EDUCATIONAL THEORY最新文献

In this essay Sandra Vanderbilt explores philosophies of peace and protest through a dialectical reading of the works of Martin Luther King Jr., Daisaku Ikeda, and Paulo Freire, and considers these philosophies in relation to her own activism, specifically in the context of dealing with White postracial myths and more overt acts of racism. This essay outlines what she learned from her dialectical reading across several works by King, Ikeda, and Freire, and how these philosophies of peace and protest informed the ways in which she has been able to initiate and sustain conversations across the chasm that separates her antiracist positioning from the stance of friends and family members who deny and enact racism and White supremacy. The three theorists Vanderbilt focuses on here all point to ongoing engagement among individuals as necessary to sustaining the collective. Drawing on their work, Vanderbilt suggests that we have to begin with a critical understanding of Whiteness in our efforts to engage someone, in radically loving acts, in confrontation with their own words and behavior. Opportunities for this sort of confrontation have the potential to bridge the conversational chasm and to open discussions wherein one can practice the virtue of justice, and importantly racial justice.

How can we build a path from the binary of gender to the unity of common humanity? What kind of difference can the “different voice” of feminism make as a human voice? In this article, Naoko Saito argues that the way we talk about the difference of a “different voice” needs to be radically transformed. To envision a route to such a transformation, she explores an alternative possibility of feminism in the American transcendentalism of Margaret Fuller and Ralph Waldo Emerson. First, Saito critically examines the politics of recognition and suggests a susceptibility to binary thinking in its approach. Second, as a way of transcending the binary mode of thinking, Saito introduces the humanist feminism of the nineteenth-century American transcendentalist Margaret Fuller. Third, as a way of elucidating the radicality of Fuller's transcendentalist feminism, Saito introduces the feminine voice of two male philosophers — Ralph Waldo Emerson and Stanley Cavell — as her conversational partners. By radically converting the way we talk about difference of voice, the transcendentalist feminism of Fuller, Emerson, and Cavell provides a third way that lies beyond the politics of recognition and care ethics. In conclusion, Saito proposes that the cultivation of the feminine subject requires an alternative political education that resists assimilation into political realism. This would realize our common humanity and, in its crossing of divides between men and women, would create democracy from within.

Many on the contemporary Left assume that the Right has irrevocably taken control of cyberspace. Many believe that the terrain of online memetic discourse, from 4chan to Russian interference in the 2016 election via social media, is now the domain of trolls, fascists, and neo-Nazis. In this article, Gabriel Keehn argues against that assumption, tracing the ways in which the Right won the meme war and arguing for the educative and liberatory potential of a left counteroffensive in this still contested space.

In this article, Heather Greenhalgh-Spencer argues that deep listening is the foundational component of bridge-building; that it is deep listening that foments the trust and desire for action that undergirds our building of bridges. While “listening” is not a new topic, Greenhalgh-Spencer adds to the literature by expanding on what are the essential components of the kind of listening — which she calls “deep listening” — that can lead to ethical action, change, and connection. She identifies desire, care, acknowledgment of difference, acknowledgment of power, and courage as the key components of this form of listening. Furthermore, she aims to provide concrete examples of how deep listening enables — in fact, is the primary foundation for — bridge-building. She begins the article by defining “deep listening” and then moves to an example of deep listening in action, one taken from the context of community-engaged partnerships — a type of bridge-building in which university faculty create partnerships with community members. In taking this approach, Greenhalgh-Spencer provides a clear illustration of the essential role deep listening plays in the ethical bridge-building process.

In this article, Barbara Applebaum examines “the inability to disagree claim” as it arises in objections made by those who want to ban “critical race theory” from being taught in schools and universities. Employing insights from the recent scholarship around willful hermeneutical ignorance, she discerns the important role that marginalized conceptual resources play in conditions of just and constructive dialogue. When such resources are misinterpreted and denied uptake, the resulting harm impedes the epistemic agency of marginally situated knowers. Applebaum claims that many high-profile anti–“critical race theory” arguments put forth by politicians, scholars, and others are a form of willful hermeneutical ignorance, and she concludes by showing how more just communications, in which disagreement is distinguishable from dismissal, can be achieved.

This essay focuses on the affective dimension of epistemic injustice — specifically, the affective harms and burdens of epistemic injustice on individuals and groups — and examines how pedagogy may help disrupt the affective injustice that epistemic injustice entails. This theorization facilitates the ability to recognize that affective wrongs are not separate from epistemic wrongs but are instead embedded in them. Here, Michalinos Zembylas brings recent philosophical inquiry on affective injustice into conversation with considerations of epistemic injustice in order to discuss how affect-related conceptions of epistemic injustice help education scholars to illuminate the entanglement of the epistemic and the affective in the wrongs of testimonial, hermeneutical, and other forms of epistemic injustice. His analysis outlines how some theoretical concepts concerning “affective goods” — including affective freedoms, affective resources, and affective recognition — have important pedagogical implications for the role educators can play in rupturing epistemic-affective injustices.

Normative case studies represent empirically grounded phenomena that raise normative philosophical questions. Growth in the popularity of case-based inquiry in philosophy reflects a recent trend in the field not to shy away from engaging with empirical realities, but instead to advance philosophical projects that recognize and speak directly to these realities, including social inequities endemic to our societies. Yet, as the use of case studies and other empirically engaged philosophical approaches has grown, concerns have been raised about whether these methods risk reducing philosophy to social science and, in turn, burdening philosophy with the constraints of social science research. Responding to these concerns calls for more attention to the methodological dimensions of case-based inquiry in philosophy. In this article, Rebecca Taylor offers reflections on two core clarifying questions: (1) What makes normative case studies distinct from other related tools for inquiry — in particular, philosophical thought experiments and qualitative case studies? (2) What quality criteria should guide the development of normative case studies?

This essay opens on the streets of Rome in 2019 among displays of fascist relics, architecture, and memorial sites. Each display speaks to Italy's violent colonial and fascist history, one that continues to be entangled with and to overdetermine Italy's contemporary restrictive citizenship laws and anti-immigrant policies. Here, Paula M. Salvio turns to a psychoanalytic understanding of omnipotence, and to Michael Rothberg's concept of multidirectional memory, in order to pursue the half-spoken history of Italian fascism that is hauntingly absent from Italy's public school curriculum, as well as from sites of public pedagogy such as museums, cinema, memorials, and social media platforms. This absence raises important questions about the ethical obligation education has to teach against omnipotence in conventional classroom settings and sites of public pedagogy. Salvio concludes with a reading of a socially engaged project, the Holocaust Memorial located in the Milan Central Railway Station on Platform 21, that is aimed at teaching against omnipotence. The memorial stands as a site of conscience that is committed to making visible what was hidden for years — the deportation between 1943 and 1945 of Italian Jews from the Milan Central Railway Station to Auschwitz-Birkenau and Bergen-Belsen.