Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00572-3
Johannes M J Wagner, Thomas Pölzler, Jennifer C Wright
Philosophical arguments often assume that the folk tends towards moral objectivism. Although recent psychological studies have indicated that lay persons' attitudes to morality are best characterized in terms of non-objectivism-leaning pluralism, it has been maintained that the folk may be committed to moral objectivism implicitly. Since the studies conducted so far almost exclusively assessed subjects' metaethical attitudes via explicit cognitions, the strength of this rebuttal remains unclear. The current study attempts to test the folk's implicit metaethical commitments. We present results of a newly developed Implicit Association Test (IAT) for metaethical attitudes which indicate that the folk generally tend towards moral non-objectivism on the implicit level as well. We discuss implications of this finding for the philosophical debate.
{"title":"Implicit Metaethical Intuitions: Validating and Employing a New IAT Procedure.","authors":"Johannes M J Wagner, Thomas Pölzler, Jennifer C Wright","doi":"10.1007/s13164-021-00572-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00572-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Philosophical arguments often assume that the folk tends towards moral objectivism. Although recent psychological studies have indicated that lay persons' attitudes to morality are best characterized in terms of non-objectivism-leaning pluralism, it has been maintained that the folk may be committed to moral objectivism <i>implicitly</i>. Since the studies conducted so far almost exclusively assessed subjects' metaethical attitudes via explicit cognitions, the strength of this rebuttal remains unclear. The current study attempts to test the folk's implicit metaethical commitments. We present results of a newly developed Implicit Association Test (IAT) for metaethical attitudes which indicate that the folk generally tend towards moral non-objectivism on the implicit level as well. We discuss implications of this finding for the philosophical debate.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":"14 1","pages":"1-31"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10033619/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9244418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-28DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00664-8
Tillmann Vierkant
{"title":"Mindshaping and Non-Gricean Approaches to Language Evolution","authors":"Tillmann Vierkant","doi":"10.1007/s13164-022-00664-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00664-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49650921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-26DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00668-4
D. Statman
{"title":"Rejecting the Objectification Hypothesis","authors":"D. Statman","doi":"10.1007/s13164-022-00668-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00668-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42867519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-21DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00670-w
Antonella Tramacere, F. Mafessoni
{"title":"Cognitive Twists: The Coevolution of Learning and Genes in Human Cognition","authors":"Antonella Tramacere, F. Mafessoni","doi":"10.1007/s13164-022-00670-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00670-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48814393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-05DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00666-6
Mark Miller, A. Clark, T. Schlicht
{"title":"Editorial: Predictive Processing and Consciousness","authors":"Mark Miller, A. Clark, T. Schlicht","doi":"10.1007/s13164-022-00666-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00666-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46721976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-02DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00667-5
Stephan Tegtmeier
{"title":"Fully Caused and Flourishing? Incompatibilist Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications for Personal Well-Being","authors":"Stephan Tegtmeier","doi":"10.1007/s13164-022-00667-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00667-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48674067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-22DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00658-6
Dr Wehinger
{"title":"The Transcendental Argument for Universal Mineness: A Critique","authors":"Dr Wehinger","doi":"10.1007/s13164-022-00658-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00658-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49059843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-09DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00661-x
Miguel Segundo-Ortin, Annemarie Kalis
According to ecological psychology, agency is a crucial feature of living organisms: therefore many ecological psychologists maintain that explaining agency is one of the core aims of the discipline. This paper aims to contribute to this goal by arguing that an ecological understanding of agency requires an account of intention. So far, intentions have not played a dominant role in ecological accounts of agency. The reluctance to integrate a notion of intention seems to be motivated by the widespread assumption that intentions should be understood as internal states with representational content. This assumption goes against two main tenets of ecological psychology: its anti-representationalist stance and its claim that perception is direct (in the sense of not being mediated by inferential processes). Ecological psychology thus needs a different answer to the question what intentions are. In this paper, we aim to show that Elizabeth Anscombe’s theory of intention can be fruitfully brought to bear on an ecological theory of agency. We will argue that Anscombe’s account can meet the two challenges of bringing intentions into the framework of ecological psychology: firstly it can explain what intentions are, if not representational states; and, secondly, it can show how our perception of affordances is guided by intention without undermining the idea of direct perception.
{"title":"Intentions in Ecological Psychology: An Anscombean Proposal","authors":"Miguel Segundo-Ortin, Annemarie Kalis","doi":"10.1007/s13164-022-00661-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00661-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to ecological psychology, agency is a crucial feature of living organisms: therefore many ecological psychologists maintain that explaining agency is one of the core aims of the discipline. This paper aims to contribute to this goal by arguing that an ecological understanding of agency requires an account of intention. So far, intentions have not played a dominant role in ecological accounts of agency. The reluctance to integrate a notion of intention seems to be motivated by the widespread assumption that intentions should be understood as internal states with representational content. This assumption goes against two main tenets of ecological psychology: its anti-representationalist stance and its claim that perception is direct (in the sense of not being mediated by inferential processes). Ecological psychology thus needs a different answer to the question what intentions are. In this paper, we aim to show that Elizabeth Anscombe’s theory of intention can be fruitfully brought to bear on an ecological theory of agency. We will argue that Anscombe’s account can meet the two challenges of bringing intentions into the framework of ecological psychology: firstly it can explain what intentions are, if not representational states; and, secondly, it can show how our perception of affordances is guided by intention without undermining the idea of direct perception.</p>","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":"224 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138531423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00662-w
Migdalia Arcila-Valenzuela, Andrés Páez
{"title":"Testimonial Injustice: The Facts of the Matter","authors":"Migdalia Arcila-Valenzuela, Andrés Páez","doi":"10.1007/s13164-022-00662-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00662-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47055,"journal":{"name":"Review of Philosophy and Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43537174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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