Acta Politica最新文献

Participatory budgeting gains momentum around the world, and increasing evidence provides mixed results about its effects. Under these circumstances, it is unclear if citizens consider it a source of empowerment and an avenue for effective decision-making in the life of their local community. We know very little about how participants in participatory budgeting perceive the collective empowerment. This article seeks to identify the factors that shape these perceptions about the empowerment potential of participatory budgeting. It focuses on the critical case of Cluj-Napoca and uses 25 semi-structured interviews conducted in October-November 2020 with three categories of participants. Our findings indicate that participants acknowledge the potential for collective empowerment and praise the limited political involvement but identify design issues and resource allocation as weakening the empowerment potential.

Economic knowledge plays a central role in many theories of political behavior. But empirical studies have found many citizens to be poorly informed about the official state of the economy. Analyzing two waves of the Eurobarometer database, we re-examine the distribution of public knowledge of three macroeconomic indicators in two dozen European countries. Respondents with high income and education give more accurate estimates than others, in line with previous studies. As we show, however, such differences in knowledge do not only reflect varying levels of information. People's estimates are also shaped by affective dynamics, in particular a more pessimistic outlook that leads to overestimation of official unemployment and inflation (but not growth) figures. We find that emotive factors can bias inflation and unemployment estimates of respondents who find themselves in a privileged economic situation in a direction that incidentally also makes them more accurate, even though respondents are not necessarily being better informed. In real-world politics, official economic statistics thus do not function as a shared information backdrop that could buttress the quality of public deliberation. Instead, knowledge of them is itself driven by personal socio-economic circumstances.

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a variety of deliberative practices in the organization and activities of political parties. What remains unclear, however, is how parties can promote deliberative democracy in an environment that remains predominantly representative. To investigate this tension, we study the Agora party in Brussels. Agora competed for the first time in the 2019 regional elections in Brussels with the aim of institutionalizing a permanent, randomly selected Citizen's Assembly with legislative power in the Brussels Capital Region and immediately gained a seat in the Brussels Regional Parliament. Based on an in-depth qualitative study including 20 semi-structured interviews with a broad range of party members and document analysis, we study whether and how Agora's organizational structure, i.e. its leadership and centralization, its intra-party democracy, and its organizational resources, allow it to promote deliberative democracy in a representative context. We argue that Agora experiences tensions between its deliberative ideals and its representative means and that there is a looming danger of becoming "just another part" of the system. However, it succeeds in simultaneously rejecting and competing in the representative system by adopting a stratarchical party organization.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1057/s41269-021-00226-3.

Counter-radicalisation measures have been criticised for stigmatising Muslim communities. However, little research exists on racialisation in policy frameworks found in counter-radicalisation policy documents themselves. Analysis of these documents can reveal whether and how racialising patterns emerge in bureaucracy at the national level, because policy documents circulate and institutionalise regulatory, administrative power. This paper presents a study of counter-radicalisation policy documents developed by the Dutch government, a pioneer in counter-radicalisation policy. A computer-assisted qualitative content analysis of policy documents was conducted and then contextualised using interviews with policy makers and executives. The policy documents were found to securitise Muslims, constructing them as potentially risky/at risk and as 'Other' communities. Using a theoretical framework that takes racialisation to be a particular essentialised construction of group membership, the analysis presents a nuanced answer to the question if counter-radicalisation policy frameworks racialise Muslims. There is evidence for racialisation, as well as for conscious efforts to prevent this effect. Insights from this study support appeals to reconsider the national security policy framework that expects Muslims to take responsibility for preventing radicalisation and terrorism.

In an increasingly digitized world, vote advice applications (VAAs) seem to be effective in providing voters with personalized information about their own positions vis-à-vis parties' positions and specific policies. Even though electoral research has increasingly paid attention to the role VAAs play in voter's opinion formation, very few studies have examined VAAs in the context of direct-democratic decisions. This article fills this gap by providing new insights into how VAAs affect individual decision-making in popular votes theoretically and empirically. We use novel data from the referendum campaign on the 2017 new energy law in Switzerland: a VAA experiment carried out in the framework of a three-wave panel survey. In the third wave, which took place a week before the referendum, respondents were randomly assigned to a treatment group and a control group; only the former was shown the VAA and made to use it. The results indicate two main takeaways. First, that using a VAA has a tangible effect inasmuch as the share of undecided voters is smaller among the treatment than among the control group. Second, VAA usage can have both a persuasive effect (i.e., it can change vote intentions) and an intensifying effect (i.e., it can strengthen voters' preexisting intentions).

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1057/s41269-022-00264-5.

We examine the relationship between individuals' political orientations and their compliance with and attitudes towards COVID-19 prevention measures using a Dutch nationally representative online sample. Due to ideological differences, we predict that people with left-wing and progressive orientations will comply more with and have more favourable attitudes towards COVID-19 prevention measures than people with right-wing, populist, and conservative orientations, while right-wing extremists will have lowest levels of compliance and least favourable attitudes towards prevention measures. Our results support these predictions. Furthermore, we test the effect of individuals' economic precarity and demographic characteristics on compliance and attitudes towards prevention measures. Results show that people experiencing economic difficulties do comply yet have less favourable attitudes towards the measures, while fear of economic loss is related to both lower compliance and less favourable attitudes towards measures. Older citizens have higher levels of compliance and more positive attitudes, whereas gender and education are not consistently related to compliance and attitudes. We further explore how these three sets of factors (political orientation, economic precarity, and demographics) are related to policy preferences for either reducing infection rates or reducing the economic impact of the pandemic. Our results suggest that all three sets of predictors are important in shaping measure compliance as well as attitudes and policy support and should all be considered for a comprehensive understanding of individuals' responses to COVID-19 measures.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1057/s41269-022-00246-7.

Although a basic income (BI) has already been widely debated, the COVID-19 crisis further intensified the discussion about this periodic cash payment that is unconditionally delivered to all. However, it remains unclear whether the crisis spurred a wave of public support for its introduction. To investigate this, we aim to answer two research questions: (1) How did support for a BI evolve in reaction to the COVID-19 crisis? and (2) To what extent did the evolution in support differ across regional contexts and social groups with varying levels of deprivation? We rely on a natural experiment by analysing data from the Belgian National Elections Study that was collected both before and during the pandemic. The results indicate an increase in support for a BI due to the pandemic, although it seems short lived and not necessarily specific to a BI. Importantly, however, the increase in popularity is only observable in the high-unemployment French-speaking region of Belgium and among relatively deprived groups.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1057/s41269-022-00260-9.

At the turn of the century, both academics and practitioners anticipated the Europeanization of national politics and political parties. One major expectation was that parties would adapt their organisation and behaviour to the existence of the EU and the functioning of its institutions. However, the early 2000s poured cold water on those expectations: the slacking politicization of EU affairs, it was concluded, created few incentives for parties to adapt, and so there was no meaningful Europeanization to speak of. EU politicization became the necessary pre-condition for party Europeanization. Today, however, that pre-condition seems (partly) fulfilled, as scholars are observing increasing EU politicization. Hence, we ask whether parties live up to expectations and, facing a politicised context, are today showing signs of party organizational Europeanization (POE). Based on a comparative case study of Dutch and Flemish parties, who function in differently politicized environments, we find that Europeanization remains limited. We conclude that it is likely not EU politicization holding parties back, but instead point towards the broader institutional misfit between national and European politics. We call on future research to further elaborate on this misfit, which might be the Achilles heel for EU democracy.