首页 > 最新文献

Journal of Public Economic Theory最新文献

英文 中文
Epidemics, vaccines, and health policy 流行病、疫苗和卫生政策
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-23 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12677
Rabah Amir, Raouf Boucekkine
{"title":"Epidemics, vaccines, and health policy","authors":"Rabah Amir, Raouf Boucekkine","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12677","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 6","pages":"1143-1148"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138432317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Temptation and self-control for the impure benevolent planner: The case of heterogeneous discounting 不纯粹的善意计划者的诱惑和自我控制:异质折扣的例子
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12674
Takashi Hayashi, Noriaki Kiguchi, Norio Takeoka

This paper presents a “behavioral” model of a normative benevolent social planner, who faces a self-control problem when he/she is in charge of aggregating diverse and conflicting preferences of individuals. The model is presented in the context of aggregating preferences over intertemporal streams of social outcomes, in which Zuber and Jackson and Yariv have shown the impossibility of a time-consistent and Paretian social objective function. Unlike previous studies, our investigation focuses on the compatibility of the Pareto condition with the impure social planner who has a dynamically consistent self-control utility function characterized by Gul and Pesendorfer. Assuming that the social planner is tempted to adopt the majority's opinion when there is a conflict of opinions among individuals, the paper characterizes an aggregation form in which the planner is allowed to depart from dictatorship in ex-post choice under noncommitment.

本文提出了一个规范的仁慈型社会规划者的“行为”模型,当他/她负责汇总个体的多样化和相互冲突的偏好时,他/她面临着自我控制问题。该模型是在社会结果跨时间流的聚合偏好的背景下提出的,其中Zuber、Jackson和Yariv已经证明了时间一致性和家长式社会目标函数的不可能性。与以往的研究不同,我们的研究重点是研究帕累托条件与具有动态一致自我控制效用函数的不纯粹社会规划者的相容性。假设社会计划者在个体之间存在意见冲突时倾向于采纳多数人的意见,本文刻画了一种允许计划者在不承诺的事后选择中脱离独裁的聚合形式。
{"title":"Temptation and self-control for the impure benevolent planner: The case of heterogeneous discounting","authors":"Takashi Hayashi,&nbsp;Noriaki Kiguchi,&nbsp;Norio Takeoka","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12674","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12674","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper presents a “behavioral” model of a normative benevolent social planner, who faces a self-control problem when he/she is in charge of aggregating diverse and conflicting preferences of individuals. The model is presented in the context of aggregating preferences over intertemporal streams of social outcomes, in which Zuber and Jackson and Yariv have shown the impossibility of a time-consistent and Paretian social objective function. Unlike previous studies, our investigation focuses on the compatibility of the Pareto condition with the impure social planner who has a dynamically consistent self-control utility function characterized by Gul and Pesendorfer. Assuming that the social planner is tempted to adopt the majority's opinion when there is a conflict of opinions among individuals, the paper characterizes an aggregation form in which the planner is allowed to depart from dictatorship in ex-post choice under noncommitment.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12674","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Price and variety in the Salop model Salop模型的价格和品种
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12675
Changying Li, Jianhu Zhang

Using a Salop circle model, this research analyzes the welfare implications of firm/product entry with information provision by consumers. While firms use consumer information to target sales efforts, consumers face privacy trade-offs when providing their personal information. We show that (i) price and profit first increase, then decrease with more varieties; (ii) consumer welfare, affected by price, sales effort, privacy loss, and matching effects, first decreases, then increases with firm entry; (iii) equilibrium information is socially optimal given the number of varieties; and (iv) if the variable cost of providing sales assistance is low (high), free entry leads to too much (few) varieties and too little (more) information, from a social welfare standpoint.

本文运用萨洛普循环模型,分析了消费者提供信息时企业/产品进入对福利的影响。虽然公司利用消费者信息来进行目标销售,但消费者在提供个人信息时面临隐私权衡。结果表明:(1)随着品种的增加,价格和利润先上升后下降;(ii)消费者福利受价格、销售努力、隐私损失和匹配效应的影响,随着企业进入先降低后增加;(iii)在给定品种数量的情况下,均衡信息是社会最优的;(iv)如果提供销售援助的可变成本低(高),从社会福利的角度来看,免费进入会导致品种太多(少)和信息太少(多)。
{"title":"Price and variety in the Salop model","authors":"Changying Li,&nbsp;Jianhu Zhang","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12675","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12675","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using a Salop circle model, this research analyzes the welfare implications of firm/product entry with information provision by consumers. While firms use consumer information to target sales efforts, consumers face privacy trade-offs when providing their personal information. We show that (i) price and profit first increase, then decrease with more varieties; (ii) consumer welfare, affected by price, sales effort, privacy loss, and matching effects, first decreases, then increases with firm entry; (iii) equilibrium information is socially optimal given the number of varieties; and (iv) if the variable cost of providing sales assistance is low (high), free entry leads to too much (few) varieties and too little (more) information, from a social welfare standpoint.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
First-best health policy in vaccine markets with health and network externalities 具有健康和网络外部性的疫苗市场的最佳卫生政策
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12673
Rabah Amir, Filomena Garcia, Iryna Topolyan

This paper considers an oligopolistic market for a vaccine, characterized by negative network effects, which stem from the free-riding behavior of individuals engaged in a vaccination game. Vaccine markets often suffer from three imperfections: high concentration, network effects, and a health externality (contagion). The first conclusion of the paper is that the negative network externality is important as a market distortion, as it may lead to significant welfare losses. The second and main part of the paper develops a two-part per-unit subsidy scheme that a social planner could use to target both consumers and producers of vaccines. The scope of such a subsidy scheme to induce the firms to produce the first-best output without network effects (which is the most ambitious first-best target) is investigated. In many cases, while the first-best is attainable, it requires negative prices for vaccines, which amounts to rewarding consumers to induce them to vaccinate.

摘要本文考虑了一个以负网络效应为特征的寡垄断疫苗市场,这种负网络效应源于参与疫苗博弈的个体的搭便车行为。疫苗市场通常存在三个缺陷:高度集中、网络效应和健康外部性(传染)。本文的第一个结论是,负网络外部性作为一种市场扭曲是重要的,因为它可能导致重大的福利损失。论文的第二部分和主要部分开发了一个由两部分组成的每单位补贴计划,社会计划者可以利用它来针对疫苗的消费者和生产者。研究了这种补贴计划的范围,以诱导企业在没有网络效应的情况下生产出最优产出(这是最雄心勃勃的第一优目标)。在许多情况下,虽然第一最佳是可以实现的,但它需要疫苗的负价格,这相当于奖励消费者,以诱使他们接种疫苗。
{"title":"First-best health policy in vaccine markets with health and network externalities","authors":"Rabah Amir,&nbsp;Filomena Garcia,&nbsp;Iryna Topolyan","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12673","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12673","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers an oligopolistic market for a vaccine, characterized by negative network effects, which stem from the free-riding behavior of individuals engaged in a vaccination game. Vaccine markets often suffer from three imperfections: high concentration, network effects, and a health externality (contagion). The first conclusion of the paper is that the negative network externality is important as a market distortion, as it may lead to significant welfare losses. The second and main part of the paper develops a two-part per-unit subsidy scheme that a social planner could use to target both consumers and producers of vaccines. The scope of such a subsidy scheme to induce the firms to produce the first-best output without network effects (which is the most ambitious first-best target) is investigated. In many cases, while the first-best is attainable, it requires negative prices for vaccines, which amounts to rewarding consumers to induce them to vaccinate.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"25 6","pages":"1229-1250"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134957221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Persuading sincere and strategic voters 说服真诚和有战略眼光的选民
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12671
Toygar T. Kerman, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Dominik Karos

A sender wants to persuade multiple homogeneous receivers to vote in favor of a proposal. Before the vote sender commits to a signal which sends private, potentially correlated, messages to receivers that are contingent on the true state of the world. The best equilibrium for sender in the resulting incomplete information game is unappealing: all receivers vote in favor of sender's preferred outcome, irrespective of their message. We therefore focus on the equilibrium where receivers vote sincerely, that is they vote in favor of the outcome that is optimal given their posterior. We characterize the optimal public and the optimal private signal, both for the case where receivers are behavioral and vote sincerely as well as the case where such behavior is a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE). For the optimal public signal, sincere voting is a BNE, but the optimal private signal is subject to the swing voter's curse. Imposing the constraint that sincere voting be a BNE leads to an optimal signal where receivers are never pivotal.

发送方希望说服多个同质接收方投票支持一项提案。在投票之前,发送者承诺向接收者发送一个信号,这个信号会根据世界的真实情况向接收者发送私人的、可能相关的信息。在由此产生的不完全信息博弈中,发送方的最佳均衡并不讨人喜欢:所有接收方都会投票支持发送方所倾向的结果,而不管他们的信息是什么。因此,我们将重点放在接收者真诚投票的均衡上,即接收者根据自己的后验结果,投票支持最优结果。我们描述了最优公共信号和最优私人信号的特征,既包括接收者行为和真诚投票的情况,也包括这种行为是贝叶斯-纳什均衡(BNE)的情况。对于最优公共信号而言,真诚投票是一个 BNE,但最优私人信号则会受到摇摆选民诅咒的影响。施加真诚投票是贝叶斯-纳什均衡(BNE)这一约束,就会产生一个最佳信号,在这个信号中,接收者永远不会起到关键作用。
{"title":"Persuading sincere and strategic voters","authors":"Toygar T. Kerman,&nbsp;P. Jean-Jacques Herings,&nbsp;Dominik Karos","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12671","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12671","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A sender wants to persuade multiple homogeneous receivers to vote in favor of a proposal. Before the vote sender commits to a signal which sends private, potentially correlated, messages to receivers that are contingent on the true state of the world. The best equilibrium for sender in the resulting incomplete information game is unappealing: all receivers vote in favor of sender's preferred outcome, irrespective of their message. We therefore focus on the equilibrium where receivers vote sincerely, that is they vote in favor of the outcome that is optimal given their posterior. We characterize the optimal public and the optimal private signal, both for the case where receivers are behavioral and vote sincerely as well as the case where such behavior is a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE). For the optimal public signal, sincere voting is a BNE, but the optimal private signal is subject to the swing voter's curse. Imposing the constraint that sincere voting be a BNE leads to an optimal signal where receivers are never pivotal.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12671","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135634262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Double auction for trading perfect complements 完美互补交易的双重拍卖
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-30 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12672
Rakesh Chaturvedi, Ashish Kumar Pandey

For a trading problem where a buyer is interested in an aggregate resource with fragmented ownership, the individually owned resources are perfect complements in trade. A double auction, chosen in accordance with a value alignment principle which we formulate, is shown to be strategy proof for owners. Since it also values the aggregate resource correctly, it mitigates the holdout problem by changing the source of inefficiency from complementarity on owners' side to lack of competition on buyer side. The value alignment principle implies that this double auction has a majority trading rule. With multiple buyers, a suitable modification makes the double auction strategy proof even for the buyers, thus mitigating the holdout problem by achieving approximate ex post efficiency when the number of owners is large.

在交易问题中,如果买方对所有权分散的总体资源感兴趣,那么各自拥有的资源在交易中就是完美的互补。根据我们提出的价值一致性原则选择的双重拍卖对所有者来说是策略证明。由于它也能正确评估总体资源的价值,因此它能将无效率的根源从所有者一方的互补性转变为买方一方的缺乏竞争性,从而缓解拒绝交易问题。价值一致原则意味着这种双重拍卖具有多数交易规则。在有多个买方的情况下,通过适当的修改,双重拍卖策略甚至对买方也是有效的,从而在所有者人数较多时,通过实现近似的事后效率,缓解了弃权问题。
{"title":"Double auction for trading perfect complements","authors":"Rakesh Chaturvedi,&nbsp;Ashish Kumar Pandey","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12672","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12672","url":null,"abstract":"<p>For a trading problem where a buyer is interested in an aggregate resource with fragmented ownership, the individually owned resources are perfect complements in trade. A double auction, chosen in accordance with a value alignment principle which we formulate, is shown to be strategy proof for owners. Since it also values the aggregate resource correctly, it mitigates the holdout problem by changing the source of inefficiency from complementarity on owners' side to lack of competition on buyer side. The value alignment principle implies that this double auction has a majority trading rule. With multiple buyers, a suitable modification makes the double auction strategy proof even for the buyers, thus mitigating the holdout problem by achieving approximate ex post efficiency when the number of owners is large.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136102654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
FDI spillovers, new industry development, and economic growth 外国直接投资溢出效应、新产业发展和经济增长
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12670
Thanh Tam Nguyen-Huu, Ngoc-Sang Pham

The paper investigates the optimal strategy of a small open economy receiving foreign direct investment (FDI) in an optimal growth context. We prove that no domestic firm can enter the new industry when the multinational enterprise's productivity or the fixed entry cost is high. Nevertheless, the host country's investment stock converges to a higher steady state than an economy without FDI. A domestic firm enters the new industry if its productivity is high enough. Moreover, the domestic firm can dominate or even eliminate its foreign counterpart.

本文研究了在最优增长背景下小型开放经济体接受外国直接投资(FDI)的最优战略。我们证明,当跨国企业的生产率或固定进入成本较高时,国内企业无法进入新行业。然而,与没有外国直接投资的经济体相比,东道国的投资存量会收敛到更高的稳定状态。如果生产率足够高,国内企业就会进入新产业。此外,国内企业可以支配甚至淘汰外国同行。
{"title":"FDI spillovers, new industry development, and economic growth","authors":"Thanh Tam Nguyen-Huu,&nbsp;Ngoc-Sang Pham","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12670","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12670","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper investigates the optimal strategy of a small open economy receiving foreign direct investment (FDI) in an optimal growth context. We prove that no domestic firm can enter the new industry when the multinational enterprise's productivity or the fixed entry cost is high. Nevertheless, the host country's investment stock converges to a higher steady state than an economy without FDI. A domestic firm enters the new industry if its productivity is high enough. Moreover, the domestic firm can dominate or even eliminate its foreign counterpart.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135885160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal law enforcement when individuals are either moral or norm followers 当个人是道德或规范追随者时的最佳执法方式
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12669
Claude Fluet, Tim Friehe

Moral rules and social norms influence whether individuals break the law. We characterize optimal law enforcement when some individuals obey internalized moral rules and implement social norms for other individuals who prefer to comply with them. Moral individuals and norm followers are linked via the endogenous social norm and this induces the social planner to create an expected sanction for norm setters that is higher than without the link. The optimal expected sanction for moral individuals is higher than the one for norm followers if the moral rule is weak but the reverse ranking is true when it is strong.

道德规则和社会规范会影响个人是否违法。我们描述了当一些人遵守内化的道德规则并为其他倾向于遵守道德规则的人实施社会规范时的最佳执法情况。道德个体和规范遵守者通过内生的社会规范联系在一起,这促使社会规划者为规范制定者制定比没有联系时更高的预期制裁。如果道德规则较弱,道德个体的最优预期制裁高于规范遵守者,但如果道德规则较强,则相反。
{"title":"Optimal law enforcement when individuals are either moral or norm followers","authors":"Claude Fluet,&nbsp;Tim Friehe","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12669","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12669","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Moral rules and social norms influence whether individuals break the law. We characterize optimal law enforcement when some individuals obey internalized moral rules and implement social norms for other individuals who prefer to comply with them. Moral individuals and norm followers are linked via the endogenous social norm and this induces the social planner to create an expected sanction for norm setters that is higher than without the link. The optimal expected sanction for moral individuals is higher than the one for norm followers if the moral rule is weak but the reverse ranking is true when it is strong.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12669","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136295439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Green industrial policy, information asymmetry, and repayable advance 绿色产业政策、信息不对称和可偿还预付款
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12668
Guy Meunier, Jean-Pierre Ponssard

The energy transition requires the deployment of risky research and development programs, most of which are partially financed by public funding. Recent recovery plans, associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy transition, increased the funding available to finance innovative low-carbon projects and called for an economic evaluation of their allocation. This paper analyzes the potential benefit of using repayable advance: a lump-sum payment to finance the project that is paid back in case of success. The relationship between the state and innovative firms is formalized in the principal-agent framework. Investing in an innovative project requires an initial observable capital outlay. We introduce asymmetric information on the probability of success, which is known to the firm but not to the state agency. The outcome of the project, if successful, delivers a private benefit to the firm and an external social benefit to the state. In this context a repayable advance consists in rewarding failure. We prove that it is a superior strategy in the presence of pure adverse selection. We investigate under what conditions this result could be extended in the presence of moral hazard. Implications for green industrial policy are discussed.

能源转型需要部署高风险的研发项目,其中大部分项目的部分资金来自公共资金。与 COVID-19 大流行病和能源转型相关的近期恢复计划增加了可用于资助创新低碳项目的资金,并要求对资金分配进行经济评估。本文分析了使用可偿还预付款的潜在好处:一次性付款为项目提供资金,项目成功后再偿还。国家与创新企业之间的关系是在委托代理框架下正式确定的。投资创新项目需要一笔可观察到的初始资本支出。我们引入了关于成功概率的不对称信息,企业知道成功概率,但国家机构不知道。如果项目成功,其结果会给企业带来私人利益,给国家带来外部社会利益。在这种情况下,可偿还预付款就是奖励失败。我们证明,在纯粹逆向选择的情况下,它是一种更优策略。我们研究了在何种条件下,这一结果可以扩展到道德风险的存在。我们还讨论了绿色产业政策的意义。
{"title":"Green industrial policy, information asymmetry, and repayable advance","authors":"Guy Meunier,&nbsp;Jean-Pierre Ponssard","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12668","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12668","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The energy transition requires the deployment of risky research and development programs, most of which are partially financed by public funding. Recent recovery plans, associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy transition, increased the funding available to finance innovative low-carbon projects and called for an economic evaluation of their allocation. This paper analyzes the potential benefit of using repayable advance: a lump-sum payment to finance the project that is paid back in case of success. The relationship between the state and innovative firms is formalized in the principal-agent framework. Investing in an innovative project requires an initial observable capital outlay. We introduce asymmetric information on the probability of success, which is known to the firm but not to the state agency. The outcome of the project, if successful, delivers a private benefit to the firm and an external social benefit to the state. In this context a repayable advance consists in rewarding failure. We prove that it is a superior strategy in the presence of pure adverse selection. We investigate under what conditions this result could be extended in the presence of moral hazard. Implications for green industrial policy are discussed.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jpet.12668","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136296091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Patent licensing for signaling the cost-reduction innovation: The case of the insider innovator 专利许可为降低成本的创新提供信号:内部创新者的案例
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-08 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12667
Cheng-Tai Wu, Tsung-Sheng Tsai

We analyze the patent licensing contracts offered by an insider innovator that has private information about the quality of innovation that can be transferred to two downstream firms. When information is complete, the first-best choice is a pure-royalty contract which is accepted by both firms (i.e., is nonexclusive). When information is incomplete, however, no nonexclusive contract can be supported as a separating equilibrium; it can only be the case where the innovator sells an exclusive contract to only one firm or a nonlicensing contract where no license is sold. In particular, when the gap in the innovation between the efficient and inefficient type is sufficiently small, there does not exist any separating equilibrium. It is sharply different from the case of an outsider innovation, in which a separating equilibrium always exists.

我们分析了一个内部创新者所提供的专利许可合同,该创新者拥有关于可转让给两家下游企业的创新质量的私人信息。当信息完全时,第一最优选择是两家公司都接受的纯版权合同(即非排他性合同)。然而,当信息不完全时,任何非排他性合同都不能作为分离均衡得到支持;只能是创新者只向一家公司出售排他性合同,或者是不出售许可证的非许可证合同。特别是,当高效型和低效型之间的创新差距足够小时,不存在任何分离均衡。这与局外人创新的情况截然不同,局外人创新总是存在分离均衡。
{"title":"Patent licensing for signaling the cost-reduction innovation: The case of the insider innovator","authors":"Cheng-Tai Wu,&nbsp;Tsung-Sheng Tsai","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12667","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jpet.12667","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze the patent licensing contracts offered by an insider innovator that has private information about the quality of innovation that can be transferred to two downstream firms. When information is complete, the first-best choice is a pure-royalty contract which is accepted by both firms (i.e., is nonexclusive). When information is incomplete, however, no nonexclusive contract can be supported as a separating equilibrium; it can only be the case where the innovator sells an exclusive contract to only one firm or a nonlicensing contract where no license is sold. In particular, when the gap in the innovation between the efficient and inefficient type is sufficiently small, there does not exist any separating equilibrium. It is sharply different from the case of an outsider innovation, in which a separating equilibrium always exists.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135197754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
期刊
Journal of Public Economic Theory
全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1