In electricity markets, the price paid by retail customers during periods of peak demand is far below the cost of supply. This leads to overconsumption during peak periods, requiring the construction of excess generation capacity compared to first-best prices that adjust at short time intervals to reflect changing marginal cost. This paper investigates the response of infrequently studied small commercial and industrial establishments to a four-hour increase in retail electricity prices invoked by individual utilities during peak demand periods 15 times per year. This policy intends to reduce electricity consumption when generation costs are highest. I find that the approximately tripled prices reduce establishment peak electricity usage by 13.5%. Using a model of capacity investment decisions, I find that the program delivers 44% of the benefits of the first-best policy of continuously varying prices and suggest two simple improvements in program design that could nearly double these welfare gains.
{"title":"Making the Best of the Second-Best: Welfare Consequences of Time-Varying Electricity Prices","authors":"Joshua A. Blonz","doi":"10.1086/720566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/720566","url":null,"abstract":"In electricity markets, the price paid by retail customers during periods of peak demand is far below the cost of supply. This leads to overconsumption during peak periods, requiring the construction of excess generation capacity compared to first-best prices that adjust at short time intervals to reflect changing marginal cost. This paper investigates the response of infrequently studied small commercial and industrial establishments to a four-hour increase in retail electricity prices invoked by individual utilities during peak demand periods 15 times per year. This policy intends to reduce electricity consumption when generation costs are highest. I find that the approximately tripled prices reduce establishment peak electricity usage by 13.5%. Using a model of capacity investment decisions, I find that the program delivers 44% of the benefits of the first-best policy of continuously varying prices and suggest two simple improvements in program design that could nearly double these welfare gains.","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"9 1","pages":"1087 - 1126"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47092852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nonmarket natural capital provides crucial inputs across the economy. We use land rental market data to calculate the welfare impacts of a change in an unpriced natural capital while accounting for spatial spillovers. We apply the welfare analysis to examine the cost of white-nose syndrome (WNS) in bats, which provide pest control services to agricultural producers. WNS, a disease that decimates bat populations, arrived in the United States in the mid-2000s. Leveraging the exogenous change in bat populations, we find that the loss of bats in a county causes land rental rates to fall by $2.84 per acre plus $1.50 per acre per neighboring county with WNS. Agricultural land falls by 1,102 acres plus 582 acres per neighboring county with WNS. As of 2017, agricultural losses from WNS were between $426 and $495 million per year. These estimates of ecosystem service values can inform public management of society’s natural capital.
{"title":"Ecosystem Services and Land Rental Markets: Producer Costs of Bat Population Crashes","authors":"D. Manning, Amy W. Ando","doi":"10.1086/720303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/720303","url":null,"abstract":"Nonmarket natural capital provides crucial inputs across the economy. We use land rental market data to calculate the welfare impacts of a change in an unpriced natural capital while accounting for spatial spillovers. We apply the welfare analysis to examine the cost of white-nose syndrome (WNS) in bats, which provide pest control services to agricultural producers. WNS, a disease that decimates bat populations, arrived in the United States in the mid-2000s. Leveraging the exogenous change in bat populations, we find that the loss of bats in a county causes land rental rates to fall by $2.84 per acre plus $1.50 per acre per neighboring county with WNS. Agricultural land falls by 1,102 acres plus 582 acres per neighboring county with WNS. As of 2017, agricultural losses from WNS were between $426 and $495 million per year. These estimates of ecosystem service values can inform public management of society’s natural capital.","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"9 1","pages":"1235 - 1277"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46833164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F. Diekert, Tillmann Eymess, J. Luomba, Israel Waichman
Formal regulations often fail to ensure sustainable management of natural resources. An alternative approach could rely on the interaction of norm-based interventions and social sanctions. Our lab-in-the-field experiment with fishermen at Lake Victoria studies how a norm-based intervention, namely, social information about high or low levels of previous cooperation, affects behavior and beliefs in a prisoner’s dilemma game with or without weak social sanctioning. Providing different social information succeeds in creating different norms of cooperation, but only if sanctioning is possible: cooperation rates start at a high level and stay at a high level when social information emphasizes cooperation but start at a low level and stay at a low level when social information emphasizes defection. Without social sanctioning, cooperation rates decline, irrespective of the social information. Particularly participants with close connection to others in their experimental session conform to the behavior that is emphasized by the social information message under sanctioning.
{"title":"The Creation of Social Norms under Weak Institutions","authors":"F. Diekert, Tillmann Eymess, J. Luomba, Israel Waichman","doi":"10.1086/720287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/720287","url":null,"abstract":"Formal regulations often fail to ensure sustainable management of natural resources. An alternative approach could rely on the interaction of norm-based interventions and social sanctions. Our lab-in-the-field experiment with fishermen at Lake Victoria studies how a norm-based intervention, namely, social information about high or low levels of previous cooperation, affects behavior and beliefs in a prisoner’s dilemma game with or without weak social sanctioning. Providing different social information succeeds in creating different norms of cooperation, but only if sanctioning is possible: cooperation rates start at a high level and stay at a high level when social information emphasizes cooperation but start at a low level and stay at a low level when social information emphasizes defection. Without social sanctioning, cooperation rates decline, irrespective of the social information. Particularly participants with close connection to others in their experimental session conform to the behavior that is emphasized by the social information message under sanctioning.","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"9 1","pages":"1127 - 1160"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48238840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Climate change poses a growing threat to biodiversity, but the welfare consequences of these changes are not well understood. Here we analyze data on the US Endangered Species Act and project increases in species listing and spending due to climate change. We show that higher endangerment is strongly associated with the probability of listing but also find a large bias toward vertebrate species for both listing and spending. Unmitigated warming would cause the listing of an additional 690 species and committed spending of $21 billion by 2100. Several thousand more species would be critically imperiled by climate change but remain unlisted. Finally, we compare ESA spending with estimates of willingness to pay for conservation of 36 listed species. Aggregate WTP is larger than ESA spending for the vast majority of species even using conservative assumptions and typically one to two orders of magnitude larger than direct ESA spending using less restrictive assumptions.
{"title":"Noah’s Ark in a Warming World: Climate Change, Biodiversity Loss, and Public Adaptation Costs in the United States","authors":"F. Moore, A. Stokes, M. Conte, Xiaoliang Dong","doi":"10.1086/716662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/716662","url":null,"abstract":"Climate change poses a growing threat to biodiversity, but the welfare consequences of these changes are not well understood. Here we analyze data on the US Endangered Species Act and project increases in species listing and spending due to climate change. We show that higher endangerment is strongly associated with the probability of listing but also find a large bias toward vertebrate species for both listing and spending. Unmitigated warming would cause the listing of an additional 690 species and committed spending of $21 billion by 2100. Several thousand more species would be critically imperiled by climate change but remain unlisted. Finally, we compare ESA spending with estimates of willingness to pay for conservation of 36 listed species. Aggregate WTP is larger than ESA spending for the vast majority of species even using conservative assumptions and typically one to two orders of magnitude larger than direct ESA spending using less restrictive assumptions.","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"9 1","pages":"981 - 1015"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48779125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze multiple subsidy programs for residential energy efficiency upgrades from 2010 to 2015 using electricity billing records of more than 11 million households in Southern California. We find that adopting these upgrades reduces overall electricity usage by 4%. However, there are significant differences in savings between upgrades. Pool pump and refrigeration upgrades generate the largest savings (13% and 6%, respectively). Lighting and HVAC retrofits generate the smallest savings (less than 1%). Some upgrades lead to concerns of rebound effects, such as dishwasher and clothes washer upgrades, and building envelope upgrades. Program impact varies by time of the year and building type. Furthermore, we find that energy savings are inconsistent with the engineering estimates. These results indicate that policy makers should consider the allocation of program funding not simply based on engineering projections but also based on measured electricity consumption such as those described in this study.
{"title":"Are Residential Energy Efficiency Upgrades Effective? An Empirical Analysis in Southern California","authors":"Yating Chuang, M. Delmas, S. Pincetl","doi":"10.1086/718529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718529","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze multiple subsidy programs for residential energy efficiency upgrades from 2010 to 2015 using electricity billing records of more than 11 million households in Southern California. We find that adopting these upgrades reduces overall electricity usage by 4%. However, there are significant differences in savings between upgrades. Pool pump and refrigeration upgrades generate the largest savings (13% and 6%, respectively). Lighting and HVAC retrofits generate the smallest savings (less than 1%). Some upgrades lead to concerns of rebound effects, such as dishwasher and clothes washer upgrades, and building envelope upgrades. Program impact varies by time of the year and building type. Furthermore, we find that energy savings are inconsistent with the engineering estimates. These results indicate that policy makers should consider the allocation of program funding not simply based on engineering projections but also based on measured electricity consumption such as those described in this study.","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"9 1","pages":"641 - 679"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44832001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Policy reforms targeting federal oil and gas production are increasingly considered as approaches to reduce CO2 emissions. Yet such policies are controversial, in part due to leakage concerns. I model the effects of three such policies, including carbon adders and a leasing ban. Accounting for leakage, a leasing ban reduces emissions by about one-quarter of the amount originally projected for the Clean Power Plan but reduces royalty revenues by $5 billion annually. Carbon adders reduce emissions less but can raise billions of dollars annually. Charging the same carbon adder for both oil and gas is not revenue-maximizing because gas production is more sensitive to the adder. I estimate revenue-maximizing adders of $40/ton for oil and $5/ton for gas, but higher revenues come at the cost of higher emissions than achieved by charging adders based on the social cost of carbon. These results highlight important policy trade-offs in federal leasing reforms.
{"title":"Supply-Side Reforms to Oil and Gas Production on Federal Lands: Modeling the Implications for CO2 Emissions, Federal Revenues, and Leakage","authors":"Brian C. Prest","doi":"10.1086/718963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718963","url":null,"abstract":"Policy reforms targeting federal oil and gas production are increasingly considered as approaches to reduce CO2 emissions. Yet such policies are controversial, in part due to leakage concerns. I model the effects of three such policies, including carbon adders and a leasing ban. Accounting for leakage, a leasing ban reduces emissions by about one-quarter of the amount originally projected for the Clean Power Plan but reduces royalty revenues by $5 billion annually. Carbon adders reduce emissions less but can raise billions of dollars annually. Charging the same carbon adder for both oil and gas is not revenue-maximizing because gas production is more sensitive to the adder. I estimate revenue-maximizing adders of $40/ton for oil and $5/ton for gas, but higher revenues come at the cost of higher emissions than achieved by charging adders based on the social cost of carbon. These results highlight important policy trade-offs in federal leasing reforms.","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"9 1","pages":"681 - 720"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48867074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Failures to conserve wildlife do not typically arise from an absence of conservation policies; they occur when existing policies are ineffective. From national laws prohibiting the killing of African elephants to international agreements governing the exploitation of marine animals, behavioral responses and enforcement capacity shape the extent to which conservation policies improve or worsen conservation outcomes. Causal estimates of the effects of conservation policies and their underlying mechanisms are largely unavailable, limiting the extent to which declines in wildlife abundance and biodiversity can be reduced and reversed. In the three chapters ofmy dissertation, I use causal inference econometrics, high-resolution data, and economic theory to begin to fill this knowledge gap. First, when regulators in Peru try to protect juvenile fish by temporarily closing specific areas of ocean, they inadvertently provide information about the location of schools of fish, resulting in large spillovers that cause the policy to backfire. Second, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) protect fisheries from unauthorized fishing, but only in EEZs with fisheries valuable enough to justify enforcement costs. Third, armed conflict near elephant habitat increases elephant poaching. Gabriel Englander is currently a postdoctoral scholar in the Environmental Markets Lab at the University of California, Santa Barbara. In August 2022 he will join the Development Research Group of the World Bank (https://www.gabrielenglander.com/).
{"title":"Wallace E. Oates Outstanding Doctoral Dissertation Award","authors":"G. Englander","doi":"10.1086/718308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718308","url":null,"abstract":"Failures to conserve wildlife do not typically arise from an absence of conservation policies; they occur when existing policies are ineffective. From national laws prohibiting the killing of African elephants to international agreements governing the exploitation of marine animals, behavioral responses and enforcement capacity shape the extent to which conservation policies improve or worsen conservation outcomes. Causal estimates of the effects of conservation policies and their underlying mechanisms are largely unavailable, limiting the extent to which declines in wildlife abundance and biodiversity can be reduced and reversed. In the three chapters ofmy dissertation, I use causal inference econometrics, high-resolution data, and economic theory to begin to fill this knowledge gap. First, when regulators in Peru try to protect juvenile fish by temporarily closing specific areas of ocean, they inadvertently provide information about the location of schools of fish, resulting in large spillovers that cause the policy to backfire. Second, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) protect fisheries from unauthorized fishing, but only in EEZs with fisheries valuable enough to justify enforcement costs. Third, armed conflict near elephant habitat increases elephant poaching. Gabriel Englander is currently a postdoctoral scholar in the Environmental Markets Lab at the University of California, Santa Barbara. In August 2022 he will join the Development Research Group of the World Bank (https://www.gabrielenglander.com/).","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"9 1","pages":"iii - iii"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48008735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Farmers and politicians in North Dakota and nearby states claim that dramatic increases in shipments of crude oil by rail in 2013–14 caused service delays and higher costs. We investigate these claims, accounting for other potential sources of rail congestion. We show that grain price spreads between the market hub and regional elevators expanded significantly when crude oil shipments increased. However, the incidence of those effects was borne mostly by buyers paying higher prices at the hub rather than farmers receiving lower prices. The effects differ by the type of grain being transported. Wheat markets were affected much more than corn and soybeans, most likely because shipping delays were more costly for wheat than corn and soybeans. When rail capacity is scarce, railroads use railcar auctions to price discriminate over the time sensitivity of a shipment.
{"title":"Food versus Fuel? Impacts of the North Dakota Oil Boom on Agricultural Prices","authors":"J. Bushnell, Jonathan E. Hughes, Aaron Smith","doi":"10.1086/716522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/716522","url":null,"abstract":"Farmers and politicians in North Dakota and nearby states claim that dramatic increases in shipments of crude oil by rail in 2013–14 caused service delays and higher costs. We investigate these claims, accounting for other potential sources of rail congestion. We show that grain price spreads between the market hub and regional elevators expanded significantly when crude oil shipments increased. However, the incidence of those effects was borne mostly by buyers paying higher prices at the hub rather than farmers receiving lower prices. The effects differ by the type of grain being transported. Wheat markets were affected much more than corn and soybeans, most likely because shipping delays were more costly for wheat than corn and soybeans. When rail capacity is scarce, railroads use railcar auctions to price discriminate over the time sensitivity of a shipment.","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"9 1","pages":"79 - 112"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43429767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine how optimal renewable energy (RE) support policies need to be adjusted to account for carbon prices. We show theoretically and empirically that changing carbon prices requires adjusting RE subsidies due to two motives. First, RE premiums need to be reduced to reflect the carbon value embedded in the market price. Second, once a coal to gas switch occurs, RE premiums and feed-in tariffs need to be adjusted to account for changes in the marginal external benefit of RE. We use empirical estimations and numerical simulation models to quantify these effects for the United Kingdom. We show that the second effect is empirically small, whereas the first effect requires to completely phase-out RE premiums with increasing carbon prices. Finally, a fuel switch increases solar-induced abatement, whereas wind-induced abatement is rather invariant to a fuel switch. Yet, the differentiation of optimal subsidies between wind and solar power is modest.
{"title":"The Impact of Carbon Prices on Renewable Energy Support","authors":"J. Abrell, Mirjam Kosch","doi":"10.1086/717417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/717417","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how optimal renewable energy (RE) support policies need to be adjusted to account for carbon prices. We show theoretically and empirically that changing carbon prices requires adjusting RE subsidies due to two motives. First, RE premiums need to be reduced to reflect the carbon value embedded in the market price. Second, once a coal to gas switch occurs, RE premiums and feed-in tariffs need to be adjusted to account for changes in the marginal external benefit of RE. We use empirical estimations and numerical simulation models to quantify these effects for the United Kingdom. We show that the second effect is empirically small, whereas the first effect requires to completely phase-out RE premiums with increasing carbon prices. Finally, a fuel switch increases solar-induced abatement, whereas wind-induced abatement is rather invariant to a fuel switch. Yet, the differentiation of optimal subsidies between wind and solar power is modest.","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"9 1","pages":"531 - 563"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2021-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48901812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The demand for automobile transportation and the external costs of driving vary widely across locations. However, gasoline taxes, the most common policy tools implemented to correct these externalities, are levied uniformly at the federal and state levels. I examine how a gasoline tax that reflects the heterogeneity in demand and damages can improve efficiency. I estimate county-level travel demand elasticities and congestion damages to compare the efficiency of state gasoline taxes to county-specific fuel taxes. Because elasticities, congestion damages, and pollution damages exhibit heterogeneity across regions, county-specific fuel taxes, largely levied in major metropolitan areas, provide consumer welfare gains between $5 and $30 per capita annually in addition to equity gains relative to revenue-neutral state fuel taxes.
{"title":"Correcting Heterogeneous Externalities: Evidence from Local Fuel Taxes","authors":"Cody Nehiba","doi":"10.1086/717418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/717418","url":null,"abstract":"The demand for automobile transportation and the external costs of driving vary widely across locations. However, gasoline taxes, the most common policy tools implemented to correct these externalities, are levied uniformly at the federal and state levels. I examine how a gasoline tax that reflects the heterogeneity in demand and damages can improve efficiency. I estimate county-level travel demand elasticities and congestion damages to compare the efficiency of state gasoline taxes to county-specific fuel taxes. Because elasticities, congestion damages, and pollution damages exhibit heterogeneity across regions, county-specific fuel taxes, largely levied in major metropolitan areas, provide consumer welfare gains between $5 and $30 per capita annually in addition to equity gains relative to revenue-neutral state fuel taxes.","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"9 1","pages":"495 - 529"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2021-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47362662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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