This article takes as its starting point the recent case of Crowter, which challenged the law permitting provision of abortion on the grounds of fetal anomaly. It begins by briefly locating the case within a longer ‘biography’ of the Abortion Act 1967, casting important light on the issue raised within it. It then focuses in detail on the claims made in Crowter, exploring how important moral, social and political concerns with disability discrimination were refracted through an anti-abortion lens as they were translated into legal argument. As a result, the legal remedies sought were simultaneously disproportionate and insufficient to address the harms described. Whilst agreeing that the Abortion Act reflects anachronistic and discriminatory understandings of disability and is overdue reform, the article argues that a response that fully reflects modern ethical values will require more radical change than envisaged in Crowter, and that this must refuse an opposition between the rights of pregnant and disabled people.
{"title":"Beyond the Tram Lines: Disability Discrimination, Reproductive Rights and Anachronistic Abortion Law","authors":"Sally Sheldon","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad025","url":null,"abstract":"This article takes as its starting point the recent case of Crowter, which challenged the law permitting provision of abortion on the grounds of fetal anomaly. It begins by briefly locating the case within a longer ‘biography’ of the Abortion Act 1967, casting important light on the issue raised within it. It then focuses in detail on the claims made in Crowter, exploring how important moral, social and political concerns with disability discrimination were refracted through an anti-abortion lens as they were translated into legal argument. As a result, the legal remedies sought were simultaneously disproportionate and insufficient to address the harms described. Whilst agreeing that the Abortion Act reflects anachronistic and discriminatory understandings of disability and is overdue reform, the article argues that a response that fully reflects modern ethical values will require more radical change than envisaged in Crowter, and that this must refuse an opposition between the rights of pregnant and disabled people.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138538340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-02eCollection Date: 2024-01-01DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqad024
Simon Douglas, Antonia Layard
This article considers 'ownership beneath' in light of the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, which has introduced a new Schedule 4A into the Land Registration Act 2002. The legislation, with notable exceptions, requires overseas entities to publicly reveal their beneficial owners, with criminal and land law consequences if transparency requirements are not met. The article explores how ownership beneath operates and can be made more transparent, noting the three different forms of beneficial ownership employed: as control, behind a trust and as a consequence. Emphasising the distinctive nature of beneficial ownership of land, the analysis recommends amending ECTEA 2022 to focus on land ownership, not merely landowning overseas entities, facilitating greater transparency by expanding the definition of registrable beneficial owners, closing the loophole where information is not available and requiring public disclosure of most trust information.
{"title":"Ownership Beneath: Transparency of Land Ownership in Times of Economic Crime.","authors":"Simon Douglas, Antonia Layard","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad024","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article considers 'ownership beneath' in light of the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, which has introduced a new Schedule 4A into the Land Registration Act 2002. The legislation, with notable exceptions, requires overseas entities to publicly reveal their beneficial owners, with criminal and land law consequences if transparency requirements are not met. The article explores how ownership beneath operates and can be made more transparent, noting the three different forms of beneficial ownership employed: as control, behind a trust and as a consequence. Emphasising the distinctive nature of beneficial ownership of land, the analysis recommends amending ECTEA 2022 to focus on land ownership, not merely landowning overseas entities, facilitating greater transparency by expanding the definition of registrable beneficial owners, closing the loophole where information is not available and requiring public disclosure of most trust information.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"44 1","pages":"74-103"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10921274/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140094804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract— In October 2022, the UK Supreme Court unanimously held that the Scottish Parliament lacks the power to legislate for a second referendum on Scottish independence (Indyref 2) absent an enabling Order by the UK government under section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998. With no such Order forthcoming, alternative pathways to Indyref 2 are being investigated. In this article, we examine two such potential pathways—a plebiscitary election and an unauthorised referendum—through the lens of constituent power. We argue that both pathways are theoretically available if one accepts (as we argue) that the Scottish people is the bearer of constituent power. However, we conclude that there are significant obstacles dotting both potential pathways, and as such the only feasible route to internationally recognised statehood for Scotland is via political negotiation.
{"title":"How (Not) to Break Up: Constituent Power and Alternative Pathways to Scottish Independence","authors":"Raffael N Fasel, Shona Wilson Stark","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract— In October 2022, the UK Supreme Court unanimously held that the Scottish Parliament lacks the power to legislate for a second referendum on Scottish independence (Indyref 2) absent an enabling Order by the UK government under section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998. With no such Order forthcoming, alternative pathways to Indyref 2 are being investigated. In this article, we examine two such potential pathways—a plebiscitary election and an unauthorised referendum—through the lens of constituent power. We argue that both pathways are theoretically available if one accepts (as we argue) that the Scottish people is the bearer of constituent power. However, we conclude that there are significant obstacles dotting both potential pathways, and as such the only feasible route to internationally recognised statehood for Scotland is via political negotiation.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135977427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Akerlof’s seminal model on asymmetric information forms the basis for a broad range of regulatory interventions aimed at addressing the adverse effects of unequal information between transacting parties. While a groundbreaking model of the effects of information asymmetries in markets, Akerlof’s model does not examine why information asymmetries emerge. This article argues that an examination of the underlying drivers and origins of information asymmetries revitalises the policy rationale for regulatory intervention.
{"title":"The Origin of Asymmetric Information: Revisiting the Rationale for Regulation","authors":"Gareth Downing","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Akerlof’s seminal model on asymmetric information forms the basis for a broad range of regulatory interventions aimed at addressing the adverse effects of unequal information between transacting parties. While a groundbreaking model of the effects of information asymmetries in markets, Akerlof’s model does not examine why information asymmetries emerge. This article argues that an examination of the underlying drivers and origins of information asymmetries revitalises the policy rationale for regulatory intervention.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135366732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article examines the epistemic bias of comparative law scholarship. Comparatists are unable or unwilling to recognise the religious dimensions in Western law as they see religion only in the context of non-Western law. This problem is typical of modern macro-comparative law, which fails to recount the influence of Christianity on Western law and legal culture. The article invites legal scholars to reach beyond the notions of ‘religious law’ and ‘secular law’ in terms of classifying the world’s legal systems. Firstly, the article explains how comparative law has a problematic relationship with religion; secondly, it shows that, despite Christianity having been deemed a thing of the past, its influence can and should also be charted in modern law. I argue for a need to rethink the manner in which Western law is depicted as a thoroughly secular law as opposed to the religious law of exoticised others.
{"title":"̀Comparative Law and Christianity—A Plank in the Eye?","authors":"Jaakko Husa","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines the epistemic bias of comparative law scholarship. Comparatists are unable or unwilling to recognise the religious dimensions in Western law as they see religion only in the context of non-Western law. This problem is typical of modern macro-comparative law, which fails to recount the influence of Christianity on Western law and legal culture. The article invites legal scholars to reach beyond the notions of ‘religious law’ and ‘secular law’ in terms of classifying the world’s legal systems. Firstly, the article explains how comparative law has a problematic relationship with religion; secondly, it shows that, despite Christianity having been deemed a thing of the past, its influence can and should also be charted in modern law. I argue for a need to rethink the manner in which Western law is depicted as a thoroughly secular law as opposed to the religious law of exoticised others.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134973933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Some recent work in legal theory argues that legal questions boil down to moral questions. On this view, lawyers and judges are ultimately interested in the moral effect of things done by legal institutions. This view has been called the ‘new legal anti-positivism’. So far, it has not given a convincing account of precedent. That is, it has not explained how moral reasons can account for what judges do in practice when they follow past decisions. Any successful account must explain the central features of this practice: why lower courts follow higher courts, and not the other way around; the difference between ratio and obiter; and the situations in which judges distinguish or overrule past decisions. This article gives a non-positivist account that meets this challenge, by giving a prominent place to the moral importance of roles. The account avoids some problems faced by existing non-positivist accounts of precedent.
{"title":"Roles and the Moral Practice of Precedent","authors":"Nathan Van Wees","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Some recent work in legal theory argues that legal questions boil down to moral questions. On this view, lawyers and judges are ultimately interested in the moral effect of things done by legal institutions. This view has been called the ‘new legal anti-positivism’. So far, it has not given a convincing account of precedent. That is, it has not explained how moral reasons can account for what judges do in practice when they follow past decisions. Any successful account must explain the central features of this practice: why lower courts follow higher courts, and not the other way around; the difference between ratio and obiter; and the situations in which judges distinguish or overrule past decisions. This article gives a non-positivist account that meets this challenge, by giving a prominent place to the moral importance of roles. The account avoids some problems faced by existing non-positivist accounts of precedent.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135477834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Judges occupy important roles in Rousseau’s constitutional theory. Placing the Social Contract alongside Rousseau’s lesser-known Letters Written from the Mountain and The Government of Poland, this article examines how Rousseau constructs judicial institutions and explores a problem he confronts. Although necessary for the republic to enjoy the rule of law, Rousseau worries that adjudicative bodies threaten the citizens’ freedom. This article describes Rousseau’s constitutional solution, which combines a conservative-yet-progressive legislative ethos, with pluralist institutionalism and judicial non-professionalism.
{"title":"Rousseau’s Republican Judges","authors":"S. Winter","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Judges occupy important roles in Rousseau’s constitutional theory. Placing the Social Contract alongside Rousseau’s lesser-known Letters Written from the Mountain and The Government of Poland, this article examines how Rousseau constructs judicial institutions and explores a problem he confronts. Although necessary for the republic to enjoy the rule of law, Rousseau worries that adjudicative bodies threaten the citizens’ freedom. This article describes Rousseau’s constitutional solution, which combines a conservative-yet-progressive legislative ethos, with pluralist institutionalism and judicial non-professionalism.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44140742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article defends the claim that the institutional source of a legal norm—be it the constitution, legislation or whatever—affects its nature and value. We argue that institutions are not merely vessels through which norms get public recognition. When different institutions use identically worded norms, say, ‘everyone is equally entitled to X’, they may nevertheless produce different norms and provide different goods. For instance, a constitutional protection of a basic right differs from a statutory right to the same right not (only) because the former is less likely to be changed, but (also) because a constitutional decision marks the right in question as one that makes no essential reference to the actual choice of the majority of the political community. We extend this argument to other institutional settings, especially the common law tradition of judge-made law.
{"title":"The Necessity of Institutional Pluralism","authors":"Avihay Dorfman, Alon Harel","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article defends the claim that the institutional source of a legal norm—be it the constitution, legislation or whatever—affects its nature and value. We argue that institutions are not merely vessels through which norms get public recognition. When different institutions use identically worded norms, say, ‘everyone is equally entitled to X’, they may nevertheless produce different norms and provide different goods. For instance, a constitutional protection of a basic right differs from a statutory right to the same right not (only) because the former is less likely to be changed, but (also) because a constitutional decision marks the right in question as one that makes no essential reference to the actual choice of the majority of the political community. We extend this argument to other institutional settings, especially the common law tradition of judge-made law.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44275205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Britain has a reputation for having a stock market-oriented corporate economy and there is an extensive literature maintaining that laws affording substantial protection to outside investors are needed for a thriving stock market. Historically, however, UK equity markets have not always flourished and, when they have, law’s contribution has been open to question. This article considers the uneasy match between law and Britain’s stock market development from when shares first began to trade publicly through to the present day, offering in so doing insights into the relationship between law and equity markets and current reforms intended to revive a flagging UK stock exchange.
{"title":"Law and Stock Market Development in the UK over Time: An Uneasy Match","authors":"Brian R Cheffins, Bobby V Reddy","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Britain has a reputation for having a stock market-oriented corporate economy and there is an extensive literature maintaining that laws affording substantial protection to outside investors are needed for a thriving stock market. Historically, however, UK equity markets have not always flourished and, when they have, law’s contribution has been open to question. This article considers the uneasy match between law and Britain’s stock market development from when shares first began to trade publicly through to the present day, offering in so doing insights into the relationship between law and equity markets and current reforms intended to revive a flagging UK stock exchange.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135396814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his long-awaited treatise on the relational theory of contracting, David Campbell provides a rigorous, systematic and consistently lucid account of mutual recognition as the basis of all volitional obligations. Fiercely negotiated economic transactions find their social expression in legally enforceable agreements that are to be followed scrupulously to the letter both by the parties and by the courts. This is because, in his view, mutual recognition, the co-operative economic enterprise, is memorialised in the legal instrument. Using the example of the emergent doctrine of good faith, this article argues that while such literalism proffers an admirably bright line for enforcement of agreements, it reduces the import and value of the relational theory of contract as an ethical and political accounting of market transactions. Literalism here is problematic not simply because of the inherent historicity and social diversity of language, but because in concepts such as good faith or reasonable interpretation, the purpose of the inscribed transaction has to be evaluated not only in terms of the plurality of the contract’s clauses, but also with a view to the overall shared intent of the exchange. For the relational theory of contract to have the impact that it merits, it needs to strengthen its account of how mutual recognition and the ethical and political dimensions of relationship best gain expression in the good-faith interpretation of the proximities manifest in agreement.
{"title":"Against the Spirit of the Age: The Rationale of Relational Contracts","authors":"P. Goodrich","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In his long-awaited treatise on the relational theory of contracting, David Campbell provides a rigorous, systematic and consistently lucid account of mutual recognition as the basis of all volitional obligations. Fiercely negotiated economic transactions find their social expression in legally enforceable agreements that are to be followed scrupulously to the letter both by the parties and by the courts. This is because, in his view, mutual recognition, the co-operative economic enterprise, is memorialised in the legal instrument. Using the example of the emergent doctrine of good faith, this article argues that while such literalism proffers an admirably bright line for enforcement of agreements, it reduces the import and value of the relational theory of contract as an ethical and political accounting of market transactions. Literalism here is problematic not simply because of the inherent historicity and social diversity of language, but because in concepts such as good faith or reasonable interpretation, the purpose of the inscribed transaction has to be evaluated not only in terms of the plurality of the contract’s clauses, but also with a view to the overall shared intent of the exchange. For the relational theory of contract to have the impact that it merits, it needs to strengthen its account of how mutual recognition and the ethical and political dimensions of relationship best gain expression in the good-faith interpretation of the proximities manifest in agreement.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45150069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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