Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2023.2217636
M. Kragh, Andreas Umland
ABSTRACT This essay adds to previous research of Putinism an investigation of the political thought and foreign outlooks of Russia’s Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev and Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Sergei Naryshkin, with a focus on their statements between 2006 to 2020. The paper outlines Patrushev’s and Naryshkin’s thoughts regarding the United States, Ukraine, and the idea of multipolarity/polycentrism. We then introduce Patrushev’s critique of liberal values and color revolutions, and Naryshkin’s statements on the memory of World War II and Western institutions. The salience of these altogether seven topics is interpreted with reference to three classical topoi in Russian political thought: the Slavophile vs. Westerners controversy, the single-stream theory, and the civilizational paradigm. Our conclusions inform the ongoing debate on whether to conceptualize Putinism as either an ideology or a mentality.
{"title":"Putinism beyond Putin: the political ideas of Nikolai Patrushev and Sergei Naryshkin in 2006–20","authors":"M. Kragh, Andreas Umland","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2023.2217636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2023.2217636","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This essay adds to previous research of Putinism an investigation of the political thought and foreign outlooks of Russia’s Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev and Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Sergei Naryshkin, with a focus on their statements between 2006 to 2020. The paper outlines Patrushev’s and Naryshkin’s thoughts regarding the United States, Ukraine, and the idea of multipolarity/polycentrism. We then introduce Patrushev’s critique of liberal values and color revolutions, and Naryshkin’s statements on the memory of World War II and Western institutions. The salience of these altogether seven topics is interpreted with reference to three classical topoi in Russian political thought: the Slavophile vs. Westerners controversy, the single-stream theory, and the civilizational paradigm. Our conclusions inform the ongoing debate on whether to conceptualize Putinism as either an ideology or a mentality.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"366 - 389"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42097102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-19DOI: 10.1080/1060586x.2023.2215688
Zuzana Fungáčová, Alexei Karas, Laura Solanko, Laurent Weill
Russia has witnessed a high number of bank failures over the last two decades. Using monthly data for 2002–2020, spanning four election cycles (2004, 2008, 2012, 2018), we test the hypothesis that bank failures are less likely before presidential elections. We find that, in general, bank failures are less likely to occur in the 12 months leading up to an election. However, we do not observe that bank failures during electoral cycles are more pronounced for banks associated with greater political costs (financial troubles) than for other reasons (illegal activities). Overall, our results provide mixed evidence that political cycles matter for the occurrence of bank failures in Russia.
{"title":"The politics of bank failures in Russia","authors":"Zuzana Fungáčová, Alexei Karas, Laura Solanko, Laurent Weill","doi":"10.1080/1060586x.2023.2215688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2023.2215688","url":null,"abstract":"Russia has witnessed a high number of bank failures over the last two decades. Using monthly data for 2002–2020, spanning four election cycles (2004, 2008, 2012, 2018), we test the hypothesis that bank failures are less likely before presidential elections. We find that, in general, bank failures are less likely to occur in the 12 months leading up to an election. However, we do not observe that bank failures during electoral cycles are more pronounced for banks associated with greater political costs (financial troubles) than for other reasons (illegal activities). Overall, our results provide mixed evidence that political cycles matter for the occurrence of bank failures in Russia.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135574450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-13DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2023.2212530
Mikhail Alexeev, W. Pyle
ABSTRACT Much of the literature on patriotic sentiment in post-Soviet Russia leans on public opinion surveys administered exclusively to Russian citizens. Absent a comparison group, such evidence, while helpful, can leave one adrift in trying to assess the meaning of a particular polling result. Drawing on multiple waves of from the International Social Survey Program and the World Values Survey, we benchmark Russians’ patriotic sentiment to that of citizens in a diverse group of middle- and high-income countries. This exercise highlights that while Russians are not unusual in the degree to which they have a benign attachment to and/or pride in their country, they stand out for espousing a patriotism that has remained consistently blind and militant since at least the mid-1990s. We speculate as to the underlying cause and highlight a potential consequence: the nature of Russian patriotism has lowered the cost to the Russian leadership of military aggression.
{"title":"A blind and militant attachment: Russian patriotism in comparative perspective","authors":"Mikhail Alexeev, W. Pyle","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2023.2212530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2023.2212530","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Much of the literature on patriotic sentiment in post-Soviet Russia leans on public opinion surveys administered exclusively to Russian citizens. Absent a comparison group, such evidence, while helpful, can leave one adrift in trying to assess the meaning of a particular polling result. Drawing on multiple waves of from the International Social Survey Program and the World Values Survey, we benchmark Russians’ patriotic sentiment to that of citizens in a diverse group of middle- and high-income countries. This exercise highlights that while Russians are not unusual in the degree to which they have a benign attachment to and/or pride in their country, they stand out for espousing a patriotism that has remained consistently blind and militant since at least the mid-1990s. We speculate as to the underlying cause and highlight a potential consequence: the nature of Russian patriotism has lowered the cost to the Russian leadership of military aggression.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"309 - 328"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48116732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-26DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2023.2202581
Vera Tolz, S. Hutchings
ABSTRACT This article offers a qualitative analysis of how, by adopting identity-related discourses whose meanings resonate within a given culture, Russian state propaganda strives to bolster “the truth status” of its Ukraine war claims. These discourses, we argue, have long historical lineages and thus are expected to be familiar to audiences. We identify three such discourses common in many contexts but with specific resonances in Russia, those of colonialism/decolonization, imperialism, and the imaginary West. The article demonstrates that these same discourses also inform war-related coverage in Russophone oppositional media. Russian state-affiliated and oppositional actors further share “floating signifiers,” particularly “the Russian people,” “historical Russia,” “the Russian world,” “Ukraine,” “fascism/Nazism,” and “genocide,” while according them radically different meanings. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of studying how state propaganda works at the level of discourses, and the acutely dialogical processes by which disinformation and counter-disinformation efforts are produced and consumed.
{"title":"Truth with a Z: disinformation, war in Ukraine, and Russia’s contradictory discourse of imperial identity","authors":"Vera Tolz, S. Hutchings","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2023.2202581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2023.2202581","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article offers a qualitative analysis of how, by adopting identity-related discourses whose meanings resonate within a given culture, Russian state propaganda strives to bolster “the truth status” of its Ukraine war claims. These discourses, we argue, have long historical lineages and thus are expected to be familiar to audiences. We identify three such discourses common in many contexts but with specific resonances in Russia, those of colonialism/decolonization, imperialism, and the imaginary West. The article demonstrates that these same discourses also inform war-related coverage in Russophone oppositional media. Russian state-affiliated and oppositional actors further share “floating signifiers,” particularly “the Russian people,” “historical Russia,” “the Russian world,” “Ukraine,” “fascism/Nazism,” and “genocide,” while according them radically different meanings. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of studying how state propaganda works at the level of discourses, and the acutely dialogical processes by which disinformation and counter-disinformation efforts are produced and consumed.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"347 - 365"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43717882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2023.2187195
Timothy Frye, Scott Gehlbach, Kyle L. Marquardt, O. J. Reuter
ABSTRACT Opinion polls suggest that Vladimir Putin has broad support in Russia, but there are concerns that some respondents may be lying to pollsters. Using list experiments, we revisit our earlier work on support for Putin to explore his popularity between late 2020 and mid-2022. Our findings paint an ambiguous portrait. A naive interpretation of our estimates implies that Putin was 10 to 20 percentage points less popular than opinion polls suggest. However, results from placebo experiments demonstrate that these estimates are likely subject to artificial deflation – a design effect that produces downward bias in estimates from list experiments. Although we cannot be definitive, on balance our results are consistent with the conclusion that Putin is roughly as popular as opinion polls suggest. Methodologically, our research highlights artificial deflation as a key limitation of list experiments and the importance of placebo lists as a tool to diagnose this problem.
{"title":"Is Putin’s popularity (still) real? A cautionary note on using list experiments to measure popularity in authoritarian regimes","authors":"Timothy Frye, Scott Gehlbach, Kyle L. Marquardt, O. J. Reuter","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2023.2187195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2023.2187195","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Opinion polls suggest that Vladimir Putin has broad support in Russia, but there are concerns that some respondents may be lying to pollsters. Using list experiments, we revisit our earlier work on support for Putin to explore his popularity between late 2020 and mid-2022. Our findings paint an ambiguous portrait. A naive interpretation of our estimates implies that Putin was 10 to 20 percentage points less popular than opinion polls suggest. However, results from placebo experiments demonstrate that these estimates are likely subject to artificial deflation – a design effect that produces downward bias in estimates from list experiments. Although we cannot be definitive, on balance our results are consistent with the conclusion that Putin is roughly as popular as opinion polls suggest. Methodologically, our research highlights artificial deflation as a key limitation of list experiments and the importance of placebo lists as a tool to diagnose this problem.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"213 - 222"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46330693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-02DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2023.2170153
Kristin M. Bakke, Kit Rickard, J. O’Loughlin
ABSTRACT Honing in on how citizens in the former Soviet Union find themselves in an information competition over their own past, this paper explores whether and why ordinary people’s perceptions of historical events and figures in their country’s past are in line with a Russian-promoted narrative that highlights World War II – known as the “Great Patriotic War” in Russia and some former Soviet states – as a glorious Soviet victory and Stalin as a great leader. We draw on comparative survey data across six states and one de facto state in 2019–2020 to examine whether geopolitical or cultural proximity to Russia is associated with a more favourable view on a Russian-promoted narrative about the past. We find that closer geopolitical proximity to Russia is associated with perceiving the past in line with the Russian-promoted narrative, though the findings are less consistent when it comes to measures for closer cultural proximity.
{"title":"Perceptions of the past in the post-Soviet space","authors":"Kristin M. Bakke, Kit Rickard, J. O’Loughlin","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2023.2170153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2023.2170153","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Honing in on how citizens in the former Soviet Union find themselves in an information competition over their own past, this paper explores whether and why ordinary people’s perceptions of historical events and figures in their country’s past are in line with a Russian-promoted narrative that highlights World War II – known as the “Great Patriotic War” in Russia and some former Soviet states – as a glorious Soviet victory and Stalin as a great leader. We draw on comparative survey data across six states and one de facto state in 2019–2020 to examine whether geopolitical or cultural proximity to Russia is associated with a more favourable view on a Russian-promoted narrative about the past. We find that closer geopolitical proximity to Russia is associated with perceiving the past in line with the Russian-promoted narrative, though the findings are less consistent when it comes to measures for closer cultural proximity.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"223 - 256"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47728365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-28DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2023.2183698
K. Chmel, A. Klimova, Nikita Savin
ABSTRACT The spread of COVID-19 sparked debates about whether incumbents should focus on saving lives or the economy. Politicians’ decisions in this dilemma could determine whether they remain in office. “Saving the economy” is predicted to affect re-election chances positively in economic voting theory. However, a public health crisis can shift the electorate’s preferences in favor of expanding healthcare support at the cost of the economy. We examine whether there is a trade-off between “saving lives” and “saving the economy” for the incumbent in receiving higher political support. Based on two experiments conducted in Russia, we measure if individuals are more likely to support, vote for, and extend the power of the incumbent based on their policies. Although both experimental factors encouraged support, the economy-driven policy had a larger effect on voting than the healthcare-driven one.
{"title":"Saving lives or saving the economy? Support for the incumbent during the COVID-19 pandemic in Russia","authors":"K. Chmel, A. Klimova, Nikita Savin","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2023.2183698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2023.2183698","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The spread of COVID-19 sparked debates about whether incumbents should focus on saving lives or the economy. Politicians’ decisions in this dilemma could determine whether they remain in office. “Saving the economy” is predicted to affect re-election chances positively in economic voting theory. However, a public health crisis can shift the electorate’s preferences in favor of expanding healthcare support at the cost of the economy. We examine whether there is a trade-off between “saving lives” and “saving the economy” for the incumbent in receiving higher political support. Based on two experiments conducted in Russia, we measure if individuals are more likely to support, vote for, and extend the power of the incumbent based on their policies. Although both experimental factors encouraged support, the economy-driven policy had a larger effect on voting than the healthcare-driven one.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"291 - 307"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44260020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-08DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2023.2172945
Paul Chaisty, S. Whitefield
ABSTRACT Electoral authoritarian political systems have a hybrid nature, possessing very significant authoritarian features alongside elections that can produce openings for political change. The risks that elections pose to regimes are diminished if they can build winning coalitions involving voters beyond their core of loyal support. This paper considers how the construction of voter coalitions might be conceptualized in the Russian electoral authoritarian context, with reference to the case of the 2020 vote on constitutional reform, which was conducted with the primary aim of extending President Vladimir Putin’s term in office. Using data from a national survey of Russians conducted immediately after the vote, our analysis indicates that the regime’s success, even taking into account allegations of widespread fraud, was the result of its offer of additional constitutional amendments that were able to target voters beyond Putin’s core support.
{"title":"Building voting coalitions in electoral authoritarian regimes: a case study of the 2020 constitutional reform in Russia","authors":"Paul Chaisty, S. Whitefield","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2023.2172945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2023.2172945","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Electoral authoritarian political systems have a hybrid nature, possessing very significant authoritarian features alongside elections that can produce openings for political change. The risks that elections pose to regimes are diminished if they can build winning coalitions involving voters beyond their core of loyal support. This paper considers how the construction of voter coalitions might be conceptualized in the Russian electoral authoritarian context, with reference to the case of the 2020 vote on constitutional reform, which was conducted with the primary aim of extending President Vladimir Putin’s term in office. Using data from a national survey of Russians conducted immediately after the vote, our analysis indicates that the regime’s success, even taking into account allegations of widespread fraud, was the result of its offer of additional constitutional amendments that were able to target voters beyond Putin’s core support.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"273 - 290"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42405255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-21DOI: 10.1080/1060586x.2022.2164450
M. Zavadskaya, Theodore P. Gerber
ABSTRACT In this essay, we first briefly recount the post-Soviet history of social science in Russia, with particular attention to the role of international collaborations in spurring its growth, and we review the accelerating attacks on university autonomy and international collaborations that preceded Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine in February 2022. Then we consider developments since the February 2022 invasion that, in our view, signal the demise of academic freedom. We consider how Russia-based social scientists have negotiated the mounting challenges to the practice of their craft. We draw on interviews with Russian and American social scientists involved in international collaborations conducted in summer 2021 and interviews with Russian social scientists carried out in spring and summer 2022, as well as scholarly and journalistic accounts of developments within Russian universities and research institutes.
{"title":"Rise and fall: social science in Russia before and after the war","authors":"M. Zavadskaya, Theodore P. Gerber","doi":"10.1080/1060586x.2022.2164450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2022.2164450","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this essay, we first briefly recount the post-Soviet history of social science in Russia, with particular attention to the role of international collaborations in spurring its growth, and we review the accelerating attacks on university autonomy and international collaborations that preceded Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine in February 2022. Then we consider developments since the February 2022 invasion that, in our view, signal the demise of academic freedom. We consider how Russia-based social scientists have negotiated the mounting challenges to the practice of their craft. We draw on interviews with Russian and American social scientists involved in international collaborations conducted in summer 2021 and interviews with Russian social scientists carried out in spring and summer 2022, as well as scholarly and journalistic accounts of developments within Russian universities and research institutes.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"108 - 120"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44174211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2162758
Alexander Lanoszka, Jordan Becker
ABSTRACT What sort of military assistance has Ukraine received to date from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members since 2014? What has driven NATO allies’ decisions to provide military assistance to Ukraine? This essay addresses both questions. It offers a preliminary examination of how strategic, economic, and risk considerations might have shaped NATO members’ decisions regarding arms transfers to Ukraine, a country that remains outside of the Alliance but nevertheless is an Enhanced Opportunities Partner. Using both a qualitative analysis of post-2014 assistance and a purpose-built dataset combining military aid to Ukraine since late January 2022, we find that prior strategic preparation in the form of investments in military readiness and infrastructure is strongly associated with military aid to Ukraine. Economic considerations and prominent risk factors such as fossil fuel dependency thus far have not.
{"title":"The art of partial commitment: the politics of military assistance to Ukraine","authors":"Alexander Lanoszka, Jordan Becker","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2162758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2162758","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What sort of military assistance has Ukraine received to date from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members since 2014? What has driven NATO allies’ decisions to provide military assistance to Ukraine? This essay addresses both questions. It offers a preliminary examination of how strategic, economic, and risk considerations might have shaped NATO members’ decisions regarding arms transfers to Ukraine, a country that remains outside of the Alliance but nevertheless is an Enhanced Opportunities Partner. Using both a qualitative analysis of post-2014 assistance and a purpose-built dataset combining military aid to Ukraine since late January 2022, we find that prior strategic preparation in the form of investments in military readiness and infrastructure is strongly associated with military aid to Ukraine. Economic considerations and prominent risk factors such as fossil fuel dependency thus far have not.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"173 - 194"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46545421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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