteristic helps understand the absence of an elite split and a high degree of elite compliance with re-autocratization in Putin’s Russia.
{"title":"Long Soviet shadows: the nomenklatura ties of Putin elites","authors":"Maria Snegovaya, K. Petrov","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2062657","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2062657","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recent studies of Putin-era elites have focused primarily on the role of siloviki. We bring the focus back to an analysis of the elite continuity within the Soviet regime. By compiling a dataset of the Putin-regime elites, we track their professional and family backgrounds to discover that the proportion of Putin-regime elites with Soviet nomenklatura origin (which comprised only 1–3% of the population during the Soviet period) constitutes approximately 60% of contemporary elites. Most have ties in the middle and lower, rather than the top, ranks of the nomenklatura. In addition, the share of those with nomenklatura backgrounds in Putin-era elites is significantly higher than the share of siloviki. These results reflect a noticeable continuity between the Soviet-era and Putin-regime elites 30 years after the transition. This often-ignored characteristic helps understand the absence of an elite split and a high degree of elite compliance with re-autocratization in Putin’s Russia.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49451590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-07DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2061817
Pál Susánszky, Á. Kopper, F. T. Zsigo
ABSTRACT Recently several European countries shifted to illiberalism and made attempts to dominate the media and political narratives. The question we raise is how media populism in Hungary contributes to the buttressing of the regime by discrediting protests. We offer a four-level media analysis. First, we ask whether the pro-government media is characterized by so-called selection bias. Second, we focus on framingbias relying on ideas presented by the protest paradigm. Third, we highlight the tone of disdain that characterizes numerous pro-governmental utterances. Finally, we point out the significance of iconic frames. Contrary to our expectations, we found no selection bias, but there was a clear framing bias in pro-governmental media, which was made harsher by the derogatory tone of pro-governmental media and the dog-whistling produced by iconic frames. By identifying how media populism operates, our aim is to offer a way to grasp democratic backsliding by concentrating on the media.
{"title":"Media framing of political protests – reporting bias and the discrediting of political activism","authors":"Pál Susánszky, Á. Kopper, F. T. Zsigo","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2061817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2061817","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recently several European countries shifted to illiberalism and made attempts to dominate the media and political narratives. The question we raise is how media populism in Hungary contributes to the buttressing of the regime by discrediting protests. We offer a four-level media analysis. First, we ask whether the pro-government media is characterized by so-called selection bias. Second, we focus on framingbias relying on ideas presented by the protest paradigm. Third, we highlight the tone of disdain that characterizes numerous pro-governmental utterances. Finally, we point out the significance of iconic frames. Contrary to our expectations, we found no selection bias, but there was a clear framing bias in pro-governmental media, which was made harsher by the derogatory tone of pro-governmental media and the dog-whistling produced by iconic frames. By identifying how media populism operates, our aim is to offer a way to grasp democratic backsliding by concentrating on the media.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49111517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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