EDUCATIONAL THEORY最新文献

In this article, I assume that it is universally accepted that education—at least sometimes—should aim at knowledge. Moreover, I take my point of departure from the classical (and minimal) definition of knowledge in terms of justified true belief (JTB). I further assume that this definition usually rests on a common-sense realist notion of truth, which I take to minimally entail that whether something is true or not is independent of our beliefs about whether something is true or not, and that we—at least sometimes—can know whether something is true or not. Given the strong relationship between education and knowledge, these assumptions might make one think that common-sense realism has a strong position in educational research. However, it is clear that educational research has been heavily influenced by views in conflict with common-sense realism. The aim of this article is to comprehensively describe the implications of rejecting common-sense realism for the practice and aim of knowledge-based education. I outline two strategies for opponents of common-sense realism: (1) either to avoid the (realist) notion of truth altogether in the definition of knowledge or (2) to (re) define truth in the definition of knowledge in a way that avoids common-sense realism. I conclude that both strategies entail radical implications for the practice and aim of knowledge-based education. I end the article by discussing and responding to some of the concerns that have motivated scholars to reject common-sense realism in the first place.

This article provides a theoretical argument for a queer failure pedagogy enacted in required diversity courses. Queer failure, as originally theorized by Halberstam (2011), rejects the traditional notion of success and failure rooted in capitalist, heteropatriarchal hierarchies. Queer- and critical disability-informed educators have taken this concept and theorized what this approach can open up for educators in the classroom. This article is particularly interested in understanding failure in the required diversity course, as failure is a constant presence when having discussions on diversity, equity, and inclusion in today's political climate. This article offers examples of the author's experience engaging with queer failure and discomfort and explores how we can reframe this crisis for ourselves and our students.

This article builds from an exorbitant moment—the invocation of an inspirational quote on the eve of a new school year—to critically explore the larger, commonplace conceptual frame that the best teachers give all of themselves to their students, even to the point of self-erasure, as it continues to manifest across various discourses in education, research, and policy. We find significant problems emerging from this rhetoric, ones that compromise both the efficacy and humanizing potential of pedagogical practices. Offering alternative ways forward for teachers that do not romanticize teacher martyrdom, we focus instead on approaches that affirm the relational complexities of work in classrooms and encourage constant transformation, versions of “a teaching life” we argue to be more life-giving and sustaining.

Capitalism inheres alienation as a fundament of modern life, twisting the root of being such that a sense of pervasive estrangement becomes the condition undergirding much of our phenomenal existence. Alienation, I argue, formed in the cleavage of capital mediation, leaves us reinscribing its tenor across multiple spheres, as we are compelled to not only maximize capitalist growth, but also maintain the fullness of capitalism beyond the economic realm. To locate this argument, I begin with a brief description of Marx's analysis of capital as an alienating force. In the second section of the article, I employ Heidegger's existential analytic to argue that capitalist alienation is a perversion that shifts and informs how we exist, as we are called not only to accumulate but also to justify capitalism as a reifying force. I approach the analysis by looking at three phenomena: first, the issue of transcendental debt; second, the emergence of neoliberal idle talk as a supplement to capitalism; third, the oppression of the built environment, as capitalist efficiencies are prioritized in a globalizing world. Given the robustness of phenomenal encounters with capitalism, it is increasingly difficult to argue that education might offer solutions for issues of alienation. Nonetheless, this very prevalence is what makes the stakes of some kind of educational response clear. As such, I conclude the article with an exploration of what might be done to disrupt capitalist tendencies through a pedagogy of respite.

On the standard picture, membership in the set of utterances “academic speech” is both necessary and sufficient for an utterance to enjoy the protections of academic freedom. In this article, I challenge the sufficiency claim by showing that there are significant epistemic and pedagogical benefits to be had by delineating a class of utterances that qualify as academic speech but that are not entitled to academic freedom protections. To this end, I adopt Eamonn Callan's (2016) distinction between “intellectual safety” and “dignity safety” and argue that there are some utterances that contribute to intellectually productive learning environments but also undermine the dignity of some members of the classroom. While such utterances count as academic speech (or so I argue), they should not enjoy academic freedom protections because this would be detrimental not only to the instructional and social aims of the university, but also (and perhaps surprisingly) to the knowledge aim. While my account of the relationship between academic speech and academic freedom is not as simple as the standard account, it can bypass two serious objections that the standard account must contend with—namely, that it relies on either a conception of academic speech that is underinclusive, or a conception of academic freedom that is overinclusive. I use these objections to highlight the importance of independence between our theoretical conceptions of academic speech and academic freedom.

This article critiques the inherent violence within conventional education systems, examining their determinative and coercive constructions as forms onto-epistemic violence. While marginalized groups experience intensified forms of this violence, all students are subjected to educational normativity that disciplines, regulates, and constrains learning through compulsory structures. Drawing on poststructural theorists such as Henry Giroux, Judith Butler, and Michel Foucault, the article explores how curricula, disciplinary practices, and performativity perpetuate explicit and implicit violence. Butler's symbolic violence elucidates how schools structure intelligibility, determining whose knowledge and being are legitimized. Similarly, Foucault's analysis of disciplinary mechanisms reveals how schools function as instruments of social control, limiting onto-epistemic possibilities. Positioning crip theory as the primary framework, with decolonial and posthumanist perspectives as complementary, this article examines how cripped subjectivities are both sites of systemic violation and forces of disruption that unsettle educational normativity. The article argues for aleatory and non-determinative educational formations that refuse stable architectures, advocating for crip (non)pedagogies, mutual aid-based learning, and nomadic subjectivities that challenge the fixity of knowledge and being. This deimagining demands the fundamental undoing of normative educational reproductions of cognition and being, allowing for more fluid, interdependent, and generative onto-epistemic formations.

This article critically examines dominant formulations of epistemic injustice, focusing on Miranda Fricker's tradition and its broader influence. We argue that much of the literature on epistemic injustice is formulated within a specific Western world-picture, and we discuss its implications. A significant source of this confinement is the view of language as merely a tool for communication. Drawing on Wittgenstein, we argue that this way of conceiving language ignores its deeper connections to our forms of life and that the generalization of epistemic injustice definitions, intended to be universally applicable, perpetuates intergenerational formative epistemic injustice, which has persisted since colonial times. This, in turn, limits epistemic capacity formation and the theory's applicability in different contexts, such that claims of including marginalized ways of knowing may, in fact, facilitate their co-optation and assimilation within a Western framework. Given the global diversity of epistemic harm and its intergenerational character, this article argues that the disaggregation of the scholarship and the recognition of diverse world-pictures as constitutive of its conceptual formation are essential to disrupting epistemic injustice.

In this essay, I explore the ethical complexities of using generative AI in academic writing. Drawing on personal experience, I reflect on the shifting terrain of scholarly labor, authorship, originality, and transparency in a moment when AI can produce fluent—and even eloquent—academic prose. Rather than offering prescriptions, or strategies to resolve the ethical tensions, I reflect on the moral ambiguity of AI-assisted scholarship, the inadequacy of current disclosure norms, and the temptation to remain silent in the face of evolving ethical expectations. I argue for ongoing reflection while navigating this new intellectual landscape and exploring the elusive possibility of meaningful policies.

I forcefully argue that generative AI presents an unprecedented and existential threat to the project of education. Reflecting on how we have historically understood the work of philosophers of education, I argue that our work going forward will be to defend the importance of requiring everyone to cultivate their minds when it is possible for them to outsource most tasks to a machine.

This article reflects on and extends my earlier arguments on democratic citizenship education by foregrounding three interrelated themes: compassionate and imaginative action, educational encounters, and civic reconciliation. I argue that education must move beyond a narrow reliance on deliberative reasoning by cultivating engagement that is also emotive and aspirational. Compassion and imagination, alongside reason, cultivate more inclusive and humane pedagogical practices. Democratic education is further conceptualized as an encounter rather than the pursuit of consensus, allowing dissensus to shape enhanced and more authentic engagements. Finally, I propose that civic reconciliation requires addressing historical injustices and embracing the African ethic of ubuntu, which emphasizes communal relationships, mutual respect, and continuous renewal. Reconceptualized in this way, democratic citizenship education becomes an ethical and relational endeavor that not only informs but also heals, inspires, and sustains democratic life in diverse and unequal societies.