It is very difficult to comment on a book with which one fundamentally agrees. Ran Hirschl's magnificent Comparative Matters is not only a deep work of intellectual history, but it also makes a powerful methodological argument. Hirschl calls for integrating the study of comparative constitutional law into a broader field of comparative constitutional studies, in which rigorous but pluralistic social sciences are deployed to help us understand problems. Who could possibly object? Certainly not I.Hirschl's clarion call is to expand our frameworks outward in three ways. First, he asks us to expand our focus geographically, away from the established democracies of Europe and North America; this is something that the field has belatedly begun to do in the last few years with superb results.1 Second, Hirschl wants the field to expand methodologically, away from narrow lawyerly doctrinalism toward truly interdisciplinary inquiry, and he points out the many contributions of social scientists to the endeavor.2 Third, he asks us to expand our temporal framework.3 Hirschl's own methodology of returning to earlier exemplars of comparison, ancient and modern, is itself an example here. Hirschl also points out that, within any particular system, we ought not be limited in our focus on the moment courts decide cases but rather should take a broader frame. Instead we ought to look at moments of constitutionalization, constitution-making and constitutional politics beyond the judiciary. This is another way of expanding the temporal frame, away from the moment of judicial decision.Let's begin with this last point. With apologies for the American parochialism, I have characterized the narrow focus on court decisions the "Seventh Inning Problem" in Comparative Constitutional Law.4 The analogy is to a baseball fan who pays overly felicitous attention to a late inning. Imagine yourself as a fan going to watch the Toronto Blue Jays with a good friend; let's call him Shai. You arrive very late, at the top of the seventh inning. You see which team is batting, and so can deduce who is the home team, since the home team in baseball always bats in the bottom half of the inning. You look at the scoreboard and see the score, which allows you to ascertain who is winning and losing. But you do not know how the score came to be that way or why.You proceed to watch the seventh inning. As baseball innings go, the seventh is fairly important-not just in the top ten but somewhat higher. Sometimes a team will score a decisive comeback run; other times a team will shut out the other side and close in on victory. (Indeed, this past October, the aforementioned Toronto Blue Jays played one of the most remarkable and important seventh innings in baseball history, winning the National League Championship Series with a three-run comeback.5) It is also the case that the seventh inning has some aesthetic or theatrical advantages over other innings. The inning is always accompanied by a rousin
{"title":"How To Study Constitution-Making: Hirschl, Elster, And The Seventh Inning Problem","authors":"Tom Ginsburg","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2997552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2997552","url":null,"abstract":"It is very difficult to comment on a book with which one fundamentally agrees. Ran Hirschl's magnificent Comparative Matters is not only a deep work of intellectual history, but it also makes a powerful methodological argument. Hirschl calls for integrating the study of comparative constitutional law into a broader field of comparative constitutional studies, in which rigorous but pluralistic social sciences are deployed to help us understand problems. Who could possibly object? Certainly not I.Hirschl's clarion call is to expand our frameworks outward in three ways. First, he asks us to expand our focus geographically, away from the established democracies of Europe and North America; this is something that the field has belatedly begun to do in the last few years with superb results.1 Second, Hirschl wants the field to expand methodologically, away from narrow lawyerly doctrinalism toward truly interdisciplinary inquiry, and he points out the many contributions of social scientists to the endeavor.2 Third, he asks us to expand our temporal framework.3 Hirschl's own methodology of returning to earlier exemplars of comparison, ancient and modern, is itself an example here. Hirschl also points out that, within any particular system, we ought not be limited in our focus on the moment courts decide cases but rather should take a broader frame. Instead we ought to look at moments of constitutionalization, constitution-making and constitutional politics beyond the judiciary. This is another way of expanding the temporal frame, away from the moment of judicial decision.Let's begin with this last point. With apologies for the American parochialism, I have characterized the narrow focus on court decisions the \"Seventh Inning Problem\" in Comparative Constitutional Law.4 The analogy is to a baseball fan who pays overly felicitous attention to a late inning. Imagine yourself as a fan going to watch the Toronto Blue Jays with a good friend; let's call him Shai. You arrive very late, at the top of the seventh inning. You see which team is batting, and so can deduce who is the home team, since the home team in baseball always bats in the bottom half of the inning. You look at the scoreboard and see the score, which allows you to ascertain who is winning and losing. But you do not know how the score came to be that way or why.You proceed to watch the seventh inning. As baseball innings go, the seventh is fairly important-not just in the top ten but somewhat higher. Sometimes a team will score a decisive comeback run; other times a team will shut out the other side and close in on victory. (Indeed, this past October, the aforementioned Toronto Blue Jays played one of the most remarkable and important seventh innings in baseball history, winning the National League Championship Series with a three-run comeback.5) It is also the case that the seventh inning has some aesthetic or theatrical advantages over other innings. The inning is always accompanied by a rousin","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2016-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68467042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cumulative constitutional rights are ubiquitous. Plaintiffs litigate multiple constitutional violations, or multiple harms, and judges use multiple constitutional provisions to inform interpretation. Yet, judges, litigants, and scholars have often criticized the notion of cumulative rights, including in leading Supreme Court rulings, such as Lawrence v. Texas, Employment Division v. Smith, and Miranda v. Arizona. Recently, the Court attempted to clarify some of this confusion. In its recent landmark opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court struck down state bans on same-sex marriage by pointing to several distinct but overlapping protections inherent in the Due Process Clause, including the right to individual autonomy, the right to intimate association, and the safeguarding of children, while also noting how the rights in question were simultaneously grounded in equal protection. “The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote. What the Court did not do was to explain the connection. To redress harms to injured plaintiffs without creating doctrinal incoherence, courts need to understand the categorically distinct ways in which cumulative constitutional harm can occur and how these forms affect constitutional scrutiny. We argue that cumulative constitutional rights cases can be categorized into three general types and that these types need to be analyzed differently. The first type, aggregate harm, occurs when multiple discrete acts, taken together, add up to a harm of constitutional magnitude, even if each individual act, taken alone, would not. The second type, hybrid rights, occurs where a plaintiff claims a single action has violated rights under multiple constitutional provisions. If a court were to apply the proper level of scrutiny to the claims individually, however, none would result in redress. As a result, hybrid rights cases should not ordinarily result in relief. The third type, which we term intersectional rights, occur when the action violates more than one constitutional provision but is only cognizable when the provisions are read to inform and bolster one another. Our aim in this Essay is to provide a framework courts can use to analyze cumulative constitutional rights. While courts should be open to conducting a cumulative analysis, when constitutional rights are mutually reinforcing, those relationships should be clearly set out and defined.
累积的宪法权利无处不在。原告提起多重违反宪法或多重损害的诉讼，法官则利用多重宪法条款为解释提供依据。然而，法官、诉讼当事人和学者经常批评累积权利的概念，包括在最高法院的主要裁决中，如劳伦斯诉德克萨斯州案、劳工局诉史密斯案和米兰达诉亚利桑那州案。最近，法院试图澄清这种混淆。在最近具有里程碑意义的奥贝格费尔诉霍奇斯案(Obergefell v. Hodges)中，最高法院推翻了各州对同性婚姻的禁令，指出正当程序条款中固有的几项不同但重叠的保护，包括个人自主权、亲密交往权和保护儿童的权利，同时也指出，相关权利是如何同时建立在平等保护的基础上的。“正当程序条款和平等保护条款有着深刻的联系，”大法官安东尼·肯尼迪(Anthony Kennedy)写道。法院没有做的是解释这种联系。为了在不造成理论不连贯的情况下纠正对受害原告的伤害，法院需要了解累积宪法损害可能发生的绝对不同的方式，以及这些形式如何影响宪法审查。我们认为，累积宪法权利案件可以分为三种一般类型，这些类型需要进行不同的分析。第一种类型是总体损害，当多个独立的行为加在一起构成宪法规定的损害时，就会发生这种情况，即使单独采取每个单独的行为不会造成损害。第二种类型是混合权利，发生在原告主张单一行为侵犯了多项宪法规定的权利。但是，如果法院对每一项索赔都进行适当程度的审查，就不会导致赔偿。因此，混合权利案件通常不应导致救济。第三种类型，我们称之为交叉权利，当行为违反了一条以上的宪法条款，但只有当这些条款被解读为相互告知和支持时，才会出现。本文的目的是提供一个法院可以用来分析累积性宪法权利的框架。虽然法院应开放进行累积分析，但当宪法权利相互加强时，这些关系应明确规定和界定。
{"title":"Cumulative Constitutional Rights","authors":"Kerry Abrams, Brandon L. Garrett","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2642640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2642640","url":null,"abstract":"Cumulative constitutional rights are ubiquitous. Plaintiffs litigate multiple constitutional violations, or multiple harms, and judges use multiple constitutional provisions to inform interpretation. Yet, judges, litigants, and scholars have often criticized the notion of cumulative rights, including in leading Supreme Court rulings, such as Lawrence v. Texas, Employment Division v. Smith, and Miranda v. Arizona. Recently, the Court attempted to clarify some of this confusion. In its recent landmark opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court struck down state bans on same-sex marriage by pointing to several distinct but overlapping protections inherent in the Due Process Clause, including the right to individual autonomy, the right to intimate association, and the safeguarding of children, while also noting how the rights in question were simultaneously grounded in equal protection. “The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote. What the Court did not do was to explain the connection. To redress harms to injured plaintiffs without creating doctrinal incoherence, courts need to understand the categorically distinct ways in which cumulative constitutional harm can occur and how these forms affect constitutional scrutiny. We argue that cumulative constitutional rights cases can be categorized into three general types and that these types need to be analyzed differently. The first type, aggregate harm, occurs when multiple discrete acts, taken together, add up to a harm of constitutional magnitude, even if each individual act, taken alone, would not. The second type, hybrid rights, occurs where a plaintiff claims a single action has violated rights under multiple constitutional provisions. If a court were to apply the proper level of scrutiny to the claims individually, however, none would result in redress. As a result, hybrid rights cases should not ordinarily result in relief. The third type, which we term intersectional rights, occur when the action violates more than one constitutional provision but is only cognizable when the provisions are read to inform and bolster one another. Our aim in this Essay is to provide a framework courts can use to analyze cumulative constitutional rights. While courts should be open to conducting a cumulative analysis, when constitutional rights are mutually reinforcing, those relationships should be clearly set out and defined.","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2016-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68237446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Professor Jim Fleming’s new book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms, purports to critique all forms of originalism from the perspective of Professor Fleming’s “moral reading” of, or “philosophic approach” to, the Constitution. I propose a somewhat different opposition: empirical reading versus moral reading. Empirical reading is necessarily originalist, but it focuses directly on the need to ground interpretation in theories of concepts, language, and communication. In this short comment, I outline the research agenda for a theory of empirical reading, explore the extent to which empirical readings and moral readings of the Constitution are compatible (spoiler alert: it’s an empirical question), and situate empirical reading within the development of originalist theory.
{"title":"Reflections of an Empirical Reader (Or: Could Fleming Be Right This Time?)","authors":"Gary Lawson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2685410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2685410","url":null,"abstract":"Professor Jim Fleming’s new book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms, purports to critique all forms of originalism from the perspective of Professor Fleming’s “moral reading” of, or “philosophic approach” to, the Constitution. I propose a somewhat different opposition: empirical reading versus moral reading. Empirical reading is necessarily originalist, but it focuses directly on the need to ground interpretation in theories of concepts, language, and communication. In this short comment, I outline the research agenda for a theory of empirical reading, explore the extent to which empirical readings and moral readings of the Constitution are compatible (spoiler alert: it’s an empirical question), and situate empirical reading within the development of originalist theory.","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2015-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68255098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Law enforcement in the modern regulatory state is largely a joint enterprise. In areas such as securities, antitrust, civil rights, and environmental law, enforcement responsibilities are allocated between public and private actors. Patent law, on the other hand, is enforced almost exclusively through private lawsuits. Considering patent law’s constitutionally-mandated public purpose — “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts�? — this privatization of patent enforcement is troubling. In recent years, there has been some movement away from this purely private enforcement regime for patent law. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, for example, have involved themselves in certain patent matters that implicate antitrust law. While heading in the right direction, these regulators alone cannot adequately enforce patent law due to their limited jurisdiction, resources, and expertise. This Article thus proposes a more robust public enforcement mechanism for patent law. It argues that Congress should arm the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the agency responsible for reviewing patents ex ante, with broad powers to police patent validity ex post. The PTO is best situated to lead this effort because of the agency’s expertise, institutional resources, and enhanced powers under the America Invents Act. Moreover, charging the PTO with the responsibility for policing patents should serve to dispel allegations of agency capture and institutional bias toward patent owners.
{"title":"Public Enforcement of Patent Law","authors":"Megan M. La Belle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2666835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2666835","url":null,"abstract":"Law enforcement in the modern regulatory state is largely a joint enterprise. In areas such as securities, antitrust, civil rights, and environmental law, enforcement responsibilities are allocated between public and private actors. Patent law, on the other hand, is enforced almost exclusively through private lawsuits. Considering patent law’s constitutionally-mandated public purpose — “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts�? — this privatization of patent enforcement is troubling. In recent years, there has been some movement away from this purely private enforcement regime for patent law. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, for example, have involved themselves in certain patent matters that implicate antitrust law. While heading in the right direction, these regulators alone cannot adequately enforce patent law due to their limited jurisdiction, resources, and expertise. This Article thus proposes a more robust public enforcement mechanism for patent law. It argues that Congress should arm the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the agency responsible for reviewing patents ex ante, with broad powers to police patent validity ex post. The PTO is best situated to lead this effort because of the agency’s expertise, institutional resources, and enhanced powers under the America Invents Act. Moreover, charging the PTO with the responsibility for policing patents should serve to dispel allegations of agency capture and institutional bias toward patent owners.","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2015-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68246274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Article is about the future of shareholder litigation. Calibrating the amount and form of shareholder litigation is one of the most vexing problems in corporate and securities litigation. An emerging — and controversial — approach is to limit shareholder litigation through terms in corporate charters and bylaws. This Article provides a much-needed framework for courts and legislatures to evaluate these provisions. It develops a theory of corporate contract procedure that looks to the structure and content of substantive corporate law to define the reach of procedural terms. The Article concludes first that state corporate law lends itself to the type of tailored procedure proposed here because substantive corporate law is structured primarily as a set of default rules. Tailored procedure would mirror this enabling structure. At the same time, substantive corporate law provides the (few) mandatory provisions that would limit procedural contracting under this framework. One implication of connecting procedure and substance is that limits depend on the area of law at issue. The connection provides a rationale for the greater use of procedural provisions in disputes over state corporate law. In legal areas characterized by mandatory terms, however, including in securities litigation, the framework provides a basis for resisting their use.
{"title":"Shareholder Litigation by Contract","authors":"Verity Winship","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2575668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2575668","url":null,"abstract":"This Article is about the future of shareholder litigation. Calibrating the amount and form of shareholder litigation is one of the most vexing problems in corporate and securities litigation. An emerging — and controversial — approach is to limit shareholder litigation through terms in corporate charters and bylaws. This Article provides a much-needed framework for courts and legislatures to evaluate these provisions. It develops a theory of corporate contract procedure that looks to the structure and content of substantive corporate law to define the reach of procedural terms. The Article concludes first that state corporate law lends itself to the type of tailored procedure proposed here because substantive corporate law is structured primarily as a set of default rules. Tailored procedure would mirror this enabling structure. At the same time, substantive corporate law provides the (few) mandatory provisions that would limit procedural contracting under this framework. One implication of connecting procedure and substance is that limits depend on the area of law at issue. The connection provides a rationale for the greater use of procedural provisions in disputes over state corporate law. In legal areas characterized by mandatory terms, however, including in securities litigation, the framework provides a basis for resisting their use.","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2015-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68210686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
INTRODUCTIONTitle VII's most significant set of amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,1 was in substantial part a response to decisions of the Rehnquist Court issued during its 1988-89 term, including the especially controversial Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.2 While the Roberts Court also has issued a number of opinions interpreting employment discrimination laws contrary to the advocacy of civil rights proponents,3 its decisions on substantive employment discrimination law have been mixed4 and have not provoked a cry for a new set of comprehensive amendments.None of the Roberts Court's interpretations of substantive law, however, seems to have the potential of doing as much damage to the promise of the amended Title VII as do several rulings of the Roberts Court on procedural issues. These rulings include the Court's application of Rule 23,5 the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") governing class actions, to a Title VII case, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.6 They also include the Court's interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")7 in a series of decisions, including ATT at least without further restrictive interpretations, Rule 23 still affords plaintiffs and conscientious federal judges the flexibility to utilize class actions to press a broad range of both systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.13Unfortunately, in my view, the importance of the Wal-Mart decision is also limited for Title VII class actions, as it is for other kinds of class actions, by the Court's recent decisions in cases dealing with the arbitration of consumer misrepresentation and antitrust claims rather than discrimination claims. Through these decisions, including Concepcion and Italian Colors, the Roberts Court in effect offered any business outside the transportation industry the option of arbitration as a bar against collective actions brought by any economically subordinate parties, including employees, upon whom the business can impose agreements.14 These decisions, in tandem with the Court's earlier application of the FAA to employment contracts,15 empower most employers to preclude not only class-based litigation, but also class-based arbitration.This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I traces the development of Title VII class actions for both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. Part II examines the predictability and manageable impact of the primary holding of the Wal-Mart decision: its application of Rule 23(a)(2)'s conditioning of certification on the existence of a common issue of fact or law. Part III provides a parallel assessment of the Court's pronouncement on the limits of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions. While this assessment acknowledges the importance of the Court's pronouncements on (b)(2), including troublesome dicta limiting the use of litigation models, the assessment concludes that these pronouncements do not provide insurmountable barriers to Title VII class actions. …
{"title":"Class-Based Adjudication of Title VII Claims in the Age of the Roberts Court","authors":"Michael C. Harper","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2563157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2563157","url":null,"abstract":"INTRODUCTIONTitle VII's most significant set of amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,1 was in substantial part a response to decisions of the Rehnquist Court issued during its 1988-89 term, including the especially controversial Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.2 While the Roberts Court also has issued a number of opinions interpreting employment discrimination laws contrary to the advocacy of civil rights proponents,3 its decisions on substantive employment discrimination law have been mixed4 and have not provoked a cry for a new set of comprehensive amendments.None of the Roberts Court's interpretations of substantive law, however, seems to have the potential of doing as much damage to the promise of the amended Title VII as do several rulings of the Roberts Court on procedural issues. These rulings include the Court's application of Rule 23,5 the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (\"FRCP\") governing class actions, to a Title VII case, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.6 They also include the Court's interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (\"FAA\")7 in a series of decisions, including ATT at least without further restrictive interpretations, Rule 23 still affords plaintiffs and conscientious federal judges the flexibility to utilize class actions to press a broad range of both systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.13Unfortunately, in my view, the importance of the Wal-Mart decision is also limited for Title VII class actions, as it is for other kinds of class actions, by the Court's recent decisions in cases dealing with the arbitration of consumer misrepresentation and antitrust claims rather than discrimination claims. Through these decisions, including Concepcion and Italian Colors, the Roberts Court in effect offered any business outside the transportation industry the option of arbitration as a bar against collective actions brought by any economically subordinate parties, including employees, upon whom the business can impose agreements.14 These decisions, in tandem with the Court's earlier application of the FAA to employment contracts,15 empower most employers to preclude not only class-based litigation, but also class-based arbitration.This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I traces the development of Title VII class actions for both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. Part II examines the predictability and manageable impact of the primary holding of the Wal-Mart decision: its application of Rule 23(a)(2)'s conditioning of certification on the existence of a common issue of fact or law. Part III provides a parallel assessment of the Court's pronouncement on the limits of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions. While this assessment acknowledges the importance of the Court's pronouncements on (b)(2), including troublesome dicta limiting the use of litigation models, the assessment concludes that these pronouncements do not provide insurmountable barriers to Title VII class actions. …","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2015-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68204781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When Jim Fleming asked me to participate in this Symposium, and more specifically to be part of the Second Amendment panel, I must confess that I was a bit puzzled. There are many parts of our political and constitutional system that are arguably dysfunctional, meaning that our late-eighteenth century Constitution prevents the achievement of policy results that are desirable in our early-twenty-first century present. I do not see, however, the Second Amendment as one of those constitutional features. As a result, this Essay challenges two assumptions: first, that the Second Amendment historically has provided much of a barrier to a desirable policy result, radical gun control or perhaps more accurately gun prohibition; and second, that such a result is indeed desirable.For the first proposition, it is fair to say that until the 2008 case of District of Columbia v. Heller1 and its 2010 companion McDonald v. City of Chicago,2 the federal courts had been essentially absent from the business of looking at the Second Amendment and seriously asking what protection it provides, as well as what limitations it places on individuals' rights to have arms. This was not, as some have erroneously insisted, because there was some universal agreement that the Amendment, which speaks of a well-regulated militia and the right of the people to keep and bear arms, applied only to militias and not to individuals in their private capacities. Before Heller, the Supreme Court had recognized the individual nature of the right to arms on those rare occasions when it had referenced this right or the right to have arms generally - including Chief Justice Taney's discussion of the rights of citizens and the implications of citizenship in Dred Scott; Chief Justice Waite's examination of the distinctions between federal restrictions and state and private action in Cruikshank; Justice Wood's refusal to apply the Second Amendment to state action in Presser v. Illinois; and Justice McReynolds's opinion in United States v. Miller, which is best read as recognizing an individual's right to have arms while also reaffirming the by-then long recognized principle that some arms are within the ambit of constitutional protection and others are not.3 The individual nature of the right was a largely unquestioned principle in the Court's jurisprudence. Indeed as late as 1961 in Justice John Marshal Harlan II's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, it was considered rather unremarkable.4Still the Second Amendment would not receive definitive recognition, including a recognition that it provided real limitations on firearms regulation, until Heller, some 217 years after its initial adoption. This lack of judicial engagement occurred for two reasons. The first reason is the intellectually haphazard way the Court has gone about the business of incorporation or applying the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. There is strong evidence that the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteen
当吉姆·弗莱明邀请我参加这次研讨会，更确切地说，邀请我成为第二修正案小组的一员时，我必须承认我有点困惑。我们的政治和宪法体系中有许多部分可以说是功能失调的，这意味着我们18世纪末的宪法阻碍了我们在21世纪初所期望的政策结果的实现。然而，我不认为第二修正案是这些宪法特征之一。因此，本文挑战了两个假设:第一，从历史上看，第二修正案为理想的政策结果——激进的枪支管制，或者更准确地说是枪支禁令——提供了很大的障碍;第二，这样的结果确实是可取的。对于第一个命题，公平地说，直到2008年哥伦比亚特区诉海勒案(District of Columbia v. Heller1)和2010年麦当劳诉芝加哥市案(McDonald v. City of Chicago)之前，联邦法院基本上没有研究第二修正案，也没有认真地询问它提供了什么保护，以及它对个人拥有武器的权利施加了什么限制。这并不像一些人错误地坚持的那样，因为人们普遍认为，修正案中提到的规范民兵和人民持有和携带武器的权利，只适用于民兵，而不适用于私人身份的个人。在海勒案之前，最高法院在极少的情况下承认了拥有武器权利的个人性质，当它提到这项权利或普遍拥有武器的权利时——包括首席大法官托尼在德雷德·斯科特案中对公民权利和公民身份含义的讨论;首席大法官韦特对克鲁克香克案中联邦限制与州和私人诉讼之间区别的审查;伍德法官在普雷斯诉伊利诺伊州案中拒绝将第二修正案适用于州行为;以及麦克雷诺兹大法官在美国诉米勒案中的意见，该意见最好被解读为承认个人拥有武器的权利，同时也重申了当时长期公认的原则，即一些武器属于宪法保护的范围，而另一些则不是这项权利的个人性质在法院的判例中基本上是一个不容置疑的原则。事实上，直到1961年，在大法官约翰·马歇尔·哈兰二世(John marshall Harlan II)对坡诉乌尔曼(Poe v. Ullman)一案的异议中，它都被认为是相当不起眼的。然而，第二修正案并没有得到明确的承认，包括承认它对枪支管理提供了真正的限制，直到海勒，在它最初被通过大约217年后。这种缺乏司法参与的情况有两个原因。第一个原因是法院在处理公司事务或通过《第十四修正案》将《权利法案》适用于各州时，在思想上是随意的。有强有力的证据表明，第十四条修正案的起草者和批准者意图并理解，通过第十四条修正案，他们将永远改变旧的联邦制，在这种联邦制中，联邦宪法很少或根本没有提到公民在面对国家权力时的权利后第十四修正案的法院很早就拒绝了新的宪法秩序，在许多方面，麦克唐纳只是最新的例子，花了将近一个半世纪的时间试图恢复乔纳森·宾厄姆和雅各布·霍华德在18668年试图推进的宪法目标。无论如何，大部分法理学都否认第二修正案声称侵犯了持有和携带武器的权利，是基于这样一种观点，即重建修正案并没有保护公民不受州对使用枪支的限制由于历史上和现在的大多数限制都是由州立法机关而不是国会制定的，因此这一限制至关重要。当然，法院越来越不愿意适用第二修正案，也不愿意认真审查它对枪支管制的限制程度，还有另一个原因。…
{"title":"Second Amendment: Not Constitutional Dysfunction, But Necessary Safeguard","authors":"Robert J. Cottrol","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3403105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3403105","url":null,"abstract":"When Jim Fleming asked me to participate in this Symposium, and more specifically to be part of the Second Amendment panel, I must confess that I was a bit puzzled. There are many parts of our political and constitutional system that are arguably dysfunctional, meaning that our late-eighteenth century Constitution prevents the achievement of policy results that are desirable in our early-twenty-first century present. I do not see, however, the Second Amendment as one of those constitutional features. As a result, this Essay challenges two assumptions: first, that the Second Amendment historically has provided much of a barrier to a desirable policy result, radical gun control or perhaps more accurately gun prohibition; and second, that such a result is indeed desirable.For the first proposition, it is fair to say that until the 2008 case of District of Columbia v. Heller1 and its 2010 companion McDonald v. City of Chicago,2 the federal courts had been essentially absent from the business of looking at the Second Amendment and seriously asking what protection it provides, as well as what limitations it places on individuals' rights to have arms. This was not, as some have erroneously insisted, because there was some universal agreement that the Amendment, which speaks of a well-regulated militia and the right of the people to keep and bear arms, applied only to militias and not to individuals in their private capacities. Before Heller, the Supreme Court had recognized the individual nature of the right to arms on those rare occasions when it had referenced this right or the right to have arms generally - including Chief Justice Taney's discussion of the rights of citizens and the implications of citizenship in Dred Scott; Chief Justice Waite's examination of the distinctions between federal restrictions and state and private action in Cruikshank; Justice Wood's refusal to apply the Second Amendment to state action in Presser v. Illinois; and Justice McReynolds's opinion in United States v. Miller, which is best read as recognizing an individual's right to have arms while also reaffirming the by-then long recognized principle that some arms are within the ambit of constitutional protection and others are not.3 The individual nature of the right was a largely unquestioned principle in the Court's jurisprudence. Indeed as late as 1961 in Justice John Marshal Harlan II's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, it was considered rather unremarkable.4Still the Second Amendment would not receive definitive recognition, including a recognition that it provided real limitations on firearms regulation, until Heller, some 217 years after its initial adoption. This lack of judicial engagement occurred for two reasons. The first reason is the intellectually haphazard way the Court has gone about the business of incorporation or applying the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. There is strong evidence that the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteen","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68590775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Government in the United States has some serious problems. At the federal level, is the problem of gridlock. The United States Congress seems unable or unwilling to do anything about anything (although it must have done something to run up more than $16 trillion in debts). Forget about addressing problems such as global warming, income inequality, failing schools, economic stimulus or you name it. How bad is it, really? Has the United States become ungovernable, and is the Constitution to blame? In my view, it’s a mixed bag. Some aspects of the United States government work very well, others are disastrous and still others muddle along, could be better but function just fine. Further, it is difficult to pin some of government’s difficulties on any particular constitutional provision when the alternatives might be just as problematic. In this essay, I highlight examples in each of these categories and look at factors that might help us understand why things work as they do. Suggestions for change will be offered, often without considering political feasibility.
{"title":"The New Constitution of the United States: Do We Need One and How Would We Get One?","authors":"J. Beermann","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2353376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2353376","url":null,"abstract":"Government in the United States has some serious problems. At the federal level, is the problem of gridlock. The United States Congress seems unable or unwilling to do anything about anything (although it must have done something to run up more than $16 trillion in debts). Forget about addressing problems such as global warming, income inequality, failing schools, economic stimulus or you name it. How bad is it, really? Has the United States become ungovernable, and is the Constitution to blame? In my view, it’s a mixed bag. Some aspects of the United States government work very well, others are disastrous and still others muddle along, could be better but function just fine. Further, it is difficult to pin some of government’s difficulties on any particular constitutional provision when the alternatives might be just as problematic. In this essay, I highlight examples in each of these categories and look at factors that might help us understand why things work as they do. Suggestions for change will be offered, often without considering political feasibility.","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2013-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68132075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Supreme Court’s June 2013 opinion in United States v. Windsor is remarkable for its bypassing of standard equal protection doctrine. In striking down section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act as unconstitutional discrimination against gays and lesbians, Windsor failed to broach the question whether sexual orientation constitutes a suspect class; indeed, it failed even to perform the “fit” analysis that doctrine demands. Instead, the Court examined the statute and accompanying legislative materials and concluded that section 3 violated the Equal Protection Clause’s core command that government action not be based on animus against a disfavored group.Windsor’s unusually direct methodology conflicts with the Court’s jurisprudence governing Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. That jurisprudence, requiring that there be “congruence and proportionality” between enforcement legislation and the constitutional violation the law targets, has relied heavily on the suspect class status of the benefitted group. Until very recently, the results of the congruence and proportionality inquiry were predictable; legislation that enforced the equal protection rights of suspect or quasi-suspect classes would enjoy deferential judicial review, while legislation enforcing the rights of nonsuspect classes would receive a skeptical judicial reception. While recent cases potentially call this template into question, it remains for now a basic feature of the Court’s Enforcement Clause doctrine.Windsor, by abjuring suspect class and even “fit” analysis, undermines the Court’s approach to the enforcement power. This Article examines the challenge Windsor poses to the Court’s Enforcement Clause doctrine. It argues that Windsor requires the Court to reconsider its approach to the congruence and proportionality standard. In particular, it argues that Windsor’s more particularized equal protection methodology requires the Court to consider how Congress may legitimately translate such judicial pointillism into enforcement legislation’s inevitably broader brushstrokes.It is urgent that the Court consider a new approach to the enforcement power. Congress either has enacted or is poised to enact several significant pieces of enforcement legislation benefitting groups whose suspect class status has not been determined and likely never will. Unless the Court is prepared to exclude Congress from participating in the equality projects the Court itself has embarked on, the Court needs to consider how to harmonize its newfound interest in constitutional pointillism with enforcement legislation’s broader brushstrokes.This Article suggests such an approach, one that recognizes Congress’s institutional competence and legitimacy to make broad judgments about the same sort of animus the Court found through its more precisely targeted inquiry in Windsor. This approach would not immunize enforcement legislation from judicial review. As explained in this Article, however,
最高法院2013年6月在“美国诉温莎案”(United States v. Windsor)中发表的意见因其绕过了标准的平等保护原则而引人注目。温莎驳回了《婚姻保护法》第3条对男女同性恋者的违宪歧视，但未能提出性取向是否构成可疑类别的问题;事实上，它甚至没有进行理论所要求的“合适性”分析。相反，法院审查了该法规及其附带的立法材料，并得出结论认为，第3条违反了平等保护条款的核心要求，即政府的行动不得基于对不受欢迎群体的敌意。温莎不同寻常的直接方法与最高法院管理国会执行平等保护条款的权力的法理相冲突。这种法理学要求在执法立法和法律所针对的违宪行为之间存在“一致性和相称性”，这在很大程度上依赖于受益群体的可疑阶级地位。直到最近，一致性和比例性调查的结果是可预测的;强制嫌疑人或准嫌疑人阶层享有平等保护权利的立法将得到恭敬的司法审查，而强制非嫌疑人阶层享有权利的立法将受到怀疑的司法接受。虽然最近的案件可能会对这一模板提出质疑，但它目前仍然是法院执行条款原则的一个基本特征。温莎放弃了嫌疑人等级甚至“合适”分析，破坏了法院对执行权的处理方式。本文考察了温莎对法院执行条款原则提出的挑战。它认为，温莎案要求最高法院重新考虑其对一致性和相称性标准的处理方法。特别是，它认为，温莎的更具体的平等保护方法要求法院考虑国会如何合法地将这种司法点主义转化为执法立法不可避免的更广泛的笔触。法院迫切需要考虑对执法权采取一种新的办法。国会要么已经颁布，要么准备颁布几项重要的执法立法，这些立法有利于那些可疑的阶级地位尚未确定、可能永远也不会确定的群体。除非最高法院准备将国会排除在最高法院自己开展的平等项目之外，否则最高法院需要考虑如何协调其对宪法点彩主义的新兴趣与执法立法的更广泛的笔触。本文提出了这样一种方法，这种方法承认国会的机构能力和合法性，可以对法院在温莎案中通过更精确的目标调查发现的那种敌意做出广泛的判断。这种做法不能使执法立法免于司法审查。然而，正如本条所解释的那样，这种做法确实需要改变法院进行一致性和相称性审查的方式。本文最后将这种新方法应用于一项悬而未决的执法立法，即《就业非歧视法案》，该法案将为男女同性恋工人提供联邦就业歧视保护。
{"title":"After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism","authors":"William D. Araiza","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2310586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2310586","url":null,"abstract":"The Supreme Court’s June 2013 opinion in United States v. Windsor is remarkable for its bypassing of standard equal protection doctrine. In striking down section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act as unconstitutional discrimination against gays and lesbians, Windsor failed to broach the question whether sexual orientation constitutes a suspect class; indeed, it failed even to perform the “fit” analysis that doctrine demands. Instead, the Court examined the statute and accompanying legislative materials and concluded that section 3 violated the Equal Protection Clause’s core command that government action not be based on animus against a disfavored group.Windsor’s unusually direct methodology conflicts with the Court’s jurisprudence governing Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. That jurisprudence, requiring that there be “congruence and proportionality” between enforcement legislation and the constitutional violation the law targets, has relied heavily on the suspect class status of the benefitted group. Until very recently, the results of the congruence and proportionality inquiry were predictable; legislation that enforced the equal protection rights of suspect or quasi-suspect classes would enjoy deferential judicial review, while legislation enforcing the rights of nonsuspect classes would receive a skeptical judicial reception. While recent cases potentially call this template into question, it remains for now a basic feature of the Court’s Enforcement Clause doctrine.Windsor, by abjuring suspect class and even “fit” analysis, undermines the Court’s approach to the enforcement power. This Article examines the challenge Windsor poses to the Court’s Enforcement Clause doctrine. It argues that Windsor requires the Court to reconsider its approach to the congruence and proportionality standard. In particular, it argues that Windsor’s more particularized equal protection methodology requires the Court to consider how Congress may legitimately translate such judicial pointillism into enforcement legislation’s inevitably broader brushstrokes.It is urgent that the Court consider a new approach to the enforcement power. Congress either has enacted or is poised to enact several significant pieces of enforcement legislation benefitting groups whose suspect class status has not been determined and likely never will. Unless the Court is prepared to exclude Congress from participating in the equality projects the Court itself has embarked on, the Court needs to consider how to harmonize its newfound interest in constitutional pointillism with enforcement legislation’s broader brushstrokes.This Article suggests such an approach, one that recognizes Congress’s institutional competence and legitimacy to make broad judgments about the same sort of animus the Court found through its more precisely targeted inquiry in Windsor. This approach would not immunize enforcement legislation from judicial review. As explained in this Article, however, ","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68089606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionA desire to reduce bullying in schools and to create safer and healthier school cultures has driven an anti-bullying movement characterized by significant reform in school programs and practices, as well as legislative reform and policy articulation in every state. A desire to improve school outcomes for boys has generated a number of programmatic proposals and responses in public and private education. Most notably, single-sex programming in public schools has been facilitated by the 2006 change to Title IX regulations setting out the criteria for permissible single-sex public school programs.1 These two recent movements in K-12 schooling spring from new urgency around each social problem: bullying and boys' relatively worse school outcomes. This new urgency has shaped new research questions in both cases. The discourse includes both grave concerns about these primary social problems, as well as backlash questions such as whether these issues are really new or worse than before and whether the reforms are worsening the problems they seek to address. This Essay asks how the two movements interact and suggests that they may be at cross-purposes in some significant ways.Attempts to intervene on the "boy question" ordinarily begin with ideas about boys' differences and the need to understand, accept, and support boys for who they are: rough-and-tumble players with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) who are hunters rather than gatherers and are noncompliant, competitive, and physically charged. In other words, attempts to intervene on the "boy question" tend to honor gender stereotypes and masculinities and to approach them without the judgments against boyhood that are allegedly part of the education system.2Attempts to intervene on the bullying problem, on the other hand, begin with a different idea. They begin with the premise that gender stereotyping can be terribly dangerous to the wellbeing and sense of belonging of large swaths of children who do not conform perfectly to normative boy or girl behavior. These children will be disciplined into understanding the parameters of a gender stereotype by their peers. Children are most often bullied based on characteristics that can be understood to be gender nonconformity. Gender nonconformity ranges from the more obvious cases of bullying LGBT or "questioning" youth to more subtle but nonetheless gendered characteristics like appearance or athletic ability. The best practices in anti-bullying work focus on establishing a culture of inclusion without regard to conformity and work to disrupt stereotype expectations.3 In particular, this school-climate work contains a social-emotional learning component that teaches social-competence skills. These skills include learning to identify and communicate about feelings directly, rather than channeling the feelings into either aggressive or self-destructive behavior.4 Unwittingly, this bullying reform agenda seeks to create school cultu
{"title":"Bullying Prevention and Boyhood","authors":"Katharine B. Silbaugh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3682122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3682122","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionA desire to reduce bullying in schools and to create safer and healthier school cultures has driven an anti-bullying movement characterized by significant reform in school programs and practices, as well as legislative reform and policy articulation in every state. A desire to improve school outcomes for boys has generated a number of programmatic proposals and responses in public and private education. Most notably, single-sex programming in public schools has been facilitated by the 2006 change to Title IX regulations setting out the criteria for permissible single-sex public school programs.1 These two recent movements in K-12 schooling spring from new urgency around each social problem: bullying and boys' relatively worse school outcomes. This new urgency has shaped new research questions in both cases. The discourse includes both grave concerns about these primary social problems, as well as backlash questions such as whether these issues are really new or worse than before and whether the reforms are worsening the problems they seek to address. This Essay asks how the two movements interact and suggests that they may be at cross-purposes in some significant ways.Attempts to intervene on the \"boy question\" ordinarily begin with ideas about boys' differences and the need to understand, accept, and support boys for who they are: rough-and-tumble players with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) who are hunters rather than gatherers and are noncompliant, competitive, and physically charged. In other words, attempts to intervene on the \"boy question\" tend to honor gender stereotypes and masculinities and to approach them without the judgments against boyhood that are allegedly part of the education system.2Attempts to intervene on the bullying problem, on the other hand, begin with a different idea. They begin with the premise that gender stereotyping can be terribly dangerous to the wellbeing and sense of belonging of large swaths of children who do not conform perfectly to normative boy or girl behavior. These children will be disciplined into understanding the parameters of a gender stereotype by their peers. Children are most often bullied based on characteristics that can be understood to be gender nonconformity. Gender nonconformity ranges from the more obvious cases of bullying LGBT or \"questioning\" youth to more subtle but nonetheless gendered characteristics like appearance or athletic ability. The best practices in anti-bullying work focus on establishing a culture of inclusion without regard to conformity and work to disrupt stereotype expectations.3 In particular, this school-climate work contains a social-emotional learning component that teaches social-competence skills. These skills include learning to identify and communicate about feelings directly, rather than channeling the feelings into either aggressive or self-destructive behavior.4 Unwittingly, this bullying reform agenda seeks to create school cultu","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68622434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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