Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献

We assess optimal deterministic nonlinear income taxation in a Mirrlees economy with a continuum of risk-averse agents whose utilities are quasilinear in labor. A weak redistribution motive makes random taxes more likely socially dominated by the deterministic policy where after-tax income lotteries are replaced with their certainty equivalents.

I propose a framework describing how naïve learning in networks may determine coordination outcomes of product adoption. Individuals receive initial signals regarding the value of the product, communicate afterwards, and make adoption decisions based on that. In the framework of DeGroot's Naïve Learning, the model suggests that as beliefs converge, the result will converge to a unique cutoff equilibrium, similar to a global game. I then describe how adoption rates and social welfare depend on network structures by showing that the variance of the unit eigenvector centrality of the listening matrix, which represents inequality in network positions, is a sufficient statistic for adoption in equilibrium. More adoption is expected with high inequality in network positions if the value of the product to be adopted is low, and vice versa. The relationship between social welfare and inequality in network positions aligns with that of adoption and inequality in network positions, except in cases of very low product value, where increased adoption may reduce overall social welfare.

This paper studies optimal linear policy directed at private long-term care insurance in the context where individuals are myopic, that is, underestimate their dependency risk. Without government intervention, myopic individuals underinsure, while the first-best optimum requires full insurance. To decentralize the first-best, one needs personalized linear subsidies on private insurance premiums combined with personalized lump-sum taxes to finance these subsidies and redistribute resources among individuals. In the second-best setting where only uniform instruments can be used, the determination of the optimal insurance subsidy rate includes three main considerations: standard efficiency concern, correction for myopia, and redistributive concerns. While the correction for myopia pushes for a higher subsidy rate, the analysis of the redistributive concerns is far less straightforward. Overall, the redistributive concerns depend on three main factors: whether wealthier individuals are less myopic, how the probability of dependency varies with wealth and what is the type of absolute risk aversion exhibited by individual preferences.

We consider a bilateral monopoly where a linear input price is determined by Nash bargaining. We show, with an increasing marginal cost of input production, that vertical integration reduces consumer surplus and welfare compared with bilateral monopoly if the bargaining power of the input supplier is low. This result is important for competition policies as it questions the common wisdom suggesting vertical integration increases welfare by eliminating the problem of double marginalization. Overproduction under bilateral monopoly compared with vertical integration is the reason for our result. Interestingly, consumer surplus and welfare can be higher under a linear input price compared with a two-part tariff input price.

This paper analyzes the incentives of individuals to add or sever links that imply the formation of stable and efficient networks when a society is partitioned into groups. In terms of group partitioning, we determine cost topology by arranging a model in which a pair of players pays equally for the link connecting them and in which such a cost depends on the neighborhood composition of the pair when they belong to different groups. To be more precise, the cost of a link between players can be reduced if at least one of these players has neighbors from the group the other player belongs to. We examine specific network structures (i.e., minimal networks, minimally connected networks, complete networks, majority complete networks, and complete bipartite networks) when they are stable and efficient. Our analysis demonstrates how players' distribution among groups modifies the conditions of stability and efficiency. More significantly, we identify some fascinating phenomena which sharply contrast with most literature dealing with stable and efficient networks: (i) the nonminimal network can be stable in the absence of a benefit decay through the path; (ii) a player may prefer to link with players in other groups with a higher average link cost abandoning connection with the partners from her own group; (iii) it is impossible to ensure that the complete network will be efficient for partition with certain characteristics irrespective of the decay factor and the value of costs. The numerical examples are provided to illustrate our theoretical findings.

We examine the long-run impact of unfunded social security on capital stock and wealth inequality in an overlapping generations (OLG) model where newborn individuals differ in their inheritance. In our model, individuals' decisions are subject to social comparisons, which can lead to overspending on personal consumption and result in zero bequests left within poor families. In this scenario, unfunded social security increases long-run wealth inequality by redistributing wealth from poor to rich families, who always leave bequests. However, it increases long-run capital stock, too. We also show that when none or all of the families leave bequests in the long run, our model predicts negative and neutral effects of social security on capital accumulation, in line with the standard OLG models of Diamond and Barro. Thus, our results emphasize the need to account for heterogeneity in bequest behavior in the analysis of social security.

Using the standard two-stage game of process R&D and Cournot competition with R&D output spillovers, this paper provides a thorough second-best welfare analysis. The planner's solution is compared with the standard noncooperative scenario, the R&D cartel, the cartelized research joint venture, and the social research joint venture solution in terms of propensities for R&D as well as welfare levels. The main result is that, when spillovers are not too high, a cartelized joint venture unexpectedly outperforms the planner's solution in terms of propensities for R&D and resulting welfare level, though it is the only market scenario to do so. We also assess the performance of a social joint venture, relative to all the well-known scenarios for the organization of R&D. Finally, we observe that the gap between market outcomes and planner's solutions, in terms of welfare levels, increases as R&D becomes less appropriable.

This paper examines the welfare ranking of indirect tax systems with corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a duopoly. Findings show that the two firms' cost and CSR asymmetries both play important roles. If the cost-efficient firm has a higher CSR level, the standard result in traditional tax theory is sustainable. Namely, ad valorem tax (specific subsidy) policies are considered superior to specific tax (ad valorem subsidy) policies. However, if the cost-inefficient firm has a significantly higher CSR level, the standard result is reversed. This result remains robust in an oligopoly model or under a tax revenue constraint.

This paper analyses and compares the performance of resource taxes and capital taxes in financing public goods while considering the positive effects of public expenditure on firm productivity. It is motivated by Franks et al. (2017), who argue that the advantage of the resource tax consists in its potential to reap foreign resource rents. I employ an analytical general equilibrium framework of $��n�$ identical resource-poor countries, where local firms use internationally mobile capital and a net imported resource in production as well as local public infrastructure. The latter is financed solely by either taxing the input of the resource or capital. The choice of the policy instrument is exogenous to policy makers and symmetric across countries. I find that expenditure on infrastructure renders the impact of fiscal policy on the terms of trade ambiguous under resource taxation and negative under capital taxation. Moreover, public expenditure weakens the outflow of factors moderating the deficit of public spending caused by tax competition. This holds for both policy scenarios. Considering both effects simultaneously, resource taxation cannot generally be identified as the policy to provide higher provision or efficiency. A numerical exercise shows cases for higher provision of either policy.

In a vertically differentiated duopoly, we assume that environmental subsidies are endogenously determined by the demand for dirtier goods and the relative greenness of cleaner alternatives. By contemplating the possibility that a subsidy targets either consumers or firms, we study how the impact of a subsidy changes with its recipients, consumers versus firms. A consumer-based subsidy is environmentally enhancing and increases firms' profits at equilibrium, while it hurts consumers. Overall, however, it is welfare improving. A firm-based subsidy makes firms better off but may be environmentally harmful and has the paradoxical effect of hurting consumers buying the cleaner variant. Moreover, it is welfare detrimental on the whole.