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Disruptive innovation in the economic organization of China and the West 中国与西方经济组织中的破坏性创新
IF 2.2 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-09-21 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000224
Hilton L. Root
We explore how macro and micro networks influence the diffusion of technological innovation and cultural/social behavior. Across the historical regimes in China and Europe, dynastic lordship's macro networks afforded different advantages in technological innovation. A network particular to Europe, the Roman Church, extended deep into local parishes with ethical norms prescribing fairness to strangers, and these cultural foundations helped guilds, trade associations, merchant courts, and universities operate cooperatively far beyond kinship. In contrast, Chinese emperors relied on ancient Confucian moral codes and system-spanning Confucian-educated officialdom; but fiscal limitations compelled officials to defer to local lineage orders, resulting in an enduring cultural pattern of guanxi and a polity whose institutional problem-solving capacity falter beyond the local level. Yet the civil service system has enabled China to outperform similar lineage-dependent regimes. Probing network topologies, we find that system-spanning networks can facilitate technological diffusion, but local networks influence cultural and behavioral change.
我们探索宏观和微观网络如何影响技术创新和文化/社会行为的扩散。纵观中国和欧洲的历史政权,王朝统治的宏观网络在技术创新方面提供了不同的优势。一个欧洲特有的网络,罗马教会,深入到当地教区,其道德规范规定了对陌生人的公平,这些文化基础帮助行会,贸易协会,商业法庭和大学合作,远远超出了亲属关系。相比之下,中国皇帝依赖古代儒家的道德规范和受儒家教育的官场;但财政限制迫使官员们服从当地的世系命令,导致了一种持久的“关系”文化模式,以及一个解决制度问题的能力超出地方层面的政治体系。然而,公务员制度使中国的表现超过了类似的依赖血统的制度。通过探索网络拓扑结构,我们发现系统跨越网络可以促进技术扩散,但局部网络影响文化和行为变化。
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引用次数: 0
The authors of economics journals revisited: evidence from a large-scale replication of Hodgson and Rothman (1999) 经济学期刊的作者重新审视:来自霍奇森和罗斯曼(1999)大规模复制的证据
IF 2.2 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-09-16 DOI: 10.1017/s174413742200025x
Matthias Aistleitner, Jakob Kapeller, Dominik Kronberger
In this paper, we present results from of a large-scale replication of Hodgson and Rothman's (1999, The Economic Journal, 109(453): 165–186) seminal analysis of the institutional and geographical concentration of authors publishing in top economic journals. We analyze bibliometric data of more than 49,000 articles published in a set of 30 highly influential economic journals between 1990 and 2018. Based on a random sample of 3,253 authors, we further analyze the PhD-granting institutions of the authors under study to better scrutinize the claim of an ‘institutional oligopoly’. The findings confirm the long-term persistence of strong oligopolistic structures in terms of both, author affiliations as well as PhD-granting institutions.
在这篇论文中,我们展示了Hodgson和Rothman(1999,《经济杂志》,109(453):165–186)对顶级经济期刊上发表的作者的机构和地理集中度的开创性分析的大规模复制结果。我们分析了1990年至2018年间在30种极具影响力的经济期刊上发表的49000多篇文章的文献计量数据。基于3253名作者的随机样本,我们进一步分析了被研究作者的博士授予机构,以更好地审查“机构寡头垄断”的说法。研究结果证实了在作者关系和博士授予机构方面,强大的寡头垄断结构长期存在。
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引用次数: 0
Does democracy cause gender equality? 民主会导致性别平等吗?
IF 2.2 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-09-13 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000236
T. B. Andersen
Does democracy cause gender equality? To address this question, I use the unexpected Second Vatican Council (1962–65) as part of a shock-based identification strategy. The Second Vatican Council brought forward in time transitions to democracy that would have happened anyway and triggered transitions to democracy that would not otherwise have occurred. I use this plausibly exogenous variation in democracy to offer a causal estimate. According to my baseline specification, one standard deviation increase in democracy leads to three-fifths of a standard deviation increase in gender equality. I also peruse qualitative evidence to sketch a causal mechanism.
民主会导致性别平等吗?为了解决这个问题,我将出人意料的第二次梵蒂冈会议(1962-65)作为基于冲击的识别策略的一部分。第二次梵蒂冈大公会议及时推进了无论如何都会发生的向民主的过渡,并触发了原本不会发生的向民主的过渡。我用民主中这种看似外生的变异来提供一个因果估计。根据我的基线规范,民主的一个标准差增加会导致性别平等的五分之三标准差增加。我还仔细研究定性证据,勾勒出因果机制。
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引用次数: 1
On the adapting function of social institutions 论社会制度的适应功能
IF 2.2 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-09-08 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000261
Alexander Lascaux
In this paper, I introduce an important dynamic function performed by social institutions, which consists in helping individual actors to adapt to significant changes taking place in their environment. This adapting function is juxtaposed against the statically-oriented properties of institutions, which comprise their enabling, constraining, and orienting functions. I explicate the three major adapting roles of social institutions, which correspond to the cognitive, normative, and regulatory institutional elements, and explore the nine principal mechanisms by which social institutions can accelerate the adaptation processes. I examine the main outcomes of the adaptation processes supported by social institutions, as well as the key enablers and barriers to successful adaptation. I present a co-evolutionary model of adaptive dynamics involving individuals, institutions, and the broader external environment, and discuss the major implications of the proposed framework.
在本文中,我介绍了社会制度执行的一个重要动态功能,它包括帮助个体行动者适应其环境中发生的重大变化。这种适应性功能与机构的静态导向属性并置,后者包括其启用、约束和定向功能。本文阐述了社会制度的三大适应作用,分别对应于认知、规范和监管制度要素,并探讨了社会制度加速适应过程的九种主要机制。我研究了社会机构支持的适应进程的主要成果,以及成功适应的关键促成因素和障碍。我提出了一个涉及个人、机构和更广泛的外部环境的自适应动力学的共同进化模型,并讨论了所提出框架的主要含义。
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引用次数: 0
Environmental economics in Classical Athens 古典雅典的环境经济学
IF 2.2 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-08-25 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000194
Emmanouil M. L. Economou, G. Halkos, Nicholas C. Kyriazis
In this paper, we present a series of environmental policies that were implemented by the city-state of Athens during the Classical period (508–323 BCE) through a specific set of environmental institutions. They included: waste management, the implementation of a recycling process regarding animal manure as well as hygiene practices. Special administrative bodies were set up for this purpose with the power to impose heavy fines to offenders, and the actual job of environmental protection was contracted out to private operators. We argue that the success of the Athenian environmental institutions should primarily be attributed to the economic stimuli that the Athenian state provided to their staff so as to perform their duties efficiently, as well as to the imposition of fines and/or other penalties if they provided subpar services. We finally provide proposals as to how the Athenian environmental policies may be seen as an inspiration for our modern societies.
在本文中,我们介绍了雅典城邦在古典时期(公元前508-323年)通过一套特定的环境制度实施的一系列环境政策。其中包括:废物管理、实施动物粪便回收过程以及卫生习惯。为此设立了专门的管理机构,有权对违规者处以重罚,并将环境保护的实际工作外包给私营企业。我们认为,雅典环境机构的成功应主要归功于雅典国家为其工作人员提供的经济刺激措施,以便他们有效地履行职责,以及如果他们提供低于标准的服务,则处以罚款和/或其他处罚。最后,我们就如何将雅典的环境政策视为对我们现代社会的启发提出了建议。
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引用次数: 0
The dynamic efficiency of gifting 送礼的动态效率
IF 2.2 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-08-25 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000200
A. Gill, Michael D. Thomas
In his Scroogenomics, Joel Waldfogel argues that gifting creates enormous deadweight loss, as individuals give one another gifts that they do not want or cannot use. He views efficiency as static, calculating the gains from trade (or gifting) at the moment of transaction. A puzzle arises, however, when one realizes that gifting has been a nearly ubiquitous institution throughout history. If gifting wastes valuable resources, why does it persist? We argue that gift giving is dynamically efficient despite the possibility of generating short-term deadweight loss. A well-functioning market economy requires expanded social networks and trustworthiness among anonymous and quasi-anonymous exchange partners. Gifting allows individuals to signal trustworthiness by offering ‘burnt sacrifices’. Gifting practices that include a willingness to sacrifice via reciprocity norms, public visibility and ritual will tend to promote generalized trust. We consider these four elements – sacrifice, reciprocity, publicness, and ritual – to be critical institutional design principles for fostering dynamic efficiency. Our essay contributes to the literature on institutional economics by prompting scholars to think about the long-term (dynamic) efficiencies generated by cultural practices that appear inexplicably inefficient.
乔尔·瓦尔德福格尔(Joel Waldfogel)在他的《古卷经济学》(Scrogenomics)中认为,礼物会造成巨大的无谓损失,因为个人相互赠送他们不想要或不能使用的礼物。他认为效率是静态的,计算交易时从交易(或礼品)中获得的收益。然而,当人们意识到送礼在历史上几乎无处不在时,一个谜题就出现了。如果送礼浪费了宝贵的资源,为什么它会持续下去?我们认为,尽管有可能产生短期的无谓损失,但送礼在动态上是有效的。一个运作良好的市场经济需要扩大社交网络,以及匿名和准匿名交换伙伴之间的可信度。送礼可以让个人通过提供“烧祭”来表示可信度。包括通过互惠规范、公众知名度和仪式做出牺牲的意愿在内的送礼行为往往会促进普遍信任。我们认为这四个要素——牺牲、互惠、公开和仪式——是培养动态效率的关键制度设计原则。我们的文章通过促使学者们思考文化实践所产生的长期(动态)效率,为制度经济学文献做出了贡献,这些文化实践似乎莫名其妙地效率低下。
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引用次数: 2
The primacy of property; or, the subordination of property rights 财产至上:财产至上;或者,物权的从属关系
IF 2.2 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-08-24 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000212
Bart J. Wilson

A property right, the standard view maintains, is a proper subset of the most complete and comprehensive set of incidents for full ownership of a thing. The subsidiary assumption is that the pieces that are property rights compose the whole that is ownership or property, i.e., that property rights explain property. In reversing the standard view I argue that (1) a custom of intelligent and meaningful human action explains property and that (2) as a custom, property is a historical process of selecting actions conditional on the context. My task is to explain how a physical world of human bodies with minds that feel, think, know, and want gives rise to a custom of property with meaning and purpose. Property is primary because ideas are primary.

标准观点认为,产权是最完整、最全面的事件集合的适当子集,是对某物的完全所有权。附属的假设是,财产权组成了所有权或财产的整体,也就是说,财产权解释了财产。在推翻标准观点的过程中,我认为(1)智慧和有意义的人类行为的习俗解释了财产,(2)作为一种习俗,财产是一个根据环境选择行为的历史过程。我的任务是解释一个有感觉、思考、认知和欲望的人类身体的物理世界是如何产生一种有意义和目的的财产习俗的。财产是首要的,因为思想是首要的。
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引用次数: 0
Do partisan politics influence domestic credit? 党派政治会影响国内信贷吗?
IF 2.2 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-08-18 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000182
V. Tawiah, Sivathaasan Nadarajah, M. Alam, T. Allen
Left-leaning and right-leaning governments hold opposing views on economic policy, resulting in disparities in economic behaviours and outcomes. Given this context, we explore the effect of political ideology on domestic credit using an unbalanced panel data of 29 countries from 1960 to 2014. Our empirical analysis shows that left-leaning governments reduce total domestic credit allocations. Also, we find that right-leaning governments provide more credit to the private sector, while left-leaning governments prefer to boost domestic credit to the public sector. In a further analysis, we show that political parties and their domestic credit strategies remain unchanged even during electoral periods. Our novel insights, that are robust to alternative measures, samples, and a set of econometric identifications, contribute to the literature on partisan politics and lending behaviour.
左倾政府和右倾政府在经济政策上持相反的观点,导致经济行为和经济结果的差异。在此背景下,我们利用1960年至2014年29个国家的不平衡面板数据,探讨了政治意识形态对国内信贷的影响。我们的实证分析表明,左倾政府减少了国内信贷分配总量。此外,我们发现右倾政府向私营部门提供更多信贷,而左倾政府更倾向于向公共部门提供国内信贷。在进一步的分析中,我们表明政党及其国内信贷策略即使在选举期间也保持不变。我们的新见解对替代措施、样本和一套计量经济学识别都是稳健的,有助于研究党派政治和借贷行为。
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引用次数: 3
Markets, repugnance, and externalities 市场、反感和外部性
IF 2.2 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-07-25 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000157
K. Krawiec
This Article considers one aspect of the ongoing debate about the moral limits of markets – namely, the purported harmful effects of market transactions on particular relations, goods, services, or society at large, due to an inappropriate valuation. In other words, the argument is that some markets are ‘repugnant’ because they degrade and corrupt a variety of nonmarket values and relations, not just to the willing parties to the exchange, but to larger segments of society. This objection contains both a (frequently unacknowledged) empirical component and a moral component. This Article critiques these empirical claims on two grounds. First, market skeptics fail to provide evidence of the negative effects they hypothesize, despite widespread variation over time and across legal regimes. Second, these objections fail to account for the well-documented human tendency to fashion repugnant exchanges in a manner that reinforces – rather than undermines – deeply held values and relationships.
本文考虑了正在进行的关于市场道德限制的辩论的一个方面——即,由于不适当的估值,市场交易对特定关系、商品、服务或整个社会的所谓有害影响。换句话说,这个论点是,一些市场是“令人反感的”,因为它们降低和腐蚀了各种非市场价值和关系,不仅是对愿意参与交换的各方,而且对更大的社会阶层。这种反对意见包含了经验成分和道德成分(通常不被承认)。本文从两个方面对这些经验主义主张进行了批判。首先,市场怀疑论者未能提供他们所假设的负面影响的证据,尽管在不同的时间和不同的法律制度中存在广泛的差异。其次,这些反对意见未能解释有充分证据表明,人类倾向于以一种强化(而不是破坏)根深蒂固的价值观和关系的方式,塑造令人反感的交流。
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引用次数: 0
Cascading expert failure 级联专家故障
IF 2.2 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-07-25 DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000169
Jon Murphy

Recent research has shown how experts may fail in their duty as advisors by providing advice that leads to a worse outcome than that anticipated by the user of expert opinion. However, those models have focused on the immediate effects of the failure on experts and nonexperts. Using a cascading network failure model, I show how expert failure can cascade throughout multiple sectors, even those not necessarily purchasing the expert opinion. Consequently, even relatively small failures end up having outsized aggregate effects. To provide evidence of my theory, I look at two case studies of COVID expert advice to show how one seemingly minor failure ended up contributing to the pandemic. I conclude with a discussion on institutional frameworks that can prevent such cascades.

最近的研究表明,专家可能会因为提供的建议导致比专家意见使用者预期的更糟糕的结果而未能履行其作为顾问的职责。然而,这些模型关注的是失败对专家和非专家的直接影响。使用级联网络故障模型,我展示了专家故障如何在多个部门中级联,甚至是那些不一定购买专家意见的部门。因此,即使是相对较小的失败最终也会产生巨大的总体效应。为了证明我的理论,我研究了两个关于COVID专家建议的案例研究,以展示一个看似微不足道的失败最终如何导致了这场大流行。最后,我将讨论能够防止这种连锁反应的体制框架。
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Journal of Institutional Economics
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