{"title":"The Dead Hand’s Grip: How Long Constitutions Bind States, by Adam R. Brown","authors":"N. M. Miller","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47952122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We compare the intergovernmental health system responses to the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy and Spain, two countries where healthcare is managed at the regional level and the impact of the first wave was highly localized. However, whereas in Italy the regional government allowed for a passively accepted central level of coordination without restricting autonomy (“descentralised coordinantion”), in Spain, the healthcare system was de facto centralized under a “single command” (“hierarchical centralization”). We argue that the latter strategy crowded out incentives for information sharing, experimentation and regional participation in decision-making. This article documents evidence of important differences in health outcomes (infected cases and deaths) and outputs (regular and emergency hospital admissions) between the two countries, both at the national and regional levels. We then discuss several potential mechanisms to account for these differences. We find that given the strong localized impact of the pandemic, allowing more autonomy in Italy (compared to centralized governance in Spain) can explain some cross-country differences in outcomes and outputs.
{"title":"Divided We Survive? Multilevel Governance during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Italy and Spain","authors":"M. Angelici, P. Berta, Joan Costa‐Font, G. Turati","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We compare the intergovernmental health system responses to the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy and Spain, two countries where healthcare is managed at the regional level and the impact of the first wave was highly localized. However, whereas in Italy the regional government allowed for a passively accepted central level of coordination without restricting autonomy (“descentralised coordinantion”), in Spain, the healthcare system was de facto centralized under a “single command” (“hierarchical centralization”). We argue that the latter strategy crowded out incentives for information sharing, experimentation and regional participation in decision-making. This article documents evidence of important differences in health outcomes (infected cases and deaths) and outputs (regular and emergency hospital admissions) between the two countries, both at the national and regional levels. We then discuss several potential mechanisms to account for these differences. We find that given the strong localized impact of the pandemic, allowing more autonomy in Italy (compared to centralized governance in Spain) can explain some cross-country differences in outcomes and outputs.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46294600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conservatives are more likely than liberals to support the concept of federalism. In this article, we look at this support in the context of particular issues. Using multiple national surveys, including an original module on the 2020 Congressional Election Study, we find that conservatives are more likely to prefer a devolution of power to state and local jurisdictions, even if doing so might make it harder to achieve conservative policy aims, whereas liberals are more instrumental, more likely to prioritize policy aims and to support whichever level of government seems most likely to achieve them. We then examine reasons why conservatives might display a stronger adherence to the federalist structure of the American government. We find that the idea of “states’ rights” continues to loom large for self-identified conservatives, as does a generalized level of trust toward political units described as small versus large.
{"title":"Ideology and Support for Federalism in Theory—And in Practice","authors":"James M Glaser, J. Berry, Deborah J. Schildkraut","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Conservatives are more likely than liberals to support the concept of federalism. In this article, we look at this support in the context of particular issues. Using multiple national surveys, including an original module on the 2020 Congressional Election Study, we find that conservatives are more likely to prefer a devolution of power to state and local jurisdictions, even if doing so might make it harder to achieve conservative policy aims, whereas liberals are more instrumental, more likely to prioritize policy aims and to support whichever level of government seems most likely to achieve them. We then examine reasons why conservatives might display a stronger adherence to the federalist structure of the American government. We find that the idea of “states’ rights” continues to loom large for self-identified conservatives, as does a generalized level of trust toward political units described as small versus large.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48632065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Contemporary research in American federalism has evaluated the centralizing characteristics of several institutions within state governments—including state statutes, executive orders, and judicial decisions—and has shown that these institutions are generally associated with shifting power away from local governments toward state governments. I expand this discussion by assessing the consequences of direct democracy for the balance of power between state and local governments. In particular, I investigate whether ballot measures are associated with decentralizing power away from state governments toward local governments or rather whether these measures are associated with centralizing power in state governments. Leveraging new data across the history of direct democracy in the United States and coding 945 proposed ballot measures according to their de/centralizing impact on local governments, I find that citizen-initiated ballot measures are neither centralizing nor decentralizing, but legislature-referred ballot measures are decentralizing. I also find that regardless of whether citizens or legislators are responsible for placing measures on the ballot, voters generally provide more support for centralizing ballot measures than decentralizing ballot measures. However, voter support is conditioned on state-level partisanship and ideology.
{"title":"The Consequences of Direct Democracy for the Balance of Power between State and Local Governments in the United States","authors":"Matthew J Uttermark","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjac043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contemporary research in American federalism has evaluated the centralizing characteristics of several institutions within state governments—including state statutes, executive orders, and judicial decisions—and has shown that these institutions are generally associated with shifting power away from local governments toward state governments. I expand this discussion by assessing the consequences of direct democracy for the balance of power between state and local governments. In particular, I investigate whether ballot measures are associated with decentralizing power away from state governments toward local governments or rather whether these measures are associated with centralizing power in state governments. Leveraging new data across the history of direct democracy in the United States and coding 945 proposed ballot measures according to their de/centralizing impact on local governments, I find that citizen-initiated ballot measures are neither centralizing nor decentralizing, but legislature-referred ballot measures are decentralizing. I also find that regardless of whether citizens or legislators are responsible for placing measures on the ballot, voters generally provide more support for centralizing ballot measures than decentralizing ballot measures. However, voter support is conditioned on state-level partisanship and ideology.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135703937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Clean Water Policy and State Choice: Promise and Performance in the Water Quality Act, by John C. Morris.","authors":"John A. Hoornbeek","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjac040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac040","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42220781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chapter 7, "Regional and local government and the European Union" by Mark Callanan and MichaëlTatham, also focuses on the European dimension of regionalization, looking at the mutual influence and interference between the EU and local government. I A Research Agenda for Regional and Local Government i is an edited book that aims to identify new trends and developments in regional and local governments in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008. [Extracted from the article]
{"title":"A Research Agenda for Regional and Local Government, Edited by Mark Callanan and John Loughlin","authors":"A. Baraggia","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjac038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac038","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 7, \"Regional and local government and the European Union\" by Mark Callanan and MichaëlTatham, also focuses on the European dimension of regionalization, looking at the mutual influence and interference between the EU and local government. I A Research Agenda for Regional and Local Government i is an edited book that aims to identify new trends and developments in regional and local governments in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008. [Extracted from the article]","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48169998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Federalism theorists debate the desirability of funding local services from local revenues or inter-governmental grants. Tiebout expects efficiency gains from local funding, but Oates says it perpetuates inequalities. Research using data from national probability samples has yet to show whether efficiency-equity trade-offs are associated with funding sources. We describe the trade-off in education by estimating the effect of revenue share from local sources on math and reading achievement. Data come from national probability samples of student performances on tests administered between 1990 and 2017. Relationships are estimated with OLS descriptive models, event study models of school finance reforms, and geographic discontinuity models that exploit differences in state funding policies. For every ten-percentage point increase in local revenue share, mean achievement rises by 0.05 standard deviations (sd) and socio-economic achievement gaps widen by 0.03sd. Voice and exit channels moderate the size of the efficiency-equity trade-off. Implications for inter-governmental grant policy are discussed.
{"title":"The Efficiency-Equity Trade-off in a Federal System: Local Financing of Schools and Student Achievement","authors":"Carlos X. Lastra‐Anadón, P. Peterson","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjac034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac034","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Federalism theorists debate the desirability of funding local services from local revenues or inter-governmental grants. Tiebout expects efficiency gains from local funding, but Oates says it perpetuates inequalities. Research using data from national probability samples has yet to show whether efficiency-equity trade-offs are associated with funding sources. We describe the trade-off in education by estimating the effect of revenue share from local sources on math and reading achievement. Data come from national probability samples of student performances on tests administered between 1990 and 2017. Relationships are estimated with OLS descriptive models, event study models of school finance reforms, and geographic discontinuity models that exploit differences in state funding policies. For every ten-percentage point increase in local revenue share, mean achievement rises by 0.05 standard deviations (sd) and socio-economic achievement gaps widen by 0.03sd. Voice and exit channels moderate the size of the efficiency-equity trade-off. Implications for inter-governmental grant policy are discussed.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43914490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article provides the first exhaustive quantitative account of the Supreme Court of Canada’s use of the term “cooperative federalism.” We find that cooperative federalism has appeared in twenty-four Supreme Court decisions from 1976 to 2019, and that these decisions have been more likely to favor the federal government than the provinces. Moreover, the Court’s use of the term can be divided between two distinct periods. During the formative period (1976–2009), the Court used the term fairly consistently. From 2010 to 2019, the Court has entered a contested period characterized by split decisions in which the Court is divided over differing conceptions of federalism. As cooperative federalism has transformed from a relatively vague concept into a more substantive constitutional principle, fissures over the term’s application have developed. This article shows how scholarly terminology can have an unexpected and even dispositive effect on judicial decisions, which can reflect uncertainty over how judges understand their institutional role.
{"title":"From the Ivory Tower to the Courtroom: Cooperative Federalism in the Supreme Court of Canada","authors":"Mark S. Harding, Dave Snow","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjac033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac033","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article provides the first exhaustive quantitative account of the Supreme Court of Canada’s use of the term “cooperative federalism.” We find that cooperative federalism has appeared in twenty-four Supreme Court decisions from 1976 to 2019, and that these decisions have been more likely to favor the federal government than the provinces. Moreover, the Court’s use of the term can be divided between two distinct periods. During the formative period (1976–2009), the Court used the term fairly consistently. From 2010 to 2019, the Court has entered a contested period characterized by split decisions in which the Court is divided over differing conceptions of federalism. As cooperative federalism has transformed from a relatively vague concept into a more substantive constitutional principle, fissures over the term’s application have developed. This article shows how scholarly terminology can have an unexpected and even dispositive effect on judicial decisions, which can reflect uncertainty over how judges understand their institutional role.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61192292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article investigates the concept and measurement of regulatory decentralization with a focus on minimum wages and renewable electricity standards. These two policy areas are chosen because they admit of a clear interpretation in continuous terms and vary substantially across jurisdictions. Concurrent central and subcentral regulatory competencies have a straightforward quantitative interpretation in these two policy areas. The article presents data on the effective autonomy of subcentral governments to determine their own minimum wage rates and renewable energy standards. It then tests whether more decentralized minimum wage and renewable energy regulatory regimes yield a consistently lower level of regulation and higher degree of interregional policy variation. I find that central governments are more likely to set regulatory minimums than maximums in these areas, and that therefore regulatory centralization does promote a higher level of regulation, but likely not through a competitive dynamic, and less policy variance.
{"title":"Regulatory Decentralization and Stringency: The Case of Comparative Minimum Wage and Renewable Energy Policies","authors":"Jason Sorens","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjac024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article investigates the concept and measurement of regulatory decentralization with a focus on minimum wages and renewable electricity standards. These two policy areas are chosen because they admit of a clear interpretation in continuous terms and vary substantially across jurisdictions. Concurrent central and subcentral regulatory competencies have a straightforward quantitative interpretation in these two policy areas. The article presents data on the effective autonomy of subcentral governments to determine their own minimum wage rates and renewable energy standards. It then tests whether more decentralized minimum wage and renewable energy regulatory regimes yield a consistently lower level of regulation and higher degree of interregional policy variation. I find that central governments are more likely to set regulatory minimums than maximums in these areas, and that therefore regulatory centralization does promote a higher level of regulation, but likely not through a competitive dynamic, and less policy variance.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42833190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comparative Federalism and Covid-19: Combating the Pandemic, Edited by Nico Steytler","authors":"Yvonne Hegele","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjac029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac029","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42406923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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