Pub Date : 2021-09-02DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2021.1976961
{"title":"Professor Zeev Sternhell","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/13569317.2021.1976961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2021.1976961","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47036,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Ideologies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47661094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-02DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2021.1978734
Alain Noël, J. Thérien, Émile Boucher
ABSTRACT How universal and effective is the left-right opposition? We use public opinion data collected in 83 societies between 2008 and 2014 through the World Values Survey and the European Values Study, to look at the relationships, in each society, between individual ideological self-positioning and attitudes towards a set of eleven issues that capture the standard dimensions of the left-right political distinction. We observe varying levels of national ideological reach – the predictive power of left-right self-positioning on other attitudes – and ideological density – an index of the strength of the relationships between all the survey questions that we examine. These different levels of ideological reach and density can be explained by economic development, secularization, and democratic experience. A lasting experience with democracy, in particular, accounts best for the variations. When citizens have the capabilities and the possibilities of making political choices, they respond better to the elites’ tendency to structure political debates in left-right terms.
{"title":"The political construction of the left-right divide: a comparative perspective","authors":"Alain Noël, J. Thérien, Émile Boucher","doi":"10.1080/13569317.2021.1978734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2021.1978734","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How universal and effective is the left-right opposition? We use public opinion data collected in 83 societies between 2008 and 2014 through the World Values Survey and the European Values Study, to look at the relationships, in each society, between individual ideological self-positioning and attitudes towards a set of eleven issues that capture the standard dimensions of the left-right political distinction. We observe varying levels of national ideological reach – the predictive power of left-right self-positioning on other attitudes – and ideological density – an index of the strength of the relationships between all the survey questions that we examine. These different levels of ideological reach and density can be explained by economic development, secularization, and democratic experience. A lasting experience with democracy, in particular, accounts best for the variations. When citizens have the capabilities and the possibilities of making political choices, they respond better to the elites’ tendency to structure political debates in left-right terms.","PeriodicalId":47036,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Ideologies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46554786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-27DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2021.1966933
Luke O’Sullivan
ABSTRACT Film matters to political theory, Davide Panagia has argued, because its unique properties as a medium create the possibility of experiencing ideas about politics in a way that the arguments of textual political theory cannot convey. This paper disputes this account by drawing on work on both the nature of political theory and on the concept of visual argument. It uses the work of Gilles Deleuze to argue that even if the filmic image cannot be understood on the analogy of language, insofar as film seeks to convey political ideas, these are always at least implicitly linguistic. Using examples drawn from classic and contemporary political films, the paper provides a classification of political films by genre according to the same criteria as written works of political theory. It concludes that although Deleuze’s argument that film can present political images and signs in a way that has no linguistic equivalent may be correct, Panagia’s further claim that there are political ideas that are uniquely suited to, or can only be conveyed in, a visual medium has no warrant.
{"title":"Theoretical projections: cinematic experience and political thinking","authors":"Luke O’Sullivan","doi":"10.1080/13569317.2021.1966933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2021.1966933","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Film matters to political theory, Davide Panagia has argued, because its unique properties as a medium create the possibility of experiencing ideas about politics in a way that the arguments of textual political theory cannot convey. This paper disputes this account by drawing on work on both the nature of political theory and on the concept of visual argument. It uses the work of Gilles Deleuze to argue that even if the filmic image cannot be understood on the analogy of language, insofar as film seeks to convey political ideas, these are always at least implicitly linguistic. Using examples drawn from classic and contemporary political films, the paper provides a classification of political films by genre according to the same criteria as written works of political theory. It concludes that although Deleuze’s argument that film can present political images and signs in a way that has no linguistic equivalent may be correct, Panagia’s further claim that there are political ideas that are uniquely suited to, or can only be conveyed in, a visual medium has no warrant.","PeriodicalId":47036,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Ideologies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43230338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-27DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2021.1968160
Meir Hatina
ABSTRACT The Sudanese thinker Mahmud Muhammad Taha (d. 1985) was a bold advocate of Arab enlightenment, which he based on a synthesis of Sufism, democracy and socialism that in his view represented the ideal amalgamation of ethics, freedom, and equality. The model of Islam he sought to renew was the Islam of Mecca (612–622). In his view, the Meccan period advocated universal values such as justice, freedom and peace, and ought hence be revived. The Medinan period (622–632), which turned Islam into a religion of coercion and exploitation, needed to be abolished. Taha’s sharp division of the Qurʾan into two parts, one exalted and the other inferior, signified a total break with past legacies. His dismantling of the sacred in the name of humanity was intertwined with his deconstruction of Arab collective memory regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, as he called for reconciliation with the Jewish State. While Taha’s vigorous writing rocked Islamic and Arabic scholarship, it left him and his followers on the fringes of consensus. This study opens a wider window onto the worldview of one of the most creative, and controversial, Arab thinkers in modern times – as yet not thoroughly researched – while framing him within a broader discussion of Arab liberalism.
{"title":"Dismantling the sacred in the name of humanity: Mahmud Muhammad Taha’s cultural revolution","authors":"Meir Hatina","doi":"10.1080/13569317.2021.1968160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2021.1968160","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Sudanese thinker Mahmud Muhammad Taha (d. 1985) was a bold advocate of Arab enlightenment, which he based on a synthesis of Sufism, democracy and socialism that in his view represented the ideal amalgamation of ethics, freedom, and equality. The model of Islam he sought to renew was the Islam of Mecca (612–622). In his view, the Meccan period advocated universal values such as justice, freedom and peace, and ought hence be revived. The Medinan period (622–632), which turned Islam into a religion of coercion and exploitation, needed to be abolished. Taha’s sharp division of the Qurʾan into two parts, one exalted and the other inferior, signified a total break with past legacies. His dismantling of the sacred in the name of humanity was intertwined with his deconstruction of Arab collective memory regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, as he called for reconciliation with the Jewish State. While Taha’s vigorous writing rocked Islamic and Arabic scholarship, it left him and his followers on the fringes of consensus. This study opens a wider window onto the worldview of one of the most creative, and controversial, Arab thinkers in modern times – as yet not thoroughly researched – while framing him within a broader discussion of Arab liberalism.","PeriodicalId":47036,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Ideologies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46474991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-12DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2021.1966939
Sam Crawley
ABSTRACT Scholars have debated why people on the right of politics are consistently found to be less likely to support environmental action than those on the left. Some authors argue that this relationship is primarily driven by conservative economic attitudes, while several studies have demonstrated a negative link between conservative social attitudes and environmental attitudes. However, as few studies include both conservative economic and social attitudes, it remains unclear whether both sets of attitudes relate to environmental attitudes independently, or whether one confounds the other. This study uses Bayesian regression analyses of data from the 2017 New Zealand election study, finding that both conservative economic attitudes (free market support, opposition to welfare) and conservative social attitudes (exclusionary attitudes, right-wing authoritarianism) have independent negative relationships with environmental attitudes. These results imply that the link between conservative ideology and environmental attitudes is as much about social attitudes and worldview as about economics.
{"title":"Disentangling the relationships between conservative economic and social attitudes and support for environmental action","authors":"Sam Crawley","doi":"10.1080/13569317.2021.1966939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2021.1966939","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Scholars have debated why people on the right of politics are consistently found to be less likely to support environmental action than those on the left. Some authors argue that this relationship is primarily driven by conservative economic attitudes, while several studies have demonstrated a negative link between conservative social attitudes and environmental attitudes. However, as few studies include both conservative economic and social attitudes, it remains unclear whether both sets of attitudes relate to environmental attitudes independently, or whether one confounds the other. This study uses Bayesian regression analyses of data from the 2017 New Zealand election study, finding that both conservative economic attitudes (free market support, opposition to welfare) and conservative social attitudes (exclusionary attitudes, right-wing authoritarianism) have independent negative relationships with environmental attitudes. These results imply that the link between conservative ideology and environmental attitudes is as much about social attitudes and worldview as about economics.","PeriodicalId":47036,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Ideologies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48560303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-06DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2021.1962146
Zhao Sikong
ABSTRACT After more than 20 years of the Chinese economic development initiated in 1978, the theoretical debates that had been discouraged by Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic approach to Socialism resurfaced in the form of the discussions and controversies surrounding the Chinese translation of the phrase Aufhebung des Privateigentums from the Manifesto of the Communist Party. Since 2000, there have been three waves of debates. The first wave confronts scholars over translating Aufhebung by yangqi (‘sublation’) instead of xiaomie (‘abolition’) of private property. The second brings into focus the controversial interpretation of ‘abolition’ relating only to ‘bourgeois private property’ rather than ‘individual property based on one’s own labour’. The third wave advances the idea, perceived as radical by some Chinese scholars, that the inclusion of the term Aufhebung in the Manifesto was a fundamental error. The integration of these debates in their historical context reveals the indirect character of the Chinese scholarly debates on political issues.
{"title":"Three waves of debates among Chinese scholars about the meaning of Aufhebung des Privateigentums in the Manifesto of the Communist Party","authors":"Zhao Sikong","doi":"10.1080/13569317.2021.1962146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2021.1962146","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT After more than 20 years of the Chinese economic development initiated in 1978, the theoretical debates that had been discouraged by Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic approach to Socialism resurfaced in the form of the discussions and controversies surrounding the Chinese translation of the phrase Aufhebung des Privateigentums from the Manifesto of the Communist Party. Since 2000, there have been three waves of debates. The first wave confronts scholars over translating Aufhebung by yangqi (‘sublation’) instead of xiaomie (‘abolition’) of private property. The second brings into focus the controversial interpretation of ‘abolition’ relating only to ‘bourgeois private property’ rather than ‘individual property based on one’s own labour’. The third wave advances the idea, perceived as radical by some Chinese scholars, that the inclusion of the term Aufhebung in the Manifesto was a fundamental error. The integration of these debates in their historical context reveals the indirect character of the Chinese scholarly debates on political issues.","PeriodicalId":47036,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Ideologies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13569317.2021.1962146","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48057141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2021.1957297
Yaacov Yadgar, Noam Hadad
ABSTRACT Adopting the ‘post-secular’ critique of the mainstream discourse on ‘religion and politics’, this article aims to offer a novel consideration of what is commonly identified as religious nationalism. Following the post-secular cue, we highlight the importance of the nation-statist configuration of power for the very construction of the conceptual and categorical frameworks into which discussions of religion, secularity, politics, and nationalism have usually been put. We use a comprehensive study of Religious-Zionist ideology, as manifested in public debates between 1967 and 2014, to examine how this phenomenon can be interpreted without falling into the trap of employing historically and politically embodied conceptual toolkits as if they were ahistorical and universal. Our analysis highlights the foundational indebtedness of Religious-Zionism to the nation-statist configuration of power, a commitment that in effect ‘politicizes’ and ‘nationalizes’ what is seen as theology or religion.
{"title":"A post-secular interpretation of religious nationalism: the case of Religious-Zionism","authors":"Yaacov Yadgar, Noam Hadad","doi":"10.1080/13569317.2021.1957297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2021.1957297","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Adopting the ‘post-secular’ critique of the mainstream discourse on ‘religion and politics’, this article aims to offer a novel consideration of what is commonly identified as religious nationalism. Following the post-secular cue, we highlight the importance of the nation-statist configuration of power for the very construction of the conceptual and categorical frameworks into which discussions of religion, secularity, politics, and nationalism have usually been put. We use a comprehensive study of Religious-Zionist ideology, as manifested in public debates between 1967 and 2014, to examine how this phenomenon can be interpreted without falling into the trap of employing historically and politically embodied conceptual toolkits as if they were ahistorical and universal. Our analysis highlights the foundational indebtedness of Religious-Zionism to the nation-statist configuration of power, a commitment that in effect ‘politicizes’ and ‘nationalizes’ what is seen as theology or religion.","PeriodicalId":47036,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Ideologies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13569317.2021.1957297","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43183908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-23DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2021.1956164
John Foster, C. el-Ojeili
ABSTRACT This article explores utopian dimensions and reality problems in the intellectual production of leading Anglophone public intellectuals and policymaking institutions of Western capitalism. We argue that from the close of the 1990s, but especially in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, elite discourse has splintered into three core strands or moments: first, a post-hegemonic, punitive neoliberalism of austerity, which retreats from leadership and seeks to preserve extant power relations; second, a pragmatic neo-Keynesian turn, which frequently combines the language of enterprise and competition with advocacy of selective political and economic re-regulation towards a more socially justified capitalism; and third, the advance of a ‘liberalism of fear’, which evokes a number of threatening dystopian figures in populism, protectionism, the 1930s, extremism and totalitarianism. This splintering effect, we argue, is one of the key features of today’s wider ideological-utopian constellation, entwined with the growth of the new far right and with radicalization on the left. Drawing on a Gramscian analysis of crisis, we argue that the ideological incoherence of the dominant intellectual elite, and the denuded utopian dimensions of their discourse, are both symptomatic and productive of the present organic crisis of Western capitalism and its attendant crisis of intellectual and moral leadership.
{"title":"Centrist utopianism in retreat: ideological fragmentation after the financial crisis","authors":"John Foster, C. el-Ojeili","doi":"10.1080/13569317.2021.1956164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2021.1956164","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores utopian dimensions and reality problems in the intellectual production of leading Anglophone public intellectuals and policymaking institutions of Western capitalism. We argue that from the close of the 1990s, but especially in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, elite discourse has splintered into three core strands or moments: first, a post-hegemonic, punitive neoliberalism of austerity, which retreats from leadership and seeks to preserve extant power relations; second, a pragmatic neo-Keynesian turn, which frequently combines the language of enterprise and competition with advocacy of selective political and economic re-regulation towards a more socially justified capitalism; and third, the advance of a ‘liberalism of fear’, which evokes a number of threatening dystopian figures in populism, protectionism, the 1930s, extremism and totalitarianism. This splintering effect, we argue, is one of the key features of today’s wider ideological-utopian constellation, entwined with the growth of the new far right and with radicalization on the left. Drawing on a Gramscian analysis of crisis, we argue that the ideological incoherence of the dominant intellectual elite, and the denuded utopian dimensions of their discourse, are both symptomatic and productive of the present organic crisis of Western capitalism and its attendant crisis of intellectual and moral leadership.","PeriodicalId":47036,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Ideologies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13569317.2021.1956164","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46070702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-23DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2021.1956758
Jessica Eastland-Underwood
ABSTRACT Many scholars have cautioned against over-emphasizing the role of culture and values in the unique structure of the American welfare state. In this article, I argue that the Tea Party movement is an exceptional example of how values attributed to the founding of the American nation are used as a cultural schema to legitimize arguments and to mobilize political actors to constrain the perception of available welfare policy options. Using the Wayback Machine, I have built a bespoke archive of rhetoric from Tea Party chapter websites in 2009 to 2011, outlining the values the Tea Party attributes to the Founding Fathers. I provide a more nuanced history of the Founding Era in order to expose the selective scope of Tea Party history, exaggerating certain ideas while neglecting others. Adapting a pragmatic historiographical method, I argue that this historical narrative illuminates the less socially desirable motivations of both the elite and everyday actors in the Tea Party: free market ideology and latent racial animus. As such, I conclude that cultural values ought to remain an important area of research, particularly identifying how modern political actors co-opt history and national identity to legitimize partisan ideological claims, particularly in the arena of welfare policy.
{"title":"What was the original intent? The Tea Party movement, the Founding Fathers, and the American welfare state","authors":"Jessica Eastland-Underwood","doi":"10.1080/13569317.2021.1956758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2021.1956758","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Many scholars have cautioned against over-emphasizing the role of culture and values in the unique structure of the American welfare state. In this article, I argue that the Tea Party movement is an exceptional example of how values attributed to the founding of the American nation are used as a cultural schema to legitimize arguments and to mobilize political actors to constrain the perception of available welfare policy options. Using the Wayback Machine, I have built a bespoke archive of rhetoric from Tea Party chapter websites in 2009 to 2011, outlining the values the Tea Party attributes to the Founding Fathers. I provide a more nuanced history of the Founding Era in order to expose the selective scope of Tea Party history, exaggerating certain ideas while neglecting others. Adapting a pragmatic historiographical method, I argue that this historical narrative illuminates the less socially desirable motivations of both the elite and everyday actors in the Tea Party: free market ideology and latent racial animus. As such, I conclude that cultural values ought to remain an important area of research, particularly identifying how modern political actors co-opt history and national identity to legitimize partisan ideological claims, particularly in the arena of welfare policy.","PeriodicalId":47036,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Ideologies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13569317.2021.1956758","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44796075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-13DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2021.1954815
Lenon Campos Maschette
ABSTRACT This article aims to re-evaluate Margaret Thatcher’s concept of citizenship and analyse its evolution during her government (1979–1990). It argues that her ideas concerning individuals and their relationship with the state and civil society were a crucial element of her belief system since at least the 1970s. Despite their importance, however, most analyses of Thatcherism have relegated these ideas to a marginal place. A rigorous analysis of speeches, interviews, memoirs and documents shows that Thatcher had reconceptualized the idea of citizenship long before her home secretary Douglas Hurd attempted to rationalize and re-package her ideas for public consumption. However, by the end of the 1980s, when moderate Conservatives such as Hurd turned their attention to this question, it was widely perceived that the Conservative Party required a more humane and coherent concept of citizenship. The article concludes that Thatcher’s ideas about the relationship between individuals, the state and community had a lasting influence on the Conservative and New Labour parties’ concept of citizenship.
{"title":"Revisiting the concept of citizenship in Margaret Thatcher’s government: the individual, the state, and civil society","authors":"Lenon Campos Maschette","doi":"10.1080/13569317.2021.1954815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2021.1954815","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article aims to re-evaluate Margaret Thatcher’s concept of citizenship and analyse its evolution during her government (1979–1990). It argues that her ideas concerning individuals and their relationship with the state and civil society were a crucial element of her belief system since at least the 1970s. Despite their importance, however, most analyses of Thatcherism have relegated these ideas to a marginal place. A rigorous analysis of speeches, interviews, memoirs and documents shows that Thatcher had reconceptualized the idea of citizenship long before her home secretary Douglas Hurd attempted to rationalize and re-package her ideas for public consumption. However, by the end of the 1980s, when moderate Conservatives such as Hurd turned their attention to this question, it was widely perceived that the Conservative Party required a more humane and coherent concept of citizenship. The article concludes that Thatcher’s ideas about the relationship between individuals, the state and community had a lasting influence on the Conservative and New Labour parties’ concept of citizenship.","PeriodicalId":47036,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Ideologies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13569317.2021.1954815","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41401262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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