Pub Date : 2021-10-29DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1994821
S. Hoppe
ABSTRACT This paper explores the commonalities of populist mobilizations in the post-Soviet region. It identifies a salient populist cleavage between two political projects that differ fundamentally about their focal point of political action: externalist sovereigntism and internalist anti-corruption messianism. While sovereigntism takes a defensive stance repelling foreign forces hostile to “the people,” anti-corruption messianism offensively tackles cronyism impeding developmental salvation for “the people.” The paper reconstructs six sovereigntist and anti-corruption projects, which have unfolded across different non-democratic regimes in Russia, Armenia, and Ukraine throughout the past decade. It is argued that the conflict between sovereigntism and anti-corruption messianism relates to a twofold, distinctively post-Soviet constellation: uncertainty over conflictual geopolitical abeyance and the exasperation over social closure due to the prevalence of oligarchical patronalism. In this context, both populist projects constitute powerful strategies of solidarity-forging under conditions in which other channels of political articulation have been either blocked or exhausted.
{"title":"Sovereigntism vs. anti-corruption messianism: a salient post-Soviet cleavage of populist mobilization","authors":"S. Hoppe","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1994821","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1994821","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper explores the commonalities of populist mobilizations in the post-Soviet region. It identifies a salient populist cleavage between two political projects that differ fundamentally about their focal point of political action: externalist sovereigntism and internalist anti-corruption messianism. While sovereigntism takes a defensive stance repelling foreign forces hostile to “the people,” anti-corruption messianism offensively tackles cronyism impeding developmental salvation for “the people.” The paper reconstructs six sovereigntist and anti-corruption projects, which have unfolded across different non-democratic regimes in Russia, Armenia, and Ukraine throughout the past decade. It is argued that the conflict between sovereigntism and anti-corruption messianism relates to a twofold, distinctively post-Soviet constellation: uncertainty over conflictual geopolitical abeyance and the exasperation over social closure due to the prevalence of oligarchical patronalism. In this context, both populist projects constitute powerful strategies of solidarity-forging under conditions in which other channels of political articulation have been either blocked or exhausted.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46451660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-07DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1984106
N. Gamkrelidze
ABSTRACT This article investigates U.S. and NATO political elite images of Georgia and policy implications from 1991 to 2020. The analysis relies on the author’s 44 original interviews with U.S. and NATO political elites, including U.S. Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of States, U.S. Generals, Secretaries-General and Deputy Secretaries of NATO, and others in power in the different periods from 1991 to 2020. The study shows that three main images of Georgia have emerged over the 30-year historical period in the eyes of U.S. and NATO political elites. In the first two decades, leadership and personal connections have increased the likelihood of certain policies together with material determinants and ideational factors. In the third decade, personal ties had disappeared, but structural incentives were acknowledged by U.S. and NATO elites which impacted their policies. Moreover, results show that the U.S. relationship with Georgia has been chiefly personalized rather than institutionalized.
{"title":"From failing state to strategic partner: analyzing US and NATO political elite images of Georgia and policy implications from 1991 to 2020","authors":"N. Gamkrelidze","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1984106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1984106","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article investigates U.S. and NATO political elite images of Georgia and policy implications from 1991 to 2020. The analysis relies on the author’s 44 original interviews with U.S. and NATO political elites, including U.S. Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of States, U.S. Generals, Secretaries-General and Deputy Secretaries of NATO, and others in power in the different periods from 1991 to 2020. The study shows that three main images of Georgia have emerged over the 30-year historical period in the eyes of U.S. and NATO political elites. In the first two decades, leadership and personal connections have increased the likelihood of certain policies together with material determinants and ideational factors. In the third decade, personal ties had disappeared, but structural incentives were acknowledged by U.S. and NATO elites which impacted their policies. Moreover, results show that the U.S. relationship with Georgia has been chiefly personalized rather than institutionalized.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43434161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-09DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1975443
Tsveta Petrova, P. Pospieszna
ABSTRACT How has the post-2015 democratic rollback in Poland impacted its support for the democratization of Ukraine and Belarus? Conventional wisdom is that countries undergoing autocratization would abandon democracy promotion. In contrast, we provide evidence that even as democracy was undermined at home, Poland continued to provide democracy support abroad, albeit less enthusiastically. We further document that it was not the normative commitment of Polish elites to democracy but the instrumental embeddedness of democracy promotion in Polish foreign and security policies that ensured its survival. Lastly, we find that Poland’s support for democracy abroad now is closer to the new conservative values promoted at home, implemented mostly through state-run or state-controlled programs and less focused on supporting civil and political society abroad. Our paper contributes to the literature on regime promotion by analyzing and theorizing the overlooked question of how foreign policy, including democracy promotion, shifts for countries undergo autocratization.
{"title":"Democracy promotion in times of autocratization: the case of Poland, 1989–2019","authors":"Tsveta Petrova, P. Pospieszna","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1975443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1975443","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How has the post-2015 democratic rollback in Poland impacted its support for the democratization of Ukraine and Belarus? Conventional wisdom is that countries undergoing autocratization would abandon democracy promotion. In contrast, we provide evidence that even as democracy was undermined at home, Poland continued to provide democracy support abroad, albeit less enthusiastically. We further document that it was not the normative commitment of Polish elites to democracy but the instrumental embeddedness of democracy promotion in Polish foreign and security policies that ensured its survival. Lastly, we find that Poland’s support for democracy abroad now is closer to the new conservative values promoted at home, implemented mostly through state-run or state-controlled programs and less focused on supporting civil and political society abroad. Our paper contributes to the literature on regime promotion by analyzing and theorizing the overlooked question of how foreign policy, including democracy promotion, shifts for countries undergo autocratization.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44142105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-08DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1971927
J. Johnson, A. Novitskaya, V. Sperling, L. Sundstrom
ABSTRACT The prevailing wisdom among scholars of gender in Russia is that Vladimir Putin – as Russia’s “strongman” president – has become an agent of traditionalism. Some political scientists, often without a gendered lens, have argued that Putin is not so powerful, compelled to deploy various tactics and ideologies to balance competing interests among elites and retain support from the general public. We systematically analyze Putin’s statements about gender in two decades of his annual speeches (1999–2020) to better understand how Putin rules. Coding Putin’s remarks on a spectrum from promoting to opposing gender equality, we find that there has been no shift toward an explicit traditionalism, but rather, an expansion of the gender-stereotypical/Soviet views that have dominated Putin’s pronouncements all along. We argue that Putin’s diverse remarks across the spectrum of gender (in)equality constitute an important part of his efforts to balance diverse elite interests and enlist mass support.
{"title":"Mixed signals: what Putin says about gender equality","authors":"J. Johnson, A. Novitskaya, V. Sperling, L. Sundstrom","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1971927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1971927","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The prevailing wisdom among scholars of gender in Russia is that Vladimir Putin – as Russia’s “strongman” president – has become an agent of traditionalism. Some political scientists, often without a gendered lens, have argued that Putin is not so powerful, compelled to deploy various tactics and ideologies to balance competing interests among elites and retain support from the general public. We systematically analyze Putin’s statements about gender in two decades of his annual speeches (1999–2020) to better understand how Putin rules. Coding Putin’s remarks on a spectrum from promoting to opposing gender equality, we find that there has been no shift toward an explicit traditionalism, but rather, an expansion of the gender-stereotypical/Soviet views that have dominated Putin’s pronouncements all along. We argue that Putin’s diverse remarks across the spectrum of gender (in)equality constitute an important part of his efforts to balance diverse elite interests and enlist mass support.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49055617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-03DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1966988
A. Yakovlev
ABSTRACT Vladimir Putin’s personal popularity creates the base for sociopolitical stability of regime. However, in the long term, the aspirations of Russia’s elite for national sovereignty will come to naught without anew economic development model. Applying the “limited access orders” framework of North, Wallis, and Weingast, this essay analyzes the interactions among three key groups in the ruling elite# the top federal bureaucracy, politically connected big business (oligarchs), and heads of security forces (siloviki). It considers the evolution of rent sources in Russia during the last 25 years and the incentives of elite groups. Itargues that under dominance of siloviki after 2012, the ruling coalition could not negotiate anew agreement on rent distribution, nor could it broaden access to economic opportunities and political activity for new social groups. Russia’s ruling elite missed the opportunity to avoid adeep shock that will likely destroy the existing “limited access order”.
{"title":"Composition of the ruling elite, incentives for productive usage of rents, and prospects for Russia’s limited access order","authors":"A. Yakovlev","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1966988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1966988","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Vladimir Putin’s personal popularity creates the base for sociopolitical stability of regime. However, in the long term, the aspirations of Russia’s elite for national sovereignty will come to naught without anew economic development model. Applying the “limited access orders” framework of North, Wallis, and Weingast, this essay analyzes the interactions among three key groups in the ruling elite# the top federal bureaucracy, politically connected big business (oligarchs), and heads of security forces (siloviki). It considers the evolution of rent sources in Russia during the last 25 years and the incentives of elite groups. Itargues that under dominance of siloviki after 2012, the ruling coalition could not negotiate anew agreement on rent distribution, nor could it broaden access to economic opportunities and political activity for new social groups. Russia’s ruling elite missed the opportunity to avoid adeep shock that will likely destroy the existing “limited access order”.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43095663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-03DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1969732
Jardar Østbø
This special issue is dedicated to the workings of Russia’s political-economic system, theorized as a limited access order (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009): under Putin, Russia has been ruled by a coalition of elites that have refrained from 1990s-style violent infighting because of common unwritten rules on resource distribution. This arrangement is now under strain. The political climate domestically and internationally has changed, resources are shrinking, and the rules for rent distribution are more unclear, all of which increases the infighting. In order to generate growth while retaining political stability, a new agreement on the future course has to be reached by three main elite groups: politically connected big business, leading security services officials, and the top bureaucracy (see Andrei Yakovlev’s article in this issue). The implications are of fundamental concern to the viability of the regime and the Russian “system” writ large. This special issue analyzes the evolution and prospects of Russia’s limited access order and offers case studies of attempts at institutional innovation, its response to social unrest, technology-driven change, and systemic obstacles to technological (and thereby economic) development.
这期特刊专门讨论俄罗斯政治经济体系的运作，理论上认为这是一种有限准入秩序(North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009):在普京的统治下，俄罗斯一直由精英联盟统治，由于在资源分配方面有共同的不成文规则，他们避免了上世纪90年代那种暴力内斗。这一安排现在面临压力。国内和国际的政治气候已经发生了变化，资源正在萎缩，租金分配规则更加不明确，所有这些都加剧了内斗。为了在保持政治稳定的同时促进经济增长，三个主要的精英群体必须就未来的进程达成新的协议:政治上有联系的大企业、主要的安全服务官员和最高官僚机构(见安德烈·雅科夫列夫在本期的文章)。这对该政权和整个俄罗斯“体制”的生存能力有着根本性的影响。本期特刊分析了俄罗斯有限准入秩序的演变和前景，并提供了关于制度创新的尝试、对社会动荡的反应、技术驱动的变革以及技术(进而经济)发展的系统性障碍的案例研究。
{"title":"State, business, and the political economy of modernization: introduction","authors":"Jardar Østbø","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1969732","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1969732","url":null,"abstract":"This special issue is dedicated to the workings of Russia’s political-economic system, theorized as a limited access order (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009): under Putin, Russia has been ruled by a coalition of elites that have refrained from 1990s-style violent infighting because of common unwritten rules on resource distribution. This arrangement is now under strain. The political climate domestically and internationally has changed, resources are shrinking, and the rules for rent distribution are more unclear, all of which increases the infighting. In order to generate growth while retaining political stability, a new agreement on the future course has to be reached by three main elite groups: politically connected big business, leading security services officials, and the top bureaucracy (see Andrei Yakovlev’s article in this issue). The implications are of fundamental concern to the viability of the regime and the Russian “system” writ large. This special issue analyzes the evolution and prospects of Russia’s limited access order and offers case studies of attempts at institutional innovation, its response to social unrest, technology-driven change, and systemic obstacles to technological (and thereby economic) development.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44458545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-03DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1967071
Janis Kluge
ABSTRACT Although the rollout of 5G in Russia has been much anticipated by both businesses and the government, progress in the introduction of the new standard came to a standstill by 2021. Key elite groups in business, the federal bureaucracy, and the security apparatus (the siloviki) have failed to agree on the rules for 5G. Major sticking points in the debate are the distribution of radio spectrum, the operators’ business model, and the degree of import substitution for 5G equipment. This article examines the bargaining among different elite actors over the new mobile communications standard. The foundering introduction of 5G illustrates a more general lack of agreement among Russia’s elites about the future direction of Russia’s economy. Negotiations are complicated by shrinking resources, the relative strengthening of the siloviki, and unrealistic aspirations to economic sovereignty in the digital sphere.
{"title":"The future has to wait: 5G in Russia and the lack of elite consensus","authors":"Janis Kluge","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1967071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1967071","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Although the rollout of 5G in Russia has been much anticipated by both businesses and the government, progress in the introduction of the new standard came to a standstill by 2021. Key elite groups in business, the federal bureaucracy, and the security apparatus (the siloviki) have failed to agree on the rules for 5G. Major sticking points in the debate are the distribution of radio spectrum, the operators’ business model, and the degree of import substitution for 5G equipment. This article examines the bargaining among different elite actors over the new mobile communications standard. The foundering introduction of 5G illustrates a more general lack of agreement among Russia’s elites about the future direction of Russia’s economy. Negotiations are complicated by shrinking resources, the relative strengthening of the siloviki, and unrealistic aspirations to economic sovereignty in the digital sphere.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45441290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-03DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1967644
E. Schulmann, M. Galeotti
ABSTRACT There is general agreement that both the Security Council and State Council are significant institutions in Putin’s Russia, but less clarity as to what this means, beyond that each provides opportunities for consultation with specific segments of the elite. Even this modest consensus was confounded in 2020, when both councils seemed to offer potential post-presidential roles for Putin himself, and underwent significant changes. This article describes the legal and administrative evolutions of both bodies, assesses their roles, and considers them from the perspective of a limited access order. It tackles the problem of institutions in undemocratic systems and the thin line between the decorative elements of the political system, and the bodies in which real administrative power is vested. We argue that they have a significant informal role as sites for the negotiation of power and resources and remain potential actors in the ongoing power transformation of the Russian political system.
{"title":"A tale of two councils: the changing roles of the security and state councils during the transformation period of modern Russian politics","authors":"E. Schulmann, M. Galeotti","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1967644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1967644","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT There is general agreement that both the Security Council and State Council are significant institutions in Putin’s Russia, but less clarity as to what this means, beyond that each provides opportunities for consultation with specific segments of the elite. Even this modest consensus was confounded in 2020, when both councils seemed to offer potential post-presidential roles for Putin himself, and underwent significant changes. This article describes the legal and administrative evolutions of both bodies, assesses their roles, and considers them from the perspective of a limited access order. It tackles the problem of institutions in undemocratic systems and the thin line between the decorative elements of the political system, and the bodies in which real administrative power is vested. We argue that they have a significant informal role as sites for the negotiation of power and resources and remain potential actors in the ongoing power transformation of the Russian political system.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45165316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-03DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1966216
Jardar Østbø
ABSTRACT The article identifies a new model for Russia’s modernization emerging among the “systemic liberals.” Offering politically neutral technological fixes, this model cannot be understood within the traditional democracy/authoritarianism dichotomy. Expanding on Shoshana Zuboff’s theory, the author calls the model hybrid surveillance capitalism. The case study is the transition of Sberbank to a tech company. Sberbank/Sber aims to be the main modernizing force leading Russia to a better future. The author “reverse engineers” Sber's modernization model by analyzing what the company actually does and how it frames its actions. A commercial company, but with state support and majority ownership, Sber competes with the state and even performs de facto state functions. Its search for profits and influence leads not only to an ever-increasing collection of data that are used to modify people’s behavior, leaving an ever-shrinking space for individual agency and even politics, but also to a new model of governance.
{"title":"Hybrid surveillance capitalism: Sber’s model for Russia’s modernization","authors":"Jardar Østbø","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1966216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1966216","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article identifies a new model for Russia’s modernization emerging among the “systemic liberals.” Offering politically neutral technological fixes, this model cannot be understood within the traditional democracy/authoritarianism dichotomy. Expanding on Shoshana Zuboff’s theory, the author calls the model hybrid surveillance capitalism. The case study is the transition of Sberbank to a tech company. Sberbank/Sber aims to be the main modernizing force leading Russia to a better future. The author “reverse engineers” Sber's modernization model by analyzing what the company actually does and how it frames its actions. A commercial company, but with state support and majority ownership, Sber competes with the state and even performs de facto state functions. Its search for profits and influence leads not only to an ever-increasing collection of data that are used to modify people’s behavior, leaving an ever-shrinking space for individual agency and even politics, but also to a new model of governance.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45367987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-03DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1968219
G. Flikke
ABSTRACT How do regimes based on limited access orders respond to socially driven discontent? What are the drivers of contentious politics in a state where the authorities assert control over society? This article analyses patterns of protest, repertories, and organization of the “rubbish protests” (musornye protesty) – a phrase coined by the Internet news outlet Zona Media during the Moscow region protests of 2018–2019. The article draws on social movement theories to explain mobilization, framing, and regime repression, and engages with the model of limited access orders to flesh out the specifics of interaction between social protest forces and the Putin regime. Finally, the case is used to tentatively classify the Russian regime as a “dysfunctional” order – where grievance communication and petitioning to the head of state evolves from being an opportunity to being curtailed by bureaucratic red tape and political repression.
{"title":"Dysfunctional orders: Russia’s rubbish protests and Putin’s limited access order","authors":"G. Flikke","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1968219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1968219","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How do regimes based on limited access orders respond to socially driven discontent? What are the drivers of contentious politics in a state where the authorities assert control over society? This article analyses patterns of protest, repertories, and organization of the “rubbish protests” (musornye protesty) – a phrase coined by the Internet news outlet Zona Media during the Moscow region protests of 2018–2019. The article draws on social movement theories to explain mobilization, framing, and regime repression, and engages with the model of limited access orders to flesh out the specifics of interaction between social protest forces and the Putin regime. Finally, the case is used to tentatively classify the Russian regime as a “dysfunctional” order – where grievance communication and petitioning to the head of state evolves from being an opportunity to being curtailed by bureaucratic red tape and political repression.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43003423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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