Children who do not understand the serious wrongness of their actions lack criminal capacity and cannot be convicted. At common law, children under seven are deemed to lack criminal capacity, children over 14 possess full capacity and children between seven and 14 are rebuttably presumed to lack capacity; the prosecution must prove capacity beyond reasonable doubt. Australia has increased the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) to 10 and is considering a further increase. England & Wales and Northern Ireland have raised the MACR to 10 but have abolished the rebuttable presumption: at age 10, all children are assigned full criminal capacity. This article agrees with international calls for the MACR to be raised but argues that it is more important that the rebuttable presumption should be retained and extended. Children's brains and decision-making capacities continue to develop throughout their teenage years at different rates. The rebuttable presumption provides individualised justice for children facing developmental difficulties. To wrongfully convict a child who lacks capacity will unjustly damage their life chances. Where a child does have capacity, a variety of evidence may be available to the prosecution to prove it. If the prosecution fails to discharge the burden, the child should be acquitted. The acquittal may be mistaken, but this error is far less harmful than a wrongful conviction.
What does it mean for a specialist department of legal studies, such as the Law of Evidence, to have, or to acquire, 'philosophical foundations'? In what sense are the theoretical foundations of procedural scholarship and teaching distinctively or uniquely philosophical? The publication of Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law (OUP, 2021), edited by Christian Dahlman, Alex Stein and Giovanni Tuzet, presents a valuable opportunity to reflect on these existential questions of disciplinary constitution, methodology and design. This review article critically examines the volume's idiosyncratic selection of topics, structural taxonomy, epistemological priorities, and enigmatic thesis that modern evidence law is turning from rules to reasons as its organising intellectual framework. Whilst the volume is impressively interdisciplinary and cosmopolitan in authorship and outlook, some doubts are expressed about its implicit US orientation, limited engagement with institutional or doctrinal details, and marginalisation of normative criminal jurisprudence.
According to a popular picture, criminal law lives up to the demands of its internal morality when its norms have counterparts with the same content in morality-when it conforms to what we call the mirror principle. This article argues that the popular picture must be redrawn by relying on a second principle, which we call the instrumental principle. Criminal law conforms to the instrumental principle when the existence of its norms helps to prevent or ameliorate moral wrongdoing. Our argument is that the instrumental principle forms part of the internal morality of criminal law, and supplies a justification for criminal laws that depart from the mirror principle. We further suggest that criminal law's internal morality is asymmetrical: though departures from the mirror principle are sometimes justified by the instrumental principle, departures from the latter are not justified by the former.
This article addresses three fundamental questions about a key phenomenon in special jurisprudence, 'areas of law': (i) what is an area of law; (ii) what are the consequences of dividing law into distinct areas; and (iii) what constitutes the foundations of an area of law. It claims that (i) 'an area of law' is a set of legal norms that are intersubjectively recognised by the legal complex as a subset of legal norms in a given jurisdiction; (ii) the sub-division of law into multiple areas matters to the content and scope of legal doctrine, to law's perceived legitimacy and possibly to its effectiveness; and (iii) the search for the normative foundations of an area of law is typically an inquiry into its 'aims' or 'functions'. This article systematically articulates, explains and answers these three questions generally, ie in relation to areas of law as such.