Since independence, Nigeria has adopted federalism to manage the country’s deep ethno-regional divisions, but federalism has not averted instability and return to military rule in the past. This highlights the need for additional factors and mechanisms to secure and stabilize civilian rule in Nigeria. The country’s ethnic party ban ensures that parties in power have a broad basis across the territory. Theoretically, these “integrated” parties are often argued to foster intergroup compromise and political stability. Yet in our case study of intergroup relations in Nigeria’s National Assembly, we demonstrate that the country’s broad-based parties do not play a strong role in organizing intergroup cooperation. Despite this, the Assembly has not experienced substantial policy gridlock. We argue that instead of integrated parties, ethno-regional balancing (i.e., a practice whereby key positions in parliament are allocated to different groupings) is a much more important stabilizing factor in Nigeria’s federal parliament.
{"title":"Managing Diversity in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic National Assembly: Integrated Parties versus Ethno-Regional Balancing","authors":"Leila Demarest, A. Langer","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Since independence, Nigeria has adopted federalism to manage the country’s deep ethno-regional divisions, but federalism has not averted instability and return to military rule in the past. This highlights the need for additional factors and mechanisms to secure and stabilize civilian rule in Nigeria. The country’s ethnic party ban ensures that parties in power have a broad basis across the territory. Theoretically, these “integrated” parties are often argued to foster intergroup compromise and political stability. Yet in our case study of intergroup relations in Nigeria’s National Assembly, we demonstrate that the country’s broad-based parties do not play a strong role in organizing intergroup cooperation. Despite this, the Assembly has not experienced substantial policy gridlock. We argue that instead of integrated parties, ethno-regional balancing (i.e., a practice whereby key positions in parliament are allocated to different groupings) is a much more important stabilizing factor in Nigeria’s federal parliament.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43425873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"We Are Not One People: Secession and Separatism in American Politics since 1776, by Michael J. Lee and R. Jarrod Atchison","authors":"Kyle Scott","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42107702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the interaction between intergovernmental transfers on the level and the structure of local own revenues. Based on a sample for Argentina’s local governments, specifically the 135 municipalities of the province of Buenos Aires, we find that transfers facilitate local revenues collection. This effect is more pronounced in urban local governments, with higher population density, poverty levels, and demand for public services. In addition, transfers bias own revenues composition. That is, higher transfers lead to higher local tax collection, which is obtained through less distortionary taxation (i.e., property tax). Interestingly, this bias is stronger for local governments with a higher share of divisible public goods (that are likely to be financed according to the “benefit principle”). The results are robust to a battery of different estimation methods and can be rationalized with existing theory from public finance and political economy as well. The findings might have important policy implications for local governments’ public finance.
{"title":"Fiscal Federalism: The Interaction between Own Revenues and Intergovernmental Transfers in Local Governments—The Case of Municipalities in Buenos Aires","authors":"Alberto Porto, J. Puig","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study the interaction between intergovernmental transfers on the level and the structure of local own revenues. Based on a sample for Argentina’s local governments, specifically the 135 municipalities of the province of Buenos Aires, we find that transfers facilitate local revenues collection. This effect is more pronounced in urban local governments, with higher population density, poverty levels, and demand for public services. In addition, transfers bias own revenues composition. That is, higher transfers lead to higher local tax collection, which is obtained through less distortionary taxation (i.e., property tax). Interestingly, this bias is stronger for local governments with a higher share of divisible public goods (that are likely to be financed according to the “benefit principle”). The results are robust to a battery of different estimation methods and can be rationalized with existing theory from public finance and political economy as well. The findings might have important policy implications for local governments’ public finance.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48158141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explains a rising trend in American politics: the increasingly prominent role the state attorneys general (AGs) play in challenging federal policies. It focuses on one particularly important case—Republican efforts to overturn the Affordable Care Act in Texas v. California. We consider how state AGs and solicitors general (SGs) drive policy efforts through litigation and the factors that contribute to their participation. We find, first, that although members of the out-of-power party in Washington are the ones who typically bring state lawsuits, the Texas litigation demonstrates that these lawsuits are also a vehicle by which members of the party in power try to achieve goals that are otherwise unattainable through the legislative process. Second, Republican AGs submerge partisan arguments in “constitution-talk” with the aim of achieving a policy goal that was defeated democratically. We reach these conclusions through content analysis of AG press releases and semi-structured interviews with litigators and other elite actors.
这篇文章解释了美国政治中的一个上升趋势:州检察长在挑战联邦政策方面发挥着日益突出的作用。它集中在一个特别重要的案例上——共和党试图在德克萨斯州诉加利福尼亚州案中推翻《平价医疗法案》(Affordable Care Act)。我们考虑州检察长和总检察长(SGs)如何通过诉讼推动政策努力，以及促成他们参与的因素。首先，我们发现，虽然华盛顿的失势党派成员通常是提起州诉讼的人，但德克萨斯州的诉讼表明，这些诉讼也是执政党成员试图通过立法程序实现无法实现的目标的工具。其次，共和党的AGs将党派争论淹没在“宪法谈话”中，目的是实现民主失败的政策目标。我们通过对AG新闻稿的内容分析以及对诉讼律师和其他精英人士的半结构化采访得出了这些结论。
{"title":"State Attorneys General and their Challenges to Federal Policies: Insights from the Texas v. California Litigation Regarding the Affordable Care Act","authors":"M. Dichio, Phillip M. Singer","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article explains a rising trend in American politics: the increasingly prominent role the state attorneys general (AGs) play in challenging federal policies. It focuses on one particularly important case—Republican efforts to overturn the Affordable Care Act in Texas v. California. We consider how state AGs and solicitors general (SGs) drive policy efforts through litigation and the factors that contribute to their participation. We find, first, that although members of the out-of-power party in Washington are the ones who typically bring state lawsuits, the Texas litigation demonstrates that these lawsuits are also a vehicle by which members of the party in power try to achieve goals that are otherwise unattainable through the legislative process. Second, Republican AGs submerge partisan arguments in “constitution-talk” with the aim of achieving a policy goal that was defeated democratically. We reach these conclusions through content analysis of AG press releases and semi-structured interviews with litigators and other elite actors.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47650109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Federal systems tend to have two venues of representation to ensure that both the people as a whole and the constituent units are represented at the federal level. While this double representation is put forward as a basic (normative) feature of federal systems, little to no empirical research has been conducted on this issue. This contribution therefore studies the representation of the people as a whole and of the constituent units in the Belgian House of Representatives by means of a representative claims analysis of 4,757 oral parliamentary questions. As federal systems tend to be dynamic, the analysis is based on six periods of federal reform through which Belgium decentralized. Our findings show that, over time, the representation of the constituent units increased and exceeded the representation of the people, providing unique empirical input for the debate about the idea that federalism is by definition beneficial for democracy. We problematize our results from a democratic point of view, as—despite being able to vote—the people as a whole are hardly any more represented by the House. Going beyond the Belgian case, we argue that processes of federalization should address the adequate representation of both the constituent units and the people.
{"title":"Exploring the Relationship between Federal Reform and the Representation of the People: The Case of the Belgian House of Representatives","authors":"Jakob Frateur, P. Bursens, P. Meier","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Federal systems tend to have two venues of representation to ensure that both the people as a whole and the constituent units are represented at the federal level. While this double representation is put forward as a basic (normative) feature of federal systems, little to no empirical research has been conducted on this issue. This contribution therefore studies the representation of the people as a whole and of the constituent units in the Belgian House of Representatives by means of a representative claims analysis of 4,757 oral parliamentary questions. As federal systems tend to be dynamic, the analysis is based on six periods of federal reform through which Belgium decentralized. Our findings show that, over time, the representation of the constituent units increased and exceeded the representation of the people, providing unique empirical input for the debate about the idea that federalism is by definition beneficial for democracy. We problematize our results from a democratic point of view, as—despite being able to vote—the people as a whole are hardly any more represented by the House. Going beyond the Belgian case, we argue that processes of federalization should address the adequate representation of both the constituent units and the people.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48554025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Dead Hand’s Grip: How Long Constitutions Bind States, by Adam R. Brown","authors":"N. M. Miller","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47952122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We compare the intergovernmental health system responses to the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy and Spain, two countries where healthcare is managed at the regional level and the impact of the first wave was highly localized. However, whereas in Italy the regional government allowed for a passively accepted central level of coordination without restricting autonomy (“descentralised coordinantion”), in Spain, the healthcare system was de facto centralized under a “single command” (“hierarchical centralization”). We argue that the latter strategy crowded out incentives for information sharing, experimentation and regional participation in decision-making. This article documents evidence of important differences in health outcomes (infected cases and deaths) and outputs (regular and emergency hospital admissions) between the two countries, both at the national and regional levels. We then discuss several potential mechanisms to account for these differences. We find that given the strong localized impact of the pandemic, allowing more autonomy in Italy (compared to centralized governance in Spain) can explain some cross-country differences in outcomes and outputs.
{"title":"Divided We Survive? Multilevel Governance during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Italy and Spain","authors":"M. Angelici, P. Berta, Joan Costa‐Font, G. Turati","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We compare the intergovernmental health system responses to the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy and Spain, two countries where healthcare is managed at the regional level and the impact of the first wave was highly localized. However, whereas in Italy the regional government allowed for a passively accepted central level of coordination without restricting autonomy (“descentralised coordinantion”), in Spain, the healthcare system was de facto centralized under a “single command” (“hierarchical centralization”). We argue that the latter strategy crowded out incentives for information sharing, experimentation and regional participation in decision-making. This article documents evidence of important differences in health outcomes (infected cases and deaths) and outputs (regular and emergency hospital admissions) between the two countries, both at the national and regional levels. We then discuss several potential mechanisms to account for these differences. We find that given the strong localized impact of the pandemic, allowing more autonomy in Italy (compared to centralized governance in Spain) can explain some cross-country differences in outcomes and outputs.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46294600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conservatives are more likely than liberals to support the concept of federalism. In this article, we look at this support in the context of particular issues. Using multiple national surveys, including an original module on the 2020 Congressional Election Study, we find that conservatives are more likely to prefer a devolution of power to state and local jurisdictions, even if doing so might make it harder to achieve conservative policy aims, whereas liberals are more instrumental, more likely to prioritize policy aims and to support whichever level of government seems most likely to achieve them. We then examine reasons why conservatives might display a stronger adherence to the federalist structure of the American government. We find that the idea of “states’ rights” continues to loom large for self-identified conservatives, as does a generalized level of trust toward political units described as small versus large.
{"title":"Ideology and Support for Federalism in Theory—And in Practice","authors":"James M Glaser, J. Berry, Deborah J. Schildkraut","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Conservatives are more likely than liberals to support the concept of federalism. In this article, we look at this support in the context of particular issues. Using multiple national surveys, including an original module on the 2020 Congressional Election Study, we find that conservatives are more likely to prefer a devolution of power to state and local jurisdictions, even if doing so might make it harder to achieve conservative policy aims, whereas liberals are more instrumental, more likely to prioritize policy aims and to support whichever level of government seems most likely to achieve them. We then examine reasons why conservatives might display a stronger adherence to the federalist structure of the American government. We find that the idea of “states’ rights” continues to loom large for self-identified conservatives, as does a generalized level of trust toward political units described as small versus large.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48632065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the revival of direct gubernatorial elections in 2012, regional governors in Russia have two formal principals: the president and the people of the region. The principal–agent theory defines this situation as a common agency problem. In the context of authoritarian federalism, direct elections pose a two-fold challenge to Vladimir Putin’s vertical power. First, even if manipulated, elections can lead to unpredictable outcomes for the federal center. Second, in the long run, popular legitimacy incentivizes regional leaders to become more independent from the Kremlin. This study argues that the federal center in Russia has addressed the common agency problem not only by limiting the freedom of choice for the local populations through restrictive electoral law, but also by adopting a recruitment pattern that prefers outsider governors who lack personal connection to the regions of service. An original dataset on regional governors’ selection in 2012–2018 provides empirical evidence for this claim.
{"title":"Mind the Gap between the Governor and the People: The Common Agency Problem in Russian Authoritarian Federalism","authors":"Stanislav Klimovich","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Since the revival of direct gubernatorial elections in 2012, regional governors in Russia have two formal principals: the president and the people of the region. The principal–agent theory defines this situation as a common agency problem. In the context of authoritarian federalism, direct elections pose a two-fold challenge to Vladimir Putin’s vertical power. First, even if manipulated, elections can lead to unpredictable outcomes for the federal center. Second, in the long run, popular legitimacy incentivizes regional leaders to become more independent from the Kremlin. This study argues that the federal center in Russia has addressed the common agency problem not only by limiting the freedom of choice for the local populations through restrictive electoral law, but also by adopting a recruitment pattern that prefers outsider governors who lack personal connection to the regions of service. An original dataset on regional governors’ selection in 2012–2018 provides empirical evidence for this claim.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45122270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Contemporary research in American federalism has evaluated the centralizing characteristics of several institutions within state governments—including state statutes, executive orders, and judicial decisions—and has shown that these institutions are generally associated with shifting power away from local governments toward state governments. I expand this discussion by assessing the consequences of direct democracy for the balance of power between state and local governments. In particular, I investigate whether ballot measures are associated with decentralizing power away from state governments toward local governments or rather whether these measures are associated with centralizing power in state governments. Leveraging new data across the history of direct democracy in the United States and coding 945 proposed ballot measures according to their de/centralizing impact on local governments, I find that citizen-initiated ballot measures are neither centralizing nor decentralizing, but legislature-referred ballot measures are decentralizing. I also find that regardless of whether citizens or legislators are responsible for placing measures on the ballot, voters generally provide more support for centralizing ballot measures than decentralizing ballot measures. However, voter support is conditioned on state-level partisanship and ideology.
{"title":"The Consequences of Direct Democracy for the Balance of Power between State and Local Governments in the United States","authors":"Matthew J Uttermark","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjac043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contemporary research in American federalism has evaluated the centralizing characteristics of several institutions within state governments—including state statutes, executive orders, and judicial decisions—and has shown that these institutions are generally associated with shifting power away from local governments toward state governments. I expand this discussion by assessing the consequences of direct democracy for the balance of power between state and local governments. In particular, I investigate whether ballot measures are associated with decentralizing power away from state governments toward local governments or rather whether these measures are associated with centralizing power in state governments. Leveraging new data across the history of direct democracy in the United States and coding 945 proposed ballot measures according to their de/centralizing impact on local governments, I find that citizen-initiated ballot measures are neither centralizing nor decentralizing, but legislature-referred ballot measures are decentralizing. I also find that regardless of whether citizens or legislators are responsible for placing measures on the ballot, voters generally provide more support for centralizing ballot measures than decentralizing ballot measures. However, voter support is conditioned on state-level partisanship and ideology.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135703937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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