This study presents a measure of federal constitutional values as a dimension of federal political culture derived from four key features of federal systems. Tested in six federal and two non-federal countries, we find the measure is stable and taps enduring values, including confirmation that citizens who support devolutionary reform have stronger federal constitutional values. Defining federalism success as a system where citizens have strong federal constitutional values and high satisfaction with their current polycentric system, our results find Switzerland and Canada being the most viable, followed by the United States, Australia, and Germany, while Belgium is not very successful. In the non-federal countries, substantial support for devolution and possibly federalism is found in France, but devolution is more contested in the United Kingdom. The results affirm the importance of public attitudes and political culture in understanding the performance of federal political systems and public support for federalist-type reforms.
{"title":"Federal Constitutional Values and Citizen Attitudes to Government: Explaining Federal System Viability and Reform Preferences in Eight Countries","authors":"A. Brown, Jacob Deem, J. Kincaid","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjab031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjab031","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study presents a measure of federal constitutional values as a dimension of federal political culture derived from four key features of federal systems. Tested in six federal and two non-federal countries, we find the measure is stable and taps enduring values, including confirmation that citizens who support devolutionary reform have stronger federal constitutional values. Defining federalism success as a system where citizens have strong federal constitutional values and high satisfaction with their current polycentric system, our results find Switzerland and Canada being the most viable, followed by the United States, Australia, and Germany, while Belgium is not very successful. In the non-federal countries, substantial support for devolution and possibly federalism is found in France, but devolution is more contested in the United Kingdom. The results affirm the importance of public attitudes and political culture in understanding the performance of federal political systems and public support for federalist-type reforms.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48468799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What role do subnational governments play in shaping a country’s redistributive efforts? Existing literature suggests that federalism can be a hindrance to redistribution. Such negative effects may be particularly true of Latin America’s federations due to high levels of regional inequality and malapportioned political institutions. However, in order to fully understand redistribution in federal systems in Latin America, we need to examine not only how subnational governments affect centralized redistributive efforts, but also what efforts these subnational governments are making themselves. In this article, I contribute to our understanding of subnational social spending in Latin America’s largest federation, Brazil. My results suggest that, in Brazil, state governments are constrained actors, but they do pursue different levels of redistributive social spending with higher levels being more likely under left parties.
{"title":"Subnational Politics and Redistribution in a Federal System: Determinants of Progressive Social Spending in Brazilian States","authors":"Claire Dunn","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjab030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjab030","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What role do subnational governments play in shaping a country’s redistributive efforts? Existing literature suggests that federalism can be a hindrance to redistribution. Such negative effects may be particularly true of Latin America’s federations due to high levels of regional inequality and malapportioned political institutions. However, in order to fully understand redistribution in federal systems in Latin America, we need to examine not only how subnational governments affect centralized redistributive efforts, but also what efforts these subnational governments are making themselves. In this article, I contribute to our understanding of subnational social spending in Latin America’s largest federation, Brazil. My results suggest that, in Brazil, state governments are constrained actors, but they do pursue different levels of redistributive social spending with higher levels being more likely under left parties.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46804888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although regional governments play vital roles in most political systems, citizens’ perceptions regarding regional authority are only rarely studied. Relying on the International Constitutional Values Survey held among more than 6,000 respondents from 142 regions in eight countries, we develop measures to tap into citizens’ preferences for self-rule—i.e., for autonomy for their region—and citizens’ preferences for shared rule—i.e., for regional engagement in national decision-making. A majority of citizens prefer their regional governments to have some level of both self-rule and shared rule, but around a quarter of the citizens prefer their region to have more self-rule and less shared rule or vice versa. The analysis reveals these varying preferences are associated with a region’s actual authority and regional identity. These results are important because they indicate that most citizens do not presume increased self-rule to be the main or only path to a strong regional authority.
{"title":"Dissecting Public Opinion on Regional Authority: Four Types of Regionalists Based on Citizens’ Preferences for Self-Rule and Shared Rule","authors":"A. Schakel, A. J. Brown","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjab020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjab020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Although regional governments play vital roles in most political systems, citizens’ perceptions regarding regional authority are only rarely studied. Relying on the International Constitutional Values Survey held among more than 6,000 respondents from 142 regions in eight countries, we develop measures to tap into citizens’ preferences for self-rule—i.e., for autonomy for their region—and citizens’ preferences for shared rule—i.e., for regional engagement in national decision-making. A majority of citizens prefer their regional governments to have some level of both self-rule and shared rule, but around a quarter of the citizens prefer their region to have more self-rule and less shared rule or vice versa. The analysis reveals these varying preferences are associated with a region’s actual authority and regional identity. These results are important because they indicate that most citizens do not presume increased self-rule to be the main or only path to a strong regional authority.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49599518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How We Vote: Innovation in American Elections, by Kathleen Hale and Mitchell Brown","authors":"Daniel J. Palazzolo","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjab032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjab032","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43856369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The deduction of certain state and local taxes (SALT) from the U.S. federal income tax base provides substantial amounts of indirect federal subsidy to state and local governments and also allows cross-state exportation of deductible state and local taxes. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) limits the SALT deduction and increases standard deduction per filer each year. This study examines the impact of TCJA on the distribution of this indirect federal subsidy and exportation of major state and local taxes. Using individual income tax data from the Internal Revenue Service, this research shows that the law narrows the disparity in states’ receipt of the indirect federal subsidy and reduces the capacity of high-tax states to export their taxes to other states. The findings shed light on the continued debate regarding the effectiveness and fairness of this important type of intergovernmental transfer in the United States.
{"title":"Indirect Federal Subsidy and Tax Exportation through State and Local Tax Deduction: Understanding the Impact of the 2017 Tax Reform on State and Local Governments","authors":"Yonghong Wu","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjab028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjab028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The deduction of certain state and local taxes (SALT) from the U.S. federal income tax base provides substantial amounts of indirect federal subsidy to state and local governments and also allows cross-state exportation of deductible state and local taxes. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) limits the SALT deduction and increases standard deduction per filer each year. This study examines the impact of TCJA on the distribution of this indirect federal subsidy and exportation of major state and local taxes. Using individual income tax data from the Internal Revenue Service, this research shows that the law narrows the disparity in states’ receipt of the indirect federal subsidy and reduces the capacity of high-tax states to export their taxes to other states. The findings shed light on the continued debate regarding the effectiveness and fairness of this important type of intergovernmental transfer in the United States.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42223313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Abortion and the Law in America: Roe v. Wade to the Present, by Mary Ziegler","authors":"Joshua C. Wilson","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjab033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjab033","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49232152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Trump administration pursued eighty-four energy reversal actions between 2017 and 2020, the majority of which through executive action. In this article, we evaluate the effectiveness of such an administrative presidency in its ability to withstand political and legal challenges. We first set the context of U.S. energy policy predating the Trump administration, and then synthesize the administration’s reversal actions according to the mechanisms, the beneficiaries, and the legal process through which each evolved. We then analyze four reversal case studies that highlight how stakeholders responded to such actions, and the resulting variation in outcomes: the rollback of coal ash standards; the proposed coastal oil and gas auctions; the revocation of California’s vehicle emissions waiver; and the replacement of the Clean Power Plan with the Affordable Clean Energy rule. We find that the administration’s executive approach was regularly checked through litigation by states, interest groups, and industry, or had limited impact due to the high level of regulatory uncertainty that it fostered. We draw implications for ongoing state and federal dynamics and for the lasting durability of the Trump administration’s energy reversal legacy.
{"title":"Energy Policy Reversal during the Trump Administration: Examination of Its Legacy and Implications for Federalism","authors":"Madeline Yozwiak, Hannah Abell, Sanya Carley","doi":"10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The Trump administration pursued eighty-four energy reversal actions between 2017 and 2020, the majority of which through executive action. In this article, we evaluate the effectiveness of such an administrative presidency in its ability to withstand political and legal challenges. We first set the context of U.S. energy policy predating the Trump administration, and then synthesize the administration’s reversal actions according to the mechanisms, the beneficiaries, and the legal process through which each evolved. We then analyze four reversal case studies that highlight how stakeholders responded to such actions, and the resulting variation in outcomes: the rollback of coal ash standards; the proposed coastal oil and gas auctions; the revocation of California’s vehicle emissions waiver; and the replacement of the Clean Power Plan with the Affordable Clean Energy rule. We find that the administration’s executive approach was regularly checked through litigation by states, interest groups, and industry, or had limited impact due to the high level of regulatory uncertainty that it fostered. We draw implications for ongoing state and federal dynamics and for the lasting durability of the Trump administration’s energy reversal legacy.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43566291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines recent proposals to “defund the police” using a perspective informed by literature on agency termination and political accountability. These concepts allow us to build a framework for categorizing such proposals based on the assignment of functions to organizations. These proposals operate in the context of a federal system which can shape the character of each category, make some choices more or less feasible, influence where functions may be assigned, and create political incentives out of the complex geography of conflict. We use examples from Minneapolis, New York, Los Angeles, and Seattle to illustrate our framework. We conclude by offering a preliminary analysis of why these cities tend towards adopting one of the alternatives we outline.
{"title":"Federalism, Defunding the Police, and Democratic Values: A Functional Accountability Framework for Analyzing Police Reform Proposals","authors":"J. Sinclair, Maya Love, María Gutiérrez-Vera","doi":"10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines recent proposals to “defund the police” using a perspective informed by literature on agency termination and political accountability. These concepts allow us to build a framework for categorizing such proposals based on the assignment of functions to organizations. These proposals operate in the context of a federal system which can shape the character of each category, make some choices more or less feasible, influence where functions may be assigned, and create political incentives out of the complex geography of conflict. We use examples from Minneapolis, New York, Los Angeles, and Seattle to illustrate our framework. We conclude by offering a preliminary analysis of why these cities tend towards adopting one of the alternatives we outline.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45010353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Power-Sharing in Europe: Past Practice, Present Cases and Future Directions, edited by Soeren Keil and Allison McCulloch","authors":"A. Piacentini","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjab012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjab012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/publius/pjab012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45699728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Partisan and ideological polarization have been major barriers to the implementation of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion in Republican-controlled states. Scholars have referred to this situation as “fractious federalism,” with Republican state policymakers toeing the national party line in refusing to cooperate with a major policy initiative. In some cases, however, diverse advocacy coalitions have overcome fractious federalism to pass expansion legislation in deeply Republican states. More recently, such coalitions have resorted to ballot initiative campaigns as another means of overcoming such polarization, and won impressive victories in a series of “deep red” states. Drawing on forty-four interviews with people involved in expansion advocacy in eleven states, I report important insights on the formation and activities of these coalitions in both the legislative and ballot initiative eras of Medicaid expansion politics.
{"title":"Advocating for Medicaid Expansion in Republican States: Overcoming “Fractious Federalism” in the Statehouse and Ballot Box","authors":"Jake Haselswerdt","doi":"10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Partisan and ideological polarization have been major barriers to the implementation of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion in Republican-controlled states. Scholars have referred to this situation as “fractious federalism,” with Republican state policymakers toeing the national party line in refusing to cooperate with a major policy initiative. In some cases, however, diverse advocacy coalitions have overcome fractious federalism to pass expansion legislation in deeply Republican states. More recently, such coalitions have resorted to ballot initiative campaigns as another means of overcoming such polarization, and won impressive victories in a series of “deep red” states. Drawing on forty-four interviews with people involved in expansion advocacy in eleven states, I report important insights on the formation and activities of these coalitions in both the legislative and ballot initiative eras of Medicaid expansion politics.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42387073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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