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Persuading Through Media Bias With News Diffusion 通过新闻传播的媒体偏见说服
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-11-19 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70073
Bartosz Redlicki

I analyze persuasion in a model in which a media outlet with a partisan motive (i.e., to persuade agents) can report news with a partisan bias (“slant”) and the news then diffuses sequentially in a population of biased (in the same direction as the media outlet) and unbiased agents, whereby each agent decides whether to share the news with the next agent or not. I find that the slant is increasing in the bias of the biased agents and in the agents' tendency to meet similar others. I also discuss two variants of the model: one in which there is no diffusion and another in which the media outlet has a pure diffusion motive rather than a partisan motive.

我在一个模型中分析说服,在这个模型中,具有党派动机的媒体(即说服代理)可以报道带有党派偏见(“倾斜”)的新闻,然后新闻在有偏见的(与媒体出口相同的方向)和无偏见的代理群体中依次扩散,每个代理决定是否与下一个代理分享新闻。我发现,在有偏见的主体的偏见和主体倾向于遇到相似的人的倾向中,这种倾斜正在增加。我还讨论了该模型的两种变体:一种没有传播,另一种媒体渠道有纯粹的传播动机,而不是党派动机。
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引用次数: 0
Economic Stimulus Effects of Product Innovation Under Demand Stagnation 需求停滞下产品创新的经济刺激效应
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-11-18 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70078
Daisuke Matsuzaki, Yoshiyasu Ono

When confronting economic stagnation, innovation (product innovation in particular) is often cited as an effective stimulus because it is assumed to encourage household consumption and lead to higher demand. Using a secular stagnation model with wealth preference, we examine the effects of product innovation on employment and consumption. This study examines three types of product innovation, including quantity-augmenting-like innovation, variety expansion, and addictive innovation. The first works as if a larger quantity were consumed although the actual quantity remains the same, the second increases the variety of consumption commodities, and the third reduces the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. We find that the first and second always reduce both consumption and employment, whereas the third can expand them. It suggests that policy makers should carefully choose the type of product innovation to promote as an economic stimulus: addictive innovation can stimulate business activity whereas quantity-augmenting-like innovation and variety expansion always worsen stagnation.

当面对经济停滞时,创新(特别是产品创新)通常被认为是一种有效的刺激措施,因为它被认为可以鼓励家庭消费并导致更高的需求。本文采用具有财富偏好的长期停滞模型,考察了产品创新对就业和消费的影响。本研究考察了三种类型的产品创新,包括数量增强型创新、品种扩大型创新和成瘾性创新。第一种方法的作用是,尽管实际数量保持不变,但消费的数量似乎增加了;第二种方法增加了消费商品的种类;第三种方法降低了消费边际效用的弹性。我们发现,前者和后者总是同时减少消费和就业,而后者则可以扩大消费和就业。这表明政策制定者应该谨慎选择产品创新的类型来促进经济刺激:成瘾性创新可以刺激商业活动,而数量增长型创新和品种扩张往往会加剧停滞。
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引用次数: 0
Tax and Subsidy Policies in a Two-Sided Market: An Application to the Digital Healthcare Industry 双边市场中的税收和补贴政策:在数字医疗行业中的应用
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-11-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70077
Doriani Lingga, Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert

We model an online health marketplace hosting telehealth services as a two-sided market facilitating patient-doctor interactions. We show that, in the laissez-faire equilibrium, a profit-maximizing platform serves too few patients and doctors, compared to the social optimum, because it does not internalize cross-group network externalities. We demonstrate under what conditions introducing a tax-subsidy policy system leads to an increase in the number of agents toward the socially optimal levels. We find that any positive subsidy under the set of policies improves participation and increases interaction benefits, but it is only welfare-enhancing if the subsidy is low enough. We demonstrate that the set of policies is particularly effective in emerging telehealth markets, where demand for medical services is high, doctors' competition is insignificant, and platform rivalry has yet to develop.

我们将托管远程医疗服务的在线医疗市场建模为促进医患互动的双边市场。我们表明,在自由放任的均衡中,与社会最优相比,利润最大化的平台服务的病人和医生太少,因为它没有内化跨群体网络的外部性。我们证明了在什么条件下引入税收补贴政策系统会导致代理人数量向社会最优水平增加。我们发现,在一组政策下,任何正向补贴都能提高参与性,增加互动效益,但只有当补贴足够低时,才会增加福利。我们证明了这套政策在新兴的远程医疗市场中特别有效,在这些市场中,医疗服务的需求很高,医生的竞争微不足道,平台的竞争尚未发展。
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引用次数: 0
The Realizing Potential Rule and Other Axiomatic Rankings of Ordinal Performance Improvements 有序性能改进的实现潜在规则和其他公理排序
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-11-17 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70080
Guy Barokas

Evaluating performance is essential for designing effective incentive structures that enhance productivity across various domains. This paper introduces and axiomatically characterizes the realizing potential rule, which assesses an agent's potential for improvement (or deterioration) based on past performance. Current performance is then evaluated based on the ratio of improvements (or deterioration) relative to this potential. Our main axiom introduces a novel consistency condition, ensuring that evaluations remain stable when the performance scale is reversed. Alternative rules are also discussed and characterized, and the seemingly natural relative improvements rule is shown to violate our consistency condition. Additionally, we show that building a reward system based on the realizing potential rule is more effective in increasing total productivity compared to reward systems based on more common rules. Finally, extending the framework to a social-rule setting, our main result provides an extension of realizing potential to cases where the level of maximal performance is not well-defined. Our results lay a foundation for designing incentive systems that equitably reward improvement while enhancing productivity, with applications in labor markets, education, and healthcare programs.

绩效评估对于设计有效的激励结构以提高各个领域的生产率至关重要。本文引入并公理化地描述了实现潜力规则,该规则基于过去的表现来评估智能体的改进(或恶化)潜力。然后根据相对于这种潜力的改进(或恶化)比率来评估当前的性能。我们的主要公理引入了一个新的一致性条件,确保当性能等级反转时评估保持稳定。对可选规则进行了讨论和表征,并证明了看似自然的相对改进规则违反了我们的一致性条件。此外,我们表明,与基于更常见规则的奖励系统相比,基于实现潜在规则的奖励系统在提高总生产力方面更有效。最后,将框架扩展到社会规则设置,我们的主要结果将实现潜力扩展到最大绩效水平未明确定义的情况。我们的研究结果为设计在提高生产率的同时公平奖励改进的激励制度奠定了基础,并应用于劳动力市场、教育和医疗保健计划。
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引用次数: 0
Emissions Taxes Versus Tradeable Permits With Many Countries 许多国家的排放税与可交易许可
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-11-11 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70079
Helmuts Azacis, David R. Collie

Tradeable permits and emissions taxes are compared in a multi-country global emissions game with perfectly competitive firms and a trans-boundary production externality. In a one-shot game, comparing welfare under the Nash equilibria, it is shown that tradeable permits are superior to emissions taxes. In an infinitely-repeated game, comparing the discount factors required to sustain a global International Environmental Agreement (IEA), it is shown that it is easier to sustain cooperation with tradeable permits than with emissions taxes when the number of countries is sufficiently large. In a coalition-formation game, the number of countries in a stable IEA is two with tradeable permits, but may be all countries in the world with emissions taxes.

可交易许可和排放税在一个多国全球排放博弈中与完全竞争企业和跨界生产外部性进行比较。在一个单次博弈中,比较纳什均衡下的福利,结果表明可交易许可优于排放税。在一个无限重复的博弈中,比较维持全球国际环境协定(IEA)所需的折扣因素,结果表明,当国家数量足够大时,与可交易许可相比,与排放税相比,更容易维持合作。在联盟形成博弈中,稳定的国际能源机构中的国家数量是两个拥有可交易许可的国家,但可能是世界上所有征收排放税的国家。
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引用次数: 0
Polarization as Pluralistic Ignorance 两极分化是多元无知
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-11-09 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70076
Kenjiro Asami, Daiki Kishishita

Polarization is considered one of the most serious challenges in democratic countries. While substantial evidence points to exaggerated perceptions of polarization—called false polarization—whether it can persist in the long run remains understudied. This paper develops a social learning model in which each citizen belongs to either of two political groups and holds either of two attitudes on a controversial issue. In each period, two citizens—one from each group—publicly express their opinions on the issue. Citizens havePolitical polarization is considered one of the conformity motives, but their distribution could be misperceived. We show that false polarization may arise as pluralistic ignorance even when the majority shares the same attitude across the two groups. Specifically, when citizens underestimate others' conformity motives, perceived polarization can trigger a self-reinforcing spiral, leading both groups to appear polarized. Consequently, both groups may continue to publicly express different opinions. Finally, we discuss conditions under which the formation of echo chambers either mitigates or exacerbates false polarization.

两极分化被认为是民主国家最严重的挑战之一。虽然有大量证据表明对两极分化的看法被夸大了,即所谓的虚假两极分化,但它能否长期存在仍有待研究。本文发展了一个社会学习模型,其中每个公民属于两个政治团体中的一个,并在一个有争议的问题上持有两种态度中的一种。在每个阶段,两个公民——每组一个人——公开表达他们对这个问题的看法。政治两极分化被认为是从众动机之一,但其分布可能被误解。我们表明,即使大多数人在两个群体中持有相同的态度,虚假的两极分化也可能出现在多元无知中。具体来说,当公民低估他人的从众动机时,感知到的两极分化会引发一种自我强化的螺旋,导致两个群体都出现两极分化。因此,这两个群体可能会继续公开表达不同的意见。最后,我们讨论了回波室的形成减轻或加剧假极化的条件。
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引用次数: 0
Sabotage and Free Riding in Contests With a Group-Specific Public Good/Bad Prize 在有特定群体公共好/坏奖的竞赛中蓄意破坏和搭便车
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-11-04 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70075
Kyung Hwan Baik, Dongwoo Lee

We study contests in which two groups compete to win (or not to win) a group-specific public good/bad prize. Each player in the groups can exert two types of effort: one to help her own group win the prize and one to sabotage her own group's chances of winning it. The players in the groups choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently. We introduce a specific form of contest success function that determines each group's probability of winning the prize, taking into account players' sabotage activities. We show that two types of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium occur, depending on parameter values: one without sabotage activities and one with sabotage activities. In the first type, only the highest valuation player in each group expends positive constructive effort, whereas in the second type, only the player with the lowest valuation (i.e., negative) in each group expends positive sabotage effort.

我们研究了两组为赢得(或不赢得)特定群体的公共好/坏奖品而竞争的比赛。小组中的每个玩家都可以做出两种努力:一种是帮助自己的小组赢得奖品,另一种是破坏自己小组赢得奖品的机会。小组中的玩家同时独立地选择他们的努力水平。我们引入了一种特殊形式的比赛成功函数,它决定了每个小组赢得奖品的概率,同时考虑到玩家的破坏活动。根据参数值的不同,存在两种类型的纯策略纳什均衡:一种是不存在破坏行为的纳什均衡,另一种是存在破坏行为的纳什均衡。在第一种类型中,只有每组中评价最高的玩家才会付出积极的建设性努力,而在第二种类型中,只有每组中评价最低(即消极)的玩家才会付出积极的破坏努力。
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引用次数: 0
Useful Public Spending, Taylor Principle, and Macroeconomic Instability 有用的公共支出、泰勒原则和宏观经济不稳定
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70054
Antoine Le Riche

This paper analyzes the stationary welfare and local stability implication of useful public spending in a discrete-time one-sector monetary economy with Taylor rule. Public spending, financed through a flat income tax, is useful and exerts externalities on production. In our economy, money is needed for transaction purposes. We show that the introduction of a public spending exerting externality in the production may lead to multiplicity and indeterminacy. When the externality in production is low enough, under a passive interest rate feedback rule, two steady states emerge and could be either locally determinate or indeterminate, depending on the interplay between the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption and the elasticity of the interest rate, while under an active interest rate feedback rule, two interior locally determinate steady states and two liquidity trap locally determinate steady states exist. When externality in production is high enough, a unique local determinate interior steady state occurs, while under an active interest feedback rule, a unique liquidity trap steady state and a unique interior steady state occur, and both are locally determinate. When both two interior steady states and two liquidity trap steady states exist, when the capital stock is low, the interior steady state has a higher level of capital than the one of the liquidity trap, while, when the capital stock is high, it is the liquidity trap steady having a higher level of capital. Finally, liquidity trap equilbria Pareto-dominate the interior equilibria in view of the zero cost of money.

本文利用泰勒规则分析了离散时间单部门货币经济中有用公共支出的平稳福利和局部稳定含义。通过单一所得税提供资金的公共支出是有用的,并对生产产生外部性。在我们的经济中,货币是用于交易的。我们表明,引入在生产中发挥外部性的公共支出可能导致多样性和不确定性。当生产外部性足够低时,在被动利率反馈规则下,根据消费替代的跨期弹性与利率弹性的相互作用,出现了两种稳定状态,可以是局部确定的,也可以是不确定的;而在主动利率反馈规则下,存在两种内部局部确定的稳定状态和两种流动性陷阱局部确定的稳定状态。当生产外部性足够高时,会出现唯一的局部确定的内部稳态,而在主动利益反馈规则下,会出现唯一的流动性陷阱稳态和唯一的内部稳态,两者都是局部确定的。当两个内部稳态和两个流动性陷阱稳态同时存在时,当资本存量较低时,内部稳态的资本水平高于流动性陷阱稳态,而当资本存量较高时,则是流动性陷阱稳态的资本水平高于流动性陷阱稳态。最后,在货币成本为零的情况下,流动性陷阱均衡是帕累托主导的内部均衡。
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引用次数: 0
In-Group Versus Out-Group Preferences in Intergroup Conflict: An Experiment 群体冲突中的群体内偏好与群体外偏好:一项实验
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70074
Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Roman M. Sheremeta

In group conflicts, individuals often have diverse preferences, such as maximizing personal payoff, maximizing the group's payoff, or defeating rivals. When these preferences coexist, isolating their impact on conflict outcomes becomes challenging. To disentangle in-group and out-group preferences, we conduct a group contest experiment in which human in-group or out-group players are replaced with historical subjects to maintain strategic similarity. Our study aims to explore (i) the variation in effort in group conflicts due to in-group and out-group preferences and group cohesion, and (ii) how the impact of these preferences changes when the two groups have explicitly different categorical identities. Surprisingly, our results indicate an absence of overall treatment effects on effort levels. However, the presence of in-groups has heightened concerns about individual payoffs. When out-groups are introduced, these concerns are moderated by an additional focus on the group's payoffs. The negative effect of the in-group preferences and the positive effect of the out-group preferences are weaker when group members have a common categorical identity.

在群体冲突中,个体往往有不同的偏好,如个人利益最大化,群体利益最大化,或击败对手。当这些偏好共存时,孤立它们对冲突结果的影响就变得具有挑战性。为了弄清群体内和群体外的偏好,我们进行了一项群体竞赛实验,在实验中,人类的群体内或群体外参与者被历史受试者取代,以保持策略相似性。本研究旨在探讨(i)群体内、群体外偏好和群体凝聚力对群体冲突努力的影响,以及(ii)当两个群体具有明显不同的类别认同时,这些偏好的影响是如何变化的。令人惊讶的是,我们的结果表明,在努力水平上,总体治疗效果是不存在的。然而,内部团体的存在加剧了人们对个人回报的担忧。当引入外群体时,这些担忧会被对群体收益的额外关注所缓和。当群体成员具有共同的范畴认同时,群体内偏好的消极作用和群体外偏好的积极作用较弱。
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引用次数: 0
Price Discrimination by a Mixed-Objective Firm 混合目标企业的价格歧视
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70068
Arup Bose, Kenneth Fjell, John S. Heywood, Debashis Pal

We examine a firm maximizing a combination of profit and consumer surplus that engages in price discrimination between two groups under incomplete information about their willingness to pay. As the firm increases the weight placed on the consumer surplus of those demanding high-quality goods, the rent captured by this group increases. While this shift alters the price-quality bundle offered to consumers demanding low quality, it never increases their surplus. Importantly, the mixed objective function can enhance overall welfare, as the firm is more likely to serve both consumer groups rather than restrict sales to only the demanders of high quality.

我们考察了一个企业最大化利润和消费者剩余的组合,在不完全信息下,在两个群体之间进行价格歧视。当企业增加对那些要求高质量商品的消费者剩余的重视时,这一群体获得的租金就会增加。虽然这种转变改变了向要求低质量的消费者提供的价格-质量捆绑,但它从未增加他们的剩余。重要的是,混合目标函数可以提高整体福利,因为企业更有可能为两个消费群体服务,而不是将销售仅限于高质量的需求者。
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Journal of Public Economic Theory
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