EDUCATIONAL THEORY最新文献

This editorial introduction marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of Educational Theory, reflecting on the journal's historical contributions while looking forward to the future of philosophy of education and educational theory. This anniversary issue of the journal features two complementary sets of essays: five revisited articles in which authors return to notable work from the past twenty-five years to assess its ongoing significance, and nine forward-looking reflections that consider the present and future roles of philosophers and theorists of education amid political, social, and technological change. Together, these contributions illuminate enduring questions about democracy, educational purpose, global engagement, public scholarship, and the challenges and possibilities posed by artificial intelligence. The introduction argues that educational philosophy and theory remain vital for interrogating educational aims, sustaining democratic commitments, and cultivating critical and imaginative thought, and it calls for continued reflection on the field's responsibilities and possibilities as Educational Theory enters its next era.

Over twenty years after her article “Whitestream Feminism and the Colonialist Project” was published, Dr. Sandy Grande gathered other Indigenous women across disciplines and stages of career to discuss how the feminist project has been taken up or resisted in the field of Indigenous studies. They start with a definition of Indigenous feminism and then move on to discuss whether a decolonial feminism is possible, what “feminism” as a politics and analytic does for Indigenous Studies, what are the current and consistent aporias in feminism, particularly as practiced in the academy and finally, what is the horizon for (anti-colonial) feminist futures.

This article challenges the prevailing binary in civic education that pits teacher neutrality against political activism. I argue that the real tension is not whether partisanship belongs in the classroom—it always does—but how it is engaged. Drawing on the concept of partisan justification, I define partisanship as reasoning from within a contestable normative framework that shapes what issues are foregrounded, how they are framed, and which disagreements are possible. I critique two dominant models: the Controversial Issues approach, which relies on the illusion of neutrality by concealing partisan framing, and the Activist approach, which risks the illusion of consensus by treating a single vision of justice as settled. Against both, I advocate for an educational partisanship as a democratic design: a practice that acknowledges the inevitability of partisan commitments and structures classroom inquiry to make them visible, discussable, and open to challenge. Using a classroom example focused on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI), I show how teachers can disclose their commitments without imposing them, expanding democratic understanding through genuine contestation. I conclude that democratic education depends not on evading partisanship but on practicing it transparently and with care—designing classrooms where disagreement is expected, plurality is preserved, and no view, including the teacher's, is above scrutiny.

STEM fields perpetuate systemic racism under the guise of meritocracy, forcing Black, Latino, and Indigenous students—particularly women—to endure racialized stress, institutional exclusion, and the psychological toll of weathering and racial battle fatigue. This paper argues that narratives of “grit” and “resilience” individualize these systemic failures, pathologizing rational responses to hostile environments as personal deficits like “imposter syndrome.” We introduce the framework of Equity Ethics—a measurable commitment to social justice comprising an equity ethos and equity action—to demonstrate how marginalized STEMmers are actively re-engineering their fields toward liberation, often at great personal cost. In an era of eroding DEI initiatives, we move beyond critique to propose a radical blueprint for structural reckoning. Grounded in four core criteria—material redistribution, power-shifting, structural accountability, and solidarity—we advocate for actionable solutions, including mandatory diversity cluster hires, trauma-informed mentoring, decolonized curricula, and reparative funding models. We conclude that the time for incremental reform has passed; only a fundamental dismantling of STEM's racist architecture can transform it from a site of exclusion into a platform for liberation.

How should philosophers of education engage with issues related to higher education? What do we have to offer? In this reflective article, I explore how current threats to higher education in the U.S. are distinctly philosophical, such as government challenges to both academic freedom and the core purposes of colleges and universities. This article concludes with a call for philosophers of (higher) education (along with other educational theorists) to collaborate purposefully with campus leaders in deciding how to approach and mitigate the external sociopolitical challenges faced by the university as a social institution, while also being responsive to faculty and other internal constituents' concerns.

What began as an innovative idea in the late 1960s—the recognition that even very young children are philosophically disposed—is no longer considered novel. While philosophy for children has transitioned from a fledgling initiative to a worldwide movement, it remains on the margins of education. In this article, we look back at key initiatives that have advanced its growth before looking ahead to what can move philosophy for children to the center of education. We consider the introduction and development of materials that invite children into philosophical spaces, the community of philosophical inquiry as a model of teachers' and children's philosophical practice, diverse models of teacher preparation, and multiple means of dissemination and collaboration. We conclude that the transformative promise of philosophy for children lies in three directions: to enrich children's lives through an iterative, sustained experience of awakening to philosophical meaning, driven by their philosophical questioning and inquiry and shared in dialogue with others; to reform education by preparing teachers to cultivate a philosophical orientation to their subjects, their students, and to education as a whole; and to continue the cross-fertilization of theoretical and empirical research among philosophy for children, education, and the humanities and social sciences. The growth of the movement and what we have learned from it make these ambitious promises reasonable to strive for.

In this invited article, I revisit my 2007 essay “Why ‘What Works’ Won't Work: Evidence-Based Practice and the Democratic Deficit in Educational Research.” I provide a summary of the key arguments in the essay, explain why I used the phrase “democratic deficit,” examine what I have observed regarding the discussion about “evidence” in education since the publication of the essay, and show, through an exploration of the educational placebo effect, why the comparison between education and medicine remains problematic. I suggest that this may have important implications for the design of educational research. It also raises the interesting question to what extent existing evidence about educational effectiveness has been looking at the right interventions. Against this background, I reiterate my call for a broader spectrum of research approaches than only those that focus on the question of “what works.” This is as much a call for researchers as it is a call for policymakers and educational practice.

This article considers the difficulties of doing work in philosophy of education that might actually be useful to practical decision-makers and discusses the way that philosophers can collaborate with social scientists to do such work.

In this invited essay for the 75^th Anniversary Special Issue of Educational Theory, I revisit my 2008 article “What Should We Teach as Controversial? A Defense of the Epistemic Criterion.” I briefly summarize my argument, then survey the various objections it has attracted in the years since its publication. I focus in on a criticism I call the value worry about the epistemic criterion and try to show that it is unsuccessful.

The field of philosophy of education is diverse and evolving. I focus here on one particular way in which some philosophers of education have been doing philosophy of education—by working as public intellectuals addressing political issues, especially in contexts related to school practice and policy. I showcase how they do this work and what benefits it offers to the public, to the scholars themselves, and to the field of philosophy of education. Some key contributions of these scholars include clarifying explicit and underlying values, aims, and political ideologies at play in educational situations, engaging the public in inquiries into them, and facilitating efforts to address related problems. Scholars of this sort also guide the public through dissent against problematic policies and practices while imagining alternatives. They build hope by collaborating with the public on solutions. Throughout the article, I raise questions regarding approaching philosophy of education in this way, pointing toward tensions that may need to be addressed or resolved as the field moves forward.