EDUCATIONAL THEORY最新文献

Although Charles Sanders Peirce died over a century before ChatGPT became publicly available, we argue that he remains informative in discussions of AI because of his articulation of the Pragmatic Maxim We argue that Peirce's pragmatism offers two avenues from which the appropriateness or inappropriateness of AI in education can be evaluated: (1) Peirce's redefinition of teaching and learning along the lines of the finite origins of reason allows for a reorientation of education that would circumscribe the uses of AI to those that are dependent on authentic, inquisitive learning; and (2) Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim is used as a test by which myriad applications of AI can be evaluated for appropriateness. This test ensures that uses of AI are directed towards, experience. Rather than making a final determination on the overall desirability or undesirability of AI in education, we offer two methods for discriminating between the two extremes.

The launch of the powerful generative AI tool ChatGPT in November 2022 sparked a wave of fear across higher education. The tool could seemingly be used to write essays and do other work without students putting in the effort expected of them. In this paper, Jamie Herman and Henry Lara-Steidel posit a way of addressing the concerns over ChatGPT and increasingly powerful generative AI tools in the classroom by first examining what exactly, if anything, widespread AI use undermines in education. That question, they argue, is logically prior to the question of what to do or how best to embrace new advances in AI technology. They propose that ChatGPT, rather than threatening student cognitive development and effort, reveals a serious flaw in higher education's current aims and assessments: they are directed at knowledge, not understanding. Herman and Lara-Steidel review the distinction between knowledge and understanding to argue that aiming for the latter requires work and effort from students, ensuring that they develop cognitive agency. They further note that assessments in higher education are typically geared toward measuring knowledge, not understanding, and suggest that this makes them particularly vulnerable to being undermined by AI use, while assessments of understanding do not. Although AI can enhance and aid students in developing understanding, it can neither provide them with understanding nor give the appearance of understanding without student effort. After addressing some salient objections, the authors conclude by outlining avenues for designing understanding-based assessments in higher education compatible with AI tools such as ChatGPT, and they provide a framework for both understanding and responding to generative AI use in education.

The emergence of ChatGPT, and other generative AI (GenAI) tools, has elicited dystopian and utopian proclamations concerning their potential impact on education. This paper suggests that responses to GenAI are based on often-implicit perceptions of naturalness and artificiality. To examine the depiction and function of these concepts, Gideon Dishon analyzes two pivotal texts in thinking about the natural and artificial — Emile and Frankenstein. These are complemented by a third text — a “conversation” between Microsoft's Bing chatbot and New York Times columnist Kevin Roose. Analyses of the natural–artificial relations across the three texts are explored along three key educational aspects: (i) the child's innate nature; (ii) how learning takes place; and (iii) the educators' role. These analyses offer three key implications for thinking about the natural–artificial in education in general, and with respect to AI specifically: (1) illuminating the centrality and ambiguity of notions of naturalness in educational discourse, often conflating its descriptive and normative use; (2) outlining how the natural and artificial are dialectically constructed across the three texts, with an emphasis on the relational view of artificiality in Frankenstein; (3) suggesting that what is novel about GenAI is not its artificial intelligence (AI), but rather its “artificial emotions” (AE) — the emotions attributed to it by humans, and the ensuing relations humans develop with such machines.

This paper develops the following thesis: teaching about religions in public school holds meaning and value beyond civic purpose, aiming also to educate the existential and spiritual dimensions of students. In developing this thesis, Carmelo Galioto employs a phenomenological approach in considering the place and role of religion in public schools. First, he reconstructs the prevailing liberal arguments regarding the purpose of teaching religion in public schools. Second, drawing on some of Edith Stein's claims, he proposes that public schools contribute not only to the development of civic friendship and critical thinking, but also to existential purposes. Third, he presents how Simone Weil's reflections help us to see the connection between teaching religion in public schools and accomplishing important existential and spiritual purposes. Finally, Galioto details how teaching religion serves as a key element in the existential and spiritual development of students, taking into account various issues related to this educational aim. The phenomenological approach, he concludes, contributes to a specific conception of religion as an educational subject in the public school system, one focused on teaching about and from religions.

This essay analyzes Pierre Hadot's reading of Aristotelian theoria in order to evaluate theoria's relevancy for the contemporary field of Contemplative Education. It emphasizes the limited engagement with theoria against a backdrop of heightened attention to mindfulness-based practices. The essay critiques the conflation of Plato and Aristotle's appropriations of diplomatic theoria and reveals shortcomings in Hadot's attempt to characterize theoria as a spiritual exercise of self-cultivation at the core of an Aristotelian way of life. The critique underscores the need for a clearer delineation of Plato and Aristotle's contribution to contemporary Contemplative Education and points to the possibility of a richer exploration of theoria beyond Hadot's interpretation.

Tolerance, a key characteristic in contemporary societies, is particularly urgent in the wake of globalization and its associated challenges. This study critiques the mainstream concept of tolerance and its educational implications, proposing an approach to education for tolerance based on the epistemological framework of philosophical pragmatism and pragmatist interpretation of the concept of habit. The mainstream definition of tolerance relies on two problematic dichotomies — reason versus emotion and individual versus social — leading to a definition of tolerance that entails the suffering of tolerant individuals. Pragmatist epistemology perceives reason and emotion as integral aspects of the holistic apparatus by which humans cultivate habits of thought and action through interactions with the material and social worlds. Habits develop only in appropriate social and emotional contexts; therefore, education for tolerance should construct pedagogical communities in which tolerance is cultivated alongside the emotionally rewarding experiences of membership and belonging.

The differences between soul and spirit can be quite difficult to understand throughout the works of John Dewey. What are they, how do they differ, and how do they relate to meaningful growth? Drawing from his personal correspondence and an analysis of the work in the later part of his life, Becky Noël Smith and Randy Hewitt conclude that, in reference to growth and flourishing specifically, Dewey's writings contain three nuanced meanings of soul. First, Noël Smith and Hewitt provide a framework for understanding his naturalized conception of soul and spirit. Then, they explore how these can help reframe how we think and talk about learning experience, relationships, and processes. The aim is to recover an inspired view of education, one grounded in a fuller sense of human becoming and rich in democratic and aesthetic dimensions.

When do teachers need to deal with sociopolitical issues impartially and when are they justified in taking a stand? In the academic literature, attempts to answer this question have centered on the relative merits of four criteria of controversial issues: the epistemic criterion, the behavioral criterion, the politically authentic criterion, and the political criterion. In this paper, Bruce Maxwell first presents a critical survey that details the limitations of these criteria as heuristic methods for reliably distinguishing controversial from uncontroversial issues for pedagogical purposes, and then advances and defends a more promising approach. This approach prioritizes students' rights and teachers' responsibilities at stake and hence aligns with the standard decision procedure that professionals gravitate toward when faced with a problem of professional ethics. The paper concludes with a discussion of the practical value for educators of focusing on teachers' responsibilities and students' rights in the context of professional decision-making about impartiality, rather than referring to the descriptive criteria of controversial issues.