Pub Date : 2021-09-03DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1966216
Jardar Østbø
ABSTRACT The article identifies a new model for Russia’s modernization emerging among the “systemic liberals.” Offering politically neutral technological fixes, this model cannot be understood within the traditional democracy/authoritarianism dichotomy. Expanding on Shoshana Zuboff’s theory, the author calls the model hybrid surveillance capitalism. The case study is the transition of Sberbank to a tech company. Sberbank/Sber aims to be the main modernizing force leading Russia to a better future. The author “reverse engineers” Sber's modernization model by analyzing what the company actually does and how it frames its actions. A commercial company, but with state support and majority ownership, Sber competes with the state and even performs de facto state functions. Its search for profits and influence leads not only to an ever-increasing collection of data that are used to modify people’s behavior, leaving an ever-shrinking space for individual agency and even politics, but also to a new model of governance.
{"title":"Hybrid surveillance capitalism: Sber’s model for Russia’s modernization","authors":"Jardar Østbø","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1966216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1966216","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article identifies a new model for Russia’s modernization emerging among the “systemic liberals.” Offering politically neutral technological fixes, this model cannot be understood within the traditional democracy/authoritarianism dichotomy. Expanding on Shoshana Zuboff’s theory, the author calls the model hybrid surveillance capitalism. The case study is the transition of Sberbank to a tech company. Sberbank/Sber aims to be the main modernizing force leading Russia to a better future. The author “reverse engineers” Sber's modernization model by analyzing what the company actually does and how it frames its actions. A commercial company, but with state support and majority ownership, Sber competes with the state and even performs de facto state functions. Its search for profits and influence leads not only to an ever-increasing collection of data that are used to modify people’s behavior, leaving an ever-shrinking space for individual agency and even politics, but also to a new model of governance.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"37 1","pages":"435 - 452"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45367987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-03DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1968219
G. Flikke
ABSTRACT How do regimes based on limited access orders respond to socially driven discontent? What are the drivers of contentious politics in a state where the authorities assert control over society? This article analyses patterns of protest, repertories, and organization of the “rubbish protests” (musornye protesty) – a phrase coined by the Internet news outlet Zona Media during the Moscow region protests of 2018–2019. The article draws on social movement theories to explain mobilization, framing, and regime repression, and engages with the model of limited access orders to flesh out the specifics of interaction between social protest forces and the Putin regime. Finally, the case is used to tentatively classify the Russian regime as a “dysfunctional” order – where grievance communication and petitioning to the head of state evolves from being an opportunity to being curtailed by bureaucratic red tape and political repression.
{"title":"Dysfunctional orders: Russia’s rubbish protests and Putin’s limited access order","authors":"G. Flikke","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1968219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1968219","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How do regimes based on limited access orders respond to socially driven discontent? What are the drivers of contentious politics in a state where the authorities assert control over society? This article analyses patterns of protest, repertories, and organization of the “rubbish protests” (musornye protesty) – a phrase coined by the Internet news outlet Zona Media during the Moscow region protests of 2018–2019. The article draws on social movement theories to explain mobilization, framing, and regime repression, and engages with the model of limited access orders to flesh out the specifics of interaction between social protest forces and the Putin regime. Finally, the case is used to tentatively classify the Russian regime as a “dysfunctional” order – where grievance communication and petitioning to the head of state evolves from being an opportunity to being curtailed by bureaucratic red tape and political repression.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"37 1","pages":"470 - 488"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43003423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-04DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1954809
Sasha Klyachkina
ABSTRACT How do residents perceive governance in Russia’s North Caucasus? Using original interviews and household survey data collected over nine months of fieldwork, this article offers a nuanced and empirically driven comparative account of governance in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. Mitigating between accounts of a hegemonic state that has saturated public space or strong non-state actors that consistently organize parallel systems of governance, I demonstrate that residents identify a role for both state and ostensibly non-state authorities in governance. Devoting particular attention to the relationships between state and non-state actors, this paper finds that despite similarities in governance of extraction and coercion across the three cases, there are also important differences in dispute resolution, goods provision, and regulation of symbolic practices. This multidimensional approach to governance reveals the limitations of accounts, both in the region and in general, that fail to attend to variations across governance domains.
{"title":"Perceptions of governance: state and non-state governance in the North Caucasus","authors":"Sasha Klyachkina","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1954809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1954809","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How do residents perceive governance in Russia’s North Caucasus? Using original interviews and household survey data collected over nine months of fieldwork, this article offers a nuanced and empirically driven comparative account of governance in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. Mitigating between accounts of a hegemonic state that has saturated public space or strong non-state actors that consistently organize parallel systems of governance, I demonstrate that residents identify a role for both state and ostensibly non-state authorities in governance. Devoting particular attention to the relationships between state and non-state actors, this paper finds that despite similarities in governance of extraction and coercion across the three cases, there are also important differences in dispute resolution, goods provision, and regulation of symbolic practices. This multidimensional approach to governance reveals the limitations of accounts, both in the region and in general, that fail to attend to variations across governance domains.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"37 1","pages":"336 - 361"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1954809","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42326622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-04DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1932064
Timothy M. Frye, Brian D. Taylor, W. Pyle, Klaus Segbers, Gulnaz Sharafutdinovae
Introduction Timothy Frye In this roundtable, we bring together a distinguished group of academics to discuss Gulnaz Sharafutdinova’s excellent new book, The Red Mirror: Putin’s Leadership and Russia’s Insecure Identity (Sharafutdinova 2020). Sharafudinova addresses two central issues of Russian politics: the source of popular support for President Vladimir Putin and the dynamics of political change in Russia. She critiques those who argue that Russia under Putin is a “return of the Soviet man, the Soviet system, or the Soviet identity” (p. 19). Instead, she argues that Putin has “been successful in promoting his image as an embodiment of the shared national identity of Russian citizens” by “tapping into powerful group emotions of shame and humiliation, derived from the painful experience of the transition in the 1990s” (p. 18). In turn, he transformed these emotions into pride and patriotism by drawing on two central pillars of Soviet collective identity: Soviet exceptionalism and a keen sense of extreme foreign threat to the state and its people. Yet, she also notes that this moment of national consolidation is just that, a moment, which has already given way to a much more uncertain period. Indeed, she identifies the sense of victimhood that Vladimir Putin has stoked as a key impediment to the modernization of Russia. To make her case, she draws on social identity theory, which emphasizes the importance of group attachments and collective memory to explore how Vladimir Putin made the “politicization of Russia’s collective identity into the core of his legitimation strategy” (p. 27). She begins by exploring collective identity in the late Soviet period, highlighting how the Communist Party fostered the notion that the Soviet Union was an exceptional country with an historic mission that also was encircled by enemies bent on its destruction. She then documents the shared sense of shame, humiliation, confusion, and vulnerability that marked Russian society in the 1990s as the country struggled over how to adapt its social identity to the country’s much-diminished status. In turn, she depicts how Vladimir Putin came to power and constructed a narrative of victimhood that proved remarkably powerful and long lasting. Putin’s great success was to both identify the national mood and shape it in ways that served his political ends. Sharafutdinova then unpacks how the Kremlin reinforces this narrative. She explores the “modern media machine” that Putin built in his first two terms in office and traces its increasing emphasis on conservative moral values and martial themes largely directed against the West. Going deeper, she dissects Russia’s political talk shows that mimic their Western counterparts in form but differ in content by loyally propagating themes favored by the Kremlin. Finally, she presents several vignettes of how Kremlin violations of basic human dignity, such as the arrest of the rapper Husky, the increase
{"title":"Roundtable on Gulnaz Sharafutdinova’s the red mirror: putin’s leadership and russia’s insecure identity","authors":"Timothy M. Frye, Brian D. Taylor, W. Pyle, Klaus Segbers, Gulnaz Sharafutdinovae","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1932064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1932064","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction Timothy Frye In this roundtable, we bring together a distinguished group of academics to discuss Gulnaz Sharafutdinova’s excellent new book, The Red Mirror: Putin’s Leadership and Russia’s Insecure Identity (Sharafutdinova 2020). Sharafudinova addresses two central issues of Russian politics: the source of popular support for President Vladimir Putin and the dynamics of political change in Russia. She critiques those who argue that Russia under Putin is a “return of the Soviet man, the Soviet system, or the Soviet identity” (p. 19). Instead, she argues that Putin has “been successful in promoting his image as an embodiment of the shared national identity of Russian citizens” by “tapping into powerful group emotions of shame and humiliation, derived from the painful experience of the transition in the 1990s” (p. 18). In turn, he transformed these emotions into pride and patriotism by drawing on two central pillars of Soviet collective identity: Soviet exceptionalism and a keen sense of extreme foreign threat to the state and its people. Yet, she also notes that this moment of national consolidation is just that, a moment, which has already given way to a much more uncertain period. Indeed, she identifies the sense of victimhood that Vladimir Putin has stoked as a key impediment to the modernization of Russia. To make her case, she draws on social identity theory, which emphasizes the importance of group attachments and collective memory to explore how Vladimir Putin made the “politicization of Russia’s collective identity into the core of his legitimation strategy” (p. 27). She begins by exploring collective identity in the late Soviet period, highlighting how the Communist Party fostered the notion that the Soviet Union was an exceptional country with an historic mission that also was encircled by enemies bent on its destruction. She then documents the shared sense of shame, humiliation, confusion, and vulnerability that marked Russian society in the 1990s as the country struggled over how to adapt its social identity to the country’s much-diminished status. In turn, she depicts how Vladimir Putin came to power and constructed a narrative of victimhood that proved remarkably powerful and long lasting. Putin’s great success was to both identify the national mood and shape it in ways that served his political ends. Sharafutdinova then unpacks how the Kremlin reinforces this narrative. She explores the “modern media machine” that Putin built in his first two terms in office and traces its increasing emphasis on conservative moral values and martial themes largely directed against the West. Going deeper, she dissects Russia’s political talk shows that mimic their Western counterparts in form but differ in content by loyally propagating themes favored by the Kremlin. Finally, she presents several vignettes of how Kremlin violations of basic human dignity, such as the arrest of the rapper Husky, the increase","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"37 1","pages":"404 - 412"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1932064","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59722160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-04DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1924041
Ángel Torres-Adán
ABSTRACT This paper assesses some of the factors that influence the public’s geopolitical preferences in the Association Agreement (AA) countries (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). Specifically, I test the winners and losers theory, according to which individuals with higher chances of success in a particular society (winners) tend to support EU membership more than those with lower chances (losers). In addition, I explore the influence of political engagement, future migration preferences, and political values on this support. Departing from the conception of geopolitical preferences in the AA countries as a dichotomy between supporters of the Eurasian Economic Union (Easternizers) and supporters of the European Union (Westernizers), I adopt a four-fold classification that also considers the individuals who support both (Balancers) and neither (Isolationists). Drawing on survey data from Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (2015–2019), I find similar patterns of effects for the winners and losers variables across the three countries, with winners more likely to be Westernizers and losers more likely to be Easternizers or Isolationists. Moreover, politically engaged individuals tend to be Balancers and Westernizers, whereas disengaged individuals show support for the Isolationist option. Values are a significant predictor for Balancers and Westernizers, since preferring liberal values has a positive effect on being a Westernizer and negative on being a Balancer.
{"title":"Still winners and losers? Studying public opinion’s geopolitical preferences in the association agreement countries (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine)","authors":"Ángel Torres-Adán","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1924041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1924041","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper assesses some of the factors that influence the public’s geopolitical preferences in the Association Agreement (AA) countries (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). Specifically, I test the winners and losers theory, according to which individuals with higher chances of success in a particular society (winners) tend to support EU membership more than those with lower chances (losers). In addition, I explore the influence of political engagement, future migration preferences, and political values on this support. Departing from the conception of geopolitical preferences in the AA countries as a dichotomy between supporters of the Eurasian Economic Union (Easternizers) and supporters of the European Union (Westernizers), I adopt a four-fold classification that also considers the individuals who support both (Balancers) and neither (Isolationists). Drawing on survey data from Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (2015–2019), I find similar patterns of effects for the winners and losers variables across the three countries, with winners more likely to be Westernizers and losers more likely to be Easternizers or Isolationists. Moreover, politically engaged individuals tend to be Balancers and Westernizers, whereas disengaged individuals show support for the Isolationist option. Values are a significant predictor for Balancers and Westernizers, since preferring liberal values has a positive effect on being a Westernizer and negative on being a Balancer.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"37 1","pages":"362 - 382"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1924041","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44301692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-04DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1936409
M. Laruelle, Kevin Limonier
ABSTRACT This article argues that to capture Russia’s influence abroad, one needs to comprehend the country’s “gray diplomacy” as a neoliberal realm open to individual initiatives. We define “entrepreneurs of influence” as people who invest their own money or social capital to build influence abroad in hopes of being rewarded by the Kremlin . We test this notion by looking at both famous and unknown entrepreneurs of influence and their digital activities. We divide them into three broad categories based on their degree of proximity to the authorities: the tycoons (Yevgeny Prigozhin and Konstantin Malofeev), the timeservers (Alexander Yonov and Alexander Malkevich), and the frontline pioneers (the Belgian Luc Michel). An analysis of the technical data documenting their online activities shows that some of these initiatives, while inscribed into Moscow’s broad aspirations to great powerness, are based on the specific agendas of their promoters, and thus outlines the inherent limits of Moscow’s endeavors.
{"title":"Beyond “hybrid warfare”: a digital exploration of Russia’s entrepreneurs of influence","authors":"M. Laruelle, Kevin Limonier","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1936409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1936409","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article argues that to capture Russia’s influence abroad, one needs to comprehend the country’s “gray diplomacy” as a neoliberal realm open to individual initiatives. We define “entrepreneurs of influence” as people who invest their own money or social capital to build influence abroad in hopes of being rewarded by the Kremlin . We test this notion by looking at both famous and unknown entrepreneurs of influence and their digital activities. We divide them into three broad categories based on their degree of proximity to the authorities: the tycoons (Yevgeny Prigozhin and Konstantin Malofeev), the timeservers (Alexander Yonov and Alexander Malkevich), and the frontline pioneers (the Belgian Luc Michel). An analysis of the technical data documenting their online activities shows that some of these initiatives, while inscribed into Moscow’s broad aspirations to great powerness, are based on the specific agendas of their promoters, and thus outlines the inherent limits of Moscow’s endeavors.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"37 1","pages":"318 - 335"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1936409","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44069439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-04DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1955325
C. Schenk
ABSTRACT Immigration control in Russia, one of the world’s top five largest immigrant-receiving countries, is rife with corruption and other informal practices. Instead of framing corruption simply as bad governance, this article shows that informal strategies are intertwined with formal state practices to produce immigration control. Instead of presenting corruption as subversive of state institutions and contradictions between formal and informal practices as a signal of system dysfunction, I argue that state actors’ simultaneous formal and informal activities can work together towards a perhaps surprisingly coherent set of goals. Drawing on ethnographic work with migrants and legal-institutional analysis of Russia’s migration sphere, this article demonstrates how felt immigration control, or the experience of migrants, combines legal and informal strategies that center on coercion. It shows how coercive interactions between migrants and state agents produce visible data and media images that are projected to the public as immigration control.
{"title":"Producing state capacity through corruption: the case of immigration control in Russia","authors":"C. Schenk","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1955325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1955325","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Immigration control in Russia, one of the world’s top five largest immigrant-receiving countries, is rife with corruption and other informal practices. Instead of framing corruption simply as bad governance, this article shows that informal strategies are intertwined with formal state practices to produce immigration control. Instead of presenting corruption as subversive of state institutions and contradictions between formal and informal practices as a signal of system dysfunction, I argue that state actors’ simultaneous formal and informal activities can work together towards a perhaps surprisingly coherent set of goals. Drawing on ethnographic work with migrants and legal-institutional analysis of Russia’s migration sphere, this article demonstrates how felt immigration control, or the experience of migrants, combines legal and informal strategies that center on coercion. It shows how coercive interactions between migrants and state agents produce visible data and media images that are projected to the public as immigration control.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"37 1","pages":"303 - 317"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1955325","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59722217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-15DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2065840
Tom Paskhalis, Bryn Rosenfeld, Katerina Tertytchnaya
ABSTRACT Existing literature recognizes growing threats to press freedom around the world and documents changes in the tools used to stifle the independent press. However, few studies investigate how independent media respond to state pressure in an autocracy, documenting the impact of tactics that stop short of shuttering alternatives to state media. Do independent outlets re-orient coverage to favor regime interests? Or does repression encourage more negative coverage of the regime instead? To shed light on these questions, we investigate how the abrupt removal of independent outlet TV Rain from Russian television providers influenced its coverage. We find that shortly after providers dropped TV Rain, the tone of its political coverage became more positive and its similarity with state-controlled Channel 1 increased. However, these effects were short-lived. Additional evidence suggests that subscription revenue contributed to the station’s resilience. These findings add to our understanding of media manipulation and authoritarian endurance.
{"title":"Independent media under pressure: evidence from Russia","authors":"Tom Paskhalis, Bryn Rosenfeld, Katerina Tertytchnaya","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2065840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2065840","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Existing literature recognizes growing threats to press freedom around the world and documents changes in the tools used to stifle the independent press. However, few studies investigate how independent media respond to state pressure in an autocracy, documenting the impact of tactics that stop short of shuttering alternatives to state media. Do independent outlets re-orient coverage to favor regime interests? Or does repression encourage more negative coverage of the regime instead? To shed light on these questions, we investigate how the abrupt removal of independent outlet TV Rain from Russian television providers influenced its coverage. We find that shortly after providers dropped TV Rain, the tone of its political coverage became more positive and its similarity with state-controlled Channel 1 increased. However, these effects were short-lived. Additional evidence suggests that subscription revenue contributed to the station’s resilience. These findings add to our understanding of media manipulation and authoritarian endurance.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"38 1","pages":"155 - 174"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41519736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1913932
Erik Andermo, M. Kragh
ABSTRACT What are the long-term effects of the financial sanctions against Russia? We provide a time-sensitive analysis of the sanctions impact on certain Russian financial markets and highlight how Russia has responded strategically. Our analysis also captures the effect of the threat of sanctions and informs the debate on sanctions effectiveness. Thus, our study indicates how financial sanctions can be incorporated into theories of deterrence and conflict resolution. We also provide some policy implications that can be generalized and reinforce previous research. Russia’s banking system is highly dependent on dollar transactions, and in response to sanctions, Russia has systematically undertaken measures to promote its economic sovereignty under conditions of continued financial integration. We argue that sanctions put some pressure on the Russian budget, and that this effect has been exacerbated by the Covid-19 crisis, but also that Russia has used debt placements strategically in order to deter sanctions escalation.
{"title":"Sanctions and dollar dependency in Russia: resilience, vulnerability, and financial integration","authors":"Erik Andermo, M. Kragh","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1913932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1913932","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What are the long-term effects of the financial sanctions against Russia? We provide a time-sensitive analysis of the sanctions impact on certain Russian financial markets and highlight how Russia has responded strategically. Our analysis also captures the effect of the threat of sanctions and informs the debate on sanctions effectiveness. Thus, our study indicates how financial sanctions can be incorporated into theories of deterrence and conflict resolution. We also provide some policy implications that can be generalized and reinforce previous research. Russia’s banking system is highly dependent on dollar transactions, and in response to sanctions, Russia has systematically undertaken measures to promote its economic sovereignty under conditions of continued financial integration. We argue that sanctions put some pressure on the Russian budget, and that this effect has been exacerbated by the Covid-19 crisis, but also that Russia has used debt placements strategically in order to deter sanctions escalation.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"37 1","pages":"276 - 301"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1913932","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44326596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-20DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2049563
D. Davydov, Jukka Sihvonen, L. Solanko
ABSTRACT This paper uses textual analysis to examine how European corporations assess sanctions in their annual reports. Using observations from a panel of almost 11,500 corporate annual reports from 2014 to 2017, we document significant cross-country variation in how firms perceive Russia-related sanctions, even after controlling for many firm-level characteristics, sectoral differences, and time trends. The cross-country differences also remain for sentiments about sanctions and contexts in which sanctions are mentioned. We also examine the role of macroeconomic linkages in explaining these differences. We show that Russia’s inward and outward FDI stocks and high levels of imports and exports with Russia explain about half of the cross-country variation, leaving a nontrivial share of variation unexplained.
{"title":"Who cares about sanctions? Observations from annual reports of European firms","authors":"D. Davydov, Jukka Sihvonen, L. Solanko","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2049563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2049563","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper uses textual analysis to examine how European corporations assess sanctions in their annual reports. Using observations from a panel of almost 11,500 corporate annual reports from 2014 to 2017, we document significant cross-country variation in how firms perceive Russia-related sanctions, even after controlling for many firm-level characteristics, sectoral differences, and time trends. The cross-country differences also remain for sentiments about sanctions and contexts in which sanctions are mentioned. We also examine the role of macroeconomic linkages in explaining these differences. We show that Russia’s inward and outward FDI stocks and high levels of imports and exports with Russia explain about half of the cross-country variation, leaving a nontrivial share of variation unexplained.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":"38 1","pages":"222 - 249"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45408646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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